Thomas Müller (LMU) gives a talk at the MCMP conference "Reduction and Emergence in the Sciences" (14-16 November, 2013) titled "How Can One and the Same Thing be Subject to Different Theories?
 On the Proper Logic for Non-Reductive Monism". Abstract: The aim of this paper is to shed light on a neglected issue in the field of intertheoretic relations: How is it that properties belonging to different theories apply to one and the same thing? What does that teach us about the notion of being one and the same thing, and what could an adequate formal representation of sameness look like? What about the controversial thesis of constitution as identity that seems to be required for a monistic (e.g., physicalistic) metaphysics? By discussing a simple example—physical and biological properties applying to a cat—we argue that standard logical resources of predicate or quantified modal logic are inadequate for the task. We finally describe case-intensional first order logic, which provides an adequate formal framework for non-reductive monism.