Hello Youtube Members, Patreons and Pacific War week by week listeners. Yes this was intended to be an exclusive episode to join the 29 others over on my Youtube Membership and Patreon, but since we are drawing to the end of the Pacific War week by week series, I felt compelled to make some special episodes to answer some of the bigger questions.

Hey before I begin I just want to thank all of you who have joined the patreon, you guys are awesome. Please let me know what other figures, events or other things you want to hear about in the future and I will try to make it happen.

So as you can see the title of this episode is, Why did the Japanese perform so many Atrocities during the Pacific War. Phewww, its honestly a difficult one to tackle, for there are countless reasons. I had a university professor who taught; ancient and modern Japanese history, history of the Japanese empire and the Pacific War. He actually answered this very question in a single lecture and in many ways I found it to be one of the most illuminating things I ever learnt about the Pacific War. To truly understand the reasons why they did such horrible things, you actually need to learn the general history of Japan, particularly the changes from Tokugawa, to Meiji, to Showa. I am going to do my very best, but I know many of you might be asking “what were the worst things they did?”, not everyone takes a special interest into such a niche part of history. May I recommend for those with strong stomachs “the knights of Bushido” by Edward Russel that covers pretty much all the atrocities of the Asia-Pacific War. For those of you who like darker things, check out Unit 731: Japan's Secret Biological Warfare in World War II

by David Wallace and Peter Williams, absolute nightmare fuel.

I can’t go through the entire history of Japan, but I think it's important to start off with the first Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895. This was the first time the Empire of Japan fought a true war with a foreign nation, that being the Qing dynasty. At this point in time, there really emerged a sort of, to be blunt, race war. The Chinese had historically referred to the Japanese as “woren”, a racist term meaning dwarf. Now historically the Japanese had always revered the Chinese, kind of like in the way a little brother looks up to his big brother. In tokugawa Japan they would learn from the Chinese, but as the Meiji restoration began this dramatically changed. Japan watched as the Chinese were humiliating and abused by the western powers and failed to modernize. Meanwhile Japan emulated the best of the west, to modernize and become a great power themselves. In many ways, Japan saw itself become big brother and now China was little brother. The Meiji restoration had an element of nationalism built into it that would explode come the Show era. Japan for its entire history had this belief they were the “Yamato Race” dating back to the 6th century. Now while the Meiji restoration sought to emulate the west, they also emulated racism and propaganda, which in the 19th century was kind of a big deal. The Japanese government gradually began a long term campaign promoting the idea the Japanese, or Yamato people were superior to that of the other asian races. Who was the next big asian boy on the block? China, so it was inevitable they would direct a lot of racist attitudes towards the Chinese. During the first sino-japanese war, the Chinese, particularly Manchu had a habit of performing atrocities upon the Japanese. They would often cut off body parts of Japanese soldiers in grotesque manners and leave them to be found by their comrades. This was honestly a pretty typical thing of war in the region, but it did also have a racist element to it, the Chinese certainly saw the Japanese as lesser people. Just before the battle of Port Arthur, the Japanese found mutilated remains of the comrades, here is a passage from Makio Okabe who was there:

As we entered the town of Port Arthur, we saw the head of a Japanese soldier displayed on a wooden stake. This filled us with rage and a desire to crush any Chinese soldier. Anyone we saw in the town, we killed. The streets were filled with corpses, so many they blocked our way. We killed people in their homes; by and large, there wasn't a single house without from three to six dead. Blood was flowing and the smell was awful. We sent out search parties. We shot some, hacked at others. The Chinese troops just dropped their arms and fled. Firing and slashing, it was unbounded joy. At this time, our artillery troops were at the rear, giving three cheers [banzai] for the emperor.

The Japanese performed a massacre at Port Arthur, butchering perhaps up to 3000 Chinese civilians, some claim 10’s of thousands and in full few of western war correspondents. It became a huge controversy that destroyed the image of the IJA internationally and hurt the Japanese governments efforts at riding themselves of unequal treaties with the western powers. The Japanese learnt a hell of a lesson and an Imperial Proclamation was made in 1894 stating that Japanese soldiers should make every effort to win the war without violating international laws. According to Japanese historian Yuki Tanaka, Japanese forces during the First Sino-Japanese War released 1,790 Chinese prisoners without harm, once they signed an agreement not to take up arms against Japan if they were released.

