The southernmost route contributing to Dietrich’s Sixth SS Panzer Army’s attack led to the Ambleve River system flowing away from the German border through Stavelot, Belgium. This route seemed ready-made for flinging a deeply penetrating spear through the thinly stretched U.S. defensive line.

Chosen to execute the task, Joachim Peiper, once personal adjutant to SS Chief Himmler, gave his name to the tailor-made military formation, Kampfgruppe, or Battle Group, Peiper, the largest of four task-organized mobile strike units of the 1st SS Panzer Division. Kampfgruppe Peiper contained the armored vehicles of the full SS Panzer Division, including the new 70-ton King Tiger tank, or Tiger II, which was impervious to U.S. anti-tank weapons but required a gallon of fuel to run for half a mile. When the Kampfgruppe began moving west it had only one-fourth the expected fuel requirement for reaching and crossing the Meuse River. According to an optimistic timetable, German plans counted on Peiper’s fast-moving armor unit to refuel at U.S. fuel depot as they were overrun. From the outset of executing its critically important task for Hitler, this formidable SS striking force began suffering defeat from a thousand cuts.

A few miles south of Monschau along the German-Belgian border is the beginning of the five-mile wide, seven-mile deep “Losheim Gap” in the Eifel Mountains. This and the westerly valleys in Belgium offered perfect terrain for launching the surprise offensive. There were no serious rivers or mountains to negotiate. From here, paved Highway 626 went northwest to Losheimergraben, then branched either north to Krinkelt-Rocherath and the eastern end of Elsenborn Ridge or, if continuing straight on Highway 626, northwest along the Ambleve and Lienne Rivers. Kampfgruppe Peiper took the latter route, passing through Lanzerath, Honsfeld, Bullingen, Malmedy, Stavelot, Trois-Ponts, and Werbomont on the way to the Meuse River crossing at Huy, Belgium.

After Malmedy, the terrain changes and the westerly river valleys develop steep banks and have narrow roads, which Peiper complained were better for bicycles than 70-ton tanks. He road-tested his armor for speed and believed his battle group of 5,000 infantry and 70 tanks could make it along the Losheim Gap to the Meuse route through Stavelot in the required time, cooing the Meuse on Day 2. Between and across low snow-covered hills as far as one can see, he would be followed by four supporting elements from the 1st SS Panzer Division.

Charged with clearing Peiper’s way into Lanzerath and Losheimergraben were the 12th Volksgrenadier and 3rd Falschirm (parachute) Divisions. The 12th Volksgrenadiers quickly ran into trouble in Losheimergraben on the Belgian-German border when they were stopped by the 1st Battalion of the 394th Regiment, U.S. 99th Infantry Division, backed by the 3rd Battalion in reserve near Bucholtz Station. The 1st Battalion fought from two customs houses and railroad crossings, using quad .50-caliber machine guns, called “meat-eaters” by the Germans. At one point, they destroyed a German self-propelled artillery piece before elevating their own mortars to 89 degrees, in order to drop rounds directly in front of their own positions. They held for one day before withdrawing to Murringen. Today in Losheimergraben there is a monument dedicated to the 1st Battalion, 394th Regiment, another bunch trained in Texas and Mississippi

With the help of tanks and 20-mm flak panzers in Peiper’s battle group, the 12th Volksgrenadiers finally took Losheimergraben and continued towards Murringen, where they were blocked by elements of the 23rd Regiment, U.S. 2nd Infantry Division, under Lieutenant Colonel John Hightower, who rushed down and screened the 394th’s withdrawal to Elsenborn.

The other unit charged with clearing the Peiper battle group’s way, also behind schedule, was the 3rd Fallschirm Regiment, which was slowed for an entire day by Lieutenant Bouck’s 18-man Intelligence and Reconnaisance Platoon of the U.S. 99th Infantry Division assigned to the 14th Cavalry at Lanzerath. In knee-deep snow and foxhole at the edge of the forest, Bouck’s small team held off German paratroopers who were charging uphill in waves. The Germans took 200 casualties before forcing Bock to surrender, but not before Bouck and his band had ruined the Sixth SS Panzer Army’s schedule, earning a Presidential Unit Citation in the process. This was the smallest military unit ever to receive such a distinction.

