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Re1: Three Kinds of Intelligence On natural, artificial and strategic intelligence; intellectual hazards; secrets.

Air date: Monday, 7th Sep. 2020, 3pm Pacific/US.

Russell on Knowledge

Philosopher Russell1, 1948, on human knowledge, p. 526 ff.:

"The forming of inferential habits which lead to true expectations is part of the adaptation to the environment upon which biological survival depends…. [S]uch inadequacies as we have seemed to find in empiricism have been discovered by strict adherence to a doctrine by which empiricist philosophy has been inspired: that all human knowledge is uncertain, inexact, and partial. To this doctrine we have not found any limitation whatever."

Retraice

Retraice is a private company started by individuals who want to do a certain kind of work. Retraice has no other financial backers; it's as independent as a new company can be. The kind of work we do is a response to the question, 'What's going on out there?', and the kind of thing we sell is what you're hearing right now.

Today: our point of departure (intelligence) and the immediate presence of danger that follows.

Three Kinds of Intelligence

If we want to know what's going on out there, a good point of departure is to look at the meaning of the word 'intelligence'. For our purposes, we can distinguish at least three ways the word is used:

1. natural intelligence: what animals, humans and groups of humans have, or what they do, that makes them different from their surroundings.
2. artificial intelligence: whatever it is that makes certain machines and computers seem to know things, and to act like they know things.
3. strategic intelligence (we're calling it): espionage, counterespionage and covert action (e.g. two competing groups keeping and stealing each others' secrets). We can justify using the word 'strategic' by pointing out that the precursor to the America CIA, built during WWII by William Donovan, was called the Office of Strategic Services, an organization that conducted espionage, counterespionage, and covert action.2 We'll reluctantly adopt the term 'strategic intelligence' to cover all these phenomena, and to distinguish them from 'natural' and 'artificial' intelligence. It is important to note that strategic intelligence is not the exclusive domain of government entities.

Each kind of intelligence is powerful, and can make use of, if not subordinate, the other two. But they seem, at a glance, to be very different from each other:

Natural intelligence:

Nueroscientist Michael O'Shea3 2005 on neurons, pp. 21-22:

"[T]he difference between insect and human neurons does not at all betray the gulf between insect and human intelligence…. Like it or not, the astonishing conclusion from comparative studies is that the evolution of our brains, capable of such extraordinary feats, did not require the evolution of 'super neurons'. The basic cellular components of mental functions are pretty much the same in all animals, the humble and the human."4

Artificial intelligence:

Philosophers Paul and Patricia Churchland5 2000 in their von Neumann6 foreward, on electronic brains, pp. xlii-xliii:

"[A] synapse-for-synapse electronic duplicate of your biological brain could enjoy, in only thirty seconds, a train of thought that would consume a year's time as conducted by the components within your own skull. And that same machine could enjoy, in half an hour, an intellectual life that would consume your entire three-score-and-ten years, if conducted within your own brain. Intelligence, clearly, has an interesting future."

Strategic intelligence:

Historian Niall Ferguson7 2017 on the 19th century Rothschild banking family, p. 140 ff:

"[T]he Rothschilds [had] an exceptional intelligence and communications network…. Major political events as well as confidential information could be relayed from one city to another well ahead of official channels…. [T]hey soon developed a reach that extended far beyond their original European bases…. Nor was this network of formal influence all; of comparable importance was the larger but looser network of links to other banks, as well as to stockbrokers, central banks and financial newspapers."

Hazards: secrets, minefields, blind spots

So far so good. But we might detect an uneasy transition when talking about strategic intelligence, entry into a gray area, a danger zone.

Outsiders who speculate about likely secrets, such as those that are known to be kept by intelligence organizations, and unlikely secrets, such as those claimed by some so-called conspiracy theorists, are on dangerous ground. The subject of espionage, and terms such as "UFO" or "ESP" or even "conspiracy", are intellectual and therefore reputational mine fields—and rightly so. If a person's thinking is so loose and excitable that he or she will believe almost anything, it's obvious that problems will soon follow. Even physical safety might eventually become hard for such a person to achieve.

