In administrative law the focus has primarily been on how to constrain executive discretion. It may, however, be equally important to consider how to constrain the delegations that create that discretion—not just by telling Congress to “do its job,” but by thinking about how to shift the incentives that members have for delegation. This panel will consider what Congress gains by delegating policymaking authority to the executive. The conventional view holds that delegations only expand the power of the executive, ignoring the myriad reasons that Congress chooses to delegate its power. Members of Congress may realize a variety of benefits from delegation, including control over how agencies exercise their discretion. Panelists will discuss the reasons why Congress delegates so broadly and consider what legal and political solutions might curb such delegations.-- This panel was presented on June 18, 2015, at the Mayflower Hotel in Washington, DC during the Third Annual Executive Branch Review Conference. -- Featuring: Prof. Jack M. Beermann, Boston University School of Law; Prof. Gillian E. Metzger, Columbia Law School; and Prof. Neomi J. Rao, George Mason University School of Law. Moderator: Mr. Dean A. Reuter, The Federalist Society.