The neurologist Robert Burton has spent years exploring our shaky reliance on what he calls "involuntary mental sensations": the internal perceptions by which we come to "know" our own minds. He says these inner representations, offered up by the brain itself, are partial at best, delusory at worst. And that's a problem not only for ordinary seekers of self-knowledge but also for an ambitious group of neuroscientists attempting to explain consciousness and the human psyche, while beholden to many of the same, suspect intuitions that bamboozle the rest of us. Bob raises these and other problems in his latest book, "A Skeptic's Guide to the Mind: What Neuroscience Can and Cannot Tell us About Ourselves." We had a long and wide-ranging tête-à-tête on the difficulties that loom when science shifts from studying the brain to mapping the mind, and the deep and dubious assumptions built into categories such as conscious and unconscious, self and other, choice and non-choice.