This is a modified portion of an article entitled, “Is Conspiracy Theorizing Really Epistemically Problematic?” published in the journal Episteme in 2020, by Kurtis Hagen. That article is a response to a set of critiques of conspiracy theorizing put forward by philosopher Keith Harris. This podcast episode focuses on just one of those critiques. Namely, Harris argues that conspiracy theorizing problematically relies on a probabilistic version of a formal argument structure known as “modus tollens.” Hagen argues that Harris's critique fails to show that there is anything epistemically problematic in conspiracy theorizing.

Article on which this episode is based:

ABSTRACT: In an article based on a recent address to the Royal Institute of Philosophy, Keith Harris has argued that there is something epistemically wrong with conspiracy theorizing. Although he finds “standard criticisms” of conspiracy theories wanting, he argues that there are three subtle but significant problems with conspiracy theorizing: (1) It relies on an invalid probabilistic version of modus tollens. (2) It involves a problematic combination of both epistemic virtues and vices. And, (3) it lacks an adequate basis for trust in its information sources. In response, I have argued that, like other generalist critiques of conspiracy theories, the arguments offered by Harris do little to undermine conspiracy theorizing as such. And they do not give us good reasons to dismiss any particular conspiracy theory without consideration of the relevant evidence.