Case Summary:

Harold R. Berk injured his ankle while visiting Delaware and went to Beebe Medical Center for treatment, where he was seen by Dr. Wilson Choy and other providers for what was diagnosed as a fracture that did not require immediate surgery. Hospital staff placed his leg in a boot and, in the course of doing so, allegedly twisted and aggravated the fracture, after which Berk was discharged with instructions to avoid bearing weight and to return for follow‑up care. At a follow‑up visit about a month later at Dr. Choy’s office, new X‑rays allegedly revealed that Berk’s ankle had become severely deformed, now requiring surgery, and Berk contends that this worsening resulted from negligent diagnosis, communication, and treatment by Dr. Choy and the hospital staff.

Berk, a citizen of another state, then filed a diversity medical‑malpractice action in federal district court in Delaware against Dr. Choy and Beebe Medical Center under Delaware substantive law. Delaware law requires that a medical‑malpractice complaint be accompanied by an affidavit of merit from a qualified expert, but Berk did not file such an affidavit and instead submitted medical records, arguing that the state’s affidavit requirement should not apply in federal court. The district court dismissed his case for failure to comply with the affidavit‑of‑merit statute, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed, holding that the Delaware requirement applied and warranted dismissal of his malpractice suit. The issue before the Supreme Court in Berk v. Choy was whether a federal court sitting in diversity and adjudicating a state‑law medical‑malpractice claim must apply a state “affidavit of merit” or expert‑affidavit requirement at the pleading stage, or instead follow the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure alone. More specifically, the question was whether Delaware’s statute requiring plaintiffs to attach a supporting expert affidavit to a malpractice complaint conflicts with and is displaced by Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8 and 12 (and related rules) when the case is filed in federal court.

Case Summary:

Ellingburg v. United States involves a federal defendant, Holsey Ellingburg Jr., who robbed a First Union National Bank before the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996 (MVRA) became law, but was sentenced after its enactment and ordered to pay $7,567.25 in restitution under that Act. Ellingburg committed the bank robbery in 1995, was indicted in 1996 on federal bank robbery charges, pleaded guilty, and received a prison term plus a restitution order to the bank, which he has still not fully paid. Years later, he challenged his ongoing restitution obligation under the Ex Post Facto Clause on the ground that applying the MVRA to conduct predating its April 24, 1996 effective date retroactively increased his punishment. The Eighth Circuit rejected his claim after treating MVRA restitution as a nonpunitive, civil measure and therefore outside the Ex Post Facto Clause, prompting the grant of certiorari. In the Supreme Court, both Ellingburg and the United States agreed that the lower court was wrong and that MVRA restitution is criminal punishment, so the Court appointed an amicus curiae, John F. Bash, to defend the Eighth Circuit’s judgment. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether restitution ordered under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996 constitutes criminal punishment, rather than a civil remedy, for purposes of applying the Ex Post Facto Clause to a defendant whose offense occurred before the MVRA’s enactment.

Case Summary:

Vista-Pro Automotive, LLC, entered bankruptcy in 2014 and initiated adversarial proceedings against Coney Island Auto Parts Unlimited, Inc., to collect $50,000 in allegedly unpaid invoices. Vista-Pro attempted to serve process on Coney Island by mail but purportedly failed to comply with Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7004(b)(3)’s mail-service requirements. Coney Island did not file an answer, and the Bankruptcy Court entered a default judgment. Over the next six years, Vista-Pro’s bankruptcy trustee attempted to enforce the judgment. These efforts bore fruit in 2021 when a marshal seized funds from Coney Island’s bank account in satisfaction of the judgment. Coney Island filed a motion to vacate the judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60, arguing that Vista-Pro’s failure to make proper service rendered the judgment void. The Bankruptcy Court denied relief, holding that Coney Island failed to abide by Rule 60’s requirement that parties make motions for relief within a “reasonable time.” The District Court and the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed.

Case Summary:

In Clark v. Sweeney, a Maryland jury convicted Jeremiah Sweeney of second-degree murder and related offenses after a shooting that killed a bystander about 75 yards away during an argument over stolen marijuana, and the conviction was later affirmed on direct appeal. After trial, it emerged that one juror had independently visited the crime scene; the court dismissed that juror and continued deliberations with 11 jurors. In later state postconviction and then federal habeas proceedings, Sweeney argued only that trial counsel was ineffective under Strickland for failing to voir dire the entire jury to determine whether any other juror was tainted by the unauthorized visit, but the state courts and the federal district court denied relief. The Fourth Circuit reversed and ordered a new trial based not on Sweeney’s ineffective-assistance claim but on its own theory that combined failures by the juror, judge, and attorney violated Sweeney’s confrontation and impartial-jury rights, thereby departing from the adversarial principle of party presentation.​ The Supreme Court held that there is no implied damages cause of action under the Constitution (no Bivens remedy) for federal prisoners alleging Eighth Amendment excessive-force violations by federal prison officials.