During the next major war the Japanese performed a dramatic 180, well at least to their enemy. During the Russo-Japanese War, over 80,000 Russian POWs were held by the IJA who were treated in accordance with the Hague conventions of 1899. The Japanese paid them for labor, housed them in conventional POW camps, made sure they received good medical treatment, ironically better than the Russians were capable of. The Japanese did all of this, making sure the foreign war correspondents wrote about it. It was a massive PR stunt in many ways. The Japanese were emulating how a world power should act, because they sought to be one. Meanwhile the Japanese swallowed their pride at being called yellow monkeys, as the prevalent Yellow Peril ideology was being pushed by Kaiser Wilhehelm and Tsar Nicholas II heavily. The Japanese treated the entire war like gentlemen and suffered horrific higher casualties than necessary because of it. But something many people don’t take much notice of, because the IJA made sure of it, was they horrible treatment of the Chinese during the war.

Now the Russians in Manchuria looted, killed and raped many Chinese, pushed quite a bit by the Yellow Peril. The Chinese, certainly the Honghuzi bandits were working for the Japanese to attack them, so its not like they had no reasons. The IJA was more professional and had orders not to molest the Chinese, as they were helping the war effort, but this did not prevent it. The Japanese also looted, killed and raped Chinese. The Japanese would often wave it off as reprisals against potential spies. I only bring this up as it was very apparent, the Japanese treated the Russians much different than the chinese.

Fast forward to WW1, the Japanese had a battle against the Germans and Austro-Hungarians known in the west as the Siege of Tsingtau. The Japanese took up an identical methodology to the Russo-Japanese war with their approach to the Germans, but even took it a step further. After winning the siege, the Japanese seized nearly 5000 German POW’s who were treated with a surreal amount of respect. They were brought back to Japan and housed for the rest of the war in 12 cities around Tokyo and Kumamoto. The POW’s enjoyed humane treatment and a rather famous event occurred at the Bando camp where a large orchestra was formed of German POW’s who toured the nation performing 100 concerts, lectures and plays. Evidence the Germans were treated well can be seen in the fact 170 prisoners never left Japan and sought wives and lives there. Now is this all a feel good love story, no, just like during the Russo-Japanese War, Japan was playing up the PR, for during WW1 they wanted official recognition as a world power and that of being racially equal to the whites. 

Japan was officially recognized as a world power during the treaty of Versailles, but when Japan gave its racial equality proposal, President Woodrow Wilson of the US and Australian Prime Minister Billy Hughes refused to allow it to pass, even though they received majority votes. Now The Japanese had been for a lack of better words, fucked over, during the first sino-japanese war when the triple intervention of France, Germany and Russia stole away their war earning of the Liaodong peninsula. During the Russo-Japanese war, Theodore Roosevelt limited the Japanese war gains and now here after WW1 the Japanese received another humiliation. To the Japanese, it was the last straw and it was a major reason they went to war with the west, who they viewed, and honestly rightfully so, would never see them as equals.

Ompf, lot of history there, but now we come to the Showa era, which was molded by the feelings of the past decades.

In 1937 Japan and China enter an unofficial war that saw one of the worst wartime atrocities in human history, the rape of Nanjing. It began on December 13th of 1937, lasting 6 or so weeks seeing the murder of possibly 300,000 civilians and pows, the mass rape of 20,000 and untold hardship upon the Chinese people. The Japanese followed this up with numerous other massacres in China such as the Changjiao Massacre claiming possibly 30,000 Chinese civilian lives, the Alexandra Hospital Massacre killing 200 patients and medical staff in Hong Kong, the Laha Massacre on Ambon island where 300 members of the Gull force were executed, the Bangka island massacre where 60 Australian and British soldiers and 22 Australian nurses were murdered, the Parit Sulong massacre in Malay where 150 wounded Australian and Indian POW’s were executed, the Bataan Death march where negligence and brutality took the lives of 650 Americans and perhaps a possible 18,000 Filipinos, the Manila massacres claiming the lives of perhaps 54,000 filipinos including women and children in the Philippines, the Balikpapan massacre in the dutch east indies taking the lives of 78 Dutch Civilians, I can keep going and going. Where the Japanese went, massacres and horrors occurred. 

Again if you really want to delve into these stories check out “the knights of Bushido”.

The Japanese also had the infamous special units like 731, who conducted horrifying experiments on civilians and POWs like vivisectioning live people without anesthesia, testing biological and chemical weapons on live people, the freezing peoples to study frostbite treatment and giving people sexually transmitted diseases to study. Lt General Shiro Ishii’s unit 731 deployed plague infested fleas, cholera, bubonic plague and other nasty weapons upon Chinese civilians killing perhaps up to 500,000. This was seen during the battle of Changde and famously during operation Sei-go also known as the Zhejiang-Jiangxi campaign. 

