In the seventh episode of In Defense of Virology, distinguished virologist Simon Wain-Hobson discusses the science (or lack thereof) behind two of the most influential publications on the origin of SARS-CoV-2: “The Proximal Origin of SARS-CoV-2” (“Proximal Origin,” published in Nature Medicine on March 17, 2020) and “Statement in Support of the Scientists, Public Health Professionals, and Medical Professionals of China Combating COVID-19” (“Calisher et al.,” published in The Lancet on March 7, 2020).

These publications were instrumental in establishing the false narrative that the weight of scientific evidence strongly favored a natural origin over a laboratory origin. While both papers have been widely criticized for years (including by Science From the Fringe host Bryce Nickels, who has been part of multiple calls for Proximal Origin to be retracted - see, Proximal Origin Retraction Request #1; Proximal Origin Retraction Request #2; Petition to Retract Proximal Origin), Simon’s comments in this episode, including his own call for their retraction, represent one of the strongest condemnations of these papers from a member of the virology community itself. The conversation concludes with a discussion of the importance of accountability in cases (such as “Proximal Origin” and “Calisher et al.”) where established scientific norms are violated in such an odious manner.

This episode serves as a companion to Simon’s essay, “Distal truths,” in which he elaborates on these arguments in written form.

(recorded February 2, 2026)

In the sixth episode of In Defense of Virology, Rutgers professor and Science From the Fringe host Bryce Nickels speaks with distinguished virologist Simon Wain-Hobson about a potentially catastrophic biosafety issue: the human H2N2 influenza virus is not classified as a federal select agent, yet live samples remain stored in laboratory freezers around the world. The discussion is prompted by Simon’s recent essay, “The virus not on the Select Agent list.”

The discussion centers on a concerning exchange between NIH Director Jay Bhattacharya and NIAID Acting Director Jeffrey Taubenberger on an August 2025 episode of The Director’s Desk podcast. During that conversation, Taubenberger—a prominent influenza researcher best known for his role in the highly controversial resurrection of the deadly 1918 “Spanish flu” virus—said that the virus responsible for the 1957 pandemic, H2N2, poses a serious concern. He noted that since 1968, no one has been exposed to this virus, even though it was fully adapted to humans. Despite this, H2N2 is not a select agent. Taubenberger explained that his lab voluntarily handles it under the same conditions as the 1918 virus, though such precautions are not required, and acknowledged that H2N2 likely remains in clinical, diagnostic, and basic virology laboratory freezers around the world. He admitted that this situation “really scares” him, since most of the global population born after 1968 lacks immunity to H2N2—a virus known to have already caused a pandemic.

Simon highlights Taubenberger’s striking acknowledgment that live H2N2 stocks persist in numerous laboratories without select agent designation or enhanced biosafety requirements. This stands in sharp contrast to the 1918 influenza virus—reconstructed by Taubenberger himself—which is designated as a Tier 1 select agent and subject to the highest level of regulatory control. Given the well-documented record of laboratory accidents, Simon argues that keeping H2N2 stocks under minimal oversight poses an unacceptable risk of a lab-acquired pandemic.

The episode questions why, if Taubenberger himself is “really scared” by the existence of H2N2 stocks in laboratories worldwide, neither he nor the NIH Director has taken concrete action since their podcast discussion. Simon maintains that H2N2 is uniquely dangerous: it is fully adapted to humans, highly transmissible, and capable of causing millions of deaths in today’s densely populated, interconnected world—potentially matching or exceeding the impact of COVID-19. In his view, any speculative scientific value in retaining live H2N2 virus stocks is vastly outweighed by their global hazard.

Emphasizing that pandemic potential depends primarily on transmissibility rather than case fatality—unlike pathogens such as Ebola—Simon calls for urgent corrective measures. He advocates adding human H2N2 to the Federal Select Agent List as a Tier 1 agent, destroying all unnecessary laboratory stocks under U.S. jurisdiction, retaining only genomic sequences for possible future reconstruction if ever justified, and encouraging equivalent actions internationally.