Peiper’s battle group finally broke loose from Lanzerath through Honsfield on December 17, advancing toward the U.S. fuel depot at Bullingen. Peiper managed to take Bullingen late on the 17th, but the delays gave other U.S. combat engineers time to block roads and blow up bridges off to the west.

Peiper refueled at Bullingen and charged west along the Ambleve River, passing through Baugnez Crossroads, site of the Malmedy massacre, and Ligneuville, and stopping for the night at the eastern edge of Stavelot. There, running low on fuel, he started hitting more resistance. He was now entering an area of forested hills, streams and rivers, and steep twisting valleys.

Seeing the immediate threat from Peiper’s force, the U.S. 30th Infantry Division had moved 49 miles from Aachen to Malmedy and Stavelot along Peiper’s route, and to Stoumont in front of him. The 30th was a veteran unit; it had landed at Omaha Beach shortly after D-Day, famously held out against German counterattacks in the Mortain Pocket, and spearheaded the U.S. breakthrough at St. Lo in Normandy, earning the nickname from the Germans as “Roosevelt’s SS.” It had recently been engaged at the tough battle for Aachen where it took 50 percent casualties, and now, after learning of the Malmedy massacre, was not taking many German prisoners. The SS Division they were facing, the 1st SS Panzer, “Liebstandarte,” was Hitler’s elite. But the two had met before in Normandy, and the confident 30th Infantry had a mantra going into this battle: “We beat them at Mortain.”

On December 18, Peiper’s tanks took Stavelot and moved west towards La Gleize. The following day, however, the 118th Regiment of the 30th Infantry retook Stavelot, counterattacking against Peiper’s rear elements, blowing up the bridges in the city, and cutting off the corridors for fuel and communications between Peiper and the other elements of the 1st SS Panzer Division that were trailing him.

Ahead of Peiper, U.S. engineer combat battalions played a crucial role, defending against Peiper’ battle group at several junctions and towns, and destroying bridges over the Lienne, Salm, and Ambleve, earning Peiper’s angry outburst at finding his river crossings blocked: “The Damned Engineers.” With little fuel, he had little room to maneuver or fight tank battles. Cut off to the rear, spread out piecemeal, and unable to get to the crossing to the south at Wanne and Trois-Ponts or in the center at Habiemont, he left part of his force at Cheneux, and backtracked with the majority to La Gleize, proceeding west from there down the meandering Ambleve river, along the dangerous winding river valley road, susceptible to ambush towards Stoumont and Werbomont, where he would finally enter open country around the Liege highway.

However, the U.S. 119th Regiment, 30th Infantry Division, had by now blocked the main road west of La Gleize in nearby Stoumont, and the 82nd Airborne had arrived Werbomont slightly to the south. On December 19 Peiper pressed ahead, attacking Stoumont. Using infantry followed by Panther and Tiger tanks, Peiper’s armor finally tipped the balance as the entire 3rd Battalion of the U.S 119th Regiment was battered, with one of its companies totally destroyed and the rest forced back under cover of artillery. The 1st Battalion reserve set up the last available roadblock at Stoumont Station west of the city.

The situation for the Allies was critical. If Peiper broke through Stoumont Station, he could move unopposed through the Ambleve valley to the high ground near Huy and the Meuse River. U.S. 30th Infantry Commander General Hobbs put out a call for help, but heard back that the only unit available was the 740th Tank Battalion.

