Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: On "aiming for convergence on truth", published by gjm on April 11, 2023 on LessWrong.

Background

Duncan Sabien wrote a list of proposed "basics of rational discourse" guidelines. Zack M Davis disagrees with (his interpretation of) one of the guidelines. I think the question is interesting and don't feel that those two posts and their comments resolve it. (Spoiler: I largely agree with Duncan on this.)

So, Duncan says that we should

aim for convergence on truth, and behave as if your interlocutors are also aiming for convergence on truth

and that we should care whether an interlocutor is

present in good faith and genuinely trying to cooperate.

Zack, on the other hand, holds (as I understand him) that

we should aim for truth and not particularly care about convergence

in cases where we have something valuable to contribute, it should be precisely because there is divergence between what others think and our view of the truth

a good frame for thinking about this is that debates are like prediction markets

it shouldn't matter much whether someone else is "in good faith" or "trying to cooperate"; the merits and defects of their arguments are whatever they are, regardless of intentions, and we should be responding to those

talk of "cooperation" and "defection" implies a Prisoner's Dilemma situation, and attempted rational discourse doesn't generally have the properties of a Prisoner's Dilemma.

I will argue

that we should aim for truth rather than for convergence as such

that I think Zack has misunderstood what Duncan means by aiming for convergence

that what Duncan means by "aiming for convergence" is a reasonable goal

that debates are importantly unlike prediction markets (and even prediction markets don't necessarily have quite the incentives Zack assumes)

that there are specific forms of not-aiming-for-convergence that are more common than Zack's "aiming for divergence"

and they are usually harmful when they occur

and when they do, it often becomes necessary to adopt modes of discourse that attend explicitly to status, politeness, intentions, etc., which makes everything worse

and this failure mode is made less likely if (as Duncan proposes) we avoid those forms of not-aiming-for-convergence and assume until we get strong contrary evidence that others are also avoiding them

that while in principle we can just respond to others' arguments and ignore their (actual or perceived) intentions, in practice we can't and shouldn't

that informal talk of cooperation and defection doesn't have to imply a PD-like situation

and is reasonable in this context even though (I agree with Zack) what is going on isn't altogether PD-like.

So, let's begin.

Convergence

Suppose A and B are discussing something they disagree on: A thinks X and B thinks Y. Here are some goals A might have. I've given them brief but crude names for later reference. The names do not perfectly reflect the meanings.

WIN, by making A look clever and wise and good, and making B look stupid or ignorant or crazy or evil. (One way, but not the only one, to do this is by proving that X is right and Y is wrong.)

LEARN, ending up believing X if X is right and Y if Y is right.

TEACH, so that B ends up believing X if X is right and Y if Y is right.

CONVINCE, so that B ends up believing X.

EXPOUND, so that the audience ends up believing X.

AVOID CONFLICT, by backing off from any point at which A and B seem likely to disagree very sharply.

AGREE, by actually ending up believing the same thing whether right or wrong.

I think that when Duncan says we should "aim for convergence on truth" he means that A should aim to LEARN and TEACH, with the hope that if A and B pool their knowledge and understanding they will likely (1) both end up with truer views, (2) end up understanding one another better, and (3) since the truth is a singl...