The conversation places these recommendations within the broader “Do No Harm” ethos of the series, arguing that responsible virology sometimes requires restraint, remediation, and the deliberate elimination of nonessential risks.

(recorded January 9, 2026)

In Episode 5 of In Defense of Virology, Bryce Nickels and Simon Wain-Hobson have a sobering conversation about the emerging risks of applying artificial intelligence to virus design.

The discussion centers on a recent Stanford preprint in which researchers trained AI models on bacteriophage genomes and used those models to generate entirely new viral sequences. From hundreds of AI-generated designs, the team synthesized 16 fully functional viruses. One replicated faster than its natural reference phage, while six displayed striking genetic stability, accumulating no detectable mutations at all. Even for Simon, whose career spans decades of studying viral evolution, the results were genuinely surprising.

Although bacteriophages are often framed as promising therapeutic tools, particularly for treating antibiotic-resistant infections, Simon cautions that the implications of this work extend far beyond phage biology. Applying similar AI-driven approaches to animal or human viruses could unintentionally generate pathogens that are more transmissible or more virulent—effectively producing gain-of-function outcomes without any traditional laboratory manipulation.

The episode places these findings within a broader and increasingly urgent context. Leaders in the AI community have begun sounding alarms about AI-enabled biology. Most notably, Yoshua Bengio warned in a New York Times op-ed that the implications of this technology are “terrifying.” Similar concerns were echoed at the September Red Lines AI meeting, where pandemic genesis was identified as the foremost global risk.

Simon and Bryce argue that this moment demands restraint rather than curiosity. They urge scientists to refrain from applying AI-based viral design to human-relevant pathogens and call on research funders, including the National Institutes of Health, philanthropies, and private foundations, to withhold support for work that could escalate existential risk. (Such restraint would align with recent U.S. executive orders aimed at preventing the enhancement of dangerous pathogens.)

The episode closes with Simon making a broader appeal for scientists to stop prioritizing technical novelty and high-risk experimentation, but for a renewed commitment to the principle of do no harm. Biology, he contends, should focus its energy on urgent human challenges (e.g., cancer, neurodegenerative disease, and mental health) where progress can be transformative without carrying the risk of catastrophic consequences.

(recorded December 7, 2025)

In this episode of Science From the Fringe, host Bryce Nickels speaks with Dana Parish—an award-winning songwriter, patient-rights advocate, advisory board member of the Bay Area Lyme Foundation, co-author of Chronic, and host of The Dana Parish Podcast—about her personal experience with Lyme disease, the broader scientific, medical, and political controversies surrounding tick-borne illness, and the historical significance of the Lyme Disease Roundtable hosted by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) on Monday, December 15, 2025.

The conversation begins with Dana’s personal Lyme story: a tick bite that abruptly derailed her music career and led to severe multisystem illness, including heart failure, after early treatment failed. She describes a long and difficult journey to diagnosis, the discovery of co-infections such as Bartonella, and her eventual recovery through extended antibiotic treatment under Dr. Steven Phillips. That experience ultimately led her to co-author Chronic, a project shaped by striking parallels between Lyme disease politics and the public response to COVID-19.

Dana discusses her advocacy work with organizations such as the Bay Area Lyme Foundation and the Lyme Disease Biobank, emphasizing the urgent need for improved diagnostics, increased research funding, insurance coverage, and formal recognition of chronic Lyme disease. The episode also explores the recent HHS Chronic Lyme Disease Roundtable, featuring figures such as RFK Jr., Dr. Oz, Dr. Steven Phillips, and Dr. Bob Bransfield. The discussion highlights growing acknowledgment of chronic Lyme’s reality, the severe neuropsychiatric consequences many patients face—including rage, psychosis, and suicide risk—and calls for systemic reforms in testing, treatment, and coverage.

