Sign up to save your podcasts
Or
Share 2021.06.18 國際新聞導讀-今天伊朗總統大選但結局已定、10月伊拉克國會大選、死海運河計畫約旦單方面喊停
Share to email
Share to Facebook
Share to X
Share to email
Share to Facebook
Share to X
Or
2021.06.18 國際新聞導讀-今天伊朗總統大選但結局已定、10月伊拉克國會大選、死海運河計畫約旦單方面喊停
2021.06.18 國際新聞導讀-今天伊朗總統大選但結局已定、10月伊拉克國會大選、死海運河計畫約旦單方面喊停
經過多年的拖延，約旦表示以色列廢止紅海-死海運河
報告稱王國將關閉管道，轉而專注於內部海水淡化項目
通過TOI人員今天下午 3:18
以色列死海以北乾旱時期的干土。 (ABIR SULTAN/Flash90)
據Kan公共廣播公司週四報導，約旦已決定取消與以色列和巴勒斯坦權力機構之間廣受吹捧的連接紅海和死海運河的聯合項目，此前該計劃停滯多年。
據報導，安曼已決定最終拔掉聯合管道的插頭，援引未具名消息人士的話說，“以色列並不真正希望”該計劃繼續進行。
相反，據報導，約旦將專注於一個潛在的內部項目，該項目將從紅海抽取水並在亞喀巴的一個設施中進行海水淡化。
跳過廣告
然而，即使發現捐助者為該內部供水項目提供資金，建設也需要時間，無論如何，王國仍然存在短缺，需要每年繼續從以色列購買約 5000 萬立方米的水。菅直人說，兩國之間的和平協議。
紅海-死海運河項目長期以來一直因官僚障礙、融資困難和環保主義者的反對而推遲，再加上以色列兩年來缺乏有效的政府，情況更加複雜。
該項目因以色列和約旦之間的外交緊張局勢而進一步受到損害，儘管新上任的外交部長亞伊爾拉皮德週一似乎尋求更好的關係，稱讚阿卜杜拉國王是“重要的戰略盟友”，並承諾與他合作。
以色列位於地中海沿岸阿什凱倫的海水淡化廠。(Edi Israel/Flash90)
經過多年討論，2013 年簽署了運河協議，旨在幫助緩解約旦嚴重的水資源短缺，同時幫助補充快速縮小的死海。
根據計劃，約旦的海水淡化廠將為該地區提供急需的飲用水，而剩餘的鹽水將向北泵入死海，以補充快速收縮的湖泊，同時通過利用水生產綠色能源。渦輪機。
以色列從運河項目中獲得的經濟收益微乎其微，該項目將花費該國約 10 億美元，但除了對死海的環境影響外，該管道還有一個戰略目標，即幫助維持約旦的穩定。
2006 年至 2011 年敘利亞發生的毀滅性乾旱被認為助長了那裡致命的內戰，因為農民遷往城市，失業加劇了不滿情緒，而糧食短缺進一步加劇了不滿情緒。
約旦是世界上最缺水的國家之一。它從地下含水層抽取近 60% 的水，抽取地下水的速度是地下水更新速度的兩倍。其餘的來自河流和溪流。
以色列南部城市埃拉特和約旦亞喀巴市，2014 年 12 月 18 日。（Hadas Parush/Flash90）
在首都安曼，每周向屋頂水箱供水一次；該國其他地區的供應頻率甚至更低。
據 估計，約旦的水足以維持一個擁有近 1000 萬人口的國家的 200 萬人口——這一數字在過去十年中增加了 150 萬難民，其中大多數是為了逃離鄰國敘利亞的內戰。
After years of delays, Jordan said to nix Red Sea-Dead Sea canal with Israel, PA
Report says kingdom will pull the plug on pipeline and instead focus on internal desalination project
By TOI STAFFToday, 3:18 pm
Dry earth in time of drought, north of Israel's Dead Sea.(ABIR SULTAN/Flash90)
Jordan has decided to cancel a highly touted joint project with Israel and the Palestinian Authority for a canal linking the Red Sea and the Dead Sea, after years of the plan stagnating, the Kan public broadcaster reported Thursday.
According to the report, Amman has decided to finally pull the plug on the joint pipeline, citing unnamed sources saying there was “no real Israeli desire” for the plan to go ahead.
Instead Jordan will reportedly focus on a potential internal project that will see water pumped from the Red Sea and desalinated at a facility in Aqaba.
However, even if donors are found to fund that internal water supply project, it will take time to build and the kingdom will in any case still have a shortfall that requires continued purchase of some 50 million cubic meters of water per year from Israel supplied under the peace agreements between the two countries, Kan said.
The Red Sea-Dead Sea canal project had long been delayed by bureaucratic hurdles, financing difficulties and environmentalist objections, compounded by Israel’s lack of a functioning government for two years.
The project was further harmed by diplomatic tensions between Israel and Jordan although newly installed Foreign Minister Yair Lapid appeared to court better ties on Monday, praising King Abdullah as “an important strategic ally” and promising to work with him.
Israel’s desalination plant in Ashkelon on the Mediterranean coast. (Edi Israel/Flash90)
After being talked about for years, an agreement on the canal was signed in 2013 with the aim of helping to alleviate Jordan’s severe water shortage while helping replenish the fast-shrinking Dead Sea.
According to the plan, a desalination plant in Jordan would provide much-needed drinking water to the region while its leftover brine would be pumped north to the Dead Sea to replenish the fast-shrinking lake, while also producing green energy through the use of water turbines.
Israel was to see very little economic gain from the canal project, which would have cost the country around $1 billion, but as well as the environmental impact on the Dead Sea, there was also the strategic aim of the pipeline helping to maintain Jordan’s stability.
A devastating drought in Syria, from 2006 to 2011, is credited with helping to fuel the deadly civil war there, as farmers moved to the cities, where unemployment intensified discontent, which was further exacerbated by food shortages.
Jordan is one of the most water-starved countries in the world. It draws nearly 60 percent of its water from underground aquifers, extracting at twice the rate that the groundwater can be renewed. The rest comes from rivers and streams.
The southern Israeli city of Eilat and Jordanian city of Aqaba seen, December 18, 2014. (Hadas Parush/Flash90)
In the capital, Amman, water is supplied to rooftop tanks once a week; other areas of the country are supplied even less frequently.
According to one estimate, Jordan’s water is enough to sustain two million people, in a country that has close to ten million — a figure swelled over the past decade by 1.5 million refugees, most of them fleeing civil war in neighboring Syria.
Sue Surkes contributed to this report.
美國稱拜登和埃爾多安就阿富汗問題達成一致但S-400問題尚未解決
隨著西方軍隊的撤離，機場的安全對於駐紮在阿富汗以外的外交使團的運作至關重要。
通過路透
2021 年 6 月 17 日 23:48
土耳其總統塔伊普·埃爾多安和美國總統喬·拜登於 2021 年 6 月 14 日在比利時布魯塞爾舉行的北約峰會期間出席雙邊會議。Murat Cetinmuhurdar/總統新聞辦公室/講義
（照片來源：MURAT CETINMUHURDAR/總統新聞辦公室/通過路透社提供的資料）
廣告
美國國家安全顧問傑克沙利文週四表示，總統喬拜登和土耳其總統塔伊普埃爾多安在本週的一次會議上同意，隨著美國從阿富汗撤軍，土耳其將在確保喀布爾機場安全方面發揮主導作用。
然而，沙利文說，兩位領導人未能解決長期存在的土耳其購買俄羅斯 S-400 防禦系統的問題，這是一場使北約盟國之間關係緊張的激烈爭執。他補充說，關於這個問題的對話將繼續進行。
沙利文告訴記者，拜登和埃爾多安週一在北約峰會上會面，討論了阿富汗問題。沙利文說，埃爾多安尋求美國的某些形式的支持以確保機場安全，拜登承諾提供這種支持。
“領導人明確承諾，土耳其將在確保哈米德卡爾扎伊國際機場安全方面發揮主導作用，我們現在正在研究如何執行以實現這一目標，”沙利文說，並提供了美國方面的第一個細節。土耳其總統沒有提供會議細節。
土耳其和美國在一系列問題上存在分歧，包括安卡拉購買俄羅斯武器、敘利亞和東地中海的政策分歧以及對埃爾多安和拜登首次面對面會晤取得突破的期望很小。
兩位領導人在會晤後聽起來很樂觀，但他們沒有宣布取得了哪些具體進展。一個潛在的合作領域是阿富汗，在美國和北約部隊在未來幾週內撤出後，安卡拉已提出在那裡保護和運營喀布爾機場。
隨著西方軍隊的撤離，機場的安全對於駐紮在阿富汗以外的外交使團的運作至關重要。
上週，塔利班發言人表示，根據 2020 年美軍撤出協議，土耳其應從阿富汗撤軍，但沙利文表示，塔利班的言論並未阻止美國正在製定的“詳細而有效”的安全計劃。
“顯然，我們認真對待塔利班或阿富汗的其他分子將攻擊西方或國際存在的擔憂……我們認為塔利班公開所說的話不應或將阻止目前正在進行的建立這種安全存在的努力， “ 他說。
作為總統，拜登對埃爾多安採取了比前任唐納德特朗普更冷靜的語氣。拜登很快承認 1915 年對亞美尼亞人的大屠殺是種族滅絕——這一立場激怒了土耳其——並加大了對土耳其人權記錄的批評。
但尚不清楚拜登是否在會晤期間與埃爾多安提出人權問題，沙利文幾乎沒有提供關於 S-400 的僵局如何（如果有的話）的細節，這促使華盛頓從 F-35 戰鬥機中移除安卡拉計劃並實施制裁，將得到解決。
“他們討論了這個問題。這個問題沒有得到解決。他們承諾繼續就 S-400 進行對話，兩個團隊將在會議後跟進，”他說。
US says Biden, Erdogan agreed on Afghanistan but S-400 issue unresolved
The security of the airport is crucial for the operation of diplomatic missions out of the Afghanistan as Western forces pull out.
By REUTERS
JUNE 17, 2021 23:48
Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan and U.S. President Joe Biden attend a bilateral meeting on the sidelines of the NATO summit in Brussels, Belgium June 14, 2021. Murat Cetinmuhurdar/Presidential Press Office/Handout
(photo credit: MURAT CETINMUHURDAR/PRESIDENTIAL PRESS OFFICE/HANDOUT VIA REUTERS)
Advertisement
President Joe Biden and Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan agreed in a meeting this week that Turkey would take a lead role in securing Kabul airport as the United States withdraws troops from Afghanistan, US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan said on Thursday.
However, the two leaders were not able to resolve the long-standing issue of Turkey's purchase of Russian S-400 defense systems, Sullivan said, a bitter dispute that strained ties between the NATO allies. He added that dialog on the issue would continue.
Sullivan told reporters that Biden and Erdogan, in their meeting on Monday at the NATO summit, discussed the Afghanistan issue. Erdogan sought certain forms of US support to secure the airport and Biden committed to providing that support, Sullivan said.
"The clear commitment from the leaders was established that Turkey would play a lead role in securing Hamid Karzai International Airport and we are now working through how to execute to get to that," Sullivan said, giving the first details from the US side of the meeting which the Turkish presidency has not provided details of.
Turkey and the United States have been at odds over a host of issues including Ankara's purchase of Russian weaponry, policy differences in Syria and the Eastern Mediterranean and expectations for a breakthrough in first face-to-face meeting between Erdogan and Biden were slim.
The two leaders sounded upbeat after their meeting although they did not announce what concrete progress they made. One potential area of cooperation has been Afghanistan, where Ankara has offered to guard and operate Kabul airport after US and NATO forces withdraw in coming weeks.
The security of the airport is crucial for the operation of diplomatic missions out of the Afghanistan as Western forces pull out.
Last week, a Taliban spokesman said Turkey should withdraw its troops from Afghanistan under the 2020 deal for the pullout of US forces but Sullivan said the Taliban comments did not deter the "detailed and effective" security plan the United States was putting together.
"Obviously we take seriously the concern that Taliban or other elements in Afghanistan will attack the Western or the international presence…We do not believe that what Taliban has said publicly should or will deter the efforts underway right now to establish that security presence," he said.
As president, Biden has adopted a cooler tone than predecessor Donald Trump towards Erdogan. Biden quickly recognized the 1915 massacre of Armenians as genocide - a position that angers Turkey - and stepped up criticism of Turkey's human rights record.
But it was not clear if Biden raised the human rights issue with Erdogan during his meeting and Sullivan provided little details on how, if at all, the impasse over the S-400s, which prompted Washington to remove Ankara from the F-35 fighter jet program and impose sanctions, would be resolved.
"They discussed it. There was not a resolution of the issue. There was a commitment to continue the dialog on the S-400 and the two teams will be following up on that coming out of the meeting," he said.
納夫塔利·貝內特總理感謝安格拉·默克爾邀請她訪問以色列
默克爾打電話給貝內特，祝賀他擔任總理的新角色以及以色列新政府的組建。
通過耶路撒冷郵報STAFF
2021 年 6 月 17 日 19:00
自 7 月 20 日在布魯塞爾爆發冠狀病毒病以來，德國總理安格拉·默克爾 (Angela Merkel) 在第一次面對面的歐盟峰會上旁觀
（圖片來源：路透社）
廣告
總理納夫塔利·貝內特週四與德國總理安格拉·默克爾通了電話，並邀請她訪問以色列。
默克爾打電話給貝內特，祝賀他擔任新職務和組建以色列新政府。
貝內特感謝總理，並與她談到了以色列的“新精神”以及加强两國關係的機會。
貝內特還對德國在上個月的“城牆守護者行動”期間對以色列安全的承諾和對以色列自衛權利的支持表示讚賞。
週一晚些時候，候補總理兼外交部長亞伊爾·拉皮德與德國外長海科·馬斯進行了交談，討論了以色列新政府，同時探討了解決地區和全球問題的新方法，“從冠狀病毒大流行的影響來看，與經濟和安全有關的問題，”拉皮德在推特上寫道。
即將卸任的總統魯文·里夫林（Reuven Rivlin）本周也與默克爾進行了交談，在他離任前向她告別。
在電話中，里夫林回憶了默克爾 2008 年在以色列議會的歷史性演講，他說：“我將永遠記得你是一位關心我們人民之間的聯繫而不僅僅是國家之間聯繫的領導人。
“你深入了解以色列公民：了解我們的文化，了解我們的習俗，了解對我們很重要的所有原則。”
PM Naftali Bennett thanks Angela Merkel, invites her to visit Israel
Merkel had called Bennett in order to congratulate him on his new role as prime minister and on the formation of Israel's new government.
By JERUSALEM POST STAFF
JUNE 17, 2021 19:00
German Chancellor Angela Merkel looks on during the first faceto-face EU summit since the coronavirus disease outbreak in Brussels on July 20
(photo credit: REUTERS)
Advertisement
Prime Minister Naftali Bennett spoke with German Chancellor Angela Merkel on the phone Thursday and invited her to visit Israel.
