We explore the **looming threat of cryptographically relevant quantum computers (CRQCs) to Bitcoin's security.** It highlights that a significant portion of Bitcoin, potentially **20-50% (4-10 million BTC), is vulnerable to theft** due to public key exposure in certain script types or address reuse practices. While **quantum computing's impact on Bitcoin mining is considered less immediate**, the paper details various **post-quantum cryptography (PQC) solutions and migration strategies** being researched, including hash-based and lattice-based algorithms, and proposals like BIP-347 and BIP-360. A central **philosophical debate, "burn vs. steal,"** addresses whether vulnerable funds should be rendered unspendable or remain accessible to quantum attackers, influencing proposed migration pathways like **Commit-Delay-Reveal (CDR) and the Quantum-Resistant Address Migration Protocol (QRAMP).** The document concludes by advocating for a **dual-track strategy—short-term contingency measures (two years) and a long-term comprehensive plan (seven years)**—to ensure Bitcoin's robust quantum resistance.