We proceed to explore the ontological status of Agency.

Agency stands apart from empirical reality because it lacks an accessible ontological identifier. We are unable to articulate its essence ("what it is"), but rather only to be it (to exist as agents).

The problem of definition is shared with empirical objects, but the consequences differ radically: We also cannot define the ultimate "reality" of a chair or any object, only its manifestation within empirical reality (i.e., how we perceive it or how nature configured it).

But for these empirical objects (and empirical reality as a whole), this manifestation is sufficient for their identity and being, as their entire existence is constituted by their participation in the observable world.

Agency - and only Agency - is fundamentally distinct in this respect.

Its core essence and definition resides in its self-manifestation - the principle of acting from within.

Agency is not merely a mechanism for input/output, nor is it the capacity to understand or be understood. It is fundamentally a self-subsisting reality independent of any devised mechanism or external process.

So, in contrast to any other object or notion, when we speak about it, we must speak about what it is as such, which we apparently cannot do.

Which should bring us back to the more basic question that must precede any positive explortatory endeavor: What is the true object of our discourse when we refer to Agency? What is it that we are trying to explain?

We proceed.