The other fight along this German high-water mark occurred 20 miles southeast of Dinant, a Meuse River crossing. Here, the U.S. 7th Corps under General Collins, consisting of the heavy 2nd Armored Division and most of the 84th Infantry Division, faced the German 2nd Panzer Division, the Panzer Lehr Division, and part of the 9th SS Panzer Division sent to help near Rochefort.

The 2nd Panzer Division’s spearhead had reached Celles just six miles from the Meuse, but they were almost out of gas, and the rest of the Division was unable to catch up to them. Sensing the Germans were in trouble, U.S. 2nd Armored Division Commander, General Harmon, ordered an attack on December 23. The result were devastating to the Germans. All three German divisions were defeated by the 2nd Armored plus elements of the 84th Infantry and by British and American fighter-bombers guided to German targets by artillery observers in small L-4 scout airplanes. Testimonials from German soldiers in letters home during the Bulge reveal the demoralizing effect that American artillery had on the Wehrmacht soldier.

“You have no idea what is going on here. Simply by using his artillery, the Americans are finishing us off here. Such massed artillery fire I have not even seen in Russia. Day after day, the earth is flying around our ears. Slowly, one loses nervous energy. I am amazed that I am still alive and in possession of my limbs.”

The 9th SS Panzer Division was destroyed at Humain, northeast of Rochefort. Panzer Lehr and 2nd Panzer were destroyed as they were running out of fuel in a three-day, moving battle. American troops with supporting tank units, some supplied by the British, were everywhere. The 2nd Panzer was exposed with no flank support. It broke into smaller units, and scattered near Celles and Foy-Notre-Dame. All day long on Christmas Day these smaller unit were shelled and bombed in back and forth battles.

The U.S. 2nd Armored Division took 1,200 prisoners, destroyed 82 tanks, and inflicted 2,500 casualties while losing only 25 Shermans, 17 killed, and 200 missing. This was the effect of American combined arms. Montanan Jesse Long of Laurel and Helena served with the 2nd Armored, pushing across France and seeing action at the Bulge near the village of Ciney, Belgium, where the German offensive was finally halted five miles from the Meuse River. He was awarded the Purple Heart, Bronze Star, and Belgian Forragere medal.

By December 27, the Germans had been stopped in both salients, at Grandmenil in the northwest, the Verdenne Pocket in the center, and the Celles Pocket in the southwest. Manteuffel had come close, but it was too little, too late. The Germans had already thrown in their last reserves. By the 23rd the skies had cleared for U.S. fighters. By the 24th, U.S. and British reserves had arrived and taken positions. The Rundstedt Offensive had ground to a halt and was destroyed from the air or encircled.

The Allies had averted a possible disaster before the Ourthe and Meuse Rivers. Eisenhower reflected later in Crusade in Europe that his fear at the time was that the Allies would be so overwhelmed they would have to throw in units piecemeal as they became available, rather than bringing forward a concentrated large mass to stop the enemy and counterattack. That concern also guided Montgomery, who was attempting to quickly move a new 7th Corps around and behind the 18th Airborne Corps to the Marche area with orders not to engage. The British 51st Highland Division would be behind them. Montgomery wanted the Germans to exhaust themselves and over-extend their supply lines before he counterattacked. The problem was that Collins’ sacred reserve corps included the 3rd Armored and 84th Infantry Divisions, which had already found themselves engaged at Marche by December 19th, countering the quick 116th Panzer Division near the Ourthe River.

At this point, Manteuffel said he knew the Bulge was lost. But Germany had probably lost its chance earlier when they faced the 30th Infantry at Stoumot and failed to take St.Vith and Bastogne in the first week. Too many U.S. divisions had since landed in France. This was the Allied “Materialschlacht” the Germans referred to, the huge supply of men and resources brought into the war from America. In addition, the Russians were preparing for their winter offensive into Germany from Poland. Dietrich had been right from the beginning. It was foolhardy to launch a winter attack in the Ardennes, an area unfavorable to offensive operations, with a poor road network and strong American forces on either flank.

As Middleton put it, “The German drive to the Meuse was a big mistake. They never had sufficient resources to push the Bulge to completion. There was much more back there they wouldn’t have coped with even if they crossed the Meuse.”

The German drive had been stopped, but the lowly U.S. soldier still had sacrifices to endure before the German Ardennes Offensive could be declared defeated. Montgomery was cautious, feeling the First Army in the north was exhausted. He wanted to regroup before driving the Germans back. Eisenhower was nervous that we “must regain the initiative quickly, with speed and energy being essential.” He wanted “a quick counteroffensive,” saying “we must prevent any stabilization of the bulging enemy salient, permitting the German the opportunity of using their panzers at will on any part of the front. The U.S. and Britain finally agreed to launch the final Allied counteroffensive on January 3. First, there was the matter of solidifying and clearing the area around Bastogne, now that it had been relieved.

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