Merkel had called Bennett in order to congratulate him on his new role and on the formation of Israel's new government.
Bennett thanked the chancellor and spoke with her about Israel's "new spirit" and the opportunities to strengthen ties between the two countries.
Bennett also expressed his appreciation for Germany's commitment to Israel's security and support for Israel's right to defend itself during Operation Guardian of the Walls last month.
Later on Monday, Alternate Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Yair Lapid talked to his German counterpart, Foreign Minister Heiko Mass, and discussed the new Israeli government, while exploring new ways of addressing regional and global issues, "ranging from the effects of the coronavirus pandemic, to issues relating to economics and security," Lapid tweeted.
Outgoing President Reuven Rivlin also spoke with Merkel this week, bidding her farewell before he leaves office.
In the call, Rivlin recalled Merkel's historic 2008 speech in the Knesset, saying: "I will always remember you as a leader who cared about the connection between our peoples and not just the connection between the countries.
"You knew the citizens of Israel in depth: about our culture, about our customs, about all the principles that are important to us."
以色列新政府將面臨哪些安全挑戰？
幕後：過去，新領導人的出現促使以色列的對手對他進行考驗
作者：喬納森·斯派爾
2021 年 6 月 17 日 16:34
本週，總理納夫塔利·貝內特會見了以色列國防軍參謀長阿維夫·科哈維。
（照片來源：AMOS BEN-GERSHOM/GPO）
廣告
如果有的話，本傑明·內塔尼亞胡政府被推翻，並由納夫塔利·貝內特和亞伊爾·拉皮德領導的新政府取代他對以色列的國家安全有什麼影響？
過去，新總理的出現，在國家安全領域相對缺乏經驗，導致以色列的對手試圖“試探”新的首席執行官，導致一段時期的不穩定。
最近，埃胡德·奧爾默特於 2006 年 1 月接替體弱多病的阿里爾·沙龍掌舵，隨後迅速發生了一系列挑釁，首先是加沙的哈馬斯，然後是黎巴嫩真主黨。這些因素促成了 2006 年 7 月至 8 月的第二次黎巴嫩戰爭。雖然無法在奧爾默特加入與哈馬斯和真主黨的挑釁之間建立某種因果關係，但時間表明奧爾默特的加入及其缺乏經驗。國家安全領域，幾乎可以肯定，這兩個組織的決策過程都被考慮在內。
那麼，新政府及其可能面臨的挑戰是什麼？
重要的是要記住，與奧爾默特政府相比，新政府在國家安全方面的經驗明顯豐富。後者只包含一位具有頂級安全經驗的部長——即以色列國防軍前參謀長沙烏爾·莫法茲。由於他的選舉名單薄弱，莫法茲擁有交通部不太可能的職位。
相比之下，貝內特本人在 2019-2020 年期間擔任內塔尼亞胡的國防部長。同樣重要的是，前以色列國防軍參謀長本尼·甘茨將繼續留在國防部。新內閣雖然未經測試，但並不缺乏最高級別的國家安全證書。
有兩個國家安全“文件”可能會引起新政府的立即關注。這些是加沙的哈馬斯問題，更重要的是，以色列與伊朗正在進行的影子戰爭。
關於前者，加沙的哈馬斯當局顯然正在尋求保持 5 月下旬為期 11 天的敵對行動期間建立的勢頭。週二從加沙發射的燃燒氣球在以色列境內引發了 20 起火災，表明了“測試”的可能方向。哈馬斯將通過關注阿克薩和耶路撒冷問題來尋求繼續對以色列（和巴勒斯坦權力機構）施加壓力，同時將其行動調整到可能導致以色列做出重大反應的門檻以下。
以色列新政府是否願意接受這種偶爾爆發的持續模式還有待觀察。
過去，Naftali Bennett 強烈反對任何與加沙武裝哈馬斯政權長期共存的目標。作為 2014 年的內閣部長，他談到需要“加沙完全非軍事化，就像在猶太和撒馬利亞一樣。沒有導彈。沒有隧道。必須賦予以色列國防軍一項明確的任務：實現這一目標。” 當前與哈馬斯控制的加沙事實上的共存政策發生重大轉變，加上努力建立對它的威懾，似乎不太可能。
哈馬斯在最近 11 天的戰鬥中遭到破壞。但它也取得了重大成就：通過圍繞阿克薩和耶路撒冷的象徵進行動員，它成功地在以色列國內引發了廣泛的騷亂，在西岸發生了一些騷亂，並在西方的重要地區動員了穆斯林公眾輿論（較少所以在中東，尤其是）。毫無疑問，該運動希望進一步利用在未來幾個月由此開啟的機會，爭取實現巴勒斯坦事業的領導地位。
關於與伊朗的影子戰爭問題，有一個重要的因素：俄羅斯。以色列與莫斯科的關係對於維持外交環境至關重要，這使得以色列正在進行的降低和破壞伊朗在敘利亞軍事能力的企圖成為可能。
沒有比這更個性化的關係了。俄羅斯國防部支持阿薩德，並希望採取行動防止敘利亞的破壞，這是以色列持續和激烈的運動不可避免的結果。內塔尼亞胡與普京總統建立的個人聯繫，以及內塔尼亞胡在個人外交上的不懈努力，在平衡這方面發揮了重要作用。這種溝通和影響的渠道能否在內塔尼亞胡被推翻後繼續存在還有待觀察。
這種變化來得不合時宜，因為美國對伊朗的外交努力也預示著“戰爭之間的戰爭”運動的到來。作為上屆美國政府對德黑蘭“最大壓力”運動的一部分，以色列的運動是天作之合。在華盛頓正在尋求（但難以捉摸）與德黑蘭和解的地區，它有可能顯得異常。屆時，美國很可能會開始尋求與俄羅斯就敘利亞問題達成全面協議。這一進程如果出現並繼續進行，將對以色列繼續開展運動以阻止伊朗在敘利亞的持續鞏固的可行性提出一個問號。
維持目前俄羅斯對以色列行動的同意似乎對新興的以色列政府構成了重大挑戰。這需要由年輕的以色列新領導層來實現，面對世界領先的政治家和戰略家之一，而此時華盛頓的偏好可能與以色列不同。貝內特以國防部長的身份聲稱，有跡象表明以色列的政策成功地促使伊朗從敘利亞撤軍。事實證明，這種說法為時過早。這個問題將繼續引起他的注意。
加沙和哈馬斯通過 al-Aqsa 爭奪巴勒斯坦領導權很可能成為頭條新聞，因為這將涉及立即的動態行動。但是，為正在進行的針對伊朗的運動保持一個窗口的問題是更重要的挑戰。
與此同時，以色列國家安全戰略的總體輪廓幾乎不會受到政府更迭的影響。在這些問題上出現重大分歧影響以色列主要選舉陣營的日子已經一去不復返了。他們是 2000 年奧斯陸進程崩潰的受害者。他們沒有返回的跡象。相反，新政府看起來將繼續內塔尼亞胡的長期戰爭戰略，尋求鞏固以色列的經濟和社會實力，避免讓步和不必要的對抗，同時假設伊斯蘭世界內的重要大國繼續敵視。
未來時期要測試的問題不是新方法的應用，而是新管理團隊在持續應用現已有效實施了二十年的戰略方面的表現。
作者是中東報導與分析中心執行主任，中東論壇研究員。他是《秋天的日子：敘利亞和伊拉克戰爭中的記者之旅》一書的作者。
What security challenges will Israel's new government face?
BEHIND THE LINES: In the past, the emergence of a new leader has prompted Israel’s adversaries to put him to the test
By JONATHAN SPYER
JUNE 17, 2021 16:34
PRIME MINISTER Naftali Bennett meets this week with IDF Chief of Staff Aviv Kohavi.
(photo credit: AMOS BEN-GERSHOM/GPO)
Advertisement
What, if any, are the implications for Israel’s national security of the toppling of Benjamin Netanyahu’s government, and his replacement by the new administration led by Naftali Bennett and Yair Lapid?
In the past, the emergence of a new prime minister, relatively inexperienced in the national security field, has led to efforts by Israel’s adversaries to “test” the new chief executive, leading to a period of instability.
Most recently, Ehud Olmert’s replacement of the infirm Ariel Sharon at the helm in January 2006 was rapidly followed by a series of provocations, from first Hamas in Gaza, and then Lebanese Hezbollah. These precipitated the Second Lebanon War of July-August 2006. While it is not possible to establish a certain causal link between the accession of Olmert and the provocations by Hamas and Hezbollah, the timing indicates that the accession of Olmert, and his inexperience in the area of national security, almost certainly factored into the decision-making process in both organizations.
What, then, of the new government and the likely challenges facing it?
It is important to remember that the new government is notably richer in national security experience than was Olmert’s administration. The latter contained only one minister with top-level security experience – namely, former IDF chief of staff Shaul Mofaz. Because of the weakness of his electoral list, Mofaz had the unlikely portfolio of the Transport Ministry.
By contrast, Bennett himself served as Netanyahu’s defense minister in the 2019-2020 period. No less importantly, former IDF chief of staff Benny Gantz is set to stay in position at the Defense Ministry. The new cabinet, though untested, is thus not lacking in national security credentials at the top level.
THERE ARE two national security “files” that are likely to engage the immediate attention of the new government. These are the issue of Hamas in Gaza and, more portentously, Israel’s ongoing shadow war with Iran.
Regarding the former, it is already clear that the Hamas authority in Gaza is seeking to maintain the momentum established in the 11-day period of hostilities in late May. The launching of incendiary balloons from Gaza on Tuesday, which started 20 fires inside Israel, indicated the likely direction of the “test.” Hamas will seek to keep up the pressure on Israel (and the Palestinian Authority) by focusing on the issue of al-Aqsa and Jerusalem, while calibrating its actions to below the threshold likely to make inevitable a major Israeli response.
It remains to be seen whether the new Israeli government will be willing to accept this ongoing pattern of occasional flare-ups.
In the past, Naftali Bennett came out strongly against the goal of any attempt at long-term coexistence with an armed Hamas regime in Gaza. As a cabinet minister in 2014 he spoke of the need for the complete “demilitarization of Gaza, as in Judea and Samaria. No missiles. No tunnels. The IDF must be given a clear task: make that happen.” A major shift from the current policy of de facto coexistence with Hamas-controlled Gaza, plus efforts to build deterrence against it, seems unlikely.
Hamas suffered damage in the recent 11 days of fighting. But it also made a significant achievement: by mobilizing around the symbols of al-Aqsa and Jerusalem, it succeeded in precipitating widespread rioting inside Israel, some unrest in the West Bank, and mobilization of Muslim public opinion in significant parts of the West (less so in the Mideast, notably). The movement will without doubt be wishing to further exploit the opportunity thereby opened in the months ahead for a bid to achieve the leadership of the Palestinian cause.
Regarding the issue of the shadow war with Iran, there is a factor of primary significance: Russia. Israel’s relations with Moscow have been crucial in maintaining the diplomatic environment that makes possible the ongoing Israeli attempt to downgrade and disrupt Iranian military capacity in Syria.
There was no relationship more personalized than this one. The Russian defense ministry is pro-Assad and wished to move to prevent the disruption in Syria that is the inevitable result of Israel’s ongoing and intense campaign. The personal connection established by Netanyahu with President Vladimir Putin, and Netanyahu’s tireless efforts at personal diplomacy played a significant role in balancing this. It remains to be seen whether this channel of communication and influence will survive Netanyahu’s toppling.
This change comes at an inopportune moment, in that US diplomatic efforts vis-à-vis Iran also augur badly for the “war between the wars” campaign. As part of the previous US administration’s campaign of “maximum pressure” on Tehran, Israel’s campaign was a natural fit. In a region in which Washington is seeking (however elusively) rapprochement with Tehran, it is in danger of appearing as an anomaly. At such a time, the US may well start seeking a general agreement with Russia on Syria. Such a process, if it emerges and proceeds, would place a question mark over the feasibility of Israel’s continued campaign to prevent Iran’s ongoing consolidation in Syria.
Maintaining the current Russian consent to Israeli operations looks set to represent a major challenge to the emerging Israeli government. This will need to be achieved by a young and new Israeli leadership, facing one of the world’s leading statesmen and strategists, at a time when Washington’s preferences are likely to diverge from Israel’s. Bennett famously claimed as defense minister that there were indications that Israeli policy was succeeding in precipitating an Iranian withdrawal from Syria. The claim turned out to be premature. This issue will continue to engage his attention.
Gaza and Hamas’s bid for the Palestinian leadership via al-Aqsa is likely to grab the headlines, since it will involve immediate kinetic action. But the issue of maintaining a window for the ongoing campaign against Iran is the more weighty challenge.
The broad contours of Israeli national security strategy, meanwhile, will be almost unaffected by the change of government. The days when major splits on these issues affected the main electoral camps in Israel are long gone. These were the victim of the collapse of the Oslo process in 2000. They show no sign of returning. Rather, the new administration looks set to continue the long-war strategy of Netanyahu, seeking to consolidate Israel’s economic and societal strength and avoid both concessions and unnecessary confrontations, while operating on the assumption of continued hostility from significant powers within the Islamic world.
The issue to be tested in the period ahead is not the application of a new approach, but, rather, the performance of a new management team in the continued application of a strategy effectively in place now for two decades.
The writer is the executive director of the Middle East Center for Reporting and Analysis, and a fellow at the Middle East Forum. He is the author of Days of the Fall: A Reporter’s Journey in the Syria and Iraq Wars.
