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Re4: Trust No One

On problems of trust: 'contrived leaks' and betrayals.

Dulles - Craft of Intelligence, Chpt. 15, 'Security in a Free Society', Part 3.

Air date: Thursday, 10th Sep. 2020, 10 AM Pacific/US.1

He was primarily a messenger and clerk responsible for the distribution and circulation of documents within NSA. What was in these documents may not even have been entirely intelligible to him. But it didn't have to be. All Dunlap had to do was photograph them and make sure that the film reached the Soviet officer handling him. If Dunlap had lived, it is unlikely that he could have recalled more than a small part of the material he passed the Soviets.2

We talked yesterday about three kinds of problems in Dulles's3 Chpt. 15, 'Security in a Free Society': problems of information, problems of trust, and problems of survival. We focused on information problems, 'giveaways' and 'careless leaks'. Main points—unintended problems and problems of trust

If giveaways and careless leaks are your team's unintended information problems, contrived leaks (e.g. whistle-blowers, or press manipulation by group-internal competitors) and betrayals are intended information problems, which are, for your team, better described as trust problems: first picking whom you trust carefully, and second, hardening your team's valuables4, bulwarking, against betrayals—by temporary dissenters, and by permanent enemies.

Problems of trust—'contrived leaks' and betrayals

Dulles's two problems of trust are distinguished by the motivations of the actors involved.

'Contrived leaks'—when the motivation is sub-group hostility

Here, the problem of trust is that even a group's friends or allies might see fit to strategically leak privileged information, perhaps for the good of the group directly, or perhaps because the friend or ally thinks their own standing should be higher for the good of the group, and so leaking serves both their own and the group's interests.

1. Dulles explains what he means by 'contrived leak': "The contrived leak is the name I give to the spilling of information without the authority to do so, and it has occurred most often in the Defense Department and at times in the State Department."5
2. Eisenhower complained about leaks in 1955 (Dulles quoting Cater): "For some two years and three months I have been plagued by inexplicable undiscovered leaks in this Government."6
3. Solutions? We've already talked abut President Wilson's proposal to Sec. of State Bryan (Feb, 1915): as few people as feasible, "so that it may always be possible to fix the responsibility for a leak definitely and at once."7

   This is as much deterrence as hardening: the fewer the people, the harder a group is to compromise; but even if someone in the group has been inserted or turned, they now need to have an escape plan if they're going to leak anything.8

4. Dulles proposes other measures that would affect 'contrived leaks', but most are also applicable to other information and trust problems. We'll discuss them in the next and final segment on chpt. 15.9

Betrayals—when the motivation is (in cause or in effect) hostile to the whole group

1. Dulles explains: By betrayal, "I mean our own defectors and all those who betray our secrets and those of NATO, under alien pressure and blackmail, for money or for 'ideological' reasons, or merely to satisfy their ego and exchange excitement for boredom."10

   In terms of cases, he gives many. And more generally, he says: "Dunlap's case was one frequently encountered in intelligence history where an insignificant employee, of meager understanding and less education, performing menial tasks but located at a vulnerable point in the internal workings of a highly secret undertaking, can do as much damage as a top-ranking official."11

2. MICE: Dr. David Charney (consultant and therapist to IC personnel) and John Irvin (CIA case officer) explain MICE, a handy way to remember what Dulles is talking about: "Perhaps the most oft-cited explanation for espionage is the revealed knowledge known by the acronym MICE, as well as its many subsequent variations. While MICE presents a more or less common-sense view of general motivation that was likely popular before being presented to the public in print, it appears to have first been posited in a book by former KGB Major Stanislav Levchenko. After defecting to the United States in 1979, Levchenko wrote a memoir in which he suggested there were four general motives for espionage: Money, Ideology, Compromise/Coercion, and Ego."12
3. The havoc: And even finding betrayers can unleash havoc. Dulles: "In passing, it is worth noting that the exposure of presumed espionage or treason—indeed, even the hint of it—in high places has a powerfully disruptive effect on governments that can be matched by little else."13

   Lowenthal says this might be what happened with James Angleton after Kim Philby was exposed: "[T]he basic tendency within any intelligence organization (or any organization, for that matter) is to trust its own people, who have been vetted and cleared. They work with one another every day. Familiarity can lead to lowering one's guard or being unwilling to believe that one's own people may be disloyal…. But the alternative behavior—unwarranted suspicion—can be just as debilitating as having a spy in one's midst. James Angleton, who was in charge of the CIA's counterintelligence from 1954 to 1974, became convinced that a Soviet mole—a deeply hidden spy—had penetrated the CIA. Some believe that Angleton was reacting to the fact that his close British associate, Kim Philby, had turned out to be a Soviet agent. Angleton was unable to find the mole, and some believe that he tied the CIA in knots by placing virtually anyone under suspicion. Some suggested that Angleton himself was the mole….14

4. Moles: Contrast President Wilson's method (small group hardening, deterrence) with the so-called 'mole' scenario, which defeats it, and fills the nightmares of any intelligence organization: secrets that are leaking from very high up, but not known to be leaking, require no escape plan.

