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We demand the convenience of banking and shopping from our phones, so why can't we vote from them? 🗳️ This episode explores the high-stakes battle between Convenience and Certainty in the future of democracy.
1. The Black Box Flaw: We break down the infamous Voatz scandal, where MIT researchers discovered vulnerabilities that allowed hackers to alter votes on a user's device before they were encrypted, effectively changing the election result without a trace. This exposes the core security paradox: you can secure the transmission, but you cannot easily secure the voter's own infected smartphone.
2. The Paper Trail Defense: Cybersecurity experts argue that internet voting is "not securable" by any known technology because it breaks the chain of custody. Unlike a physical mail-in ballot which provides a Paper Trail for audits, a digital vote vanishes into a server. We discuss why experts like Andrew Appel insist that "software independence" (paper) is the only way to prove an election wasn't rigged by a foreign state.
3. The Accessibility Argument: On the other side, proponents like the Mobile Voting Foundation argue that the current system disenfranchises millions of overseas military members and voters with disabilities. We look at new open-source protocols like VoteSecure that promise "End-to-End Verifiability," claiming to finally solve the math of trusting a digital ballot. Is this the future, or just a more expensive risk?
By MorgrainWe demand the convenience of banking and shopping from our phones, so why can't we vote from them? 🗳️ This episode explores the high-stakes battle between Convenience and Certainty in the future of democracy.
1. The Black Box Flaw: We break down the infamous Voatz scandal, where MIT researchers discovered vulnerabilities that allowed hackers to alter votes on a user's device before they were encrypted, effectively changing the election result without a trace. This exposes the core security paradox: you can secure the transmission, but you cannot easily secure the voter's own infected smartphone.
2. The Paper Trail Defense: Cybersecurity experts argue that internet voting is "not securable" by any known technology because it breaks the chain of custody. Unlike a physical mail-in ballot which provides a Paper Trail for audits, a digital vote vanishes into a server. We discuss why experts like Andrew Appel insist that "software independence" (paper) is the only way to prove an election wasn't rigged by a foreign state.
3. The Accessibility Argument: On the other side, proponents like the Mobile Voting Foundation argue that the current system disenfranchises millions of overseas military members and voters with disabilities. We look at new open-source protocols like VoteSecure that promise "End-to-End Verifiability," claiming to finally solve the math of trusting a digital ballot. Is this the future, or just a more expensive risk?