Part 1 of this essay was published by rediff.com at https://www.rediff.com/news/column/rajeev-srinivasan-trumps-huge-venezuela-gamble/20260114.htm

Part 2 of this essay was published by rediff.com at https://www.rediff.com/news/column/rajeev-srinivasan-was-maduros-capture-a-warning-shot-to-china/20260124.htm

It is hard to judge whether the US regime-change operation in Venezuela is a stroke of genius or an act of pure recklessness. This is completely orthogonal to the questions of morality and legality involved in such, well, coups, to put it bluntly. The real issue at hand is twofold: why did they do it? And what is the long-term fallout from it?

I consider several perspectives below: the moral/legal angle, the alleged oil bonanza, the alleged drug trafficking, geo-politics and geo-economics. In sum, I am inclined to believe that the Venezuela adventure may not be an indication of American strength, alas, but rather of American weakness. To someone like me who is deeply supportive of the US (especially in opposition to China, the G2 condominium notwithstanding), this is a disheartening conclusion.

The morality and legality angle

Let us summarily dispose of the entire morality-legality question. At the end of the day, international relations, despite flowery marketing language, is essentially Chanakyan matsya-nyaya, i.e. the big fish eat the little fish, the law of the jungle. Might is right, and that’s just the way realpolitik is, let us accept that and move on. The United Nations and the so-called ‘liberal rules-based international order’ are syntactic sugar hiding this bitter fact of life.

There are a few implications for the little or medium-sized fish: deter the big fish. 1. Bulk up, build up your military and economic strength, including your ability to produce lots of military hardware, 2. Build your economic leverage, so that you are an indispensable trading partner nobody can afford to alienate, 3. Build a nuclear arsenal.

This last is significant. Let us consider all the recent (and near-future) invasions by big fish. Iraq. Libya. Iran. Panama. Vietnam. Afghanistan. Ukraine. And soon, alas, Taiwan. Ok, I may have missed some here, but none of them have nukes. If you have working nuclear weapons, and the means to deliver them (such as nuclear-capable missiles, submarines lurking in the ocean depths with nuclear warheads), then it is risky for the invading big fish. No big fish likes body bags, and they certainly don’t like mushroom clouds over their cities.

In addition, there was the stunning silence from the European Union and Britain, which have been moralizing to everybody about how wicked it was for Russia to invade Ukraine. No clutching pearls this time, eh, Eurocrats in Brussels? In fact, EU leaders were positively ecstatic about Trump’s intervention in Venezuela. It is indeed the end of the European century.

Ditto with the United Nations, which, by the way, is pretty much on its last legs so far as I can tell: on 7th January President Trump exited 31 UN agencies and a grand total of 66 multilateral entities.This of course hurts the UN’s budget, not to mention its relevance.

In January the US will formally exit the Paris Climate Agreement and the WHO, and it has already exited the UNHRC, UNESCO, and UNRWA. The newly announced exits include the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, the UN Women’s Fund, the UN Population Fund, the International Solar Alliance, the International Renewable Energy Alliance, and so on.

All this fits in with the ‘Fortress America’ part of the National Security Strategy, which I wrote about at some length recently. In my opinion, it is not in the US’ long-term interests. The post-WW II “liberal, rules-based international order” with America as its center was good for the US, and its precipitous end will erode pre-eminence, Manifest Destiny notwithstanding. The problem is that the dollar, sanctions, SWIFT and US Treasury debt are losing their clout. Pax Americana too.

Summary: Nobody is bothered about morality or legality.

The oil colony: is it for real?

It could be argued that the unabashed Trump statements about Venezuela’s oil are exactly like the British and other European colonization of many lands in the 19th century. It can be summarized as: “we have the guns, we’re going to take your butter”. That may well be true, although it is not discussed in genteel circles, where they pretend the Euros were on an, um… civilizing mission.

Trump, to his credit, makes no bones about it: he says in so many words that he will henceforth consider Venezuela’s oil to be his, and that it will be used for the benefit of both Venezuelans and Americans. To be honest, there is some rationale behind this: the infamous Resource Curse, where resource-rich countries end up with the riches being grabbed by both foreigners and kleptocratic local elites, and miserable citizens get virtually nothing.

I am not quite sure how Arab OPEC countries managed to keep their money, and spend it on their own nationals: possibly because their populations were low, and they were used to authoritarian rulers anyway. The same with Norway. But the Resource Curse is a fairly universal phenomenon. I bet the global money managers are laughing all the way to the bank.

