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Dr. Jared M. McKinney and Dr. Peter Harris – “Broken Nest: Deterring China from Invading Taiwan”
Released 16 December, 2021.
Deterring a Chinese invasion of Taiwan without recklessly threatening a great-power war is both possible and necessary through a tailored deterrence package that goes beyond either fighting over Taiwan or abandoning it. This article joins cutting-edge understandings of deterrence with empirical evidence of Chinese strategic thinking and culture to build such a strategy. Click here to read the article.
Episode Transcript:
Stephanie Crider (Host)
Welcome to Decisive Point, a US Army War College Press production featuring distinguished authors and contributors who get to the heart of the matter in national security affairs.
Decisive Point welcomes Dr. Jared M. McKinney, co-author of “Broken Nest: Deterring China from Invading Taiwan,” written with Dr. Peter Harris and featured in Parameters’ 2021 – 22 Winter issue.
Dr. McKinney is the chair of the Department of Strategy and Security Studies at the eSchool of Graduate Professional Military Education, Air University, and reviews editor of the Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs.
Dr. Peter Harris is associate professor of political science at Colorado State University and Indo-Pacific Perspectives editor of the Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs.
Jared, I'm so glad you're here. Thanks for joining me today. Let's talk about your article, “The Broken Nest.” Would the People's Republic of China invade Taiwan even if it meant risking war with the United States and its allies? Your article says there's no doubt that the United States has a strong interest in deterring a Chinese takeover of Taiwan but relying on the latent threat of a great power war is the wrong approach.
Please elaborate on this.
Dr. Jared M. McKinney
Yeah, it would be my pleasure to walk you through the argument. Just as I get going, I’ll note that my opinions, conclusions, and recommendations are solely my own and that of Peter Harris, my coauthor, and we don't represent the views of the Air Force or the Department of Defense.
The Taiwan issue is really hot right now not just because of provocations or perceived provocation, but also because the strategic environment has changed.
The historical position of the United States has been that the Navy could deter a Chinese invasion by denying it the possibility to succeed.
This is how the 7th Fleet responded in the 1950s to various Taiwan Straits crises. And as recently as 1996, the US Navy again was deployed to the region around Taiwan in an act of deterrence against perceived Chinese aggression at the time.
In 2021, the question really is, is this possible anymore? And pretty much everyone agrees that the status quo is inadequate.
One camp says that we need to double down on deterrence by denial, and we need to do more much more quickly.
This is in a response to the recognition that China's capabilities have developed very quickly. The PRC of this decade is radically more powerful than (the) PRC of previous eras.
And so, in this environment a posture of deterrence by denial seems much less credible because it's quite possible that the United States would not have the ability to effectively deny a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. The question therefore becomes, does this create an opportunity for a Chinese invasion, and what would the United States do?
In our article, we argue that simply doubling down on deterrence by denial is foolish and not sufficient in the long run. Because even if deterrence by denial could be reinvigorated for this year or next year, it's not going to be possible to do so in the long run due to imbalances in valuing Taiwan, and in geography.
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By US Army War College PressReleased 16 December, 2021.
Deterring a Chinese invasion of Taiwan without recklessly threatening a great-power war is both possible and necessary through a tailored deterrence package that goes beyond either fighting over Taiwan or abandoning it. This article joins cutting-edge understandings of deterrence with empirical evidence of Chinese strategic thinking and culture to build such a strategy. Click here to read the article.
Episode Transcript:
Stephanie Crider (Host)
Welcome to Decisive Point, a US Army War College Press production featuring distinguished authors and contributors who get to the heart of the matter in national security affairs.
Decisive Point welcomes Dr. Jared M. McKinney, co-author of “Broken Nest: Deterring China from Invading Taiwan,” written with Dr. Peter Harris and featured in Parameters’ 2021 – 22 Winter issue.
Dr. McKinney is the chair of the Department of Strategy and Security Studies at the eSchool of Graduate Professional Military Education, Air University, and reviews editor of the Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs.
Dr. Peter Harris is associate professor of political science at Colorado State University and Indo-Pacific Perspectives editor of the Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs.
Jared, I'm so glad you're here. Thanks for joining me today. Let's talk about your article, “The Broken Nest.” Would the People's Republic of China invade Taiwan even if it meant risking war with the United States and its allies? Your article says there's no doubt that the United States has a strong interest in deterring a Chinese takeover of Taiwan but relying on the latent threat of a great power war is the wrong approach.
Please elaborate on this.
Dr. Jared M. McKinney
Yeah, it would be my pleasure to walk you through the argument. Just as I get going, I’ll note that my opinions, conclusions, and recommendations are solely my own and that of Peter Harris, my coauthor, and we don't represent the views of the Air Force or the Department of Defense.
The Taiwan issue is really hot right now not just because of provocations or perceived provocation, but also because the strategic environment has changed.
The historical position of the United States has been that the Navy could deter a Chinese invasion by denying it the possibility to succeed.
This is how the 7th Fleet responded in the 1950s to various Taiwan Straits crises. And as recently as 1996, the US Navy again was deployed to the region around Taiwan in an act of deterrence against perceived Chinese aggression at the time.
In 2021, the question really is, is this possible anymore? And pretty much everyone agrees that the status quo is inadequate.
One camp says that we need to double down on deterrence by denial, and we need to do more much more quickly.
This is in a response to the recognition that China's capabilities have developed very quickly. The PRC of this decade is radically more powerful than (the) PRC of previous eras.
And so, in this environment a posture of deterrence by denial seems much less credible because it's quite possible that the United States would not have the ability to effectively deny a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. The question therefore becomes, does this create an opportunity for a Chinese invasion, and what would the United States do?
In our article, we argue that simply doubling down on deterrence by denial is foolish and not sufficient in the long run. Because even if deterrence by denial could be reinvigorated for this year or next year, it's not going to be possible to do so in the long run due to imbalances in valuing Taiwan, and in geography.