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During the 1983 Soviet nuclear false alarm incident, Lieutenant Colonel Stanislav Petrov was the duty officer at the command center for the Oko nuclear early-warning system. On September 26, 1983, the system reported that five missiles had been launched from the United States.
Petrov judged these reports to be a false alarm.
This judgment is credited with having prevented an erroneous retaliatory nuclear attack on the United States and its NATO allies. Had Petrov reported incoming American missiles as a real attack, his superiors might have launched a nuclear assault against the United States, which could have precipitated a corresponding nuclear response from the United States, likely resulting in a large-scale nuclear war.
Petrov's decision to disobey orders and go against Soviet military protocol by not immediately reporting the supposed missile launch was crucial. According to the Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the UN, Soviet nuclear retaliation required confirmation from multiple sources. Petrov decided to wait for a confirmation that never came. Ground radar also failed to pick up corroborating evidence.
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By Swetlana AIDuring the 1983 Soviet nuclear false alarm incident, Lieutenant Colonel Stanislav Petrov was the duty officer at the command center for the Oko nuclear early-warning system. On September 26, 1983, the system reported that five missiles had been launched from the United States.
Petrov judged these reports to be a false alarm.
This judgment is credited with having prevented an erroneous retaliatory nuclear attack on the United States and its NATO allies. Had Petrov reported incoming American missiles as a real attack, his superiors might have launched a nuclear assault against the United States, which could have precipitated a corresponding nuclear response from the United States, likely resulting in a large-scale nuclear war.
Petrov's decision to disobey orders and go against Soviet military protocol by not immediately reporting the supposed missile launch was crucial. According to the Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the UN, Soviet nuclear retaliation required confirmation from multiple sources. Petrov decided to wait for a confirmation that never came. Ground radar also failed to pick up corroborating evidence.
Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.