When I first went to the US in the late 1970s, I had a graduate student friend, a woman from Venezuela. She was there on a generous scholarship funded by oil revenues, just like the Iranians who had studied with me in India. At least some of the money was going to actual citizens, and wasn’t disappearing into tax havens. I guess socialism did Venezuela in over decades, as we have seen in West Bengal and Kerala.

The country’s finances are an absolute mess, through years of economic collapse, US sanctions, and a sovereign default in 2017. There are enormous debts owed by Venezuela to foreign investors, add up to more than $150 billion, or twice GDP; this includes interest, penalties for default, and arbitration awards for the expropriation (nationalization) of oil infrastructure. Venezuelan assets abroad (e.g. the CITGO oil retailer) are at risk.

So far as I can tell, the country owes the following:

* Bond default in 2017 (sovereign and state oil company PDVSA bonds): face value $60 billion, now up to $100 billion with accrued interest and penalties. Owed mostly to international asset managers such as Fidelity, Greylock, T Rowe Price (often US based)

* Oil-backed loans of about $15 billion, to be paid off in oil shipments (China and Russia)

* Arbitration awards often based on nationalization/expropriation of (especially oil-related) assets: around $30 billion (US and Canada based creditors such as ConocoPhillips and Crystallex owed around $8-10 billion)

This means there’s a lot of issues that needs to be settled before Venezuela becomes a normal and substantial player in the world oil market. Besides, despite the exertions of Chevron, an American oil major that still has operations in Venezuela, I don’t think it will be easy to ramp up production there, which has collapsed due to a variety of factors, including the non-availability of naphtha to make the very viscous, heavy crude from the Orinoco Belt more easily transportable.

It is said, however, that a number of US refineries can indeed handle this heavy crude (incidentally Indian refineries such as Reliance’s Jamnagar can as well) and so, over time, the oil will begin to flow, although it is going to cost quite a bit to get there. Their production was of the order of 3.5 million barrels per day in the 2010s, but it has fallen to about 1.1 million barrels now, as the result of infrastructure decay, mismanagement, corruption, and US sanctions.

I have read estimates that it might take as much as $180 billion in investments over the next 10-15 years to bring Venezuela back online at scale. This means that any dreams of the US tapping Venezuela’s vast oil reserves any time soon are unrealistic. Besides, that could lead to an oil glut, depressing global prices even below the current $50-60 levels, which has the side effect of making America’s own shale-based oil production unviable.

There is one good outcome, though: for neighboring Guyana. Venezuela had been threatening to go to war over Guyana’s oil fields. Given that Guyana has a large Indian origin population, I am glad that at least some diaspora people are becoming oil rich. But then again, Trump may feel free to claim their oil too, who knows?

All this suggests that, despite all the talk of seizing the largest oil reserves in the world, this is not the real reason behind the regime change.

Summary: The oil issue is overblown, and nothing dramatic will happen short-term.

What about the drug-running?

There was a lot of noise about how Venezuelan gangs pushing drugs in the US was a major threat, and how that needs to be taken care of. However, on closer scrutiny, Venezuela is not a major producer of cocaine (production is almost entirely in Colombia, with smaller amounts from Peru and Bolivia). It serves as a minor transit country for some cocaine, mostly headed to Europe or the Caribbean rather than directly to the streets of America.

Data from the UNODC (UN Office on Drugs and Crime) and the US DEA (Drug Enforcement Agency) show no significant direct sea routes from Venezuela to the US; the only known direct route is limited air trafficking.

DEA reports (including the 2025 National Drug Threat Assessment) and UNODC (World Drug Report 2025) consistently show Colombia as the overwhelming source of cocaine entering the US (around 84%+ of samples). Venezuela ranks low in direct contributions, with most US-bound cocaine transiting through Mexico/Central America via Pacific routes.

Fentanyl trafficking into the United States follows a distinct supply chain, very different from plant-based drugs like cocaine. The overwhelming consensus from US authorities is that Mexico is the primary source of finished illicit fentanyl reaching the US, while China remains the main origin for the precursor chemicals needed to produce it.

The fentanyl crisis is overwhelmingly a China to Mexico to US southwest border pipeline not linked to Venezuela or South America in any substantial way, per DEA, State Department, and congressional reporting.

Summary: The talk about Venezuela’s drug-running is a smoke-screen.