Case Summary:

A Maryland jury convicted Jeremiah Sweeney of second-degree murder and related offenses after he fired shots during an argument over stolen marijuana, missing his intended targets but killing a bystander about 75 yards away. During trial, one juror independently visited the crime scene, and after this was disclosed, the parties agreed to dismiss that juror and continue deliberations with 11 jurors, which led to Sweeney’s convictions being affirmed on direct appeal and the denial of state postconviction relief. Sweeney then sought federal habeas relief, arguing only that his trial counsel was ineffective under Strickland v. Washington for failing to seek voir dire of the entire jury to determine whether any other juror had been tainted by Juror 4’s unauthorized visit. The Supreme Court reversed the Fourth Circuit’s grant of habeas relief and remanded, holding that the court of appeals violated the principle of party presentation by awarding relief on a claim Sweeney had never asserted.

Case Summary:

In May 2020, Jeffrey Clyde Pitts’s young daughter, A.G.C., spent a weekend visiting him, and after returning home she told her mother that he had sexually abused her, which led to criminal charges. At trial, the prosecution requested that a physical screen be placed between A.G.C. and Pitts while she testified, so that the judge and jury could see her but she could not see her father. The State relied on a Mississippi statute that grants child witnesses a right to such a screen, and the trial judge approved the request, explaining that the statute appeared mandatory and expressing concern about refusing to follow it or declaring it unconstitutional. Pitts objected, arguing that even though the statute used mandatory language, the Sixth Amendment required a case-specific showing that screening was necessary in his particular case, but the trial went forward with the screen in place and the jury convicted him. He then appealed within the Mississippi courts, maintaining that the use of the screen without an individualized showing of necessity violated his confrontation rights. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Mississippi Supreme Court and remanded, holding that the Sixth Amendment was violated when the child witness was allowed to testify behind a screen without a case-specific finding of necessity. The Court reaffirmed that, even in child-abuse cases, a trial court must hear evidence and make a case-specific finding that screening is necessary to protect the child from trauma that would impair the child’s ability to communicate, and that a mandatory state statute or generalized legislative findings cannot substitute for this individualized determination. The Court also made clear that this confrontation error is subject to harmless-error review, and left it to the Mississippi courts on remand to decide whether the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under Chapman v. California.

Case Summary:

Bost v. Illinois Board of Elections arises from a 2022 lawsuit in which Congressman Michael Bost and two Republican presidential elector nominees challenged Illinois’ mail‑ballot rules, which require election officials to count mail ballots that are postmarked or certified by Election Day but received within 14 days afterward. They sued the Illinois State Board of Elections and its executive director, claiming that counting these later‑arriving ballots unlawfully extends the federal Election Day set by 2 U.S.C. § 7 and 3 U.S.C. § 1 and dilutes their votes or forces them to expend additional campaign resources, but both the district court and the Seventh Circuit dismissed the case for lack of Article III standing before the Supreme Court took it up.

Case Summary:

Case v. Montana involves William Trevor Case, whose ex-girlfriend called 911 after he told her on the phone that he was going to kill himself, mentioned writing a note, appeared to cock a gun, and then made a popping sound before the line went dead. Three officers responded for a welfare check, knew about Case’s history of alcohol abuse, mental-health problems, prior suicide threats, and a past apparent “suicide‑by‑cop” incident, saw through the windows empty beer cans, an empty handgun holster, and a notepad that looked like a suicide note, got no response to loud knocking and calling, and about 40 minutes after arrival entered the home to render emergency aid. Inside, as an officer entered an upstairs bedroom, Case suddenly threw open a closet curtain holding a black object that looked like a gun, the officer shot and wounded him, a handgun was later found nearby, and Case was then prosecuted and convicted in Montana state court for assaulting a police officer after the trial court refused to suppress evidence from the warrantless entry

The Supreme Court Decision in BOWE v. UNITED STATES

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES case in TERENCE CLARK, DIRECTOR, PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, ET AL. v. JEREMIAH ANTOINE SWEENEY