阿拉伯媒體的聲音：伊拉克人會抵制下一次選舉嗎？
2021 年伊拉克議會選舉定於 10 月舉行。我們在 2018 年以前的選舉中目睹的情景會重演嗎？伊拉克人會集體抵制選舉嗎？
通過針對媒體線
2021 年 6 月 17 日 11:46
丹麥國旗。
（照片來源：漢娜·麥凱/路透社）
廣告
伊拉克會抵制下一次選舉嗎？
伊拉克阿爾馬達，6 月 11 日
有關 The Media Line 的更多故事，請訪問themedialine.org
2021 年伊拉克議會選舉定於 10 月舉行。我們在 2018 年以前的選舉中目睹的情景會重演嗎？伊拉克人會集體抵制選舉嗎？
什麼不鼓勵大多數發達國家的民主實踐？為什麼不投票？
先生們，我和所有伊拉克人一樣，夢想著真正的變革，但我們的政客們正在實踐的東西不能被描述為“民主”。我們的政治制度與在我們眼前一遍又一遍地播放的悲喜劇沒有太大區別。選舉一結束，完全相同的人就會出現在我們的電視屏幕上，發表完全相同的演講，使用完全相同的流行語。“我們是來救你的”將是他們講話的要點。
但是伊拉克人民迫切需要的是具有正直、誠實和寬宏大量品質的政治領導人；不是那些尋求增強自身權力、維護自身利益、濫用政治豁免權逃避腐敗的人。
任人唯親的惡臭充斥著我們國家機構的走廊。從那裡，它蔓延到我們各省、城鎮和城市的街道上，地方領導人在那裡爭奪政治頭銜、社會聲望和權力。
在之前的選舉中，伊拉克約有一半的合格選民選擇不投票。他們厭倦了乞求最基本的權利。
我不知道選舉結果會是什麼樣子。我也不知道實際投票率是多少。但我知道伊拉克人民已經受夠了。他們無法忍受過去三年來一直與之打交道的同樣腐敗和無能的領導層。— 阿里·侯賽因
** 猶太人的第一個狀態：為什麼這是一個隱藏的事實？**
科威特，Al-Qabas，6 月 12 日
你聽說過俄羅斯的猶太自治州嗎？可能不會。那是因為以色列國在隱藏這個共和國存在的事實方面有既得利益。
猶太自治州位於俄羅斯東南部，是猶太人的祖國。直到今天，當地人口的很大一部分是猶太人。不幸的是，與以色列國合作，這一事實已被掩蓋，因此在巴勒斯坦建立猶太人家園的猶太復國主義夢想將繼續存在。
與猶太復國主義者聲稱的不同，巴勒斯坦從來都不是猶太人的家園。猶太人可以很容易地在他們分配的自治區建立自己的家園，在那裡他們不會傷害任何人，也不會依賴山姆大叔的持續支持。
據記載，這個獨立的共和國面積超過 40,000 平方公里。也就是說，它接近瑞士的大小。它還具有極低的人口密度。因此，它本可以成為猶太人的理想家園。猶太復國主義者本可以在已經分配給他們的地方建立他們的國家，而不是篡奪巴勒斯坦的土地。
但這一事實已被掩蓋，因此在以色列竊取巴勒斯坦土地時，世界將站在以色列一邊。
另一個重要問題：為什麼猶太復國主義者阻止這個共和國從俄羅斯分離？為什麼猶太自治州沒有像車臣等其他領土一樣尋求獨立？
我認為答案很明確：沒有人希望將注意力從巴勒斯坦轉移開。猶太復國主義者希望隱藏他們的選擇，以便對巴勒斯坦的領土佔領可以繼續進行到今天。– Fakhri Hashem Sayed Rajab
Voices from the Arab press: Will Iraqis boycott the next election?
The 2021 Iraqi parliamentary elections are scheduled to take place in October. Will the scenario we witnessed in the previous elections of 2018 be repeated? Will Iraqis boycott the election en masse?
By THE MEDIA LINE
JUNE 17, 2021 11:46
THE DANISH flag.
(photo credit: HANNAH MCKAY/ REUTERS)
Advertisement
WILL IRAQIS BOYCOTT THE NEXT ELECTION?
Al-Mada, Iraq, June 11
For more stories from The Media Line go to themedialine.org
The 2021 Iraqi parliamentary elections are scheduled to take place in October. Will the scenario we witnessed in the previous elections of 2018 be repeated? Will Iraqis boycott the election en masse?
Some might ask: Why not encourage the practice of democracy that takes place in most countries of the developed world? Why not vote?
Gentlemen, I, like all Iraqis, dream of real change, but what our politicians are practicing cannot be described as “democracy.” Our political system is not much different from a tragicomedy that is playing over and over in front of our eyes, on repeat. As soon as the elections are over, the exact same people will appear on our television screens, delivering the exact same speeches, ripe with the exact same buzzwords. “We came to save you” will be the gist of their remarks.
But what the people of Iraq are desperate for are political leaders who possess the qualities of integrity, honesty and magnanimity; not people who seek to enhance their own power, protect their own interests, and abuse their political immunity to evade corruption.
The foul odor of cronyism fills the hallways of our state institutions. From there, it spreads into the streets of our provinces, towns and cities, where local leaders fight over political titles, social prestige and power.
During the previous elections, about half of eligible voters in Iraq chose not to vote. They were tired of begging for their most basic rights.
I don’t know what the election results will look like. I also don’t know what turnout rates will actually be. But I do know that the people of Iraq are fed up. They cannot bear to suffer the same corrupt and inept leadership they’ve been dealing with for the past three years. – Ali Hussein
** THE FIRST STATE OF THE JEWS: WHY IS IT A HIDDEN FACT?**
Al-Qabas, Kuwait, June 12
Have you heard of the Jewish Autonomous Oblast in Russia? Probably not. That’s because the State of Israel has a vested interest in hiding the fact that this republic exists.
The Jewish Autonomous Oblast, located in southeastern Russia, is the motherland of the Jews. Until this very day, a large portion of the local population is Jewish. Unfortunately, this fact has been obscured, in cooperation with the State of Israel, so that the Zionist dream of establishing a Jewish homeland in Palestine would continue to exist.
Unlike what Zionists like to claim, Palestine was never the homeland of the Jewish people. The Jews could have easily established their homeland in their allocated autonomous region, where they wouldn’t harm anyone or rely on the continuous support of Uncle Sam.
For the record, this independent republic has an area of over 40,000 square kilometers. That is, it is close to the size of Switzerland. It also has an extremely low population density. Therefore, it could have served as an ideal homeland for the Jews. Instead of usurping Palestinian lands, Zionists could have built their nation at a place already allocated to them.
But this fact has been obscured so that the world would stand by Israel’s side as it steals Palestinian lands.
Another important question: Why did Zionists prevent the secession of this republic from Russia? How come the Jewish Autonomous Oblast didn’t seek independence, just like other territories such as Chechnya?
I think the answer is clear: No one wanted attention diverted away from Palestine. The Zionists wanted to keep their options hidden so that the territorial occupation of Palestine could continue to take place to this very day. – Fakhri Hashem Sayed Rajab
新政府不能解決以色列最深層次的宗教和國家問題嗎？
宗教事務：新聯盟表示希望推進的立法能否真正獲得通過？
作者：傑瑞米·沙龍
2021 年 6 月 17 日 20:38
以色列首席拉比在耶路撒冷。
（圖片來源：FLASH90）
廣告
在前總理本雅明·內塔尼亞胡 (Benjamin Netanyahu) 擔任總理的 12 年任期內，宗教和國家事務幾乎完全由極端正統黨派沙斯 (Shas) 和聯合托拉猶太教 (United Torah Judaism) 負責。
這種情況在某種程度上甚至成立，當這些政黨不在 2013 年至 2015 年的以色列第 33 屆政府中時，Yesh Atid 嘗試過但在這些問題上取得進展相對不成功。
這次失敗的部分原因是保守派和強硬的宗教猶太復國主義拉比的反對，他們向納夫塔利·貝內特領導的巴伊特耶胡迪黨施加壓力，反對影響深遠的改革，但也由於極端正統黨派對內塔尼亞胡施加的壓力。警告他不要允許在宗教和國家問題上進行重大的立法改革，從而破壞他們的政治聯盟。
鑑於其微弱的多數和其聯盟夥伴的意識形態差異，以及重大的外交和安全挑戰，週日宣誓就職的新政府面臨著巨大的政治困難。
但是儘管存在這些問題，儘管猶太國家的宗教和國家問題具有可燃性，但新政府在關於共同商定的聯盟立法議程的聯盟協議的附錄中承諾，就此類問題實施四項改革，所有其中將通過立法進行。
事實上，通過所有四項立法的時間非常短，其中一項計劃在政府成立後 30 天內獲得批准，其他在 60 或 90 天內獲得批准，這表明即使不具有法律約束力，對這些問題的承諾。
具體而言，附錄列出了權力下放 kashrut 監管市場的改革；去中心化轉換；改變選舉首席拉比的選舉機構；並改變拉比法庭法官遴選委員會的組成。
競爭，以改善經常被企業本身和國家報告批評並遭受嚴重腐敗的 kashrut 監督服務。
關於皈依的立法將允許市政首席拉比進行皈依，從而將皈依的權力從首席拉比的控制中下放，並允許自由傾向的市政首席拉比，他們都是東正教，執行諸如未成年人皈依之類的政策，以及通常使用更溫和的轉換標準。
第三項立法將改變選舉首席拉比的選舉機構的構成，其具體目標是選舉“猶太復國主義首席拉比”——也就是說，不是像兩位現任現任總統那樣極端正統的拉比。
最後，立法附錄規定通過一項法案，該法案將保證在女性拉比法官遴選委員會中至少有兩個席位，目的是讓婦女對拉比法官的遴選產生更大的影響，這些法官對拉比法官的遴選產生重大影響。以色列婦女的生活，儘管婦女本身被禁止擔任拉比法官。
除了這四個問題之外，還有其他一些宗教和國家問題潛伏在幕後，需要解決或忽略。
其中之一是政府 2016 年的西牆決議，該決議決定在西牆南端為非東正教祈禱創造一個國家認可的空間，但在極端正統派抵抗之後，該決議於 2017 年被同一政府無限期暫停計劃，在最初同意之後。
另一個問題將是提供民事婚姻或民事結合，這是 Yisrael Beytenu 的一個重要關注點，而在安息日允許公共交通是聯盟的左翼和自由黨將尋求推進的另一個主題。
Yisrael Beytenu 與 Yesh Atid 的聯盟協議規定，在極端正統學校促進核心課程主題的研究，如數學、科學和英語，是另一個重要問題。
宗教猶太復國主義者 Ne'emanei Torah Va'Avodah 遊說團體的宗教和國家部門負責人 Tani Frank 認為，將首席拉比的服務（例如皈依和 kashrut）下放是提高其質量的關鍵。
他說，一方面，首席拉比對以色列大部分宗教生活的壟斷和中央集權是“系統性的失敗”，這導致濫用權力，並使身體相信它可以在沒有克制。
然而，問題出現了，新聯盟表示希望推進的立法是否真的可以通過。
或許現任政府面臨的最嚴重的政治問題是其最低限度的多數，這將使它在議會工作的各個方面都陷入地獄般的生活，無論是在委員會、通過立法還是僅僅通過不信任投票。
因此，首相急於從反對黨選入他已經很笨拙的聯盟，但他的選擇似乎僅限於極端正統黨派，儘管至少在短期內這種叛逃的機會看起來非常渺茫。
儘管如此，反對Shas和UTJ的擔憂可能會減輕擬議改革的通過，希望推遲或淡化它們可以為他們將來加入政府開闢道路。
此外，聯盟中的保守宗教分子，如 Yamina MK Nir Orbach，他曾是高度保守的 Bayit Yehudi 領導人 Rafi Peretz 的高級顧問，可能會在通過此類立法時產生問題。
新希望高級人物、建築和住房部長澤夫埃爾金與宗教猶太復國主義部門的強硬分子關係密切，他們強烈反對削弱首席拉比的權威。
當聯盟中的每個 MK 都需要通過一項法案時，這將成為一個重大問題。
然而，弗蘭克對擬議的立法可以成功通過成為法律表示樂觀。
他指出，在與宗教猶太復國主義黨分裂後，亞米納幾乎沒有受到拉比的影響，新的宗教服務部長馬坦卡哈納比前副宗教服務部長伊萊本-達漢更為溫和，後者在 2013 年期間負責該部和 2015 年，但其根源和影響在於宗教猶太復國主義社區的保守派。
弗蘭克認為，許多投票支持亞米娜的宗教猶太復國主義選民在宗教上是溫和的，他們認為擬議的改革對於徹底改革一個不再符合大多數宗教猶太復國主義社區的需求和意見的宗教機構來說是必要和可取的。 .
弗蘭克說：“亞米納需要向選民表明，它實際上正在就這些問題採取行動。”
宗教和國家問題專家、Calcalist 的專欄作家沙哈爾·伊蘭 (Shahar Ilan) 同意提議的改革將有利於以色列的宗教生活，但表示政府必須非常謹慎地進行改革。
對於 Hiddush 宗教多元化組織的前副主任伊蘭來說，宗教和國家關切的可燃性，尤其是在被納入立法形式時，意味著在這個議程上應該非常謹慎，以免炸毀整個政府.
儘管 Ilan 認為其中一些問題對國家的健康至關重要，例如針對極端正統派學生的核心課程研究，但他表示，他更擔心的是，如果政府採取措施，可能會對法治和民主造成損害。倒台，內塔尼亞胡重新掌權。
伊蘭說：“內塔尼亞胡已經證明，他準備傷害和燒毀民主和法治的每一個守門人，以影響和停止對他的審判，因此至關重要的是他不會重新掌權。”
因此，伊蘭說，如果要推進聯盟協議中規定的變更，則應通過對政府法規而不是立法進行行政變更來進行變更。
在以色列議會通過法律會引起人們的注意，引起宗教和極端正統黨派的憤怒，並造成政治壓力和問題。
因此，與 Yisrael Beytenu 所尋求的民事結合立法不同，內政部長 Ayelet Shaked 可以簡單地批准美國猶他州在線和遠程進行的民事婚姻登記。
這將解決數以萬計的以色列人無法在自己的國家結婚的嚴重問題，這是由於已建立的宗教機構——猶太人的首席拉比——對婚姻的壟斷，同時避免了大規模的議會攤牌並使搖擺不定的MK承受壓力。
西牆協議在程序上也很容易解決，需要內閣進行簡單的投票，儘管這樣做肯定會引起極端正統黨派的憤怒。
已提議更改初始決議的語言，這將掩蓋但不會改變改革和保守運動代表將出席該網站行政委員會的事實，這可能會簡化這一步驟的通過。
伊蘭說，交通部的規定可能會改變，以允許更多的小巴出租車在安息日運營，從而避免在這個問題上立法的必要性。
並通過胡蘿蔔加大棒向極端正統派市政委員會施壓，允許在其管轄範圍內建立州立極端正統學校，而不是通過削減資金來威脅所有極端正統學校，這將防止與哈雷迪社區的巨大對抗並抵禦內部來自新希望和亞米納的 UTJ 和 Shas 附近元素的聯盟反對。
伊蘭說，關於卡什魯特、皈依以及如何選擇下一任首席拉比的改革主要是內部宗教鬥爭，政府可以遏制和承受這些鬥爭。
但是，對於高度敏感和象徵性問題的徹底改變，例如公證婚姻、安息日的公共交通和極端正統教育，應該再擱置一天。
在過去的 12 年中，猶太國家在宗教事務上的衝突已成為以色列社會中分裂最嚴重的分裂之一，其中對民族和宗教身份的擔憂與對多元化和免於宗教脅迫的自由的要求發生了衝突。
政府確實面臨著一系列令人恐懼的挑戰，同時在推進其可能達成的任何議程方面面臨巨大的政治障礙。
但是，控制宗教生活的問題在這個猶太國家持續存在並惡化了太久，如果不能糾正其中一些問題，可能會加速對宗教機構的信任的侵蝕，並加深社會分裂。
Can the new gov't resolve Israel's deepest religion and state issues?
RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS: Can the legislation that the new coalition has stated it wishes to advance actually be passed?
By JEREMY SHARON
JUNE 17, 2021 20:38
THE CHIEF Rabbinate of Israel in Jerusalem.