Is it geopolitics then?

The most interesting thing about the extraction of former Venezuelan President Maduro was not the dramatic flair with which it was done, though that was indeed very Youtube-ready. The helicopter gunships, the silenced air defences, the Cuban bodyguard eliminated (by a sonic weapon?): all the elements of a pretty exciting Hollywood film. I’m sure one is coming up soon.

What was even more interesting, though, was that a delegation from the Chinese Communist Party had met him just a few hours before. China has been rather chummy with a fellow-socialist, and has been a good customer as an oil buyer. The fact that Maduro was extricated while the Chinese were still in Venezuela was a warning shot: besides, it suggests that they had no clue what was going to happen

In effect, it was a slap on the face of China, and it goes back to my belief that the US is investing in a G2 condominium with them. Stick and carrot, maybe? Collaborate in general in the spheres of influence concept, but hey, you better keep out of my sphere, ok? As I said earlier, China has made serious inroads into Latin America, which the US may now be hinting is simply not ok: stay in your lane, Xi! In simple terms, China will no longer have access to Venezuelan oil.

The prognosis is grim: Russia and the EU are mired in the Ukraine mess, China is rampant (certainly in Asia, with their declared intent of invading Taiwan by 2027), the QUAD is more or less defunct. Trump refused to support Japanese premier Takaichi Sanae when she was bullied by the Chinese over her remark that if Taiwan were to be attacked by China, this would create a survival-threatening situation for Japan, which is literally true as Taiwan is only 70 miles away.

Parenthetically, India has also realized the same about the US – that it is on its own – after what was quite likely a US-supported regime-change operation in Bangladesh has put the Hindu minority there in real danger of genocide and ethnic cleansing, with daily incidents of burning alive, murder, rape and abduction and threats of capturing Indian territory.

The emerging situation in Iran is also likely to be a blow to China: they would lose one more source of cheap oil. But then, they do have buyer power: in other words, major oil producers do have to sell their stuff to somebody, and as China demonstrated in the case of soybeans from the US, its refusal to buy the stuff has severe consequences for the seller.

So it is true that the US and China in general have to respect each other and trade with each other. This is perfectly feasible under the G2 condominium, the principal role of which is to give each of them a ‘playpen’ if you will, and prevent a new power, e.g. India, from forcing its way into a G3. It appears they both are applying the Thucydides Trap to India.

The US is still ahead of China in the geopolitical game, but if it continues to burn its bridges with its erstwhile allies and partners (such as the EU and Quad members) it will accelerate its relative decline. This is hardly the time to alienate potential partners, especially now that a belligerent NATO has pushed a reluctant Russia into the dhritarashtra-alinganam of China.

Unfortunately, in geo-politics America is becoming less exceptional, and Henry Kissinger’s quip that “it is dangerous to be America’s enemy, but fatal to be its friend” is taking on a new urgency. The action in Venezuela (and possibly in Cuba before long) does not encourage other nations to look to the US for partnerships.

Summary: The geopolitical fallout is not particularly good for America’s image as an ally.

It may well be economics, and a desperate fin-de-siecle lunge

The final issue is that of economics and economic history. Over the past several centuries, we have seen how those countries that hold the global reserve currency have prospered and have been financial hegemons to begin with, based on some substantial competitive advantage, but then a strange malady (“the Dutch disease”) sets in, and over time their financial clout diminishes, until at one point they become major debtors and then, they become irrelevant.

This has happened several times in the past 800 or so years, and the patterns are strikingly similar, so there is a fair chance that it is happening again. The countries in question are:

* Spain in the 16th century onwards

* The Netherlands in the 17th century onwards

* Britain in the 19th century onwards

* And alas, the US in the 20th century onwards

Now, I would dearly wish the US could avoid this vicious cycle, partly because it is a continent-sized nation with immense resources, but I believe that economic profligacy, wasting money on unnecessary things like wars, and complacency fostered by easy money is leading to a mountain of debt, which usually is a bad place to be in. In each of these European examples, initial success inevitably led to collapse. I hope the US can avoid this fate, especially as warnings have been sounded for some time by experts such as Ray Dalio.

Great economic powers, particularly those issuing the world’s primary reserve currency, tend to follow a recurring historical cycle of rise, peak dominance, gradual (or sometimes rapid) decline, loss of competitiveness, mounting debt burdens, and eventual marginalization on the global stage. This pattern has repeated over the last 500+ years.

