Dialogue Works

Prof. Ted Postol: The War That Solves Nothing, Why Attacking Iran Is a Losing Game


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Nima Rostami Alkhorshid:

  1. While the U.S. was negotiating with Iran, Israel launched an attack. Donald Trump claimed he knew about it in advance. What was the outcome of that attack, and how has it affected Iran’s trust in negotiations?
  2. Given the attack during negotiations, what message does this send to other countries considering diplomatic engagement with the U.S. or Israel?
  3. The attack was said to target Iran’s nuclear program. What was its actual strategic outcome—did it hinder Iran’s ability to build nuclear weapons?
  4. How should we interpret Iran’s current nuclear capabilities in light of the attack and its aftermath?
  5. You mentioned that Iran may now be considered an undeclared nuclear weapons state. Can you explain the evidence behind this assessment?


Prof. Ted Postol:

  1. The attack severely damaged Iran’s enrichment facilities, but it failed in its core objective: preventing Iran from building nuclear weapons. In fact, Iran now has the capability to produce enough weapons-grade uranium for approximately 10 atomic bombs.
  2. Any country in a tense relationship with Western powers must now question the credibility of diplomatic negotiations, given repeated instances—like Minsk II and the Iran talks—where agreements were undermined or abandoned unilaterally.
  3. Iran has produced around 400+ kilograms of 60% enriched uranium and over 13,000 centrifuges. Even if only a small fraction are hidden, they could quickly enrich uranium to weapons-grade levels, making Iran a de facto undeclared nuclear weapons state—similar to Israel.
  4. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) found uranium enriched to 83.7%, which is functionally equivalent to 90% weapons-grade material. This indicates Iran has likely tested its final enrichment steps, confirming its technical readiness to build bombs.
  5. Iran doesn’t need a large or visible facility to produce a bomb. A small cascade of centrifuges (e.g., 174 units) in a 60-square-meter space, powered by something as small as a Prius generator, could complete final enrichment in weeks—making detection nearly impossible and deterrence a reality.

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Dialogue WorksBy Nima Rostami Alkhorshid