Interwoven with humor and banter—including jokes about exterminating ticks, “limited hangouts,” and mutual suspicions of being “spooks”—the episode confronts deeper issues: institutional denial, media bias, insurance barriers, failed vaccine efforts, and the enormous personal and economic toll of untreated chronic illness. Dana and Bryce also explore links between Lyme disease, toxic mold exposure, reactivated infections, and long COVID, underscoring the complexity of chronic inflammatory conditions.

The episode closes with cautious optimism about potential reforms under new HHS leadership, stressing both the urgency of alleviating patient suffering and the need for skepticism and follow-through to ensure that recent developments amount to real change rather than symbolic optics.

(recorded December 19, 2025)

In this episode of Science From the Fringe, host Bryce Nickels speaks with documentary filmmaker Jenner Furst, the Director of Thank You, Dr. Fauci, which examines the career and controversies surrounding Dr. Anthony Fauci.

The conversation explores Jenner’s motivation for making the film, which began when independent financiers approached him to investigate Fauci’s record during the COVID-19 pandemic. Jenner describes his deep dive into Fauci’s involvement in gain-of-function research, the lab-origin hypothesis for SARS-CoV-2, and what he characterizes as a vast scientific cover-up, reconstructed through emails, publications, and whistleblower testimony.

They discuss interviews featured in the film with figures such as Fauci’s long time nemesis Richard Ebright, former CDC Director Dr. Robert Redfield, and current FDA Commissioner Dr. Marty Makary, while critically examining institutional incentives, possible intelligence-community entanglements, and how crises can be leveraged for power, profit, and political advantage.

Interspersed with humor—ranging from bad Christmas songs and Ghostbusters metaphors to behind-the-scenes filming anecdotes—the discussion also confronts darker themes: suppressed dissent, fraud in science, failures of transparency, and the structural weaknesses of modern biosafety and public-health oversight.

The episode asks how ambition, distorted incentives, and institutional corruption may have contributed to a global catastrophe—and whether meaningful accountability or reform is possible under new leadership. Listeners are encouraged to watch the film for a fuller reckoning.

(Recorded December 13, 2025)

In the fourth episode of In Defense of Virology, Rutgers Professor and Science From the Fringe host Bryce Nickels and distinguished virologist Simon Wain-Hobson argue that labs should destroy frozen stocks of dangerous, nonessential pathogens produced through gain-of-function research or historical resurrection—simple to do, high-impact for reducing global risk.

Simon highlights precedent—from post-eradication smallpox and rinderpest—and cites a recent Newcastle disease virus re-emergence in China strongly suggestive of a freezer escape. Given that even top labs leak, he argues, destruction of unnecessary stocks is common-sense risk reduction.

The episode concludes with an overlooked puzzle: despite SARS-CoV-2’s devastating impact, fewer than 100 related genomes have been disclosed, compared to more than 240 for SARS-1. Whether due to undersampling or undisclosed sequences, Simon contends the gap is a public-health failure—surveillance is essential, but must not be confused with the risky manipulation that helped create today’s biosafety crisis. Virology must decide between continued high-risk work and responsibly “cleaning house.”

(recorded November 22, 2025)

In this episode of Science from the Fringe, host Bryce Nickels speaks with Dr. Meryl Nass—medical adviser to Robert F. Kennedy Jr., biological warfare expert, publisher of Meryl’s CHAOS letter, and founder of DoorToFreedom.org—about the urgent need to strengthen the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC).

The conversation examines the escalating risks posed by bioweapons research, and why the current political moment—with HHS Secretary Robert F. Kennedy Jr. and President Trump openly calling for an end to bioweapons development—may offer the strongest opportunity in decades to close the gaps in the Biological Weapons Convention.

Dr. Nass recounts that President Nixon’s 1969–70 decision to renounce U.S. offensive bioweapons work led to the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention—now joined by nearly 200 nations—but one deliberately drafted without verification, inspections, or penalties in order to secure rapid international agreement. She explains that in 2001 the Bush administration abruptly dismantled a nearly completed verification protocol, fracturing international trust and leaving the treaty effectively unenforceable.