The archetypal cycle often unfolds in phases:

* Rise and dominance: Because of strong education, innovation, productivity, trade dominance, military power, and financial innovation create a virtuous cycle (this is the model that I have in mind of the US. But there is a second model: colonial loot. Spain stole trillions from Latin America, Britain from India. This too leads to (unearned) privilege). This leads to the currency becoming the preferred global medium for trade, reserves, and debt denomination.

* Peak and overextension: Success breeds complacency, wealth inequality widens, debt accumulates (often to fund wars, welfare, or consumption), and costs rise relative to competitors. Besides, there is a form of the Resource Curse: the colonial loot or digging things out from a hole in a ground is so easy that all other industries wither away and die. We see this in Kerala today: remittances are easy money, so everybody wants to go to the Persian Gulf (skilled and unskilled labor) or Europe (nurses). Maybe the generativeAI bubble falls into the same category: the money is too easy.

* Decline in competitiveness: Education and innovation lag, unit labor costs rise, trade shares erode, and emerging rivals catch up or surpass in productivity and technology. Too much by way of wokeness, social justice and related illnesses means the smart ones leave, and the dumb ones keep congratulating each other. Ruchir Sharma just wrote in the Financial Times about how the continuing exodus of skilled Indians is a big negative.

* Debt buildup and financial strain: The “exorbitant privilege” of reserve status allows cheap borrowing, encouraging more debt. Deficits grow, and the currency is printed or devalued to manage burdens. Print, baby, print. But one day you have to pay the piper.

* Marginalization: Confidence erodes (via inflation, devaluations, defaults, or crises), foreigners reduce holdings, and a new power’s currency gains primacy. The reserve status lingers due to network effects and habit, but the issuing power loses geopolitical and economic centrality.

Spain had its colonies in the Americas from which it extracted enormous amounts of gold and silver; the Dutch started the Amsterdam stock exchange and stepped into the vacuum of finance when Spain faltered; the British outcompeted the Dutch in colonization and in industrialization and defeated them in wars; and the US took over when Britain lost its colonies and had nowhere to dump its goods, and was in debt for its spending in World Wars I and II.

Some of the symptoms of the “Dutch disease” are showing in the US: enormous debt, wars that have no clear benefit to the nation, loss of manufacturing, geopolitical challenges, loss of competitiveness and brand superiority in industry after industry.

US investors are quietly moving their funds to other countries, while foreigners are quietly moving their money out of US treasuries (e.g. China has reduced its holdings from a high of $1.3 trillion in 2013 to $688 billion now) and into gold, the BRICS group is creating an alternative currency and a non-SWIFT settlement mechanism, and many countries are trading with each other bilaterally in local currencies. De-dollarization is a little far off but no longer implausible.

Now, as a big supporter of the US, I do hope the dollar will continue to be supreme, but I am beginning to have my doubts. I have had faith in the US and its ability to re-invent itself on the brains of its immigrants, but I wonder if a post-MAGA US will be the beacon, the “City on the Hill”, “Give me your tired, your poor/Your huddled masses yearning to breathe free”. Maybe not any more. Perhaps cyclical decline, and the rot, are already too deep.

This, in my opinion, is the real reason for Trump’s little adventure in Venezuela: to be relevant in global finance for a little longer. The petrodollar has been the lifeline allowing the US to run substantial deficits for a long time. Because all transactions for oil have traditionally been mandated to be in dollars, there has been constant demand for the dollar, despite the loss of manufacturing (in other words, nobody needs dollars to buy US goods except a few like weapons, aircraft, and Big Tech software). But everybody needs it to buy oil.

Trump is ensuring that Venezuela’s giant oil reserves (the largest in the world) will now be sold in dollars, contrary to Maduro’s plans to trade in yuan. This is deja vu: when Iraq’s President Saddam Hussein planned to trade his oil in Euros in 2000, he found himself deposed. When Libya’s President Muammar Gaddafi planned to trade his oil in a new currency called the ‘gold dinar’ around 2009, he found himself deposed. Coincidence? Perhaps.

This is why I have had the feeling that the Venezuela adventure does not show American strength, but rather American weakness. The dollar is in trouble, and thus the US welfare state. This is an attempt to shore it up.

Summary: The real rationale behind the Venezuela regime-change is to ensure that de-dollarization is postponed at least for a while.

3450 words, Jan 12, 2026

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