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Matthew Hatami - Deepwater Horizon and the Lessons Still Being Missed
In part one of my conversation with Matthew Hatami, we get into a detailed discussion on Deepwater Horizon, Macondo and well control. Matthew shares the research he has carried out over the years into the disaster, including his views on why the accident happened, why failed negative pressure tests can be so deceptive, and why he believes one of the biggest lessons is still being missed across the industry. He also speaks about the role of mechanical barriers, the SEDCO 711 incident in the North Sea, and why information sharing matters far more than many people realise.
0:00 Introduction
0:25 Matthew Hatami introduces himself
1:12 Starting an exploration company and raising private equity
2:47 Quick message to like and subscribe
2:48 Matthew’s early career in petroleum engineering
3:40 Working for Halliburton in the Permian Basin
4:08 International work in North Africa
4:45 Seeing the industry from service companies and operators
7:50 Writing The Oilfield Survivor’s Guide
9:17 Writing his second book on shale oil and gas operations
11:10 Why controlling costs matters in oil and gas
12:40 How companies reduce well costs
13:21 Operational decisions that become expensive mistakes
15:04 Deepwater Horizon discussion begins
16:00 Matthew’s research into the disaster
17:00 Why he believes the cause is misunderstood
18:40 Similar North Sea incident before Deepwater Horizon
19:30 Failed pressure test example from field experience
21:10 What pressure testing is actually meant to prove
23:05 How communication failures happen during operations
24:40 Why small decisions can lead to major incidents
26:20 Safety culture and decision making offshore
28:05 The pressure engineers face during high value operations
29:40 When engineers have to challenge decisions
31:15 Learning lessons from major offshore incidents
33:05 Why the industry sometimes repeats the same mistakes
35:10 Cost pressure versus operational safety
37:00 The importance of experienced leadership offshore
39:20 How operations can drift away from best practice
41:10 Lessons from decades in the oil and gas industry
43:05 Advice for engineers early in their careers
45:00 What separates good operations from bad ones
47:15 Reflections on the current state of the industry
49:30 What Matthew hopes the industry learns going forward
51:20 Final thoughts from Matthew Hatami
53:10 Closing remarks
00:00 Introduction to Matthew Hatami
00:11 Matthew’s career in oil and gas and major companies he worked for
00:50 Starting his own exploration company
02:05 From Halliburton to Hess, Chesapeake and beyond
04:36 Why Matthew wrote Oilfield Survival Guide
06:02 Writing his second book on shale oil and gas operations
07:56 Why cost reduction is critical in the oil industry
10:07 Small operational decisions that become expensive later
11:48 Deepwater Horizon and why Matthew researched the disaster
14:19 What he believes really caused the Macondo disaster
15:45 Why failed negative pressure tests can be deceptive
19:05 The key mistake he believes happened on Deepwater Horizon
20:50 Why “massive flow” is not always the first warning sign
22:17 A real failed pressure test from Matthew’s own experience
24:40 Pressure from investors and making decisions in the field
27:10 How wells can give misleading warning signs
29:24 Why the industry still has not fully learned from Macondo
32:48 The most important lesson from Deepwater Horizon
35:13 Why adding more barriers is not always the answer
37:38 How well control events can build slowly
40:05 Experience gaps and critical decision making
41:59 The Sedco 711 incident in the North Sea
42:21 Why lessons from earlier incidents were not shared
44:44 Leadership responsibility and information sharing
46:44 Why even experienced engineers can miss warning signs
49:10 Why nobody in the industry has seen everything
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By joeleather92In part one of my conversation with Matthew Hatami, we get into a detailed discussion on Deepwater Horizon, Macondo and well control. Matthew shares the research he has carried out over the years into the disaster, including his views on why the accident happened, why failed negative pressure tests can be so deceptive, and why he believes one of the biggest lessons is still being missed across the industry. He also speaks about the role of mechanical barriers, the SEDCO 711 incident in the North Sea, and why information sharing matters far more than many people realise.
0:00 Introduction
0:25 Matthew Hatami introduces himself
1:12 Starting an exploration company and raising private equity
2:47 Quick message to like and subscribe
2:48 Matthew’s early career in petroleum engineering
3:40 Working for Halliburton in the Permian Basin
4:08 International work in North Africa
4:45 Seeing the industry from service companies and operators
7:50 Writing The Oilfield Survivor’s Guide
9:17 Writing his second book on shale oil and gas operations
11:10 Why controlling costs matters in oil and gas
12:40 How companies reduce well costs
13:21 Operational decisions that become expensive mistakes
15:04 Deepwater Horizon discussion begins
16:00 Matthew’s research into the disaster
17:00 Why he believes the cause is misunderstood
18:40 Similar North Sea incident before Deepwater Horizon
19:30 Failed pressure test example from field experience
21:10 What pressure testing is actually meant to prove
23:05 How communication failures happen during operations
24:40 Why small decisions can lead to major incidents
26:20 Safety culture and decision making offshore
28:05 The pressure engineers face during high value operations
29:40 When engineers have to challenge decisions
31:15 Learning lessons from major offshore incidents
33:05 Why the industry sometimes repeats the same mistakes
35:10 Cost pressure versus operational safety
37:00 The importance of experienced leadership offshore
39:20 How operations can drift away from best practice
41:10 Lessons from decades in the oil and gas industry
43:05 Advice for engineers early in their careers
45:00 What separates good operations from bad ones
47:15 Reflections on the current state of the industry
49:30 What Matthew hopes the industry learns going forward
51:20 Final thoughts from Matthew Hatami
53:10 Closing remarks
00:00 Introduction to Matthew Hatami
00:11 Matthew’s career in oil and gas and major companies he worked for
00:50 Starting his own exploration company
02:05 From Halliburton to Hess, Chesapeake and beyond
04:36 Why Matthew wrote Oilfield Survival Guide
06:02 Writing his second book on shale oil and gas operations
07:56 Why cost reduction is critical in the oil industry
10:07 Small operational decisions that become expensive later
11:48 Deepwater Horizon and why Matthew researched the disaster
14:19 What he believes really caused the Macondo disaster
15:45 Why failed negative pressure tests can be deceptive
19:05 The key mistake he believes happened on Deepwater Horizon
20:50 Why “massive flow” is not always the first warning sign
22:17 A real failed pressure test from Matthew’s own experience
24:40 Pressure from investors and making decisions in the field
27:10 How wells can give misleading warning signs
29:24 Why the industry still has not fully learned from Macondo
32:48 The most important lesson from Deepwater Horizon
35:13 Why adding more barriers is not always the answer
37:38 How well control events can build slowly
40:05 Experience gaps and critical decision making
41:59 The Sedco 711 incident in the North Sea
42:21 Why lessons from earlier incidents were not shared
44:44 Leadership responsibility and information sharing
46:44 Why even experienced engineers can miss warning signs
49:10 Why nobody in the industry has seen everything