The Japanese also enacted the infamous “Sanko Sakusen / three all’s policy : kill all, urn all, loot all” in retaliation to the Chinese communists Hundred regiments offensive in December of 1940. Sanctioned by Hirohito personally, it is thought this act resulted in the death of 2.7 million Chinese civilians. According to author Werner Gruhl 8 million Chinese civilian deaths could be attributable to the Japanese. 

 So then we come back to the big question, why? So now that I’ve covered the loose history for coherency sake I want to list here the largest reasons for the atrocities and by no means is this official categories or even all of them, I am simply stating kind of my top ones I guess you can say:

Yes its time to talk about treaties, yawn. Now I said previously Japan did sign the Hague Conventions of 1899 and would ratify them in 1907. The Hague conventions did contain laws for prisoners of war, protection of civilians. Alongside this, in 1894 an imperial proclamation was made stating Japanese soldiers should make every effort to win a war without violating international laws. More significantly Japan “signed” but unlike the majority of other world powers did not ratify the Geneva convention of 1929. Why? To be blunt, the geneva conventions did not really benefit the Japanese military from their point of view.

First the Japanese had a very specific perspective on surrendering, they simply did not do it, so they did not expect many of their soldiers to ever become POW’s, so how would it benefit them to ratify such a thing? If they are not going to have many POW’s, why would they burden themselves with upholding all the conventional laws for POW’s they would obtain during war? 

Another glaring reason involved aerial bombing. Many Japanese leaders, like Kanji Ishiwara, believed the home islands would be subjected to massive aerial bombing if a global war broke out. If Japan was subjected to aerial bombing and ratified the geneva convention, this meant they would have to take the pilots who were caught prisoner. The Japanese believed this would encourage further bombing. Lastly the convention had rules for POW treatment that literally contradicted how Japanese soldiers were treated by their own superiors. More about that in the last part about the military’s brutality, but summarized, the Japanese army were abusive as hell and to sign such a thing would literally contradict how they did things.

Emperor Hirohito personally ratified a decision to remove certain constraints of the Hague Conventions when it came to the treatment of Chinese POW’s in the directive of 5 August 1937. This notification advised staff officers to simply stop using the term "prisoners of war". They would refer to their enemy as bandits, guerillas and such, anything but soldiers so they would not have to take any prisoners, though they typically did not leave anyone alive in China regardless.

The Geneva Convention exempted POWs of sergeant rank or higher from manual labor, and stipulated that prisoners performing work should be provided with extra rations and other essentials. The Japanese in the later half of the war would be starved of provisions and resources, thus its to no surprise they could not meet these demands, even if they sought to uphold them.

I will note in 1942, Japan indicated they would “follow” the Geneva rules and would observe the Hague Convention of 1907 outlining the laws and customs of war. Yet this is like a verbal confirmation, it had no legal basis, something the Japanese particularly loved to do during the war.

According to Dr. William Skelton III, who produced a document entitled American Ex Prisoners of War for the U.S. Department of Veterans' Affairs, more POWs died at the hands of the Japanese in the Pacific theater and specifically in the Philippines than in any other conflict to date. For example in Germany, POWs died at a rate 1.2%. In the Pacific theater the rate was 37%. In the Philippines, POWs died at a rate of 40%. 

Now these pieces of paper that were signed or not signed, what does this really matter when it comes to war, its obvious they were not upholding certain rules, but how did this quote en quote make them more brutal and perform more atrocities? Well here is the sticky thing, if you are part of the Japanese military and you know your nation did not ratify certain rules of war, this meant your enemy had no supposed legal basis to follow said rules against you either. 

So I want you to think of two aspects of this. If your nation did not sign or ratify certain treaties, then you could not expect the enemy to respect such rules when it comes to you. But more importantly, what if the leader of your nation…just told you to believe that? 

In early 1942, Great Britain, the United States of America and other great powers did officially let the Japanese know that they would, on their  part, observe all the provisions of the Convention and requested reciprocity. Japanese foreign minister at the time, Hideki Tojo gave a formal assurance that although Japan was not bound by the Geneva convention, the Japanese would apply it “mutatis mutandis” towards the Americans, British, Canadians, Australians and New Zealander POW’s, note he most definitely did not extend this to the asiatic groups, nor the Dutch whom I guess he just forgot about. But this did morally bind Japan to comply with the convention. However the top brass of the Japanese military, notably Hideki Tojo in these cases, went out of his way to instill beliefs within the military as to what they should expect from the enemy. As you will see in the next points, this was basically a type of indoctrination.