Called the “Daredevils,” the 740th was a new arrival in Europe, then miles away, and still waiting for its armor and other equipment. Nevertheless, hearing the alarm, the 740th tankers and mechanics swung into action, rushing to a nearby ordnance depot at Sprimont, Belgium, where they found a few older-model Sherman tanks, a tank destroyer, five amphibious tanks, and one 90-mm self-propelled gun. Pulling these together, and scavenging 25 broken-down Sherman tanks, the “Daredevils” rushed to the aid of the 30th Division on December 20, advancing in tandem with the 1st Battalion of the 119th Infantry. With artillery and mortars in support, they destroyed a number of German tanks and, joined by additional troops and armor from the 3rd Armored Combat Command B and 30th Infantry Division elements, drove the Germans back to defensive positions in Stoumont and La Gleize.

Bill Lovelady of Helena, Montana, was with the 740th Tank Battalion, and modestly joked in an interview after the war that, yes, his unit had stolen equipment from an abandoned warehouse since they had no equipment of their own. “We acquired what we needed.”

A noose was now tightening on Peiper. The U.S. 82nd Airborne Division was attacking from the southwest toward Cheneux; the U.S. 3rd Armored Division’s CCB was attacking from the north; and the 30th Infantry’s 119th Regiment was closing in from the west.

On December 20-21, 82nd Airborne Division paratroopers attacked Peiper’s force at Cheneux, taking heavy casualties from German 20-mm flack wagons but achieving their objective after heavy hand-to-hand combat. Sending in several waves over open fields and through barbed wire, two airborne companies finally overcame German tank, mortar, and machine gun defenses and fought off several counterattacks, destroying five companies of SS troops and trapping 30 tanks. In this heroic action, the 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment (PIR) under Colonel Reuben Tucker suffered 225 casualties. One company was left with 18 men, another with 38. This was a high cost to pay, but Cheneux was the first place where the Von Rundstedt Offensive got turned back. More would be heard later from the 504th PIR on the Marche Plain.

At the same time, the 82nd sent the 505th PIR towards Trois-Ponts and Petit Coo where it joined the U.S. 51st Engineers holding the west bank of the Salm river. With support arriving from the 117th and 120th Regiments of the U.S. 30th Division and a tank force of the 3rd Armored Division CCB, the 505th PIR, in tough fighting on the hillsides with high casualties on both sides, was able to intercept and destroy a large 1st SS Panzer relief force, which was arriving along a slightly more southern route through Recht and Rodt to help Pieper.

Seeing no further reinforcements in sight, with his essential relief column stopped at Trois-Ponts, Stavelot retaken behind him, and the 12th SS Panzer blocked further back at Butgenbach, Peiper and the remnants of this battle group dug in for a last-ditch defense on the heights at La Gleize. Here, very low on fuel, they held back numerous U.S. attacks by a combined 4,000 men and 200 tanks from the 82nd Airborne, 30th Infantry, and 3rd Armored Divisions, but were driven into cellars by proximity-fuzed artillery, earning La Gleize a new name from the Germans: “The Cauldron.” Finally receiving permission from the German General Staff to withdraw during the night of the 23rd, Peiper escaped back to Germany with 800 of his troops, leaving all his tanks behind in the snow.

The repulse of Peiper’s battle group and the Sixth SS Panzer Army’s failure behind him extinguished hopes for a German breakthrough in the north, while adding Cheneux, Stoumont, Trois-Ponts, and La Gleize to the list of major Bulge battles. Some 237,000 American land mines, 370 roadblocks, and 70 blown bridges now ensured there would be no further German advance. The German spearhead of the Ardennes offensive now switched from the Sixth SS Panzer Army in the north to Manteuffel’s Fifth Panzer Army in the center.

After the war, while in captivity, Peiper recounted his version of events, admitting that terrain played a huge factor in his problems, changing after Ligneuville into more curvy mountainous roads, but adding that he had waited too long for infantry to clear his path at the beginning. Nor could they keep pace with the tanks, a factor that hurt him at Stavelot, where he lacked infantry support to clear the roads of U.S. tank destroyers. With regard to the Ardennes offensive in general, Peiper complained that Germany had only three SS Panzer columns going east to west (at Stavelot, St. Vith, and Bastogne), the it really needed twenty such columns for a broader advance. He attributed this to the Ardennes terrain and lack of good roads.