But it is always possible that a given unlikely secret is really being kept (think of the Manhattan Project); and to dismiss them all would be to accept large attentional blind spots.

Tests and reminders

Another reason to take the hazardous subjects seriously is that they provide a constant test of one's mettle, of whether one's methods of thinking have become too lax, too weak, too mushy.

With these things in mind, let's get some reminders about careful thinking—and thinking carelessly.

Knowledge

What is knowledge? Russell8 1948, p. 516:

" 'Knowledge', as we have seen, is a term incapable of precision. All knowledge is in some degree doubtful, and we cannot say what degree of doubtfulness makes it cease to be knowledge, any more than we can say how much loss of hair makes a man bald."

Evidence

What is evidence? Paul Horwich9 1982, p. 1:

"[It's an] obvious yet frequently neglected fact that belief is not an all-or-nothing matter, but is susceptible to varying degrees of intensity…. [Further,] diverse elements of scientific method may be unified and justified by means of the concept of subjective probability."

Fallacies

What is a fallacy? Charles Hamblin10 1970, p. 224:

"A fallacy is a fallacious argument…. [It] may be made up even out of true statements, if they occur in proper form; that is, if they constitute or express an argument that seems valid but is not."

Anthony Weston11 2000 on the two major kinds of fallacy, p. 71 ff.:

"One of our most common temptations is to draw conclusions from too little evidence…, generalizing from incomplete information…. A second common fallacy is overlooking alternatives…. Don't rush; there are usually many more alternative explanations than you think."

Secrets—Likely and Unlikely

We've offset some of the fog of strategic intelligence with reminders about how to think clearly. But what sorts of real things might that fog be hiding?

The price of information

Astronomer turned computer scientist Vallee12 1979 on counterespionage and the price of information, p. 66 ff.:

"Now, the UFO phenomenon could be controlled by alien beings. 'If it is,' added ['Major Murphy'], 'then the study of it doesn't belong in science. It belongs in Intelligence.' Meaning counterespionage…. 'You are a scientist. In science there is no concept of the "price" of information. Suppose I gave you 95 per cent of the data concerning a phenomenon. You're happy because you know 95 per cent of the phenomenon. Not so in Intelligence. If I get 95 per cent of the data, I know this is the "cheap" part of the information. I still need the other 5 per cent, but I will have to pay a much higher price to get it.' "13

Deception

Intelligence analyst Cynthia Grabo14 2002 on deception, p. 119:

"Confidence [in our] judgment of the adversary's intentions fades as one contemplates the chilling prospect of deception. There is no single facet of the warning problem so unpredictable, and yet so potentially damaging in its effect, as deception…. [T]he most brilliant analysis may founder in the face of deception and … the most expert and experienced among us on occasion may be as vulnerable as the novice."

Intelligence in warfare

Sun-tzu 5th-3rd century BC (Ames15 1993) on natural intelligence, strategic intelligence, and war, p. 171:

"[O]nly those farsighted rulers and their superior commanders who can get the most intelligent people as their spies are destined to accomplish great things. Intelligence is of the essence in warfare—it is what the armies depend upon in their every move."

Next

We'll start by looking more closely at strategic intelligence, and the assessment of an undisputed authority on the subject, DCI Allen Dulles, who, in the early 1960s, wrote (or perhaps helped to write) a book.

References

Ames, R. T. (1993). Sun Tzu: The Art of Warfare. Random House. ISBN: 034536239X. Searches: https://www.amazon.com/s?k=034536239X https://www.google.com/search?q=isbn+034536239X https://lccn.loc.gov/92052662

Churchland, P., & Churchland, P. (2000). Foreward to the second edition of Von Neumann's The Computer and the Brain. In von Neumann (1958).