The leaders of Japan knew full well how unmatched they were in terms of resources and productivity before they began the war with the west. How could they possibly win the war? The IJN was dead set on a decisive naval battle, but for the IJA to compensate for their lack of resources, they believed their “spirit” would overcome the enemy. In many ways this spirit meant going above and beyond normal human endurance, to literally outperform the allies and notably to conduct the war with absolutely zero mercy. Once Japan lost the initiative in the war, after Guadalcanal, the IJA were forced to fight a war of attrition. Now they would prolong and exact maximum casualties upon the allies hoping to force them to the peace table. The idea was quite simple, the IJA would do everything possible to make the allies believe they would never give up and it would far too costly to defeat them. How does one go about achieving these aims? Well the IJA officers would tell you “by steeling your hearts”. To achieve all of this required extreme indoctrination. 

Japanese children grew up in regimentation, they were desensitized to violence through tales of martial glory, and were taught that their purpose in life was to serve the emperor. Upon entering  military service, they were trained out of any individualistic spirit, and taught that compassion was a weakness and had no place in the field of war. The soldier’s motto was faith equaled strength.  Faith being devotion to duty and service to the Divine Emperor. Apart from ideology and spiritual toughening, training in the Japanese Imperial Army was also extremely harsh and violent. This was not even particularly a special aspect of Showa Japan, it went all the way back to the Meiji era. From a young age children’s education directed them, like a pipeline for military duty.

Now at the offset of the war, Hideki Tojo released the “Senjinkun” “instructions for the battlefield”. This was basically a manual for soldiers on how to conduct war. The document was used to establish standards of behavior for Japanese troops and improve discipline and morale within the Army, it also included things like a prohibition against being taken prisoner. It stated if you were captured by the enemy, because Japan did not sign or ratify certain treaties, you would be killed or tortured by the allies, and if you survived you and your family would face shame back home, and punishment resulting typically in 6 months of prison.

Here is a small excerpt from the document

Those who know shame are weak. Always think of [preserving] the honor of your community and be a credit to yourself and your family. Redouble your efforts and respond to their expectations. Never live to experience shame as a prisoner. By dying you will avoid leaving a stain on your honor.

The purpose was basically psychological warfare, against their own army. Those like Hideki Tojo believed Japan could only defeat the resource rich Americans with spirit. Thus the manuals like Senjinkun demanded the forces not ever surrender, because the allies would do horrible things, it was shameful to do so and there were disciplinary actions for any who did. In 1942 the Army amended its criminal code to specify that officers who surrendered soldiers under their command faced at least six months imprisonment, regardless of the circumstances in which the surrender took place. This change attracted little attention, however, as the Senjinkun imposed more severe consequences and had greater moral force.

In a report dated June 1945, the U.S. Office of War Information noted that 84 percent of one group of interrogated Japanese prisoners, many of whom had been injured or unconscious when captured stated that they had expected to be killed or tortured by the Allies if taken prisoner. The OWI analysts described this as being typical, and concluded that fear of the consequences of surrender, “rather than Bushido,” was the motivation for many Japanese battle deaths in hopeless circumstances–as much as, and probably more than, the other two major considerations: fear of disgrace at home, and “the positive desire to die for one’s nation, ancestors, and god-emperor.”

Something barely talked about in the west, was during the Pacific War, the Americans had a habit of taking human trophies. Human trophies were Japanese skulls, gold teeth, finger bones and such. The famous novel “With the Old Breed” by Eugene Sledge spoke of his personal accounts of these actions, its a rather gruesome and dark part of the war. Now some of these actions were publicized, despite the US military's efforts to quell and hush it down. Time magazine famously had an iconic photo of a woman whose enlisted boyfriend sent her home a Japanese skull. FDR also famously was given a letter opener carved out of Japanese bones. These stories were seized up greedily by the Japanese government who used them as propaganda to prove to their soldiers what would happen if they were captured. It had a profound effect as you can imagine. And this was not limited to Japanese soldiers. The propaganda machine would contribute at the end of the war to mass civilian suicides on Okinawa and Saipan.

