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Information flow analysis for mobile code in dynamic security environments
With the growing amount of data handled by Internet-enabled
mobile devices, the task of preventing software from leaking
confidential information is becoming increasingly important. At
the same time, mobile applications are typically executed on
different devices whose users have varying requirements for the
privacy of their data. Users should be able to define their
personal information security settings, and they should get a
reliable assurance that the installed software respects these
settings. Language-based information flow security focuses on
the analysis of programs to determine information flows among
accessed data resources of different security levels, and to
verify and formally certify that these flows follow a given
policy. In the mobile code scenario, however, both the dynamic
aspect of the security environment and the fact that mobile
software is distributed as bytecode pose a challenge for existing
static analysis approaches. This thesis presents a
language-based mechanism to certify information flow security in
the presence of dynamic environments. An object-oriented
high-level language as well as a bytecode language are equipped
with facilities to inspect user-defined information flow security
settings at runtime. This way, the software developer can create
privacy-aware programs that can adapt their behaviour to
arbitrary security environments, a property that is formalized as
"universal noninterference". This property is statically
verified by an information flow type system that uses restrictive
forms of dependent types to judge abstractly on the concrete
security policy that is effective at runtime. To verify compiled
bytecode programs, a low-level version of the type system is
presented that works on an intermediate code representation in
which the original program structure is partially restored.
Rigorous soundness proofs and a type-preserving compilation
enable the generation of certified bytecode programs in the style
of proof-carrying code. To show the practical feasibility of the
approach, the system is implemented and demonstrated on a
concrete application scenario, where personal data are sent from
a mobile device to a server on the Internet.
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By Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München
5
11 ratings
With the growing amount of data handled by Internet-enabled
mobile devices, the task of preventing software from leaking
confidential information is becoming increasingly important. At
the same time, mobile applications are typically executed on
different devices whose users have varying requirements for the
privacy of their data. Users should be able to define their
personal information security settings, and they should get a
reliable assurance that the installed software respects these
settings. Language-based information flow security focuses on
the analysis of programs to determine information flows among
accessed data resources of different security levels, and to
verify and formally certify that these flows follow a given
policy. In the mobile code scenario, however, both the dynamic
aspect of the security environment and the fact that mobile
software is distributed as bytecode pose a challenge for existing
static analysis approaches. This thesis presents a
language-based mechanism to certify information flow security in
the presence of dynamic environments. An object-oriented
high-level language as well as a bytecode language are equipped
with facilities to inspect user-defined information flow security
settings at runtime. This way, the software developer can create
privacy-aware programs that can adapt their behaviour to
arbitrary security environments, a property that is formalized as
"universal noninterference". This property is statically
verified by an information flow type system that uses restrictive
forms of dependent types to judge abstractly on the concrete
security policy that is effective at runtime. To verify compiled
bytecode programs, a low-level version of the type system is
presented that works on an intermediate code representation in
which the original program structure is partially restored.
Rigorous soundness proofs and a type-preserving compilation
enable the generation of certified bytecode programs in the style
of proof-carrying code. To show the practical feasibility of the
approach, the system is implemented and demonstrated on a
concrete application scenario, where personal data are sent from
a mobile device to a server on the Internet.
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