(photo credit: FLASH90)
Throughout former prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s 12-year term as premier, matters of religion and state were almost entirely designated to the trust of the ultra-Orthodox parties Shas and United Torah Judaism.
This state of affairs even held true, to a certain extent, when those parties were not in the 33rd government of Israel of 2013 to 2015, in which Yesh Atid tried but was relatively unsuccessful in making headway on such issues.
This failure was in part due to opposition from conservative and hardline religious-Zionist rabbis who exerted pressure on the Bayit Yehudi Party led by Naftali Bennett against far-reaching reforms, but also due to pressure exerted by the ultra-Orthodox parties on Netanyahu, which warned him not to break their political alliance by allowing serious legislative changes on religion and state issues.
The new government sworn in on Sunday faces formidable political difficulties given its razor-thin majority and the ideological disparity of its coalition partners, as well as major diplomatic and security challenges.
But despite these problems, and despite the combustible nature of religion and state issues in the Jewish state, the new government has pledged, in an appendix to the coalition agreements on a mutually agreed coalition legislative agenda, to enact four reforms on such matters, all of which will be carried out through legislation.
Indeed, very short time frames have been given to pass all four pieces of legislation, with one scheduled for approval within 30 days of the establishment of the government, and the others within 60 or 90 days, indicating a real, if not legally binding, commitment to these issues.
Specifically, the appendix lays out reforms to decentralize the kashrut supervision market; decentralize conversion; change the electoral body for selecting chief rabbis; and changing the composition of the committee for selecting Rabbinical Court judges.
The legislation on kashrut would permit any municipal rabbinate or religious council to expand its kashrut supervision operations beyond its municipal boundaries, allowing it to hire kashrut supervisors and inspectors around the country and oversee kashrut in any restaurant or food business that requests its services, from Eilat to Katzrin.
The idea is to create competition among municipal rabbinates for the custom of food businesses, in order to improve kashrut supervision services which are frequently panned by businesses themselves as well as state reports, and have also suffered from severe corruption.
The legislation on conversion would allow municipal chief rabbis to perform conversions, thereby decentralizing authority over conversion from the control of the Chief Rabbinate and allow liberally inclined municipal chief rabbis, all of whom are Orthodox, to implement policies such as the conversion of minors, and to utilize more moderate criteria for conversion in general.
A third piece of legislation would change the makeup of the electoral body that elects chief rabbis, with the specific goal of electing “a Zionist chief rabbi” – that is, not ultra-Orthodox ones like the two current incumbents.
Finally, the appendix on legislation stipulates the passage of a bill that would guarantee at least two spots on the Selection Committee for Rabbinical Judges for women, with the goal of giving women greater influence over the selection of rabbinical judges, who have great impact on the lives of women in Israel, even though women themselves are barred from being rabbinical judges.
Aside from these four issues, there are several other matters of religion and state that are lurking in the background and that will need to be addressed, or ignored.
One of those is the government’s Western Wall resolution of 2016 which determined to create a state-recognized space for non-Orthodox prayer at the southern end of the Western Wall, but which was suspended indefinitely by the same government in 2017 following ultra-Orthodox resistance to the plan, after initially consenting to it.
Another issue will be providing for civil marriage, or civil unions, which is an important concern for Yisrael Beytenu, while permitting public transport on Shabbat is an additional topic which the left-wing and liberal parties of the coalition will seek to advance.
Promoting the study of core curriculum topics, such as maths, science and English, in ultra-Orthodox schools is another important issue for Yisrael Beytenu which is stipulated in its coalition agreement with Yesh Atid.
Tani Frank, head of the religion and state department of the religious-Zionist Ne’emanei Torah Va’Avodah lobbying group, argues that decentralizing the Chief Rabbinate’s services, such as conversion and kashrut, is key to improving their quality.
He says the monopoly on one hand and the centralized authority on the other, of the Chief Rabbinate over much of religious life in Israel is a “systemic failure” which lends itself to abuse of power and has allowed the body to believe it can act without restraint.
THE QUESTION arises, however, as to whether the legislation that the new coalition has stated it wishes to advance can actually be passed.
Perhaps the most severe political problem the current government suffers from is its bare-minimum majority, which will make its life hellish in every aspect of its parliamentary work, be it in committees, passing legislation or merely surviving votes of no confidence.
The prime minister is therefore eager to draft in parties from the opposition to his already unwieldy coalition, but his options appear limited to the ultra-Orthodox parties, although the chances of such a defection look very slim at least in the short term.
Nevertheless, concern for antagonizing Shas and UTJ may mitigate against the passage of the proposed reforms, in the hope that delaying or watering them down could leave the way open for them to join the government in the future.
Additionally, conservative religious elements in the coalition such as Yamina MK Nir Orbach, who was formerly the senior adviser to the highly conservative Bayit Yehudi leader Rafi Peretz, could create problems in passing such legislation.
And senior New Hope figure and Construction and Housing Minister Ze’ev Elkin is close to hard-line elements in the religious-Zionist sector who fervently oppose any diminution of the authority of the Chief Rabbinate.
When every single MK in the coalition is needed to pass a bill, this becomes a significant problem.
Frank expresses optimism, however, that the proposed legislation can be successfully passed into law.
He notes that Yamina is mostly denuded of rabbinic influence following the split with the Religious Zionist Party, and that the new religious services minister, Matan Kahana, is more moderate than former deputy religious services minister Eli Ben-Dahan, who ran the ministry between 2013 and 2015 but whose roots and influences lie in the conservative wing of the religious-Zionist community.
Frank opined that many of the religious-Zionist voters who voted for Yamina are religiously moderate and see the proposed reforms as necessary and desirable to overhaul a religious establishment that is no longer in tune with the needs and opinions of much of the religious-Zionist community.
“Yamina will need to show its voters that it is actually acting on these issues,” said Frank.
Shahar Ilan, an expert on religion and state issues and a columnist for Calcalist, agrees that the proposed reforms would be advantageous to religious life in Israel, but says that the government must be very careful in how it proceeds.
For Ilan, a former deputy director of the Hiddush religious pluralism organization, the combustible nature of religion and state concerns, especially when put into a legislative format, means that great caution should be exercised over this agenda so as not to blow up the entire government.
Although Ilan sees some of these issues as critical to the health of the country, such as core curriculum studies for ultra-Orthodox pupils, he says he is more concerned about the damage to the rule of law and democracy that could occur were the government to fall and Netanyahu to return to power.
“Netanyahu already proved he is ready to harm and burn every gatekeeper of democracy and the rule of law in order to influence and stop his trial, so it is critical he does not return to power,” said Ilan.
As such, Ilan said, changes beyond those spelled out in the coalition agreements should, if they are to be advanced, be carried out by administrative changes to government regulations instead of legislation.
Passing laws in the Knesset draws attention, invokes the ire of the religious and ultra-Orthodox parties, and creates political pressure and problems.
So instead of pursuing legislation on civil unions as sought by Yisrael Beytenu, Interior Minister Ayelet Shaked could simply approve the registration of civil marriages conducted online and remotely by the US state of Utah.
This would resolve the highly problematic situation in which tens of thousands of Israelis cannot marry in their own country, owing to the monopoly over marriage held by the established religious institutions – the Chief Rabbinate for Jews – while at the same time avoiding a massive parliamentary showdown and putting wavering MKs under pressure.
The Western Wall agreement is also procedurally easy to resolve, requiring a simple vote in the cabinet, although doing so would certainly draw ire from the ultra-Orthodox parties.
Changes have been proposed to the language of the initial resolution which would obscure, but not alter, the fact that representatives of the Reform and Conservative movements would be on the site’s administrative council, and this might ease the passage of this step.
Regulations in the Transportation Ministry could be changed to allow for greater numbers of minibus taxis to operate on Shabbat, circumventing the need for legislation on the issue, says Ilan.
And pressuring ultra-Orthodox municipal councils, through carrots and sticks, to allow the establishment of state ultra-Orthodox schools in their jurisdictions instead of threatening all ultra-Orthodox schools with funding cuts would prevent a huge confrontation with the haredi community and ward off internal coalition opposition from elements close to UTJ and Shas in New Hope and Yamina.
Ilan says that the reforms over kashrut, conversion and how the next chief rabbis are chosen are largely internal religious battles, which the government could contain and withstand.
But sweeping and dramatic changes to highly sensitive and symbolic issues such as civil marriage, public transport on Shabbat and ultra-Orthodox education should be put aside for another day.
OVER THE course of the last 12 years, conflicts in the Jewish state over religious matters have become one of the most bitterly divisive schisms in Israeli society, in which concerns for national and religious identity have clashed with demands for pluralism and freedom from religious coercion.
The government does indeed have a frightening array of challenges before it, and at the same time faces huge political obstacles in advancing any agenda it might be able to agree upon.
But problems with the control over religious life have persisted and festered for too long in the Jewish state, and a failure to redress some of those issues could accelerate the erosion of trust in religious institutions and deepen societal schisms.
報告：內塔尼亞胡下令在離任前撕碎文件
前總理否認聲稱他讓工作人員在將文件交給貝內特之前銷毀了存放在總理辦公室保險箱中的文件
通過TOI人員今天，晚上 11:03
本傑明·內塔尼亞胡於 2018 年 6 月 10 日抵達耶路撒冷總理辦公室參加每週內閣會議。 (Yonatan Sindel/Flash90/File)
週四的一份報告稱，就在前總理本雅明·內塔尼亞胡週日離開辦公室之前，他的工作人員撕碎了存放在保險箱中的文件。
內塔尼亞胡的發言人稱該報告“完全是謊言。從來沒有發生過這樣的事情。”
如果屬實，《國土報》詳述的指控將代表利庫德集團領導人的可恥且可能是非法的最終行為，因為他在執政 12 年後繼續掌權的努力已告結束。
該報援引在內塔尼亞胡辦公室工作的未透露姓名的工作人員的話說，他們被告知要在周日早上粉碎文件，幾個小時前，一個致力於將內塔尼亞胡下台的政黨聯盟上台。他們說命令來自內塔尼亞胡本人。
現在由納夫塔利·貝內特 (Naftali Bennett) 領導的總理辦公室表示，它不知道這些指控，但會審查這些指控。
據《國土報》報導，這些保險箱位於總理辦公室的一部分，稱為水族館，是總理和高級官員所在的內部密室。
2015 年 12 月 7 日，本傑明·內塔尼亞胡和尤西·科恩正在查看內塔尼亞胡在社交媒體上發布的照片中的文件，當時他任命科恩為新的摩薩德首領。（PMO/Facebook/文件）
據《國土報》報導，雖然目前尚不清楚據稱被撕碎的文件中的內容，但保險箱中通常存放著與高級官員的工作日程、日常政府活動等相關的文件。
根據法律，任何與政府工作有關的文件都是國家財產，應當予以保存和歸檔。據報導，至少有一些文件被交給了貝內特的工作人員，以備歸檔或根據需要使用。
新政府成員和活動人士尋求公開先前保密的成績單和其他文件，以揭開內塔尼亞胡和其他人在其 12 年執政期間做出的決定的面紗。
週三，國防部長本尼·甘茨（Benny Gantz）敦促貝內特（Bennett）改變政府規定，以允許公佈過去一年目前機密的冠狀病毒內閣會議的會議記錄。
在以色列議會於 2021 年 6 月 13 日以 60 票對 59 票對貝內特的聯盟投下信任票後，被擊敗的總理本傑明·內塔尼亞胡在與新總理納夫塔利·貝內特短暫握手後離開。 (Emmanuel Dunand / AFP)
曾是該內閣成員的甘茨表示，協議的披露將有助於公眾更好地了解領導政府遏制大流行的部長級機構做出的決定，同時也讓冠狀病毒內閣成員承擔責任。
除了 Gantz，信息自由運動預計將在未來幾天與 Bennett 聯繫，提出同樣的要求，以發布會議記錄。
週一，內塔尼亞胡在一次異常簡潔和簡短的會議上將辦公室及其正式權力移交給了貝內特，會議結束時沒有進行傳統的儀式、握手或合影，這表明內塔尼亞胡對貝內特懷有敵意，他自己的一個——時間參謀長。
Report: Netanyahu ordered papers shredded before leaving office
Former PM denies claim he had staffers destroy documents that had been stored in safes at Prime Minister’s Office prior to handing it over to Bennett
By TOI STAFFToday, 11:03 pm
Benjamin Netanyahu arrives to the weekly cabinet meeting at the Prime Minister's Office in Jerusalem on June 10, 2018. (Yonatan Sindel/Flash90/File)
A report Thursday claimed that, just before former prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu left the office on Sunday, his staff shredded documents that were being stored in safes.
A spokesperson for Netanyahu called the report “total lies. No such thing ever happened.”
If true, the allegations detailed by the Haaretz daily would represent an ignominious and likely illegal final act by the Likud leader, as his efforts to hold on to power reached their conclusion, after 12 years in office.
The paper quoted unnamed staffers who worked in Netanyahu’s bureau who said that they had been told to shred documents on Sunday morning, hours before a coalition of parties working to oust Netanyahu from office took power. They said that the order had come from Netanyahu himself.
The Prime Minister’s Office, now headed by Naftali Bennett, said it was unaware of the allegations, but would examine the claims.
According to Haaretz, the safes were located in a part of the Prime Minister’s Office known as the Aquarium, an inner sanctum where the premier and top officials were situated.
Benjamin Netanyahu and Yossi Cohen look over documents in a photo posted on social media by Netanyahu on December 7, 2015, shortly after he named Cohen as the new Mossad chief. (PMO/Facebook/File)
While it is not known what was in the documents that were allegedly shredded, the safes normally held papers relating to senior officials’ work schedules, routine government activity, and more, Haaretz reported.
By law, any documents relating to government work are state property and are to be preserved and archived. According to the report, at least some documents were handed over to Bennett’s staff to be filed away or used as needed.
Members of the new government and activists have sought the release of transcripts and other documents previously held under wraps, in a bid to lift the veil off decisions made by Netanyahu and others during his 12 years in power.
On Wednesday, Defense Minister Benny Gantz urged Bennett to change government regulations in order to allow the publication of minutes from the currently classified coronavirus cabinet meetings over the past year.
Defeated prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu walks away after briefly shaking hands with new Prime Minister Naftali Bennett, after the Knesset voted confidence in Bennett’s coalition by 60-59 votes, June 13, 2021. (Emmanuel Dunand / AFP)
Gantz, who was part of that cabinet, said the disclosure of the protocols will help the public better understand decisions taken by the ministerial body that led the government’s efforts to curb the pandemic, while also holding members of the coronavirus cabinet accountable.
In addition to Gantz, the Movement for Freedom of Information is expected to reach out to Bennett in the coming days to make the same request to release the meeting transcripts.
On Monday, Netanyahu handed the office and its formal powers over to Bennett in an unusually terse and short meeting, which ended without a traditional ceremony, handshake, or photo-op, an indication of the animus Netanyahu harbors toward Bennett, his own one-time chief of staff.
Tal Schneider contributed to this report.