Back to the POW subject. When it came to the treatment of POW’s, Hideki Tojo began submitting in May of 1942 a series of memorandum, basic orders as to how POW’s should be treated. “Prisoners of war can be used for the enlargement of our production and as military labor, white prisoners of war will be confined successively in Korea, Formosa and Manchuria. Superior technicians and high ranking officers -- Colonels and above -- will be included among the prisoners of war confined in Formosa. Those who are not suitable for use in enlargement of our production will be confined in prisoner of war camps which will be built immediately on the spot.Although the working of prisoner of war officers and warrant officers is forbidden by the Regulations of 1903, the policy of the control authorities is that under the situation of our country where not one person now eats without working they want them to set to work. It is desired that you give proper orders on this.The present situation of affairs in this country does not permit anyone to lie idle doing nothing but eating freely. With that in view, in dealing with prisoners of war, I hope you will see that they may be usefully employed. In Japan, we have our own ideology concerning prisoners of war, which should naturally make their treatment more or less different from that in Europe and America. In dealing with them, you should, of course, observe the various Regulations concerned, aim at an adequate application of them . . . At the same time, you must not allow them to lie idle doing nothing but eating freely for even a single day. Their labor and technical skill should be fully utilized for the replenishment of production, and contribution rendered toward the prosecution of the Greater East Asiatic War for which no effort ought to be spared."

Thus in the end as a grunt in the IJA you were led to believe: if I am captured I will be tortured, killed maybe turned into a letter opener, or someone will place my skull on their mantle. If I surrender and survive and make it back home, I will be severely punished and worst of all me and my family will be shamed. I could not expect any humanity from the enemy, because my nation did not sign or ratify treaties like the Geneva convention. More so, because my armies conduct was so unbelievably barbaric, I could only expect the very same from my enemy. It was a vicious cycle. You perform atrocities, expecting the enemy to do the same, and thus it just keeps perpetuating itself.

Now we spoke a little bit about the concept of the Yamato race, the Japanese were indoctrinated to believe they were a superior race and that their emperor was something akin to a living god. Until this war, the Japanese empire was on a hell of a winning streak going all the way back to the Meiji Era. For the first half of the Pacific war, the Japanese won nearly every battle. This led to something historians called “victory disease” that made them become somewhat arrogant and cocky, but it also made them feel “superhuman”. The allies' news reporting at the beginning of the war began to frantically refer to the Japanese as “supermen”or  “super jungle fighters”. Particularly because of the Malay campaign, the Japanese soldier just seemed to be tougher, could survive harsher jungle climates, even doing so with less food or war materials. The Japanese read the allied news reports and came to the conclusion that had been driven down their throats by their government, indeed the Japanese spirit was winning the war. The Japanese public ate this up in their propaganda and it perpetuated their ultra-nationalistic beliefs. The Japanese truly came to believe they were destined to rule the asia-pacific. Look at the results in China for example. Within a short amount of time they conquered much of China, though the public really had no idea how bad the China was bottled down by 1940. Then came the greater east asia co-prosperity sphere propaganda, which is an excellent example of their megalomania. 

Yet alongside their ultra-nationalism, seen more strongly perpetuated against other Asian groups, the Japanese also indoctrinated their public with racism against them. The Yellow Peril of the 19th century and anti-japanese or anti-asian racism fueled the Japanese soldiers. The Japanese as a people had faced brutal racist hardships historically at the hands of the west, particularly from their point of view from America. There was the slights against them during the first sino-japanese war, the infamous triple intervention of france, germany and Russia stealing away their prize that was the liaodong peninsula. Then during the Boxer rebellion they faced racism, not being allowed to lead mutli national army formations, despite them being the lionshare of said military force. The Russo-Japanese war saw from their point of view, America stealing their war prizes. Last but not least, after WW1 they were told to their faces that they were a world power, but not racially equal. The Japanese faced anti-Japanese and anti-asian immigration laws when it came to America in the form of the gentleman’s agreement and Australia’s “great white Australia policy”. During the war, the American propaganda machine began pumping out racist caricatures of Japanese as rats, goggle eyed  bucktooth people, literal yellow monkey’s.

For the IJA the pacific war in many was a holy war directed at the arrogant whites who had abused them for so long. This will probably sound controversial, but indeed, the pacific war was very much a race war. If you are not convinced of that, I recommend reading “War without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War” by John Dower. The human trophy taking, anti-japanese bucktooth, rat people cartoon propaganda, history of racial abuse like the japanese concentration camps, the gentleman’s agreement, the stealing of victories during the first sino-japanese war, russo-japanese war and ww1 all plagued the mind of a Japanese soldier. To them in many ways, the “whites had it coming”. Which is rather ironic given how the Japanese would treat the other asian racial groups they came into contact with. But such is the contradictory nature of the Imperial Japanese military. 

