Anne Meylan (Basel) gives a talk at the MCMP Colloquium (11 November, 2015) titled "Doxastic Responsibility and the Basing Relation". Abstract: People are responsible for their beliefs and not only for their actions. However, they are not apparently able to control their beliefs as they are able to control their actions. This is what I call “the problem of doxastic responsibility”. The aim of this presentation is to describe a difficulty for a particular solution to this problem. This solution —I dub it “the solution of reasons-responsiveness”— has been extensively defended recently. The plan is as follows. In the first and second part, I present the problem of doxastic responsibility and the solution of reasons-responsiveness respectively. Crucially, this solution is very largely inspired by an account of our moral responsibility for actions that takes reasons-responsiveness to be necessary and sufficient for actions. In the third and final part, I levy a potential objection of my own against the solution of reasons-responsiveness. Briefly, the solution of reasons-responsiveness does not capture the difference between cases of based and cases of un-based beliefs.