--
Hosting provided by SoundOn
View all episodes
By 蘇育平 Yuping SU
5
44 ratings
2021.06.18 國際新聞導讀-今天伊朗總統大選但結局已定、10月伊拉克國會大選、死海運河計畫約旦單方面喊停
經過多年的拖延，約旦表示以色列廢止紅海-死海運河
報告稱王國將關閉管道，轉而專注於內部海水淡化項目
通過TOI人員今天下午 3:18
以色列死海以北乾旱時期的干土。 (ABIR SULTAN/Flash90)
據Kan公共廣播公司週四報導，約旦已決定取消與以色列和巴勒斯坦權力機構之間廣受吹捧的連接紅海和死海運河的聯合項目，此前該計劃停滯多年。
據報導，安曼已決定最終拔掉聯合管道的插頭，援引未具名消息人士的話說，“以色列並不真正希望”該計劃繼續進行。
相反，據報導，約旦將專注於一個潛在的內部項目，該項目將從紅海抽取水並在亞喀巴的一個設施中進行海水淡化。
跳過廣告
然而，即使發現捐助者為該內部供水項目提供資金，建設也需要時間，無論如何，王國仍然存在短缺，需要每年繼續從以色列購買約 5000 萬立方米的水。菅直人說，兩國之間的和平協議。
紅海-死海運河項目長期以來一直因官僚障礙、融資困難和環保主義者的反對而推遲，再加上以色列兩年來缺乏有效的政府，情況更加複雜。
該項目因以色列和約旦之間的外交緊張局勢而進一步受到損害，儘管新上任的外交部長亞伊爾拉皮德週一似乎尋求更好的關係，稱讚阿卜杜拉國王是“重要的戰略盟友”，並承諾與他合作。
以色列位於地中海沿岸阿什凱倫的海水淡化廠。(Edi Israel/Flash90)
經過多年討論，2013 年簽署了運河協議，旨在幫助緩解約旦嚴重的水資源短缺，同時幫助補充快速縮小的死海。
根據計劃，約旦的海水淡化廠將為該地區提供急需的飲用水，而剩餘的鹽水將向北泵入死海，以補充快速收縮的湖泊，同時通過利用水生產綠色能源。渦輪機。
以色列從運河項目中獲得的經濟收益微乎其微，該項目將花費該國約 10 億美元，但除了對死海的環境影響外，該管道還有一個戰略目標，即幫助維持約旦的穩定。
2006 年至 2011 年敘利亞發生的毀滅性乾旱被認為助長了那裡致命的內戰，因為農民遷往城市，失業加劇了不滿情緒，而糧食短缺進一步加劇了不滿情緒。
約旦是世界上最缺水的國家之一。它從地下含水層抽取近 60% 的水，抽取地下水的速度是地下水更新速度的兩倍。其餘的來自河流和溪流。
以色列南部城市埃拉特和約旦亞喀巴市，2014 年 12 月 18 日。（Hadas Parush/Flash90）
在首都安曼，每周向屋頂水箱供水一次；該國其他地區的供應頻率甚至更低。
據 估計，約旦的水足以維持一個擁有近 1000 萬人口的國家的 200 萬人口——這一數字在過去十年中增加了 150 萬難民，其中大多數是為了逃離鄰國敘利亞的內戰。
After years of delays, Jordan said to nix Red Sea-Dead Sea canal with Israel, PA
Report says kingdom will pull the plug on pipeline and instead focus on internal desalination project
By TOI STAFFToday, 3:18 pm
Dry earth in time of drought, north of Israel's Dead Sea.(ABIR SULTAN/Flash90)
Jordan has decided to cancel a highly touted joint project with Israel and the Palestinian Authority for a canal linking the Red Sea and the Dead Sea, after years of the plan stagnating, the Kan public broadcaster reported Thursday.
According to the report, Amman has decided to finally pull the plug on the joint pipeline, citing unnamed sources saying there was “no real Israeli desire” for the plan to go ahead.
Instead Jordan will reportedly focus on a potential internal project that will see water pumped from the Red Sea and desalinated at a facility in Aqaba.
However, even if donors are found to fund that internal water supply project, it will take time to build and the kingdom will in any case still have a shortfall that requires continued purchase of some 50 million cubic meters of water per year from Israel supplied under the peace agreements between the two countries, Kan said.
The Red Sea-Dead Sea canal project had long been delayed by bureaucratic hurdles, financing difficulties and environmentalist objections, compounded by Israel’s lack of a functioning government for two years.
The project was further harmed by diplomatic tensions between Israel and Jordan although newly installed Foreign Minister Yair Lapid appeared to court better ties on Monday, praising King Abdullah as “an important strategic ally” and promising to work with him.
Israel’s desalination plant in Ashkelon on the Mediterranean coast. (Edi Israel/Flash90)
After being talked about for years, an agreement on the canal was signed in 2013 with the aim of helping to alleviate Jordan’s severe water shortage while helping replenish the fast-shrinking Dead Sea.
According to the plan, a desalination plant in Jordan would provide much-needed drinking water to the region while its leftover brine would be pumped north to the Dead Sea to replenish the fast-shrinking lake, while also producing green energy through the use of water turbines.
Israel was to see very little economic gain from the canal project, which would have cost the country around $1 billion, but as well as the environmental impact on the Dead Sea, there was also the strategic aim of the pipeline helping to maintain Jordan’s stability.
A devastating drought in Syria, from 2006 to 2011, is credited with helping to fuel the deadly civil war there, as farmers moved to the cities, where unemployment intensified discontent, which was further exacerbated by food shortages.
Jordan is one of the most water-starved countries in the world. It draws nearly 60 percent of its water from underground aquifers, extracting at twice the rate that the groundwater can be renewed. The rest comes from rivers and streams.
The southern Israeli city of Eilat and Jordanian city of Aqaba seen, December 18, 2014. (Hadas Parush/Flash90)
In the capital, Amman, water is supplied to rooftop tanks once a week; other areas of the country are supplied even less frequently.
According to one estimate, Jordan’s water is enough to sustain two million people, in a country that has close to ten million — a figure swelled over the past decade by 1.5 million refugees, most of them fleeing civil war in neighboring Syria.
Sue Surkes contributed to this report.
美國稱拜登和埃爾多安就阿富汗問題達成一致但S-400問題尚未解決
隨著西方軍隊的撤離，機場的安全對於駐紮在阿富汗以外的外交使團的運作至關重要。
通過路透
2021 年 6 月 17 日 23:48
土耳其總統塔伊普·埃爾多安和美國總統喬·拜登於 2021 年 6 月 14 日在比利時布魯塞爾舉行的北約峰會期間出席雙邊會議。Murat Cetinmuhurdar/總統新聞辦公室/講義
（照片來源：MURAT CETINMUHURDAR/總統新聞辦公室/通過路透社提供的資料）
廣告
美國國家安全顧問傑克沙利文週四表示，總統喬拜登和土耳其總統塔伊普埃爾多安在本週的一次會議上同意，隨著美國從阿富汗撤軍，土耳其將在確保喀布爾機場安全方面發揮主導作用。
然而，沙利文說，兩位領導人未能解決長期存在的土耳其購買俄羅斯 S-400 防禦系統的問題，這是一場使北約盟國之間關係緊張的激烈爭執。他補充說，關於這個問題的對話將繼續進行。
沙利文告訴記者，拜登和埃爾多安週一在北約峰會上會面，討論了阿富汗問題。沙利文說，埃爾多安尋求美國的某些形式的支持以確保機場安全，拜登承諾提供這種支持。
“領導人明確承諾，土耳其將在確保哈米德卡爾扎伊國際機場安全方面發揮主導作用，我們現在正在研究如何執行以實現這一目標，”沙利文說，並提供了美國方面的第一個細節。土耳其總統沒有提供會議細節。
土耳其和美國在一系列問題上存在分歧，包括安卡拉購買俄羅斯武器、敘利亞和東地中海的政策分歧以及對埃爾多安和拜登首次面對面會晤取得突破的期望很小。
兩位領導人在會晤後聽起來很樂觀，但他們沒有宣布取得了哪些具體進展。一個潛在的合作領域是阿富汗，在美國和北約部隊在未來幾週內撤出後，安卡拉已提出在那裡保護和運營喀布爾機場。
隨著西方軍隊的撤離，機場的安全對於駐紮在阿富汗以外的外交使團的運作至關重要。
上週，塔利班發言人表示，根據 2020 年美軍撤出協議，土耳其應從阿富汗撤軍，但沙利文表示，塔利班的言論並未阻止美國正在製定的“詳細而有效”的安全計劃。
“顯然，我們認真對待塔利班或阿富汗的其他分子將攻擊西方或國際存在的擔憂……我們認為塔利班公開所說的話不應或將阻止目前正在進行的建立這種安全存在的努力， “ 他說。
作為總統，拜登對埃爾多安採取了比前任唐納德特朗普更冷靜的語氣。拜登很快承認 1915 年對亞美尼亞人的大屠殺是種族滅絕——這一立場激怒了土耳其——並加大了對土耳其人權記錄的批評。
但尚不清楚拜登是否在會晤期間與埃爾多安提出人權問題，沙利文幾乎沒有提供關於 S-400 的僵局如何（如果有的話）的細節，這促使華盛頓從 F-35 戰鬥機中移除安卡拉計劃並實施制裁，將得到解決。
“他們討論了這個問題。這個問題沒有得到解決。他們承諾繼續就 S-400 進行對話，兩個團隊將在會議後跟進，”他說。
US says Biden, Erdogan agreed on Afghanistan but S-400 issue unresolved
The security of the airport is crucial for the operation of diplomatic missions out of the Afghanistan as Western forces pull out.
By REUTERS
JUNE 17, 2021 23:48
Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan and U.S. President Joe Biden attend a bilateral meeting on the sidelines of the NATO summit in Brussels, Belgium June 14, 2021. Murat Cetinmuhurdar/Presidential Press Office/Handout
(photo credit: MURAT CETINMUHURDAR/PRESIDENTIAL PRESS OFFICE/HANDOUT VIA REUTERS)
Advertisement
President Joe Biden and Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan agreed in a meeting this week that Turkey would take a lead role in securing Kabul airport as the United States withdraws troops from Afghanistan, US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan said on Thursday.
However, the two leaders were not able to resolve the long-standing issue of Turkey's purchase of Russian S-400 defense systems, Sullivan said, a bitter dispute that strained ties between the NATO allies. He added that dialog on the issue would continue.
Sullivan told reporters that Biden and Erdogan, in their meeting on Monday at the NATO summit, discussed the Afghanistan issue. Erdogan sought certain forms of US support to secure the airport and Biden committed to providing that support, Sullivan said.
"The clear commitment from the leaders was established that Turkey would play a lead role in securing Hamid Karzai International Airport and we are now working through how to execute to get to that," Sullivan said, giving the first details from the US side of the meeting which the Turkish presidency has not provided details of.
Turkey and the United States have been at odds over a host of issues including Ankara's purchase of Russian weaponry, policy differences in Syria and the Eastern Mediterranean and expectations for a breakthrough in first face-to-face meeting between Erdogan and Biden were slim.
The two leaders sounded upbeat after their meeting although they did not announce what concrete progress they made. One potential area of cooperation has been Afghanistan, where Ankara has offered to guard and operate Kabul airport after US and NATO forces withdraw in coming weeks.
The security of the airport is crucial for the operation of diplomatic missions out of the Afghanistan as Western forces pull out.
Last week, a Taliban spokesman said Turkey should withdraw its troops from Afghanistan under the 2020 deal for the pullout of US forces but Sullivan said the Taliban comments did not deter the "detailed and effective" security plan the United States was putting together.
"Obviously we take seriously the concern that Taliban or other elements in Afghanistan will attack the Western or the international presence…We do not believe that what Taliban has said publicly should or will deter the efforts underway right now to establish that security presence," he said.
As president, Biden has adopted a cooler tone than predecessor Donald Trump towards Erdogan. Biden quickly recognized the 1915 massacre of Armenians as genocide - a position that angers Turkey - and stepped up criticism of Turkey's human rights record.
But it was not clear if Biden raised the human rights issue with Erdogan during his meeting and Sullivan provided little details on how, if at all, the impasse over the S-400s, which prompted Washington to remove Ankara from the F-35 fighter jet program and impose sanctions, would be resolved.
"They discussed it. There was not a resolution of the issue. There was a commitment to continue the dialog on the S-400 and the two teams will be following up on that coming out of the meeting," he said.
納夫塔利·貝內特總理感謝安格拉·默克爾邀請她訪問以色列
默克爾打電話給貝內特，祝賀他擔任總理的新角色以及以色列新政府的組建。
通過耶路撒冷郵報STAFF
2021 年 6 月 17 日 19:00
自 7 月 20 日在布魯塞爾爆發冠狀病毒病以來，德國總理安格拉·默克爾 (Angela Merkel) 在第一次面對面的歐盟峰會上旁觀
（圖片來源：路透社）
廣告
總理納夫塔利·貝內特週四與德國總理安格拉·默克爾通了電話，並邀請她訪問以色列。
默克爾打電話給貝內特，祝賀他擔任新職務和組建以色列新政府。
貝內特感謝總理，並與她談到了以色列的“新精神”以及加强两國關係的機會。
貝內特還對德國在上個月的“城牆守護者行動”期間對以色列安全的承諾和對以色列自衛權利的支持表示讚賞。
週一晚些時候，候補總理兼外交部長亞伊爾·拉皮德與德國外長海科·馬斯進行了交談，討論了以色列新政府，同時探討了解決地區和全球問題的新方法，“從冠狀病毒大流行的影響來看，與經濟和安全有關的問題，”拉皮德在推特上寫道。
即將卸任的總統魯文·里夫林（Reuven Rivlin）本周也與默克爾進行了交談，在他離任前向她告別。
在電話中，里夫林回憶了默克爾 2008 年在以色列議會的歷史性演講，他說：“我將永遠記得你是一位關心我們人民之間的聯繫而不僅僅是國家之間聯繫的領導人。
“你深入了解以色列公民：了解我們的文化，了解我們的習俗，了解對我們很重要的所有原則。”
PM Naftali Bennett thanks Angela Merkel, invites her to visit Israel
Merkel had called Bennett in order to congratulate him on his new role as prime minister and on the formation of Israel's new government.
By JERUSALEM POST STAFF
JUNE 17, 2021 19:00
German Chancellor Angela Merkel looks on during the first faceto-face EU summit since the coronavirus disease outbreak in Brussels on July 20
(photo credit: REUTERS)
Advertisement
Prime Minister Naftali Bennett spoke with German Chancellor Angela Merkel on the phone Thursday and invited her to visit Israel.
Merkel had called Bennett in order to congratulate him on his new role and on the formation of Israel's new government.
Bennett thanked the chancellor and spoke with her about Israel's "new spirit" and the opportunities to strengthen ties between the two countries.
Bennett also expressed his appreciation for Germany's commitment to Israel's security and support for Israel's right to defend itself during Operation Guardian of the Walls last month.
