Xi Jinping, the world's most powerful man, seemed like a good fit for the 50th episode of the podcast. Thank you to all of you who have stuck by the Hated and the Dead for its first half-century; there's plenty more to come. 

Xi has been President of the People's Republic of China since 2012. In a few weeks time, he is set to embark on an unprecedented third term as China's leader, which will make him China's most powerful leader since Mao- if he isn't already. 

It is Xi’s international profile, especially his relationship with the United States, that is the focus of the conversation you’re about to hear. There is an important story to be told about Xi’s misdemeanours inside China- Xinjiang, surveillance, party purges and Tibet all spring to mind- but these are issues for another episode. On the world stage, Xi’s time in power- he took over in 2012- has taken place against the backdrop of a China that has continued to grow in stature and importance. 

At the same time, however, China’s relationship with the US has noticeably soured. The symbiotic US-China relationship of the 2000s has given way to a trade war, a tech war, and escalating military tensions between the world’s two most powerful countries. It’s entirely plausible that relations between the US and China are now so frosty, that Xi himself, always forthright in his intention to make the 21st century a Chinese one, doesn’t matter very much anymore, and that America and China are now on a collision course no matter their leaders- though the exact nature of that collision is still unclear. 

My guest today is the American political scientist, Aaron Friedberg. Aaron is the Co-Director of the Center for International Security Studies at Princeton University, and recently released the book Getting China Wrong, which details missteps in US foreign policy towards China. He also worked as an advisor to former US Vice President Dick Cheney. 

We discuss Xi’s rise through the Chinese Communist Party, the nature of his beliefs about power and ideology, the nature of the US and China’s falling out, to put it euphemistically, and whether perversely, that falling out might result in the two countries becoming, not more different, but more similar.