Ferguson, N. (2017). The Square and the Tower: Networks and Power, from the Freemasons to Facebook. Penguin. ISBN: 978-0735222915. Searches: https://www.amazon.com/s?k=978-0735222915 https://www.google.com/search?q=isbn+978-0735222915 https://lccn.loc.gov/2018418429

Grabo, C. M. (2002). Anticipating Surprise: Analysis for Strategic Warning. Center for Strategic Intelligence Research. ISBN: 0965619567 https://www.ni-u.edu/ni_press/pdf/Anticipating_Surprise_Analysis.pdf Retrieved 7th Sep. 2020.

Hamblin, C. L. (1970). Fallacies. Vale. First published 1970. This Vale Press edition 2004. ISBN: 0916475247. Different edition available at: https://archive.org/details/fallacies0000hamb/page/12/mode/2up.

Horwich, P. (1982). Probability and Evidence. Cambridge. First published 1982; first paperback 2011; this Cambridge Philosophy Classics edition 2016. ISBN: 978-1316507018. Searches: https://www.amazon.com/s?k=978-1316507018 https://www.google.com/search?q=isbn+978-1316507018 https://lccn.loc.gov/2015049717

Lowenthal, M. M. (2020). Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy. CQ Press / SAGE Publications, 8th ed. ISBN: 978-1544358345. Searches: https://www.amazon.com/s?k=978-1544358345 https://www.google.com/search?q=isbn+978-1544358345 https://lccn.loc.gov/2019027254 Other editions available at: https://archive.org/search.php?query=Intelligence%3A%20From%20Secrets%20to%20Policy

O'Shea, M. (2005). The Brain: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford. ISBN: 978-0192853929. Searches: https://www.amazon.com/s?k=978-0192853929 https://www.google.com/search?q=isbn+978-0192853929 https://lccn.loc.gov/2005027741

Russell, B. (1921). The Analysis of Mind. Macmillan. No ISBN. https://books.google.com/books?id=4dYLAAAAIAAJ Retrieved 6th May. 2019.

Russell, B. (1992). Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits. Routledge. First published in 1948. This edition 1992. ISBN: 0415083028. Different editions available at: https://archive.org/search.php?query=Human%20Knowledge%3A%20Its%20Scope%20and%20Limits

Vallee, J. (1979). Messengers of Deception: UFO Contacts and Cults. And/Or Press. ISBN: 0915904381. A different edition available at: https://archive.org/details/MessengersOfDeceptionUFOContactsAndCultsJacquesValle1979/mode/2up

von Neumann, J. (1958). The Computer and the Brain. Yale, 3rd ed. First published 1958. Third edition 2012. ISBN: 978-0300181111. Searches for this edition: https://www.amazon.com/s?k=978-0300181111 https://www.google.com/search?q=isbn+978-0300181111 https://lccn.loc.gov/2011943281 Different editions available at: https://archive.org/search.php?query=The%20Computer%20and%20the%20Brain

Weston, A. (2000). A Rulebook for Arguments. Hackett, 3rd ed. ISBN: 0872205525. Also available at: https://archive.org/details/rulebookforargum00west_3

1Russell (1992)

2Lowenthal (2020) pp. 20-21

3O'Shea (2005)

4Cf. Russell (1921), p. 41: "[F]rom the protozoa to man there is nowhere a very wide gap either in structure or in behaviour. From this fact it is a highly probable inference that there is also nowhere a very wide mental gap."

5Churchland & Churchland (2000)

6von Neumann (1958)

7Ferguson (2017)

8Russell (1992)

9Horwich (1982)

10Hamblin (1970)

11Weston (2000)

12Vallee (1979)

13Vallee does not challenge the idea that there is no concept of the price of information in science, but we can assume that many scientists (e.g. those seeking to do experiments in the Arctic or on Mars, or those filling out endless grant proposals) would disagree. The question, then, is whether there's a difference between information that is expensive by accident (being on Mars) and information that is expensive on purpose (being camouflaged).

14Grabo (2002)

15Ames (1993)