Later on Monday, Alternate Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Yair Lapid talked to his German counterpart, Foreign Minister Heiko Mass, and discussed the new Israeli government, while exploring new ways of addressing regional and global issues, "ranging from the effects of the coronavirus pandemic, to issues relating to economics and security," Lapid tweeted.
Outgoing President Reuven Rivlin also spoke with Merkel this week, bidding her farewell before he leaves office.
In the call, Rivlin recalled Merkel's historic 2008 speech in the Knesset, saying: "I will always remember you as a leader who cared about the connection between our peoples and not just the connection between the countries.
"You knew the citizens of Israel in depth: about our culture, about our customs, about all the principles that are important to us."
以色列新政府將面臨哪些安全挑戰？
幕後：過去，新領導人的出現促使以色列的對手對他進行考驗
作者：喬納森·斯派爾
2021 年 6 月 17 日 16:34
本週，總理納夫塔利·貝內特會見了以色列國防軍參謀長阿維夫·科哈維。
（照片來源：AMOS BEN-GERSHOM/GPO）
廣告
如果有的話，本傑明·內塔尼亞胡政府被推翻，並由納夫塔利·貝內特和亞伊爾·拉皮德領導的新政府取代他對以色列的國家安全有什麼影響？
過去，新總理的出現，在國家安全領域相對缺乏經驗，導致以色列的對手試圖“試探”新的首席執行官，導致一段時期的不穩定。
最近，埃胡德·奧爾默特於 2006 年 1 月接替體弱多病的阿里爾·沙龍掌舵，隨後迅速發生了一系列挑釁，首先是加沙的哈馬斯，然後是黎巴嫩真主黨。這些因素促成了 2006 年 7 月至 8 月的第二次黎巴嫩戰爭。雖然無法在奧爾默特加入與哈馬斯和真主黨的挑釁之間建立某種因果關係，但時間表明奧爾默特的加入及其缺乏經驗。國家安全領域，幾乎可以肯定，這兩個組織的決策過程都被考慮在內。
那麼，新政府及其可能面臨的挑戰是什麼？
重要的是要記住，與奧爾默特政府相比，新政府在國家安全方面的經驗明顯豐富。後者只包含一位具有頂級安全經驗的部長——即以色列國防軍前參謀長沙烏爾·莫法茲。由於他的選舉名單薄弱，莫法茲擁有交通部不太可能的職位。
相比之下，貝內特本人在 2019-2020 年期間擔任內塔尼亞胡的國防部長。同樣重要的是，前以色列國防軍參謀長本尼·甘茨將繼續留在國防部。新內閣雖然未經測試，但並不缺乏最高級別的國家安全證書。
有兩個國家安全“文件”可能會引起新政府的立即關注。這些是加沙的哈馬斯問題，更重要的是，以色列與伊朗正在進行的影子戰爭。
關於前者，加沙的哈馬斯當局顯然正在尋求保持 5 月下旬為期 11 天的敵對行動期間建立的勢頭。週二從加沙發射的燃燒氣球在以色列境內引發了 20 起火災，表明了“測試”的可能方向。哈馬斯將通過關注阿克薩和耶路撒冷問題來尋求繼續對以色列（和巴勒斯坦權力機構）施加壓力，同時將其行動調整到可能導致以色列做出重大反應的門檻以下。
以色列新政府是否願意接受這種偶爾爆發的持續模式還有待觀察。
過去，Naftali Bennett 強烈反對任何與加沙武裝哈馬斯政權長期共存的目標。作為 2014 年的內閣部長，他談到需要“加沙完全非軍事化，就像在猶太和撒馬利亞一樣。沒有導彈。沒有隧道。必須賦予以色列國防軍一項明確的任務：實現這一目標。” 當前與哈馬斯控制的加沙事實上的共存政策發生重大轉變，加上努力建立對它的威懾，似乎不太可能。
哈馬斯在最近 11 天的戰鬥中遭到破壞。但它也取得了重大成就：通過圍繞阿克薩和耶路撒冷的象徵進行動員，它成功地在以色列國內引發了廣泛的騷亂，在西岸發生了一些騷亂，並在西方的重要地區動員了穆斯林公眾輿論（較少所以在中東，尤其是）。毫無疑問，該運動希望進一步利用在未來幾個月由此開啟的機會，爭取實現巴勒斯坦事業的領導地位。
關於與伊朗的影子戰爭問題，有一個重要的因素：俄羅斯。以色列與莫斯科的關係對於維持外交環境至關重要，這使得以色列正在進行的降低和破壞伊朗在敘利亞軍事能力的企圖成為可能。
沒有比這更個性化的關係了。俄羅斯國防部支持阿薩德，並希望採取行動防止敘利亞的破壞，這是以色列持續和激烈的運動不可避免的結果。內塔尼亞胡與普京總統建立的個人聯繫，以及內塔尼亞胡在個人外交上的不懈努力，在平衡這方面發揮了重要作用。這種溝通和影響的渠道能否在內塔尼亞胡被推翻後繼續存在還有待觀察。
這種變化來得不合時宜，因為美國對伊朗的外交努力也預示著“戰爭之間的戰爭”運動的到來。作為上屆美國政府對德黑蘭“最大壓力”運動的一部分，以色列的運動是天作之合。在華盛頓正在尋求（但難以捉摸）與德黑蘭和解的地區，它有可能顯得異常。屆時，美國很可能會開始尋求與俄羅斯就敘利亞問題達成全面協議。這一進程如果出現並繼續進行，將對以色列繼續開展運動以阻止伊朗在敘利亞的持續鞏固的可行性提出一個問號。
維持目前俄羅斯對以色列行動的同意似乎對新興的以色列政府構成了重大挑戰。這需要由年輕的以色列新領導層來實現，面對世界領先的政治家和戰略家之一，而此時華盛頓的偏好可能與以色列不同。貝內特以國防部長的身份聲稱，有跡象表明以色列的政策成功地促使伊朗從敘利亞撤軍。事實證明，這種說法為時過早。這個問題將繼續引起他的注意。
加沙和哈馬斯通過 al-Aqsa 爭奪巴勒斯坦領導權很可能成為頭條新聞，因為這將涉及立即的動態行動。但是，為正在進行的針對伊朗的運動保持一個窗口的問題是更重要的挑戰。
與此同時，以色列國家安全戰略的總體輪廓幾乎不會受到政府更迭的影響。在這些問題上出現重大分歧影響以色列主要選舉陣營的日子已經一去不復返了。他們是 2000 年奧斯陸進程崩潰的受害者。他們沒有返回的跡象。相反，新政府看起來將繼續內塔尼亞胡的長期戰爭戰略，尋求鞏固以色列的經濟和社會實力，避免讓步和不必要的對抗，同時假設伊斯蘭世界內的重要大國繼續敵視。
未來時期要測試的問題不是新方法的應用，而是新管理團隊在持續應用現已有效實施了二十年的戰略方面的表現。
作者是中東報導與分析中心執行主任，中東論壇研究員。他是《秋天的日子：敘利亞和伊拉克戰爭中的記者之旅》一書的作者。
What security challenges will Israel's new government face?
BEHIND THE LINES: In the past, the emergence of a new leader has prompted Israel’s adversaries to put him to the test
By JONATHAN SPYER
JUNE 17, 2021 16:34
PRIME MINISTER Naftali Bennett meets this week with IDF Chief of Staff Aviv Kohavi.
(photo credit: AMOS BEN-GERSHOM/GPO)
Advertisement
What, if any, are the implications for Israel’s national security of the toppling of Benjamin Netanyahu’s government, and his replacement by the new administration led by Naftali Bennett and Yair Lapid?
In the past, the emergence of a new prime minister, relatively inexperienced in the national security field, has led to efforts by Israel’s adversaries to “test” the new chief executive, leading to a period of instability.
Most recently, Ehud Olmert’s replacement of the infirm Ariel Sharon at the helm in January 2006 was rapidly followed by a series of provocations, from first Hamas in Gaza, and then Lebanese Hezbollah. These precipitated the Second Lebanon War of July-August 2006. While it is not possible to establish a certain causal link between the accession of Olmert and the provocations by Hamas and Hezbollah, the timing indicates that the accession of Olmert, and his inexperience in the area of national security, almost certainly factored into the decision-making process in both organizations.
What, then, of the new government and the likely challenges facing it?
It is important to remember that the new government is notably richer in national security experience than was Olmert’s administration. The latter contained only one minister with top-level security experience – namely, former IDF chief of staff Shaul Mofaz. Because of the weakness of his electoral list, Mofaz had the unlikely portfolio of the Transport Ministry.
By contrast, Bennett himself served as Netanyahu’s defense minister in the 2019-2020 period. No less importantly, former IDF chief of staff Benny Gantz is set to stay in position at the Defense Ministry. The new cabinet, though untested, is thus not lacking in national security credentials at the top level.
THERE ARE two national security “files” that are likely to engage the immediate attention of the new government. These are the issue of Hamas in Gaza and, more portentously, Israel’s ongoing shadow war with Iran.
Regarding the former, it is already clear that the Hamas authority in Gaza is seeking to maintain the momentum established in the 11-day period of hostilities in late May. The launching of incendiary balloons from Gaza on Tuesday, which started 20 fires inside Israel, indicated the likely direction of the “test.” Hamas will seek to keep up the pressure on Israel (and the Palestinian Authority) by focusing on the issue of al-Aqsa and Jerusalem, while calibrating its actions to below the threshold likely to make inevitable a major Israeli response.
It remains to be seen whether the new Israeli government will be willing to accept this ongoing pattern of occasional flare-ups.
In the past, Naftali Bennett came out strongly against the goal of any attempt at long-term coexistence with an armed Hamas regime in Gaza. As a cabinet minister in 2014 he spoke of the need for the complete “demilitarization of Gaza, as in Judea and Samaria. No missiles. No tunnels. The IDF must be given a clear task: make that happen.” A major shift from the current policy of de facto coexistence with Hamas-controlled Gaza, plus efforts to build deterrence against it, seems unlikely.
Hamas suffered damage in the recent 11 days of fighting. But it also made a significant achievement: by mobilizing around the symbols of al-Aqsa and Jerusalem, it succeeded in precipitating widespread rioting inside Israel, some unrest in the West Bank, and mobilization of Muslim public opinion in significant parts of the West (less so in the Mideast, notably). The movement will without doubt be wishing to further exploit the opportunity thereby opened in the months ahead for a bid to achieve the leadership of the Palestinian cause.
Regarding the issue of the shadow war with Iran, there is a factor of primary significance: Russia. Israel’s relations with Moscow have been crucial in maintaining the diplomatic environment that makes possible the ongoing Israeli attempt to downgrade and disrupt Iranian military capacity in Syria.
There was no relationship more personalized than this one. The Russian defense ministry is pro-Assad and wished to move to prevent the disruption in Syria that is the inevitable result of Israel’s ongoing and intense campaign. The personal connection established by Netanyahu with President Vladimir Putin, and Netanyahu’s tireless efforts at personal diplomacy played a significant role in balancing this. It remains to be seen whether this channel of communication and influence will survive Netanyahu’s toppling.
This change comes at an inopportune moment, in that US diplomatic efforts vis-à-vis Iran also augur badly for the “war between the wars” campaign. As part of the previous US administration’s campaign of “maximum pressure” on Tehran, Israel’s campaign was a natural fit. In a region in which Washington is seeking (however elusively) rapprochement with Tehran, it is in danger of appearing as an anomaly. At such a time, the US may well start seeking a general agreement with Russia on Syria. Such a process, if it emerges and proceeds, would place a question mark over the feasibility of Israel’s continued campaign to prevent Iran’s ongoing consolidation in Syria.
Maintaining the current Russian consent to Israeli operations looks set to represent a major challenge to the emerging Israeli government. This will need to be achieved by a young and new Israeli leadership, facing one of the world’s leading statesmen and strategists, at a time when Washington’s preferences are likely to diverge from Israel’s. Bennett famously claimed as defense minister that there were indications that Israeli policy was succeeding in precipitating an Iranian withdrawal from Syria. The claim turned out to be premature. This issue will continue to engage his attention.
Gaza and Hamas’s bid for the Palestinian leadership via al-Aqsa is likely to grab the headlines, since it will involve immediate kinetic action. But the issue of maintaining a window for the ongoing campaign against Iran is the more weighty challenge.
The broad contours of Israeli national security strategy, meanwhile, will be almost unaffected by the change of government. The days when major splits on these issues affected the main electoral camps in Israel are long gone. These were the victim of the collapse of the Oslo process in 2000. They show no sign of returning. Rather, the new administration looks set to continue the long-war strategy of Netanyahu, seeking to consolidate Israel’s economic and societal strength and avoid both concessions and unnecessary confrontations, while operating on the assumption of continued hostility from significant powers within the Islamic world.
The issue to be tested in the period ahead is not the application of a new approach, but, rather, the performance of a new management team in the continued application of a strategy effectively in place now for two decades.
The writer is the executive director of the Middle East Center for Reporting and Analysis, and a fellow at the Middle East Forum. He is the author of Days of the Fall: A Reporter’s Journey in the Syria and Iraq Wars.
阿拉伯媒體的聲音：伊拉克人會抵制下一次選舉嗎？
2021 年伊拉克議會選舉定於 10 月舉行。我們在 2018 年以前的選舉中目睹的情景會重演嗎？伊拉克人會集體抵制選舉嗎？
通過針對媒體線
2021 年 6 月 17 日 11:46
丹麥國旗。
（照片來源：漢娜·麥凱/路透社）
廣告
伊拉克會抵制下一次選舉嗎？
伊拉克阿爾馬達，6 月 11 日
有關 The Media Line 的更多故事，請訪問themedialine.org
2021 年伊拉克議會選舉定於 10 月舉行。我們在 2018 年以前的選舉中目睹的情景會重演嗎？伊拉克人會集體抵制選舉嗎？
什麼不鼓勵大多數發達國家的民主實踐？為什麼不投票？
先生們，我和所有伊拉克人一樣，夢想著真正的變革，但我們的政客們正在實踐的東西不能被描述為“民主”。我們的政治制度與在我們眼前一遍又一遍地播放的悲喜劇沒有太大區別。選舉一結束，完全相同的人就會出現在我們的電視屏幕上，發表完全相同的演講，使用完全相同的流行語。“我們是來救你的”將是他們講話的要點。
但是伊拉克人民迫切需要的是具有正直、誠實和寬宏大量品質的政治領導人；不是那些尋求增強自身權力、維護自身利益、濫用政治豁免權逃避腐敗的人。
任人唯親的惡臭充斥著我們國家機構的走廊。從那裡，它蔓延到我們各省、城鎮和城市的街道上，地方領導人在那裡爭奪政治頭銜、社會聲望和權力。
在之前的選舉中，伊拉克約有一半的合格選民選擇不投票。他們厭倦了乞求最基本的權利。
我不知道選舉結果會是什麼樣子。我也不知道實際投票率是多少。但我知道伊拉克人民已經受夠了。他們無法忍受過去三年來一直與之打交道的同樣腐敗和無能的領導層。— 阿里·侯賽因
** 猶太人的第一個狀態：為什麼這是一個隱藏的事實？**
科威特，Al-Qabas，6 月 12 日
你聽說過俄羅斯的猶太自治州嗎？可能不會。那是因為以色列國在隱藏這個共和國存在的事實方面有既得利益。
猶太自治州位於俄羅斯東南部，是猶太人的祖國。直到今天，當地人口的很大一部分是猶太人。不幸的是，與以色列國合作，這一事實已被掩蓋，因此在巴勒斯坦建立猶太人家園的猶太復國主義夢想將繼續存在。
與猶太復國主義者聲稱的不同，巴勒斯坦從來都不是猶太人的家園。猶太人可以很容易地在他們分配的自治區建立自己的家園，在那裡他們不會傷害任何人，也不會依賴山姆大叔的持續支持。
據記載，這個獨立的共和國面積超過 40,000 平方公里。也就是說，它接近瑞士的大小。它還具有極低的人口密度。因此，它本可以成為猶太人的理想家園。猶太復國主義者本可以在已經分配給他們的地方建立他們的國家，而不是篡奪巴勒斯坦的土地。
但這一事實已被掩蓋，因此在以色列竊取巴勒斯坦土地時，世界將站在以色列一邊。
另一個重要問題：為什麼猶太復國主義者阻止這個共和國從俄羅斯分離？為什麼猶太自治州沒有像車臣等其他領土一樣尋求獨立？
我認為答案很明確：沒有人希望將注意力從巴勒斯坦轉移開。猶太復國主義者希望隱藏他們的選擇，以便對巴勒斯坦的領土佔領可以繼續進行到今天。– Fakhri Hashem Sayed Rajab
Voices from the Arab press: Will Iraqis boycott the next election?
