Guderian had been headstrong as a victorious panzer commander leading the charge across France from the Ardennes to the English Channel. The next year he had been the same in leading the charge into Russia. But was Guderian, now having failed to bring the Russian blitzkrieg to a successful conclusion, still that same man?

The failure to take Moscow in December, partly caused because the Germans were then vastly overstretched, with supply lines that weren’t coping, with the final nail in the coffin of their attempt to take Moscow being the surprise launching by the thoroughly defeated Russian Army, as the Germans saw it, of the Russian Winter Offensive. How good that offensive was has been grossly exaggerated in most minds. It was a pitiful affair that damaged the Russians more than it did the Germans. Then came Hitler’s halt order, his haltbefehl, of 18 December 1941. Was that going to save the German Army or destroy it? Generals from the new Army Group Centre commander, von Kluge down, handled it with subtelty. But subtelty wasn’t schneller Heinz (Swift Heinz) way of doing things. Ultimately what would be left of the Ostheer – the German Army in the east - for the next fateful year, 1942 and would the German Army in that year be able to win the war on the eastern front, or was Germany then doomed to a slow agonizing death by a thousand cuts?

Tag words: David Stahel; Retreat from Moscow; halt order; haltbefehl; Heinz Guderian; schneller Heinz;Panzer Leader; Adolf Hitler; Army Group Centre; Ostheer; Nicholas von Below; At Hitler’s Side; von Kluge; Wolfram von Richthofen; Bock; Winter Offensive; Rastenburg; Wolf’s Lair;