Rise and Kill First (Ronen Bergman)

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#targetedassassinations #Israeliintelligence #Mossad #counterterrorism #covertoperations #RiseandKillFirst

These are takeaways from this book.

Firstly, Origins of a doctrine and the security logic behind it, A central topic is how targeted killing became a recurring instrument in Israels national security toolkit. The book situates early decisions in the context of a small state facing persistent threats, limited strategic depth, and enemies who often operated outside conventional battlefields. Bergman shows that assassinations were not only reactive acts of revenge but were frequently justified as preemptive measures intended to disrupt imminent attacks, deter future violence, and compensate for intelligence gaps or weak policing capacity in hostile areas. The narrative highlights how leaders and commanders framed the practice as a way to remove highly capable operatives, bomb makers, commanders, or planners whose continued activity could translate into mass casualty attacks. At the same time, it explores how the doctrine was never static. It evolved with changes in technology, regional politics, and the character of adversaries, moving from ad hoc missions to more routinized processes. The topic also includes the strategic tradeoffs decision makers confronted: the promise of short term disruption versus the risk of escalation, retaliatory cycles, and increased recruitment for militant groups. By examining the logic, the book clarifies why such operations remained attractive even when their long term impact was uncertain.

Secondly, How intelligence services identify, validate, and prioritize targets, Another major theme is the machinery of intelligence that makes targeted operations possible. Bergman emphasizes that assassination programs depend less on cinematic action and more on patient collection, analysis, and verification. This topic explores how agencies build dossiers through human sources, signals intelligence, surveillance, interrogations, and collaboration across units. It also covers the practical challenge of attribution in terrorism and insurgency environments, where networks are compartmentalized and misinformation is common. The book describes how identifying the correct person is only the first hurdle. Decision makers must determine role, imminence, replaceability, and expected collateral harm, then decide whether capture is feasible. The process also involves competing institutional incentives: agencies may favor bold operations to demonstrate relevance, while political leaders weigh public pressure, international scrutiny, and the risk to alliances. The book sheds light on the layers of review that can exist alongside moments when urgency compresses deliberation. It illustrates how mistakes happen, from misidentification to flawed assumptions about a targets operational importance. By following the chain from raw tip to actionable target, the reader gains a realistic sense of how intelligence uncertainty shapes life and death choices and how the fog of clandestine war can distort even well intended safeguards.

Thirdly, Operational methods, innovation, and the problem of unintended consequences, The book devotes significant attention to the operational side, showing how methods changed over decades and how innovation emerged from necessity. This topic includes the practical constraints of operating in foreign cities, refugee camps, or contested zones, where surveillance can be difficult and deniability is often essential. Bergman discusses the range of tools that have been publicly associated with such campaigns: undercover teams, remote attacks, special forces raids, and later the growing role of precision technologies. The topic also addresses the operational calculus of timing and location, including the desire to strike when a target is isolated and the competing imperative to avoid civilian casualties that can trigger backlash. A recurring point is that operational success can be tactically impressive yet strategically ambiguous. Even when a mission removes a key figure, it can produce replacement leaders, encourage decentralization, or motivate retaliatory attacks. Failures and near failures can have outsized consequences, exposing networks, souring diplomatic relations, and hardening enemy resolve. By presenting operations as complex systems rather than isolated events, the book highlights how clandestine action generates second order effects, some predictable and others impossible to foresee, and why organizations keep refining techniques despite recurring risks.

Fourthly, Legal, ethical, and democratic oversight tensions, A major topic is the moral and legal debate surrounding targeted assassinations in a democratic state under threat. Bergman presents how leaders, jurists, and commanders wrestled with questions that have no simple answers: What distinguishes assassination from legitimate wartime targeting. How should imminence be defined when intelligence is fragmentary. What level of collateral risk is acceptable. And how do secrecy and accountability coexist. This topic explores the ways justification is often framed through self defense and the laws of armed conflict, alongside concerns that repeated exceptions can become a normalized policy. The book also examines how internal oversight mechanisms, cabinet level authorizations, and legal opinions can restrain operations, yet may also provide institutional cover. Public debate is complicated by censorship, classification, and political polarization, which can limit what citizens know about actions taken in their name. The narrative raises the problem of precedent: once a state embraces targeted killing as routine, it implicitly argues that other states may do the same. It also considers the human impact on operators and decision makers, including moral injury and the psychological burden of error. By treating ethics as a living argument rather than a footnote, the book encourages readers to evaluate effectiveness and morality together, not as separate questions.

Lastly, Strategic outcomes: deterrence, escalation, and the long arc of conflict, The final key theme is what targeted assassination achieves at the strategic level and what it cannot. Bergman frames the policy as a tool that can buy time, disrupt plots, and remove uniquely capable adversaries, but rarely resolves the political drivers of conflict. This topic examines how leaders often sought deterrence, hoping that the personal risk to commanders and planners would constrain enemy behavior. In some cases, the book suggests deterrence may be temporary or uneven, working against certain actors while failing against groups that value martyrdom or have deep benches of replacements. It also addresses escalation dynamics, where killings prompt retaliation, which then produces further strikes, creating a cycle that can expand beyond the original objective. Another angle is the relationship between assassinations and broader strategy: targeted operations may complement negotiations by weakening spoilers, or they may sabotage diplomacy by inflaming public opinion and empowering hardliners. The book also highlights learning on both sides, as adversaries adapt with security measures, deception, and decentralization. Ultimately, this theme pushes readers to judge the policy by a sober ledger: tactical wins, operational costs, political fallout, and the enduring reality that violence management is not the same as conflict resolution. The book leaves a nuanced picture of power used in the shadows and the limits of force.