The 2021 Iraqi parliamentary elections are scheduled to take place in October. Will the scenario we witnessed in the previous elections of 2018 be repeated? Will Iraqis boycott the election en masse?
By THE MEDIA LINE
JUNE 17, 2021 11:46
THE DANISH flag.
(photo credit: HANNAH MCKAY/ REUTERS)
Advertisement
WILL IRAQIS BOYCOTT THE NEXT ELECTION?
Al-Mada, Iraq, June 11
For more stories from The Media Line go to themedialine.org
The 2021 Iraqi parliamentary elections are scheduled to take place in October. Will the scenario we witnessed in the previous elections of 2018 be repeated? Will Iraqis boycott the election en masse?
Some might ask: Why not encourage the practice of democracy that takes place in most countries of the developed world? Why not vote?
Gentlemen, I, like all Iraqis, dream of real change, but what our politicians are practicing cannot be described as “democracy.” Our political system is not much different from a tragicomedy that is playing over and over in front of our eyes, on repeat. As soon as the elections are over, the exact same people will appear on our television screens, delivering the exact same speeches, ripe with the exact same buzzwords. “We came to save you” will be the gist of their remarks.
But what the people of Iraq are desperate for are political leaders who possess the qualities of integrity, honesty and magnanimity; not people who seek to enhance their own power, protect their own interests, and abuse their political immunity to evade corruption.
The foul odor of cronyism fills the hallways of our state institutions. From there, it spreads into the streets of our provinces, towns and cities, where local leaders fight over political titles, social prestige and power.
During the previous elections, about half of eligible voters in Iraq chose not to vote. They were tired of begging for their most basic rights.
I don’t know what the election results will look like. I also don’t know what turnout rates will actually be. But I do know that the people of Iraq are fed up. They cannot bear to suffer the same corrupt and inept leadership they’ve been dealing with for the past three years. – Ali Hussein
** THE FIRST STATE OF THE JEWS: WHY IS IT A HIDDEN FACT?**
Al-Qabas, Kuwait, June 12
Have you heard of the Jewish Autonomous Oblast in Russia? Probably not. That’s because the State of Israel has a vested interest in hiding the fact that this republic exists.
The Jewish Autonomous Oblast, located in southeastern Russia, is the motherland of the Jews. Until this very day, a large portion of the local population is Jewish. Unfortunately, this fact has been obscured, in cooperation with the State of Israel, so that the Zionist dream of establishing a Jewish homeland in Palestine would continue to exist.
Unlike what Zionists like to claim, Palestine was never the homeland of the Jewish people. The Jews could have easily established their homeland in their allocated autonomous region, where they wouldn’t harm anyone or rely on the continuous support of Uncle Sam.
For the record, this independent republic has an area of over 40,000 square kilometers. That is, it is close to the size of Switzerland. It also has an extremely low population density. Therefore, it could have served as an ideal homeland for the Jews. Instead of usurping Palestinian lands, Zionists could have built their nation at a place already allocated to them.
But this fact has been obscured so that the world would stand by Israel’s side as it steals Palestinian lands.
Another important question: Why did Zionists prevent the secession of this republic from Russia? How come the Jewish Autonomous Oblast didn’t seek independence, just like other territories such as Chechnya?
I think the answer is clear: No one wanted attention diverted away from Palestine. The Zionists wanted to keep their options hidden so that the territorial occupation of Palestine could continue to take place to this very day. – Fakhri Hashem Sayed Rajab
新政府不能解決以色列最深層次的宗教和國家問題嗎？
宗教事務：新聯盟表示希望推進的立法能否真正獲得通過？
作者：傑瑞米·沙龍
2021 年 6 月 17 日 20:38
以色列首席拉比在耶路撒冷。
（圖片來源：FLASH90）
廣告
在前總理本雅明·內塔尼亞胡 (Benjamin Netanyahu) 擔任總理的 12 年任期內，宗教和國家事務幾乎完全由極端正統黨派沙斯 (Shas) 和聯合托拉猶太教 (United Torah Judaism) 負責。
這種情況在某種程度上甚至成立，當這些政黨不在 2013 年至 2015 年的以色列第 33 屆政府中時，Yesh Atid 嘗試過但在這些問題上取得進展相對不成功。
這次失敗的部分原因是保守派和強硬的宗教猶太復國主義拉比的反對，他們向納夫塔利·貝內特領導的巴伊特耶胡迪黨施加壓力，反對影響深遠的改革，但也由於極端正統黨派對內塔尼亞胡施加的壓力。警告他不要允許在宗教和國家問題上進行重大的立法改革，從而破壞他們的政治聯盟。
鑑於其微弱的多數和其聯盟夥伴的意識形態差異，以及重大的外交和安全挑戰，週日宣誓就職的新政府面臨著巨大的政治困難。
但是儘管存在這些問題，儘管猶太國家的宗教和國家問題具有可燃性，但新政府在關於共同商定的聯盟立法議程的聯盟協議的附錄中承諾，就此類問題實施四項改革，所有其中將通過立法進行。
事實上，通過所有四項立法的時間非常短，其中一項計劃在政府成立後 30 天內獲得批准，其他在 60 或 90 天內獲得批准，這表明即使不具有法律約束力，對這些問題的承諾。
具體而言，附錄列出了權力下放 kashrut 監管市場的改革；去中心化轉換；改變選舉首席拉比的選舉機構；並改變拉比法庭法官遴選委員會的組成。
競爭，以改善經常被企業本身和國家報告批評並遭受嚴重腐敗的 kashrut 監督服務。
關於皈依的立法將允許市政首席拉比進行皈依，從而將皈依的權力從首席拉比的控制中下放，並允許自由傾向的市政首席拉比，他們都是東正教，執行諸如未成年人皈依之類的政策，以及通常使用更溫和的轉換標準。
第三項立法將改變選舉首席拉比的選舉機構的構成，其具體目標是選舉“猶太復國主義首席拉比”——也就是說，不是像兩位現任現任總統那樣極端正統的拉比。
最後，立法附錄規定通過一項法案，該法案將保證在女性拉比法官遴選委員會中至少有兩個席位，目的是讓婦女對拉比法官的遴選產生更大的影響，這些法官對拉比法官的遴選產生重大影響。以色列婦女的生活，儘管婦女本身被禁止擔任拉比法官。
除了這四個問題之外，還有其他一些宗教和國家問題潛伏在幕後，需要解決或忽略。
其中之一是政府 2016 年的西牆決議，該決議決定在西牆南端為非東正教祈禱創造一個國家認可的空間，但在極端正統派抵抗之後，該決議於 2017 年被同一政府無限期暫停計劃，在最初同意之後。
另一個問題將是提供民事婚姻或民事結合，這是 Yisrael Beytenu 的一個重要關注點，而在安息日允許公共交通是聯盟的左翼和自由黨將尋求推進的另一個主題。
Yisrael Beytenu 與 Yesh Atid 的聯盟協議規定，在極端正統學校促進核心課程主題的研究，如數學、科學和英語，是另一個重要問題。
宗教猶太復國主義者 Ne'emanei Torah Va'Avodah 遊說團體的宗教和國家部門負責人 Tani Frank 認為，將首席拉比的服務（例如皈依和 kashrut）下放是提高其質量的關鍵。
他說，一方面，首席拉比對以色列大部分宗教生活的壟斷和中央集權是“系統性的失敗”，這導致濫用權力，並使身體相信它可以在沒有克制。
然而，問題出現了，新聯盟表示希望推進的立法是否真的可以通過。
或許現任政府面臨的最嚴重的政治問題是其最低限度的多數，這將使它在議會工作的各個方面都陷入地獄般的生活，無論是在委員會、通過立法還是僅僅通過不信任投票。
因此，首相急於從反對黨選入他已經很笨拙的聯盟，但他的選擇似乎僅限於極端正統黨派，儘管至少在短期內這種叛逃的機會看起來非常渺茫。
儘管如此，反對Shas和UTJ的擔憂可能會減輕擬議改革的通過，希望推遲或淡化它們可以為他們將來加入政府開闢道路。
此外，聯盟中的保守宗教分子，如 Yamina MK Nir Orbach，他曾是高度保守的 Bayit Yehudi 領導人 Rafi Peretz 的高級顧問，可能會在通過此類立法時產生問題。
新希望高級人物、建築和住房部長澤夫埃爾金與宗教猶太復國主義部門的強硬分子關係密切，他們強烈反對削弱首席拉比的權威。
當聯盟中的每個 MK 都需要通過一項法案時，這將成為一個重大問題。
然而，弗蘭克對擬議的立法可以成功通過成為法律表示樂觀。
他指出，在與宗教猶太復國主義黨分裂後，亞米納幾乎沒有受到拉比的影響，新的宗教服務部長馬坦卡哈納比前副宗教服務部長伊萊本-達漢更為溫和，後者在 2013 年期間負責該部和 2015 年，但其根源和影響在於宗教猶太復國主義社區的保守派。
弗蘭克認為，許多投票支持亞米娜的宗教猶太復國主義選民在宗教上是溫和的，他們認為擬議的改革對於徹底改革一個不再符合大多數宗教猶太復國主義社區的需求和意見的宗教機構來說是必要和可取的。 .
弗蘭克說：“亞米納需要向選民表明，它實際上正在就這些問題採取行動。”
宗教和國家問題專家、Calcalist 的專欄作家沙哈爾·伊蘭 (Shahar Ilan) 同意提議的改革將有利於以色列的宗教生活，但表示政府必須非常謹慎地進行改革。
對於 Hiddush 宗教多元化組織的前副主任伊蘭來說，宗教和國家關切的可燃性，尤其是在被納入立法形式時，意味著在這個議程上應該非常謹慎，以免炸毀整個政府.
儘管 Ilan 認為其中一些問題對國家的健康至關重要，例如針對極端正統派學生的核心課程研究，但他表示，他更擔心的是，如果政府採取措施，可能會對法治和民主造成損害。倒台，內塔尼亞胡重新掌權。
伊蘭說：“內塔尼亞胡已經證明，他準備傷害和燒毀民主和法治的每一個守門人，以影響和停止對他的審判，因此至關重要的是他不會重新掌權。”
因此，伊蘭說，如果要推進聯盟協議中規定的變更，則應通過對政府法規而不是立法進行行政變更來進行變更。
在以色列議會通過法律會引起人們的注意，引起宗教和極端正統黨派的憤怒，並造成政治壓力和問題。
因此，與 Yisrael Beytenu 所尋求的民事結合立法不同，內政部長 Ayelet Shaked 可以簡單地批准美國猶他州在線和遠程進行的民事婚姻登記。
這將解決數以萬計的以色列人無法在自己的國家結婚的嚴重問題，這是由於已建立的宗教機構——猶太人的首席拉比——對婚姻的壟斷，同時避免了大規模的議會攤牌並使搖擺不定的MK承受壓力。
西牆協議在程序上也很容易解決，需要內閣進行簡單的投票，儘管這樣做肯定會引起極端正統黨派的憤怒。
已提議更改初始決議的語言，這將掩蓋但不會改變改革和保守運動代表將出席該網站行政委員會的事實，這可能會簡化這一步驟的通過。
伊蘭說，交通部的規定可能會改變，以允許更多的小巴出租車在安息日運營，從而避免在這個問題上立法的必要性。
並通過胡蘿蔔加大棒向極端正統派市政委員會施壓，允許在其管轄範圍內建立州立極端正統學校，而不是通過削減資金來威脅所有極端正統學校，這將防止與哈雷迪社區的巨大對抗並抵禦內部來自新希望和亞米納的 UTJ 和 Shas 附近元素的聯盟反對。
伊蘭說，關於卡什魯特、皈依以及如何選擇下一任首席拉比的改革主要是內部宗教鬥爭，政府可以遏制和承受這些鬥爭。
但是，對於高度敏感和象徵性問題的徹底改變，例如公證婚姻、安息日的公共交通和極端正統教育，應該再擱置一天。
在過去的 12 年中，猶太國家在宗教事務上的衝突已成為以色列社會中分裂最嚴重的分裂之一，其中對民族和宗教身份的擔憂與對多元化和免於宗教脅迫的自由的要求發生了衝突。
政府確實面臨著一系列令人恐懼的挑戰，同時在推進其可能達成的任何議程方面面臨巨大的政治障礙。
但是，控制宗教生活的問題在這個猶太國家持續存在並惡化了太久，如果不能糾正其中一些問題，可能會加速對宗教機構的信任的侵蝕，並加深社會分裂。
Can the new gov't resolve Israel's deepest religion and state issues?
RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS: Can the legislation that the new coalition has stated it wishes to advance actually be passed?
By JEREMY SHARON
JUNE 17, 2021 20:38
THE CHIEF Rabbinate of Israel in Jerusalem.
(photo credit: FLASH90)
Throughout former prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s 12-year term as premier, matters of religion and state were almost entirely designated to the trust of the ultra-Orthodox parties Shas and United Torah Judaism.
This state of affairs even held true, to a certain extent, when those parties were not in the 33rd government of Israel of 2013 to 2015, in which Yesh Atid tried but was relatively unsuccessful in making headway on such issues.
