In these three chapters, 7, 8 and 9, Floridi (2019) explores the philosophy of information, focusing on the principle of information closure and its implications for modal logic. The author defends information closure against sceptical objections, arguing that its rejection unnecessarily restricts the formalisation of information logic. The text also examines formal logical fallacies and proposes a Bayesian interpretation that sees them as informational shortcuts rather than pure errors. Finally, the author develops a tradition of 'maker's knowledge', distinguishing it from observer's and receiver's knowledge within an information-theoretical framework, and proposing a new category of 'ab anteriori' knowledge. The overall argument focuses on refining our understanding of information acquisition, processing and representation, especially in multi-agent systems.

Please note that the podcast covers key points from the source with synthetic voices, which may have glitches. It’s a reflective, not comprehensive, interpretation.

Floridi, L. (2019). The logic of information: A theory of philosophy as conceptual design (First edition). Oxford University Press. (pp. 149-187)

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