In this issue, I dig into my unanswered puzzle of the Russia Investigation. As mentioned in the previous newsletter, the behavior of the U.S. source in Russia, and their life after being extracted to the U.S., are confusing. Thank you for subscribing, and if you enjoy reading this, please forward the newsletter to your friends. ~ KevinQuote: “Don't give it to them all at once, make them work for it. Confuse them with detail, leave things out, go back on your tracks. Be testy, be cussed, be difficult. Drink like a fish; don't give way on the ideology, they won't trust that. They want to deal with a man they've bought; they want the clash of opposites, Alec, not some half-cock convert.”  ~ John le Carré, The Spy Who Came In from the Cold Last week we started the discussion of my number one puzzle from the investigation into Russia’s intrusion in the 2016 election. I closed the last issue asking: What would you do if you had crossed Putin? I have asked myself that question many times regarding this story.  It seems to me the logical conclusion is that you would hide. I expect that many would have run far and would have made it a point to be hard to find. The more distant the better, like witness protection, designed so that the source could not be located. Even though many movies have exciting plots to the contrary, the overwhelming share of people in witness protection are rarely, if ever, in danger.

It is difficult to understand why the source who allegedly betrayed Putin did not choose such a route. Please join me in taking another look at some unresolved questions linked to this story. I will conclude with some observations about confirmation bias and its impact, as well.

If the source decided to hide, what message would that send, especially to Putin and Russian intelligence?  It would say that they had been double-crossed.  As mentioned earlier, there are examples of Russians being killed for crossing Putin and this would be considered a major betrayal.  Therefore, hiding is uniquely dangerous, and doing something different might be a preferred path. Just like the rabbit I wrote about in a previous newsletter, who nests in the open, being in plain sight may be a preferred alternative.  Being in the open is dangerous, but it might also make it more dangerous for those who seek to harm the rabbit. (in this case, the source).  However, I expect in this case, it is not outside the realm of Putin’s options to do fatal harm to someone he considers a traitor, possibly even someone living on U.S. soil.  Crossing such a threshold is considered an international political taboo, but it is one I think Putin would cross under these circumstances.  Of course, the source who was relocated to the U.S. knows all of this and chose this path anyway. Therefore, while it seems counter-intuitive from what many would rationally choose to do, it seems being vulnerable might be a path to security.  At least that appears to be the situation in this case.  Perhaps Russian Intelligence may be more trusting of the U.S. source the more vulnerable that source seems to be.  However, revealing details about Russia that they consider important would still seem to be a dangerous approach. The source was considered very important and guarded.  This is where other elements of the investigation come into play. I believe the much-dramatized document, the Steele Dossier, served the purpose of junk intel to provide cover for this source.  It seems plausible and one might speculate that intelligence services trade in gossip as a means to muddy the counterintelligence efforts of enemies and to protect sources.   Over time this material got pulled into the investigation, but the author and his sources have been routinely discounted by the CIA. So why use them for years?  They used them for information, knowing it was false, so if the Russians caught wind of activity they would assume (though this is all sloppy) the junk material was the source.  This could seemingly provide cover to a real source.  This might keep a source going longer, although this is certainly no justification for knowingly including this material in a FISA application. There are some plausible paths I consider when looking at this that range from the U.S. source being a double agent to providing false information they did not know was false.  First, Russia interfered in the U.S. election through various means, but it seems like this source informed U.S. intelligence, who took notice on the policy front.  Like many effective lies, it seems plausible that some elements were true and some were not true.  But this source, as far as Russia is concerned, did a great service for them by focusing the U.S. political system inwards instead of thinking about geopolitics. It also seems possible that the location of this source was listed but they were not living at that location. This approach might have been used as a way to draw out potential threats, but that strategy seems a little obvious. Perhaps there is an in-between space of deceit that maintains the status quo.  U.S. intelligence realizes they were partially duped and Putin figures keeping the facade up is useful.  Or from the other side, if this person was slightly untrustworthy from Putin’s perspective, he got rid of someone and gained politically at the same time. Some Questions: How did a media figure get information about a source that was so important that it was left out of the President’s Daily Intelligence Brief?   Who at this time knew of this figure existing?  How much danger was the source put in by being revealed…. and was it intentional?  Why did the story die as quickly as it started? In short, there are many parts of this matter that feed other questions that hopefully we will learn more about. This is important for the record. It is also significant to see how rivals are manipulative and react, to help serve as a lesson for future actions.  One lesson is how Russia managed to concoct a plot that got Americans to be more distrusting of each other than of their old Cold War enemy.  How this played out exposed a deep vulnerability, driven by confirmation bias, that senior officials and the public are swayed by. Sometimes we are too quick to believe something, not because it is factual, but because it is in line with opinions we already hold. What worries me most is how unaware we are as individuals of confirmation bias and how it drives so much of our behavior.  We share that, like many other things, with each other.

Quote: “To the hard-liners of East and West the Second World War was a distraction. Now it was over, they could get on with the real war that had started with the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917, and had been running under different flags and disguises ever since.” ~  John le Carré, The Spy Who Came in from the Cold

News:

I am enjoying the chance to share these newsletters with you in the form of the new podcasts and appreciate your continued feedback. You can reply to this email or leave your comments below.  I sincerely enjoy chatting and learning what folks think. Thank you ~ Kevin

This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit modlinglobal.substack.com