Rommel’s advance into Cyrenaica again in 1942 had once more stretched the ability of his quartermasters to keep him supplied.

Martin Creveld, in his book, Supplying War says:

On 9 February, 100 per cent supplies could no longer be guaranteed to the troops, and by the next day tactical developments had overtaken logistical possibilities to such an extent that, because of the enormous distances and chronic lack of vehicles, no more ammunition was reaching the forward troops. On 12 February the DAK quartermaster angrily demanded an urgent interview with Rommel. On 13 February it was announced that the advance would stop at El Gazala, 900 miles from Tripoli.

Rommel’s halt at El Gazala meant that his supply lines were 900 miles, about 1450 kilometres. Compare that to the distance from the German jump off points for Operation Barbarossa, the Invasion of Russia, to Moscow was only 965 kilometres – roughly the distance to Benghazi. Benghazi was half way to El Alamein.

Would taking Malta solve Rommel’s problems? You might be surprised at the answer to that question?

Tag words: Field Marshall Erwin Rommel; Martin Creveld; Supplying War; Deutsches Afrika Korp; German Africa Corp; Malta; North African campaign; Tripoli; Ian Walker; Iron Hulls, Iron Hearts; Admiral Raedar; Mein Kampf; Mussolini; Tobruk; Bir Hakeim; Albert Kesselring; Panzerarmee Africa; General Claude Auchinleck; Battle of Alam Halfa; Cavallero; El Alamein;