The American Security Project hosted a roundtable discussion about the strategic framework and effects of U.S. drones policy.  The discussion, moderated by ASP Fellow Joshua Foust, included three noted counterterrorism experts: Aaron Zelin of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Will McCants of CNA and Johns Hopkins’ SAIS, and Christine Fair of Georgetown University.

Audio from this event is available here

The standing room-only event provided a forum for a candid and fact-based discussion of current US drone programs and their effects in target environments.   Foust introduced the discussion as one focused on the “big picture” of drone policy that has developed over time, noting that much of the current discourse has eschewed strategic concerns in preference for tactical concerns.

The discussion highlighted the challenges in determining the effects of current US drone programs in the absence of quality empirical data as well as the need for strategic discussion.  Throughout the discussion, it was a common refrain that those who were more familiar with drones – whether through official channels or as a consequence of a first-hand experience of a strike – were generally less hostile to their presence and use.

Christine Fair spoke on the use of drones in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan, where the unique environment preferences drones above other policies and tactics.  Within FATA, there are three specific groups with which the US must contend: enemies in common with Pakistan, allies of Pakistan who are enemies of the US, and militant enemies of Pakistan that are of little strategic interest to the US.  As a result, Pakistan will cooperate with the US on some targets, while undermining joint efforts on others.

In speaking on the lack of empirical data on drone strikes, Fair said that in data collection and analysis, one must remain cognizant of the question of who is the US trying to kill, the influence of “circular reportage” and “social desirability bias” on data availability and quality, and the need for confirmations of deaths through burials or proof of existence.  Ultimately, Fair noted, this data is needed to determine the efficacy of US drone programs, but it is consistently “obfuscated” on official levels in both the US and in Pakistan.

Will McCants suggested understanding the use of drones in counterterrorism requires one to consider how current US drone programs evolved.  Referring to a specific event in 2000, McCants mentioned how unarmed Predator drone conducting surveillance observed a figure suspected to be Osama bin Laden walking around a property.  The President was advised it would be six hours before a missile could be placed within strike distance.  Furthermore, it was believed children could be present in the area.  Any opportunity to conduct the strike quickly passed.

McCants marked this event as a precursor to equipping of drones with lethal force; the attacks of September 11, 2001, “changed the calculus” in defense strategy by reinforcing and accelerating efforts to this end.  Now, the US is faced with four increasingly difficult questions in evaluating the strategic use and effects of drones:

* Do drone strikes drain US resources moreso than other policy options?

* Do drone strikes reduce the threat of a large-scale attack on the homeland that would result in unbalanced policy?

* Are drone strikes empowering terrorists in recruitment efforts?

* Are drone strikes breeding future anti-American sentiments?