Peiper described his own experience as follows: “We encountered tough resistance at Stavelot where the main narrow approach fell off to the left, with a steep wall on the right and U.S. tanks on the curve offering tough resistance. We were delayed again at Trois-Ponts by an anti-tank gun and engineers who blew the bridge over the Ambleve River in our faces. Otherwise, we would have reached the Meuse that day. We went to Habiemont over the Lienne River, but U.S. engineers gave heavy resistance and blew that bridge, too, as we started to cross. Another crossing had a bridge too weak for our tank and we had no bridging units, a big mistake. We had to divert to La Gleize and Stoumont, where we encountered significant U.S. forces, the U.S. 30th Infantry Division coming up from Spa, followed by the U.S. 82nd Airborne coming on. Both U.S. units fought savagely.

Due to the terrain, we couldn’t leave the roads. We did a much with the fuel that we had, but were running low already at Stavelot and were almost out three miles west of Stoumont at the railroad station. From then on, things turned rapidly against us. We resisted U.S. assaults but finally had to abandon Cheneux and Stoumont, retreating to La Gleize and finally breaking out east without tanks on December 23. This was to me, the first indication that the (Bulge) offensive had failed.”

In 2017, we drove a good part of the battlefield in this sector, touring the Stavelot area, Trois-Ponts, La Gleize, and Stoumont with the help of our guide. At La Gleize, we stopped in front of the “Ardennes ‘44 Museum” to examine the snow-covered German King Tiger tank, one of Peiper’s own, astride the road to Stoumont. The Tiger was awesome, with six inch of steel armor on the front and half that amount the sides and rear, and with a massive high-velocity 88-mm cannon. It was twice the size of our Shermans whose shells often bounced off it. To illustrate this point, there was a deep hole and a groove carved into the Tiger’s front armor leading towards the turret where a U.S. shell had obviously hit the Tiger but failed to penetrate.

We could only imagine the courage of those who faced this tank at a necessary range of less than 200 yards, perhaps the two unknown engineers on the approach to Stavelot whose towed 57-mm gun somehow knocked out Peiper’s lead tank on the evening of December 17, blocking the column and forcing Peiper to call a rest for the night and divert to Trois-Ponts. The engineers were later killed at their road block.

The terrain in this part of the northern Ardennes was mainly rolling hills with forests and the occasional river valleys, like western Pennsylvania. The larger river towns like Stavelot had one or more visible bridges in the town center fed from narrow siding roads following misty contours of the hills above. Some villages had forested slopes on one side and steep drops on the other.

We were awed by what the U.S. combat engineers had accomplished, blowing these critical bridges in front of Peiper, a German infantry and tanks rushed forward to seize them. We also recognized the contribution, which Peiper failed to mention, of the U.S. 116th AAA (Anti-Aircraft Artillery) Gun Battalion, which engaged 87 German aircraft, including Colonel Von Der Heydte’s JU-52s carrying 800 German paratroopers near Malmedy on the night of December 16, the first day of the Bulge. Von Der Heydte’s mission that night was to capture and hold the bridges in advance of Battle Group Peiper’s spearhead to the Meuse. The 116th, using proximity fuses, destroyed or dispersed the air assault, leaving German paratroopers scattered over Holland and Belgium and the vital bridges in the hands of U.S. engineers. Two Helenans, D-Day and Bulge veterans Bill Coldiron and Ed Gilleran, spoke proudly after the war about serving in the 116th.

We made a side trip from Stavelot, traveling west a few miles to Spa, to the former site of the U.S. First Army Headquarters at the Britannique Hotel, and driving the road to Francorchamps that Peiper’s armored spearhead missed, thereby bypassing a major U.S. fuel depot desperately needed to resupply his tanks.

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