Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: Making Bad Decisions On Purpose, published by Screwtape on November 10, 2023 on LessWrong.

Allowing myself to make bad decisions on purpose sometimes seems to be a load bearing part of epistemic rationality for me.

Human minds are so screwed up.

I.

Start from the premise that humans want to do the right thing.

For example, perhaps you are trying to decide whether to do your homework tonight. If you do your homework, you will get a better grade in class. Also, you may learn something. However, if you don't do your homework tonight you could instead hang out with your roommate and play some fun games. Obviously, you want to do the right thing.

When contemplating between these two options, you may observe your brain coming up with arguments for and against both sides. University is about networking as well as pure learning, so making a lasting friendship with your roommate is important. To make the most of your time you should do your homework when you're alert and rested, which isn't right now. Also, aren't there some studies that show learning outcomes improved when people were relaxed and took appropriate breaks? That's if doing homework even helps you learn, which you think is maybe uncertain.

Hrm, did I say your brain might come up with arguments for both sides? We seem to have a defective brain here, it seems to have already written its bottom line.

There are a variety of approaches to curbing your brain's inclination to favour one side over the other here. Some are harder than others, some easier. Sometimes just knowing your brain does this and metaphorically glaring at it is enough to help, though if you're like me eventually your brain just gets sneakier and more subtle about the biased arguments. This article is about the most effective trick I know, though it does come with one heck of a downside.

Sometimes I cut a deal, and in exchange for the truth I offer to make the wrong decision anyway.

II.

Imagine sitting down at the negotiating table with your brain.

You: "Listen, I'd really like to know if doing homework will help me learn here."

Your Brain: "Man, I don't know, do you remember The Case Against Education?"

You: "No, I don't, because we never actually read that book. It's just been sitting on the shelf for years."

Brain: "Yeah, but you remember the title. It looked like a good book! It probably says lots of things about how homework doesn't help you learn."

You: "I feel like you're not taking your role as computational substrate very seriously."

Brain: "You want me to take this seriously? Okay, fine. I'm not actually optimized to be an ideal discerner of truth. I optimized for something different than that, and the fact that I can notice true things is really kind of a happy coincidence as far as you're concerned. My problem is that if I tell you yes, you should do your homework, you'll feel bad about not getting to build social bonds, and frankly I like social bonds a lot more than I like your Biology classwork. The Litany of Tarski is all well and good but what I say is true changes what you do, so I want to say the thing that gets me more of those short term chemical rewards I want.

You: ". . . Fair point. How about this bargain: How about you agree to tell me me whether I would actually do better in class if I did my homework, and I'll plan to hang out with my roommate tonight regardless of which answer you give."

Brain: "Seriously?"

You: "Yep."

Brain: ". . . This feels like a trap. You know I'm the thing you use to remember traps like this, right? I'm the thing you use to come up with traps like this. In fact, I'm not actually sure what you're running on right now in order to have this conversation-"

You: "Don't worry about it. Anyway, I'm serious. Actually try to figure out the truth, and I won't use it against you tonight."

Brain: "Fine, deal. I...