Judge in Murder for Hire Case has a Sense of Humor

On Jan 3 the Judge Scott L. Palk ruled against Joe Schreibvogel’s motion to dismiss counts 3-11 of his tiger trafficking charges stating that he owned the tigers before the rule went into effect to restricted the interstate commerce in tigers.  That rule was the Generic Tiger Loophole that we successfully closed on 4/5/2016.  The judge ruled that possession of the tigers, or anything he did with them, prior to that date wasn’t at issue as these were all current allegations.

 

Yesterday the judge ruled against Joe’s motion to dismiss counts 1 or 2 regarding hiring a hitman to kill me.  

 

The court summarized:

 

The Court's references to these counts as “murder-for-hire counts" herein instead of the wordier "use of interstate commerce facilities for purposes of murder-for-hire counts” is not meant to diminish the Government's requirement of proving the use of an interstate commerce facility in relation to the alleged offenses, as well as each count's other elements. care, exhibition, and breeding of tigers and lions that, in February 2013, resulted in a civil judgment against Defendant of more than $1 million. C.B. and related business entities have attempted to collect the judgment from Defendant and his related business entities ever since.

 

In the first murder-for-hire count, the Government alleges that Defendant inquired of Individual 1 in November 2017 whether Individual 1 would travel to Florida to murder C.B. for a sum of money and that Defendant mailed a cell phone to another State to conceal Individual 1’s involvement in their plot. The Government also alleges that Defendant gave $3,000 to Individual 1 in November 2017 in exchange for his agreement to travel to Florida and kill C.B.

 

In the second murder-for-hire count, the Government alleges that from July 2016 to March 2018, Defendant asked Individual 2 if he could locate somebody to kill C.B. for payment. The Government further alleges that, in December 2017, Individual 2 offered to introduce, and then introduced Defendant, to an undercover FBI agent (posing as a “hitman”) who discussed with Defendant the murder of C.B. for payment. 

 

The Superseding Indictment continues: from December 2017 to March 2018, Defendant allegedly spoke with Individual 2 by cellular phone regarding the murder of C.B. But the Government does not allege that Defendant interacted with the undercover FBI agent directly after a single face-to-face meeting in December 2017 (which was recorded by the Government); all of Defendant's remaining interactions are alleged to have been with Individual 2. Nor did Defendant supply money or anything of pecuniary value to the undercover FBI agent.  

 

The judge then had to chuckle to himself as he wrote this in response to Joe’s attorney’s best efforts:

 

Further, Defendant's proposed interpretation of § 1958(a) necessarily fails when the statute's text is evaluated in toto. The “another” referenced in relation to the use of an interstate commerce facility can be per the statute—the intended victim. Applying Defendant's approach to a situation where the “another” is the intended victim, a person could only be guilty of violating § 1958(a) if he or she caused an intended victim to use a facility of interstate commerce with the intent of murdering himself or herself in exchange for payment to the same intended victim. Such a fact pattern is nonsensical. Unless the Court deletes “(including the intended victim)” from the statute—which the Court will not do—Defendant's interpretation cannot prevail without creating an absurdity within the statute.

 

The judge also referenced this testimony:  The transcript of a discussion between Defendant and the undercover FBI agent excerpted in the Government's response (to which Defendant raises no objection) creates at least a dispute about whether this evidence (and any other evidence presented at trial) will show a violation of § 1958(a) as alleged in Cou