Dr. Nass further notes that, since 2001, the surge in biodefense and “pandemic preparedness” funding has actively encouraged dangerous gain-of-function research—and that this research enterprise has itself become a significant source of global public-safety risk.

Still, she sees a historic opportunity to reduce this danger by finally fixing the BWC. President Trump’s May 2025 executive order restricting gain-of-function research, his September 23, 2025 UN speech urging all nations to end biological weapons development, and RFK Jr.’s continued focus on the issue at HHS together create an unprecedented chance to add the verification, inspection, and enforcement mechanisms the treaty has lacked for more than fifty years.

The episode offers a stark warning: today’s gravest biological threat is not nature but dangerous gain-of-function research. Dr. Nass argues that this moment must be seized—before the next accident or deliberate release makes COVID-19 look modest by comparison.

(Recorded November 24, 2025)

Timestamps

00:30 — Introduction of Dr. Meryl Nass02:37 — Discovering Pentagon-funded bioweapons work at UMass (1989)07:43 — Joining the Council for Responsible Genetics; early BWC history09:50 — Nixon’s renunciation and the intentional omission of verification11:49 — Failures of five-year review conferences; Bush’s 2001 sabotage14:10 — Context of the 2001 walkout: 9/11 and the anthrax attacks15:20 — Why the U.S. abruptly killed the verification protocol17:35 — Trump’s 2025 UN speech and executive order on GOF19:55 — The global boom in “pandemic preparedness” funding22:23 — USAID’s $44B budget and dangerous research abroad24:15 — Why narrow GOF definitions are misleading26:56 — The number of lab incidents that occur each year30:37 — Risks of basic research on natural Ebola-level pathogens31:24 — The 2018–19 Ebola vaccine rollout: unresolved issues35:06 — Rand Paul’s oversight bill vs. the broader Trump/RFK Jr. strategy36:03 — Financial incentives behind the global biodefense system40:45 — Rebuilding trust and addressing entrenched interests41:45 — The opportunity created by RFK Jr. at HHS46:22 — Concrete steps that signal real progress48:55 — AI, synthetic biology, and the future of bioweapons oversight52:33 — Why public understanding of biowarfare risks remains limited01:00:14 — Closing remarks

intro and outro by Tess Parks

In this episode of Science From the Fringe, host Bryce Nickels, speaks with David Zweig—a New York City–based journalist, author, and contributor to The Atlantic, The New York Times, and The Free Press—about his new book, An Abundance of Caution: American Schools, the Virus, and the Story of Bad Decisions.

Their conversation traces David’s motivation for writing the book, beginning with his early recognition of the devastating effects of remote learning on children during the COVID-19 pandemic. David explains how a mix of action bias, politicization, and institutional inertia led to catastrophic decisions on school closures and mitigation measures such as masking, distancing, and barriers.

David critiques the reliance on flawed models, the role of teachers’ unions, and the class divides that deepened the harms, while highlighting how real-time evidence from Europe and elsewhere was ignored. The discussion also explores the erosion of public trust, the suppression of dissent, and the moral grandstanding that replaced evidence-based reasoning.

At its core, this episode examines how “good” intentions and systemic dysfunction combined to produce policies that harmed children with little to no public health benefit, and what it will take to ensure more intellectually honest, transparent, and evidence-driven decision-making in future crises.

(recorded November 10, 2025)

In this episode of Science from the Fringe, host Bryce Nickels, Professor of Genetics at Rutgers University, speaks with Aaron Siri—civil rights attorney, managing partner at Siri & Glimstad LLP, and author of Vaccines Amen: The Religion of Vaccines. Together, they discuss the corrupting influence of commercial interests on scientific integrity and public policy, and how, in the case of vaccines, appeals to authority are sold to the public as unassailable fact.

