This issue looks at the Indo-Pacific region and specifically relationships among countries and the influence of China.  We will focus on the India and Japan relationship as a way to examine regional dynamics as they play out in many ways in the short and medium-term.  Thank you for subscribing, and if you enjoy reading this, please forward the newsletter to your friends. ~ Kevin The Japan Times recently reported that, “Japan and India have signed a military pact enabling them to exchange supplies and logistical support.”  The report continues by pointing out that these increased military ties are, “part of efforts to step up security cooperation in the face of China’s growing assertiveness.” The most frequently noticed element of Japanese – Indian military relations are the increased scope of military exercises.  As Rej recently noticed in The Diplomat, “Since 2015, Japan has participated in the U.S.-India Malabar naval exercises, which have grown considerably more sophisticated over the years.”

The engagement also includes efforts to incorporate regional partners including Vietnam, Indonesia, and Australia.  People observing this activity may be interested in the meaning of this pattern of relations. First, let's turn to some general theoretical ideas to look at these relations. There is a concept in the Realist school of thought called “ offshore balancing” where a great power will seek to contain the rise of another great power through direct and indirect assistance for other regional powers.  The assistance can come in the form of supporting economies or institutions deemed critical, as well as the procurement of military systems and training.  The more direct approaches come in the form of alliances and mutually coordinating when engaging in conflict with an adversarial power. 

This offshore balancing concept is most directly articulated in a Foreign Affairs article by Mearsheimer and Walt that, “Instead of policing the world, the United States would encourage other countries to take the lead in checking rising powers, intervening itself only when necessary.”  As we know, the U.S. does not have a formal mutual security treaty with India like the one shared between the U.S. and Japan.  There is no talk of modifying that dynamic. But instead, some significant steps to strengthen regional partners are taking place. However, there are numerous practical and conceptual challenges we may observe in these regional partnerships.  There is a conceptual tension, not unlike in other collective human endeavors, and it centers around commitment.  A great power may want its regional partners to be proactive in protecting their territory and overall security.  On the other hand, the regional partners want to know to what degree there is a commitment from the great power.  The great power can run into the challenges of over committing and inducing a free-rider situation of having the regional powers become too dependent. Conversely, the regional powers could be partners in name only who would be untrusting of the backing of the great power.  They could operate in the spectrum of these scenarios where different ones are to the benefit of one of the major powers.  It is also possible that the hypothetical median point of the two extremes could be even less desirable to some of the actors. In short, this can be a complex needle to thread. This practical problem intersects with another conceptual challenge in that these countries are fundamentally seeking to deter the rise of China in their space.  Deterrence is a core objective of a country as it tries to dissuade a threat.  However, it is not always easy to know if your policies are working. Sometimes it is easier to tell when a policy has failed than when it has succeeded. Therefore, regional powers may take on a mixed approach to achieve multiple ends, including addressing their relations with great powers. These two conceptual challenges of deterrence (as directed primarily toward China but conveyed to partners) and commitment (coordinated with partners but conveyed to China) will be part of these discussions in the decades to come.  There are various levels of engagement in Washington involved in strengthening the relations with Japan and India, including at the State Department and Defense Department.  It is worth noting that the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2021 has differing focuses in the House and Senate versions.  However, there is a strong consensus on allocating direct funds to the Indo-Pacific Command for direct assistance to its military counterparts in its region.  We may be surprised that there are layers of overlap in politics whether that be in Tokyo, New Delhi, or Washington, DC.  Politics, as they say, create interesting bedfellows. But the most predictable, to me, are those that meet because they agree on a perceived threat. While this seems to be the consensus view, the approach does not prevent or even dissuade interactions that would improve U.S. and China relations. However, this approach would provide options if relations between the U.S. and China further deteriorate.

 The deterrence and commitment challenges are at play in the U.S. – Taiwan relationship, as well.  Although they are not security allies, the U.S. sells equipment to Taiwan with the intent of helping them resist an invasion.  Taiwan's political engagements and acquisition are efforts to improve a commitment dimension in its relationship with the U.S.  This was considered a bridge too far for the U.S., who for decades instead conveyed to China its satisfaction with the status quo. This approach was particularly effective in the earlier eras in the relationship, but is now challenged by China’s increased capabilities in precision munitions. As Greer points out there are a multitude of changes that evolved in the relationship and, specifically, Taiwan’s capability to sufficiently deter a sustained offensive from China.  He argues the military (especially the reserve component necessary for repelling an invasion) is poorly trained and ill-prepared for a sustained conflict.  Greer’s point may emphasize some of the challenges of prolonged off-shore balancing (it can rightfully be argued that the early relations were not part of a regional balancing effort that is in play today).  Again, these challenges of commitment and deterrence may make other challenges or crises difficult to address, like two gears that grind into each other continuously.  Challenges can arise without sufficient lubricant or when small external objects slow the gears down. How the U.S. deftly handles these dynamics, and equally important how the regional actors respond, will play a significant role in the politics and economics in the region over these coming decades.  It is also an important place to watch for potential flashpoints. It is a geographic space most likely to be the site of a disagreement between two great powers. Some of these concepts are discussed in an article I wrote with Drs. Chand and Garcia on regional efforts to address China’s rise.  For a more thorough discussion of the regional relations, you can access this 2019 article from The Air Force Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs.

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I am enjoying the chance to share these newsletters with you in the form of the new podcasts and appreciate your continued feedback. You can reply to this email or leave your comments below.  I sincerely enjoy chatting and learning what folks think. Thank you ~ Kevin

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