People v. Brock, 2015 IL App (1st) 133404 (November 2015). Episode 114 (Duration: 4:24)

Reporting is different than registering, and Defendant is required to have documentation with his new address in order to register that address.

The sex offender registration act (730 ILCS 150/1 et seq.) imposes two separate requirements. The first imposes a general duty to register on all sex offenders. 730 ILCS 150/3. The second, is the duty to report. 730 ILCS 150/6. The statute also imposes a separate and additional duty on those sex offenders specifically adjudicated "dangerous" or "violent," and it is clear from the language of the statute that the legislature intended to distinguish a duty to report that does not simply duplicate the registration requirement.

Thus, the language of the statute clearly distinguishes "report" and "register" and when it requires one, or both, it does so by expressly stating such requirement. Logically, one can "report" without registering, but may not "register" without reporting, because registration requires the creation of a signed writing.

This defendant did report on time but was turned away because he could not pay the registration fee. However, defendant did violate the failure to register a new address provision because he did not have an ID or some type of documentation with the new address as is required. See 730 ILCS 150/3(c)(5).

Additionally, the defendant had only two prior felony convictions—one for aggravated criminal sexual assault and a second for indecent liberties with a child. The indictment listed defendant's prior conviction for aggravated criminal sexual assault as the basis for establishing his duty to comply with the Act. Establishing a defendant's duty to register under the Act is an element of the offense.

This conviction was also necessarily used as one of his two prior felony convictions to mandate Class X sentencing. The sentence was improper. See People v. Hall, 2014 IL App (1st) 122868.