The conversation begins with the historical inflection point of the little known 1986 National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act, which established legal immunity for vaccine manufacturers and reshaped the incentives that underpin vaccine development and public health policy. The discussion then turns to how this unprecedented legal structure has contributed to shortcuts in scientific oversight, particularly in “placebo” trial design, post-licensure safety evaluation, and mechanisms for compensating vaccine injuries.

Aaron argues that many vaccine claims are rooted in dogma rather than evidence, critiques the role of figures like Dr. Stanley Plotkin in shaping vaccine policy, and highlights cases of coercion, censorship, and inadequate safety oversight. He emphasizes the importance of informed consent, individual rights, and persuading the public on merits rather than mandates, while touching on potential unintended consequences of vaccination programs, including the potential disruption of humanity’s ecological relationship with certain pathogens.

At its core, this “scientist meets lawyer” conversation probes how scientific integrity can be distorted by profit-driven systems, what happens when healthy skepticism becomes verboten, and the human cost of trading transparency for expedience.

(Recorded October 29th, 2025)

Timestamps

00:30 — Introduction of Aaron Siri01:17 — Aaron’s definition of a vaccine03:03 — Aaron shares his personal opinion on vaccine policy08:32 — Dr. Stanley Plotkin: a central figure in vaccinology12:04 — Aaron’s 2018 deposition of Plotkin in a custody case15:28 — The 1986 National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act19:57 — How the 1986 Act inverted market incentives for vaccine safety22:24 — Design defect claims and the Supreme Court’s ruling on vaccine liability 26:19 — Lucrativeness of vaccines for pharmaceutical companies28:26 — The Mandate for Safer Childhood Vaccines and HHS’s failure to fulfill it32:36 — Potential for HHS under RFK Jr. to enforce vaccine safety mandates35:55 — Mistreatment of vaccine injured: the case of Maddie de Garay42:20 — Broader societal treatment of vaccine-injured and unvaccinated44:14 — GSK’s 2017 pertussis vaccine ad and litigation over misleading claims48:19 — Exchange with Dr. Paul Offit on placebo trials57:26 — Humanity’s ecological relationship with infectious diseases01:08:35 — Measles mortality decline pre-vaccine and potential long-term effects of eradication01:11:50 — Aaron describes his vision for a world without mandates

intro and outro by Tess Parks

In the third episode of In Defense of Virology, Rutgers Professor and Science From the Fringe host Bryce Nickels and distinguished virologist Simon Wain-Hobson discuss two striking examples of reckless virology research—one well known and the other largely forgotten—and issue a call to change the culture of modern science.

The first example revisits the controversial resurrection of the 1918 Spanish flu, a virus that killed tens of millions worldwide. Simon explains how NIH-funded researchers extracted genetic fragments from frozen cadavers, used PCR to reconstruct the viral genome, and then revived the virus in 2005, publishing the full sequence in Science. Despite claims that the work would aid vaccine development, he argues that no public-health benefit ever materialized, while the potential for misuse dramatically increased.

The second example, less known but equally concerning, involves retroviruses resurrected from fragments within the human genome. In work published in 2006 and 2007, researchers in France and New York chemically synthesized what they believed to be defunct human viruses—naming one “Phoenix.” Although performed with NIH and national-science-foundation support, there was no transparency about biosafety levels or prior ethical review. Simon argues that such experiments, however clever, violate the moral boundary between curiosity and recklessness.

From these examples, Simon and Bryce turn to solutions—chief among them a Hippocratic Oath for scientists. Just as physicians swear to “do no harm,” they propose that life-science researchers and funding agencies adopt a similar pledge to avoid work that makes the world more dangerous. Simon envisions a three-part reform: NIH and major foundations embedding the principle into grants, universities incorporating it into graduation ceremonies, and scientific culture embracing it as a moral baseline.

The conversation closes with a call to action for listeners: write to local universities or newspapers to support a research culture grounded in humility, safety, and moral responsibility.

(recorded October 23, 2025)