Branden Fitelson (Rutgers University) gives a talk at the MCMP Workshop on Computational Metaphysics titled "Russellian Descriptions & Gibbardian Indicatives (Two Case Studies Involving Automated Reasoning)". Abstract: The first part of this talk (which is joint work with Paul Oppenheimer) will be about the perils of representing claims involving Russellian definite descriptions in an "automated reasoning friendly" way. I will explain how to eliminate Russellian descriptions, so as to yield logically equivalent (and automated reasoning friendly) statements. This is a special case of a more general problem -- which is representing philosophical theories/explications in a way that automated reasoning tools can understand. The second part of the talk shows how automated reasoning tools can be useful in clarifying the structure (and requisite presuppositions) of well-known philosophical "theorems". Here, the example comes from the philosophy of language, and it involves a certain "triviality result" or "collapse theorem" for the indicative conditional that was first discussed by Gibbard. I show how one can use automated reasoning tools to provide a precise, formal rendition of Gibbard's "theorem". This turns out to be rather revealing about what is (and is not) essential to Gibbard's argument.