freedom is that it can be defined in negative terms as absence of

interference. My lecture begins by noting that, because the concept of

interference is such a complex one, this general agreement has turned

out to be compatible with a great deal of disagreement about the

conditions under which it may be legitimate to claim that freedom has

been infringed. I am chiefly concerned, however, with those writers who

have wished to challenge the core assumption that freedom is best

understood as absence of interference. Some doubt whether the presence

of freedom is best defined in terms of an absence at all, and instead

attempt to connect freedom with specific patterns of moral behaviour But

other critics -- on whom my lecture will end by focusing -- agree that

the presence of freedom is best understood as the absence of something,

while arguing that freedom fundamentally consists in the absence not of

acts of interference but rather of broader conditions of arbitrary

domination and dependence. I conclude by noting some of the implications

of this view of freedom for the proper conduct of democratic

government.