Seneca (4 BC-65 AD) had no understanding of the concept of justice, and what is even worse, he did not care. As a result, his version of Stoicism lost touch with the social and economic fibre of the Roman Empire. It would have been easy for Seneca to endorse the doctrines of Aristotle (384-322 BC) on justice. In the “Eudemian Ethics” and the “Nicomachean Ethics,” Aristotle considered justice a major virtue. A rational man aims at giving each person his due, Aristotle argued. Fairness and justice arise from the human capacity to think. Animals have no concept of justice, and no expectations thereof. Without rationality, we cannot determine who deserves what, who owns what, and who has earned what. Seneca gained important insights on the subject of serenity, equanimity and happiness, but he would have done even better if he had devoted some time to reflecting about justice. He did acknowledge the problems caused by malfeasance and abuse, but without pointing to their root cause. The 47th Letter to Lucilius exemplifies Seneca’s astonishing indifference to injustice. It recounts that Calvisius Sabinus, a Roman aristocrat, had mistreated his servants, but fails to rate Sabinus’ behaviour as evil. Instead of condemning Sabinus for mistreating his servants, Seneca expresses his dislike for Sabinus’ ignorance in matters of literature and social decorum. The Letter demonstrates deep moral and social blindness on Seneca’s side. Obliviousness to justice is a general problem affecting Stoic thinkers. In the ensuing generations, Marcus Aurelius (121-180 AD) and Epictetus (55-135 AD) show slightly more sensitivity for justice than Seneca, but their passive acceptance of abuses remains worrying. What about earlier Stoics? Zeno of Citium (334-262 BC), Cleanthes (330-230 BC) and Chrysippus (279-206 BC) had not remained insensitive to injustice, but they viewed it as a source of suffering that cannot be eradicated. For Seneca, philosophy is a balsam for the victims of abuse, mistreatment and other injustices, but its effects are limited in scope. The balsam may heal existing injuries, but does nothing to prevent new abuses from occurring. Due to Seneca’s underlying indifference for justice, I find it difficult to take his advice for victims seriously. The 47th Letter to Lucilius affirms that “only the practice of virtue can help us secure happiness,” but does not mention justice a single time. Seneca systematically avoided social or economic criticism. I have not found in all his writings even a couple of paragraphs commenting on Aristotle’s theory of justice. The avoidance of this sensitive subject is of course deliberate, not unintentional. In comparison, Seneca devoted hundreds of pages to issues of little importance. As a salient illustration, I can point to the 15th Letter to Lucilius, which criticises pointless exercise. The banality of its contents barely justifies the cost of the paper that Seneca employed for writing it. In any case, I think that Seneca should have rather praised the benefits of moderate exercise. Seneca arrives at the wrong conclusion that we should not expect too much from life. He regards failure and injustice as perennial and universal, as something we cannot avoid even if we deploy our best efforts. The 67th and 78th Letters to Lucilius present shipwreck (in a figurative manner) as normal. We can choose a good pilot for our ship and he can deploy his best efforts, but a storm may appear out of nowhere and cause the ship to sink. As philosophers, Seneca says, our job consists of fortifying our soul, so that we can cope with shipwrecks (setbacks). His most definite statement reads as follows: “Neither poverty nor suffering nor any other storm can have negative effects on wise individuals.” I couldn’t disagree more and I regret that Seneca missed the point completely. Here is the link to the original article: https://johnvespasian.com/senecas-teachings-on-justice/