This is your Digital Frontline: Daily China Cyber Intel podcast.

Hey listeners, Ting here on Digital Frontline, your slightly overcaffeinated China cyber nerd, so let’s jack straight into today’s intel.

The big headline in the past day is how Chinese state-backed hackers are shifting from quiet spying to what the Pentagon’s new “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2025” report flat‑out frames as pre‑positioning for disruption inside the United States. According to that report from the US Department of Defense, campaigns like Volt Typhoon have already burrowed into critical infrastructure networks across energy, water, transportation, and communications, with a 150% surge in intrusions on US infrastructure during 2024 alone. Anadolu Agency and Yeni Safak both highlight that Pentagon analysts now see this as a direct homeland risk, not just an Indo‑Pacific sideshow.

Here’s the tactical twist: these aren’t smash‑and‑grab ransomware crews. Volt Typhoon and related clusters are living‑off‑the‑land operators. They hijack built‑in admin tools like PowerShell and WMI, blend with normal Windows domain traffic, and then just… sit there. The new DoD report, echoed by SatNews in its coverage of China’s ISR and cyber posture, underlines that this is about having the ability to flip switches—ports, pipelines, rail, telecom—if a Taiwan or South China Sea crisis goes hot.

Targeted sectors in the last 24 hours mirror that playbook: regional power utilities, smaller municipal water operators, and logistics hubs that connect rail and trucking to coastal ports. Open‑source reporting around the Pentagon release notes that many of these targets are chosen precisely because they rely on legacy Windows domains, flat networks, and third‑party contractors logging in from everywhere with VPNs and weak MFA.

Defensively, the loudest advisory signal right now is “assume compromise and hunt.” The Pentagon report and commentary from the Foundation for Defense of Democracies both stress that US businesses can’t treat this as just a government problem. The emerging best practices look like this: continuous monitoring for anomalous domain controller activity, strict service‑account hygiene, and segmentation between IT and operational technology so a phished help‑desk ticket can’t cascade into a substation outage.

So, here’s Ting’s rapid‑fire playbook for you and your security team:

Lock down remote access: enforce phishing‑resistant MFA for admins and contractors, kill shared accounts, and audit every always‑on VPN tunnel.

Tune your detections for “quiet” attackers: look for unusual use of command‑line tools, odd lateral Kerberos tickets, and new scheduled tasks on critical servers, not just malware signatures.

Segment like you’re paranoid: separate critical OT, finance, and identity systems; if your domain controller can directly talk to a PLC on the plant floor, that’s a Christmas gift to Beijing.

Rehearse the bad day: run tabletop exercises where an advanced persistent threat has been in your network for a year and you discover them during a geopolitical crisis, not on a quiet Tuesday.

And finally, invest in threat intelligence sharing—plug into your sector ISAC, CISA alerts, and vendor intel so when groups like Volt Typhoon shift infrastructure or TTPs, you see the wave coming, not just the splash.

I’m Ting, this has been Digital Frontline: Daily China Cyber Intel. Thanks for tuning in, and make sure you subscribe so you don’t miss tomorrow’s breach of the day.

This has been a quiet please production, for more check out quiet please dot ai.

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