This failure was in part due to opposition from conservative and hardline religious-Zionist rabbis who exerted pressure on the Bayit Yehudi Party led by Naftali Bennett against far-reaching reforms, but also due to pressure exerted by the ultra-Orthodox parties on Netanyahu, which warned him not to break their political alliance by allowing serious legislative changes on religion and state issues.
The new government sworn in on Sunday faces formidable political difficulties given its razor-thin majority and the ideological disparity of its coalition partners, as well as major diplomatic and security challenges.
But despite these problems, and despite the combustible nature of religion and state issues in the Jewish state, the new government has pledged, in an appendix to the coalition agreements on a mutually agreed coalition legislative agenda, to enact four reforms on such matters, all of which will be carried out through legislation.
Indeed, very short time frames have been given to pass all four pieces of legislation, with one scheduled for approval within 30 days of the establishment of the government, and the others within 60 or 90 days, indicating a real, if not legally binding, commitment to these issues.
Specifically, the appendix lays out reforms to decentralize the kashrut supervision market; decentralize conversion; change the electoral body for selecting chief rabbis; and changing the composition of the committee for selecting Rabbinical Court judges.
The legislation on kashrut would permit any municipal rabbinate or religious council to expand its kashrut supervision operations beyond its municipal boundaries, allowing it to hire kashrut supervisors and inspectors around the country and oversee kashrut in any restaurant or food business that requests its services, from Eilat to Katzrin.
The idea is to create competition among municipal rabbinates for the custom of food businesses, in order to improve kashrut supervision services which are frequently panned by businesses themselves as well as state reports, and have also suffered from severe corruption.
The legislation on conversion would allow municipal chief rabbis to perform conversions, thereby decentralizing authority over conversion from the control of the Chief Rabbinate and allow liberally inclined municipal chief rabbis, all of whom are Orthodox, to implement policies such as the conversion of minors, and to utilize more moderate criteria for conversion in general.
A third piece of legislation would change the makeup of the electoral body that elects chief rabbis, with the specific goal of electing “a Zionist chief rabbi” – that is, not ultra-Orthodox ones like the two current incumbents.
Finally, the appendix on legislation stipulates the passage of a bill that would guarantee at least two spots on the Selection Committee for Rabbinical Judges for women, with the goal of giving women greater influence over the selection of rabbinical judges, who have great impact on the lives of women in Israel, even though women themselves are barred from being rabbinical judges.
Aside from these four issues, there are several other matters of religion and state that are lurking in the background and that will need to be addressed, or ignored.
One of those is the government’s Western Wall resolution of 2016 which determined to create a state-recognized space for non-Orthodox prayer at the southern end of the Western Wall, but which was suspended indefinitely by the same government in 2017 following ultra-Orthodox resistance to the plan, after initially consenting to it.
Another issue will be providing for civil marriage, or civil unions, which is an important concern for Yisrael Beytenu, while permitting public transport on Shabbat is an additional topic which the left-wing and liberal parties of the coalition will seek to advance.
Promoting the study of core curriculum topics, such as maths, science and English, in ultra-Orthodox schools is another important issue for Yisrael Beytenu which is stipulated in its coalition agreement with Yesh Atid.
Tani Frank, head of the religion and state department of the religious-Zionist Ne’emanei Torah Va’Avodah lobbying group, argues that decentralizing the Chief Rabbinate’s services, such as conversion and kashrut, is key to improving their quality.
He says the monopoly on one hand and the centralized authority on the other, of the Chief Rabbinate over much of religious life in Israel is a “systemic failure” which lends itself to abuse of power and has allowed the body to believe it can act without restraint.
THE QUESTION arises, however, as to whether the legislation that the new coalition has stated it wishes to advance can actually be passed.
Perhaps the most severe political problem the current government suffers from is its bare-minimum majority, which will make its life hellish in every aspect of its parliamentary work, be it in committees, passing legislation or merely surviving votes of no confidence.
The prime minister is therefore eager to draft in parties from the opposition to his already unwieldy coalition, but his options appear limited to the ultra-Orthodox parties, although the chances of such a defection look very slim at least in the short term.
Nevertheless, concern for antagonizing Shas and UTJ may mitigate against the passage of the proposed reforms, in the hope that delaying or watering them down could leave the way open for them to join the government in the future.
Additionally, conservative religious elements in the coalition such as Yamina MK Nir Orbach, who was formerly the senior adviser to the highly conservative Bayit Yehudi leader Rafi Peretz, could create problems in passing such legislation.
And senior New Hope figure and Construction and Housing Minister Ze’ev Elkin is close to hard-line elements in the religious-Zionist sector who fervently oppose any diminution of the authority of the Chief Rabbinate.
When every single MK in the coalition is needed to pass a bill, this becomes a significant problem.
Frank expresses optimism, however, that the proposed legislation can be successfully passed into law.
He notes that Yamina is mostly denuded of rabbinic influence following the split with the Religious Zionist Party, and that the new religious services minister, Matan Kahana, is more moderate than former deputy religious services minister Eli Ben-Dahan, who ran the ministry between 2013 and 2015 but whose roots and influences lie in the conservative wing of the religious-Zionist community.
Frank opined that many of the religious-Zionist voters who voted for Yamina are religiously moderate and see the proposed reforms as necessary and desirable to overhaul a religious establishment that is no longer in tune with the needs and opinions of much of the religious-Zionist community.
“Yamina will need to show its voters that it is actually acting on these issues,” said Frank.
Shahar Ilan, an expert on religion and state issues and a columnist for Calcalist, agrees that the proposed reforms would be advantageous to religious life in Israel, but says that the government must be very careful in how it proceeds.
For Ilan, a former deputy director of the Hiddush religious pluralism organization, the combustible nature of religion and state concerns, especially when put into a legislative format, means that great caution should be exercised over this agenda so as not to blow up the entire government.
Although Ilan sees some of these issues as critical to the health of the country, such as core curriculum studies for ultra-Orthodox pupils, he says he is more concerned about the damage to the rule of law and democracy that could occur were the government to fall and Netanyahu to return to power.
“Netanyahu already proved he is ready to harm and burn every gatekeeper of democracy and the rule of law in order to influence and stop his trial, so it is critical he does not return to power,” said Ilan.
As such, Ilan said, changes beyond those spelled out in the coalition agreements should, if they are to be advanced, be carried out by administrative changes to government regulations instead of legislation.
Passing laws in the Knesset draws attention, invokes the ire of the religious and ultra-Orthodox parties, and creates political pressure and problems.
So instead of pursuing legislation on civil unions as sought by Yisrael Beytenu, Interior Minister Ayelet Shaked could simply approve the registration of civil marriages conducted online and remotely by the US state of Utah.
This would resolve the highly problematic situation in which tens of thousands of Israelis cannot marry in their own country, owing to the monopoly over marriage held by the established religious institutions – the Chief Rabbinate for Jews – while at the same time avoiding a massive parliamentary showdown and putting wavering MKs under pressure.
The Western Wall agreement is also procedurally easy to resolve, requiring a simple vote in the cabinet, although doing so would certainly draw ire from the ultra-Orthodox parties.
Changes have been proposed to the language of the initial resolution which would obscure, but not alter, the fact that representatives of the Reform and Conservative movements would be on the site’s administrative council, and this might ease the passage of this step.
Regulations in the Transportation Ministry could be changed to allow for greater numbers of minibus taxis to operate on Shabbat, circumventing the need for legislation on the issue, says Ilan.
And pressuring ultra-Orthodox municipal councils, through carrots and sticks, to allow the establishment of state ultra-Orthodox schools in their jurisdictions instead of threatening all ultra-Orthodox schools with funding cuts would prevent a huge confrontation with the haredi community and ward off internal coalition opposition from elements close to UTJ and Shas in New Hope and Yamina.
Ilan says that the reforms over kashrut, conversion and how the next chief rabbis are chosen are largely internal religious battles, which the government could contain and withstand.
But sweeping and dramatic changes to highly sensitive and symbolic issues such as civil marriage, public transport on Shabbat and ultra-Orthodox education should be put aside for another day.
OVER THE course of the last 12 years, conflicts in the Jewish state over religious matters have become one of the most bitterly divisive schisms in Israeli society, in which concerns for national and religious identity have clashed with demands for pluralism and freedom from religious coercion.
The government does indeed have a frightening array of challenges before it, and at the same time faces huge political obstacles in advancing any agenda it might be able to agree upon.
But problems with the control over religious life have persisted and festered for too long in the Jewish state, and a failure to redress some of those issues could accelerate the erosion of trust in religious institutions and deepen societal schisms.
報告：內塔尼亞胡下令在離任前撕碎文件
前總理否認聲稱他讓工作人員在將文件交給貝內特之前銷毀了存放在總理辦公室保險箱中的文件
通過TOI人員今天，晚上 11:03
本傑明·內塔尼亞胡於 2018 年 6 月 10 日抵達耶路撒冷總理辦公室參加每週內閣會議。 (Yonatan Sindel/Flash90/File)
週四的一份報告稱，就在前總理本雅明·內塔尼亞胡週日離開辦公室之前，他的工作人員撕碎了存放在保險箱中的文件。
內塔尼亞胡的發言人稱該報告“完全是謊言。從來沒有發生過這樣的事情。”
如果屬實，《國土報》詳述的指控將代表利庫德集團領導人的可恥且可能是非法的最終行為，因為他在執政 12 年後繼續掌權的努力已告結束。
該報援引在內塔尼亞胡辦公室工作的未透露姓名的工作人員的話說，他們被告知要在周日早上粉碎文件，幾個小時前，一個致力於將內塔尼亞胡下台的政黨聯盟上台。他們說命令來自內塔尼亞胡本人。
現在由納夫塔利·貝內特 (Naftali Bennett) 領導的總理辦公室表示，它不知道這些指控，但會審查這些指控。
據《國土報》報導，這些保險箱位於總理辦公室的一部分，稱為水族館，是總理和高級官員所在的內部密室。
2015 年 12 月 7 日，本傑明·內塔尼亞胡和尤西·科恩正在查看內塔尼亞胡在社交媒體上發布的照片中的文件，當時他任命科恩為新的摩薩德首領。（PMO/Facebook/文件）
據《國土報》報導，雖然目前尚不清楚據稱被撕碎的文件中的內容，但保險箱中通常存放著與高級官員的工作日程、日常政府活動等相關的文件。
根據法律，任何與政府工作有關的文件都是國家財產，應當予以保存和歸檔。據報導，至少有一些文件被交給了貝內特的工作人員，以備歸檔或根據需要使用。
新政府成員和活動人士尋求公開先前保密的成績單和其他文件，以揭開內塔尼亞胡和其他人在其 12 年執政期間做出的決定的面紗。
週三，國防部長本尼·甘茨（Benny Gantz）敦促貝內特（Bennett）改變政府規定，以允許公佈過去一年目前機密的冠狀病毒內閣會議的會議記錄。
在以色列議會於 2021 年 6 月 13 日以 60 票對 59 票對貝內特的聯盟投下信任票後，被擊敗的總理本傑明·內塔尼亞胡在與新總理納夫塔利·貝內特短暫握手後離開。 (Emmanuel Dunand / AFP)
曾是該內閣成員的甘茨表示，協議的披露將有助於公眾更好地了解領導政府遏制大流行的部長級機構做出的決定，同時也讓冠狀病毒內閣成員承擔責任。
除了 Gantz，信息自由運動預計將在未來幾天與 Bennett 聯繫，提出同樣的要求，以發布會議記錄。
週一，內塔尼亞胡在一次異常簡潔和簡短的會議上將辦公室及其正式權力移交給了貝內特，會議結束時沒有進行傳統的儀式、握手或合影，這表明內塔尼亞胡對貝內特懷有敵意，他自己的一個——時間參謀長。
Report: Netanyahu ordered papers shredded before leaving office
Former PM denies claim he had staffers destroy documents that had been stored in safes at Prime Minister’s Office prior to handing it over to Bennett
By TOI STAFFToday, 11:03 pm
Benjamin Netanyahu arrives to the weekly cabinet meeting at the Prime Minister's Office in Jerusalem on June 10, 2018. (Yonatan Sindel/Flash90/File)
A report Thursday claimed that, just before former prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu left the office on Sunday, his staff shredded documents that were being stored in safes.
A spokesperson for Netanyahu called the report “total lies. No such thing ever happened.”
If true, the allegations detailed by the Haaretz daily would represent an ignominious and likely illegal final act by the Likud leader, as his efforts to hold on to power reached their conclusion, after 12 years in office.
The paper quoted unnamed staffers who worked in Netanyahu’s bureau who said that they had been told to shred documents on Sunday morning, hours before a coalition of parties working to oust Netanyahu from office took power. They said that the order had come from Netanyahu himself.
The Prime Minister’s Office, now headed by Naftali Bennett, said it was unaware of the allegations, but would examine the claims.
According to Haaretz, the safes were located in a part of the Prime Minister’s Office known as the Aquarium, an inner sanctum where the premier and top officials were situated.
Benjamin Netanyahu and Yossi Cohen look over documents in a photo posted on social media by Netanyahu on December 7, 2015, shortly after he named Cohen as the new Mossad chief. (PMO/Facebook/File)
While it is not known what was in the documents that were allegedly shredded, the safes normally held papers relating to senior officials’ work schedules, routine government activity, and more, Haaretz reported.
By law, any documents relating to government work are state property and are to be preserved and archived. According to the report, at least some documents were handed over to Bennett’s staff to be filed away or used as needed.
Members of the new government and activists have sought the release of transcripts and other documents previously held under wraps, in a bid to lift the veil off decisions made by Netanyahu and others during his 12 years in power.
On Wednesday, Defense Minister Benny Gantz urged Bennett to change government regulations in order to allow the publication of minutes from the currently classified coronavirus cabinet meetings over the past year.
Defeated prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu walks away after briefly shaking hands with new Prime Minister Naftali Bennett, after the Knesset voted confidence in Bennett’s coalition by 60-59 votes, June 13, 2021. (Emmanuel Dunand / AFP)
Gantz, who was part of that cabinet, said the disclosure of the protocols will help the public better understand decisions taken by the ministerial body that led the government’s efforts to curb the pandemic, while also holding members of the coronavirus cabinet accountable.
In addition to Gantz, the Movement for Freedom of Information is expected to reach out to Bennett in the coming days to make the same request to release the meeting transcripts.
On Monday, Netanyahu handed the office and its formal powers over to Bennett in an unusually terse and short meeting, which ended without a traditional ceremony, handshake, or photo-op, an indication of the animus Netanyahu harbors toward Bennett, his own one-time chief of staff.
Tal Schneider contributed to this report.
--
Hosting provided by SoundOn
More shows like 蘇老師講解國際新聞、中東與中亞歷史、中國事務、太空知識的頻道。 Diplomat's daily news review and history research on Middle East and Central Asia, China Affairs and Space Exploration
View all
Dr.Liu國際新聞摘要分析
15 Listeners
轉角國際新聞 Daily Podcast
187 Listeners
旅行快門TravelShutter
41 Listeners