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The Paradox of the Empty Category
Why are we driven to inquire into this abstract, "metaphysical" self? We find ourselves searching for the source of Agency—the prime mover behind every action—yet we must ask: does this Agency ever truly manifest itself?
The answer is a resounding no. Agency never presents itself as an observable or otherwise conceivable phenomenon. It is, paradoxically, a category without particulars. While a Labrador is an instance of the category "Dog," and the Tower of London is a particular of the category "Castle," the same logic does not apply to the self. Neither I, nor my uncle, nor any other human being constitutes a "specimen" of Agency in the same way we are specimens of a species, a gender, an ethnicity, or a temperament (even sanguine, choleric, melancholic and phlegmatic have instances in the world).
If the category is empty of empirical particulars, what is the object of our bewilderment? We are forced to confront a startling possibility:
We are not exploring a "thing" in the world, but the shadow cast by the word "I".
Beyond the metaphorical 'shadow', however, lies a more radical truth: we are investigating a state that is conceptually contingent upon the use of the word, rather than one that exists prior to it. We are exploring a subject that is generated by, and inseparable from, its own linguistic expression.
We proceed.
By Daniel DrabkinThe Paradox of the Empty Category
Why are we driven to inquire into this abstract, "metaphysical" self? We find ourselves searching for the source of Agency—the prime mover behind every action—yet we must ask: does this Agency ever truly manifest itself?
The answer is a resounding no. Agency never presents itself as an observable or otherwise conceivable phenomenon. It is, paradoxically, a category without particulars. While a Labrador is an instance of the category "Dog," and the Tower of London is a particular of the category "Castle," the same logic does not apply to the self. Neither I, nor my uncle, nor any other human being constitutes a "specimen" of Agency in the same way we are specimens of a species, a gender, an ethnicity, or a temperament (even sanguine, choleric, melancholic and phlegmatic have instances in the world).
If the category is empty of empirical particulars, what is the object of our bewilderment? We are forced to confront a startling possibility:
We are not exploring a "thing" in the world, but the shadow cast by the word "I".
Beyond the metaphorical 'shadow', however, lies a more radical truth: we are investigating a state that is conceptually contingent upon the use of the word, rather than one that exists prior to it. We are exploring a subject that is generated by, and inseparable from, its own linguistic expression.
We proceed.