Our guest today is Sergei Davidis, a Russian lawyer, human rights activist and leading member of Memorial. Sergei Davidis has extensive experience in organising various human rights initiatives and political protests in defence of democratic principles in Putin’s Russia. In 2010, Davidis founded the programme in support of political prisoners, which operates within Memorial, a programme he heads to this day. He is also a Memorial board member.

In December 2021, a few months before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation ordered the shutting down of Memorial, Russia’s oldest and largest human rights organisation. On 3 March 2022, Davidis appeared as a witness for the defence in the trial of Aleksei Navalny. On 4 March, security forces raided and ransacked the organisation’s Moscow office. A few days later, due to the increasing risks and virtual impossibility of continuing his work in support of political prisoners in Russia, Davidis decided to leave the country with his family. He currently lives in Lithuania. Together with his team, they track the number of political prisoners in Russia, organise support, and maintain a register according to the stringent standards adopted by Memorial.

This podcast was recorded on 25 September 2025.

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My Questions

1 Could you tell us about the history of your project. When did Memorial decide that it was necessary to keep a record of all those individuals you consider to be political prisoners?

2 How do you define political prisoners? As you know, other organisations use other terms – for example Amnesty International refers to ‘prisoners of conscience’? What is the difference?

3 How many political prisoners are there in Russia at the moment?

4 My understanding is that under Gorbachev, all political prisoners were released and there were none under Yeltsin. When did political prisoners first reappear in Russia?

5 Two new laws in particular were introduced at the very start of the war criminalising ‘discrediting’ the Russian military or spreading ‘fake news’ about the Russian military. Could you explain the difference between those two laws and the differences in punishments?

6  read that some individuals are given ridiculously long terms in prison for an action which even in terms of Russian legislation would seem to be a minor offence – for example 13 years in prison for donating a small sum to a Ukrainian charity. That is far more than someone would get for murder. How do you explain that?

7 Russia these days has a whole range of laws criminalising individuals and organisations, for example the foreign agent laws, the laws branding organisations as extremist or as ‘undesirable’. How far are those convicted under these laws represented among those you classify as political prisoners?

8 To what extent is criticism of the Russian leader – Vladimir Putin – criminalised? Are people in prison simply for speaking out against Putin? That would tell us a great deal about the regime, given how focused it is on the personality of the leader?

9 If we consider Russia as an authoritarian state, in terms of the numbers of political prisoners in the country and the severity of the sentences, how does Russia compare with other authoritarian countries?

10 Your colleague Oleg Orlov was imprisoned for calling the regime ‘fascist’. Do you agree with that classification?

11 How much harder is it to do your work, based outside the country?

12 To what extent are you able to gauge the impact of your work, both inside Russia and internationally?