   Compare Peter Grose on the idea of a 'mole': A relatively recent term, and mostly fictional: "The CIA—along with the rest of the world—never succeeded in penetrating the mind of Stalin, and did only marginally better with the Soviet leaders who succeeded him. Acquiring such intelligence would ideally require a 'mole,' a well-connected agent within the Kremlin who could accurately and confidently report out his findings. (The term 'mole' is a relatively recent addition to the lexicon of espionage. It was coined by the British novelist John le Carré.) Though such a boon sometimes appears in the history of intelligence, it generally belongs in the category of what Allen [Dulles] called 'story-book stuff.' "15

Recap

Information problems (careless leaks, giveaways) are different from trust problems (contrived leaks, betrayals), based on the intentions, and group memberships, of those involved. Everyone has selfish motives, and most have selfless motives (for the good of the group) as well. Money, ideology, compromise or coercion, and ego, can change motives. But even solving a particular trust problem case can lead to paranoia and profound dysfunction. Strategic intelligence is a world of inherent, complex problems, and any group trying to survive would seem to need subtle, if not complex, solutions to its strategic intelligence problems.

Next

We'll talk about survival, and the role of strategic intelligence generally, and spies in particular.

References

Charney, D. L., & Irvin, J. A. (2016). A guide to the psychology of espionage. In Oleson (2016).

Dulles, A. (2016). The Craft of Intelligence. Lyons Press / Rowman & Littlefield. First published 1963. This edition copyright Joan Buresch Talley, daughter of Dulles. ISBN: 978-1493018796. Searches: https://www.amazon.com/s?k=978-1493018796 https://www.google.com/search?q=isbn+978-1493018796 https://lccn.loc.gov/2016017105 Different editions available at: https://archive.org/search.php?query=The%20Craft%20of%20Intelligence

Grose, P. (1994). Gentleman Spy: The Life of Allen Dulles. Houghton Mifflin. ISBN: 0395516072. Also available at: https://archive.org/details/gentlemanspylife00gros

Hersh, S. M. (2018). Reporter: A Memoir. Vintage / Penguin Random House. ISBN: 978-0307276612. Searches: https://www.amazon.com/s?k=978-0307276612 https://www.google.com/search?q=isbn+978-0307276612 https://lccn.loc.gov/2017051856

Lowenthal, M. M. (2020). Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy. CQ Press / SAGE Publications, 8th ed. ISBN: 978-1544358345. Searches: https://www.amazon.com/s?k=978-1544358345 https://www.google.com/search?q=isbn+978-1544358345 https://lccn.loc.gov/2019027254 Other editions available at: https://archive.org/search.php?query=Intelligence%3A%20From%20Secrets%20to%20Policy

Oleson, P. C. (Ed.) (2016). AFIO's Guide to the Study of Intelligence. Association of Former Intelligence Officers, 1st ed. Citations are of the pbk edition, ISBN: 978-0997527308. PDF edition available at: https://www.afio.com/40_guide.htm Retrieved 10th Sep. 2020.

Retraice (2020/09/11). Re5: Hints From Inside. retraice.com. https://www.retraice.com/segments/re5 Retrieved 22nd Sep. 2020.

Schneier, B. (2003). Beyond Fear: Thinking Sensibly About Security in an Uncertain World. Copernicus Books. ISBN: 0387026207. Searches: https://www.amazon.com/s?k=0387026207 https://www.google.com/search?q=isbn+0387026207 https://lccn.loc.gov/2003051488 Similar edition available at: https://archive.org/details/beyondfearthinki00schn_0

1Retraice works on the question 'What's going on out there?' Our point of departure is the concept of intelligence, which seems to have at least three kinds: natural, artificial, and strategic. Here, we're working on strategic intelligence.

2Dulles (2016) p. 249

3Dulles (2016)

4On 'valuables', cf. Hersh (2018) p. 208 on the CIA's 'family jewels'.

5Dulles (2016) p. 241par21.

6Dulles (2016) p. 238par12.

7Dulles (2016) p. 243.

8Cf. Schneier (2003) pp. 176-178 on the nature and efficacy of deterrence, including its inextricable link to education.

9See Retraice (2020/09/11) p. 3, 'Dulles Recap' point 4.

10Dulles (2016) p. 249par43.

11Dulles (2016) p. p. 249par45.

12Charney & Irvin (2016) p. 465.

13Dulles (2016) p. 250par48.

14Lowenthal (2020) p. 213.

15Grose (1994) p. 469.