The Japanese also held racist beliefs about the westerners. The Japanese soldiers were taught the allies were akin to demons or beasts. They were described often as “the hairy ones” or “anglo-American demons”. Taught these men would rape women and girls, stample upon the civilians they captured with the treads of their tanks. The marines were especially dreaded.  According to a story circulated widely among the Japanese on Saipan, all Marine Corps recruits were compelled to murder their own parents before being inducted into service. It was said that Japanese soldiers taken prisoner would suffer hideous tortures—their ears, noses, and limbs would be cut off; they would be blinded and castrated; they could also be cooked and fed to dogs. As silly as this may sound, do remember the Americans were taking human trophies so the Japanese propaganda machine had its evidence. Tons of photos of skulls atop american tanks for example were displayed to the Japanese public. Another famous one was the cartoon appearing in an American servicemen’s magazine, which was later reproduced and translated in the Japanese press. It suggested the existence of “Japanese hunting licenses, promising open season on the enemy, complete with free ammunition and equipment—with pay! 

In terms of how the Japanese exacted their own racism towards their fellow asians. During the War the Japanese dragged into forced labor, Koreans, Chinese and southeast asians. 670,000 Koreans were brought to Japan to work mines and heavy industry, around 60,000 of them died to harsh conditions. Between April 1943 to May 1945, 41,862 Chinese were sent to Japan to work, 2800 died before even reaching the home islands. 6872 died in the work sites again from brutal conditions. When it comes to southeast asian numbers are hard to pinpoint but its safe to say at least 300,000 Javanese, Malay, Burmese, Tamil and other groups were mobilized to construct the Burma-Siam railroad between October 1942 to november 1943 and 60,000 perished. This all went for the men, for the women, all those racial groups would face the horrors of becoming comfort women, historians estimate there could have been 50-200,000 pressed into it. But for the Japanese, believing their were superior to these other asiatic groups, groups whom they would publicly say were like children, they as the father figure would guide, well they simply abused them.

So in a contradictive fashion, the Japanese believed they were superior and could do horrible things to their Asian neighbors while simultaneously decrying the racism cast towards them by western powers as justification for their brutal actions against them. These types of feelings and perspectives molded the mind of the average Japanese soldier, dehumanizing others has always been a standard military practice afterall. 

I think this is one the vast majority of WW2 history buffs know, the Japanese perspective on surrender and the bushido code. In the book “military trials of war criminals in the Netherlands east indies 1946-1949” Fred Borch had this to say about the variable of bushido for the brutality

As Japan continued its modernization in the early 20th century, her armed forces became convinced that success in battle would be assured if Japanese soldiers, sailors, and airmen had the "spirit" of Bushido. ... The result was that the Bushido code of behavior "was inculcated into the Japanese soldier as part of his basic training." Each soldier was indoctrinated to accept that it was the greatest honor to die for the Emperor and it was cowardly to surrender to the enemy. ... Bushido therefore explains why the Japanese soldiers who were stationed in the NEI so mistreated POWs in their custody. Those who had surrendered to the Japanese—regardless of how courageously or honorably they had fought—merited nothing but contempt; they had forfeited all honor and literally deserved nothing. Consequently, when the Japanese murdered POWs by shooting, beheading, and drowning, these acts were excused since they involved the killing of men who had forfeited all rights to be treated with dignity or respect. While civilian internees were certainly in a different category from POWs, it is reasonable to think that there was a "spill-over" effect from the tenets of Bushido.

It is very true, the Japanese soldiers and sailors were taught Japan was a sacred nation. Traditional samurai values of bushido were merged with modern training and weaponry. The government propagandized the figure of the Emperor as a living god who embodied the Japanese state, the Kokutai. Emperor Hirohito and his family were the spiritual essence of Japan. To even show your back to the enemy let alone surrender was deemed cowardly and brought dishonor upon your family. As written by Inouye Jukichi in 1910, something read by many Japanese “The Japanese warriors looked upon it as shame to themselves not to die when their Lord was hard pressed . . . their own shame was the shame upon their parents, their family, their house and their whole clan, and with this idea deeply impressed upon their minds, the Samurai, no matter of what rank, held their lives light as feathers when compared with the weight they attached to the maintenance of a spotless name”. 

Young men of Japan were taught that "The greatest honor is to die for the Emperor" Additionally precept the Japanese were taught that it is an ignominy to surrender to the enemy. The combined effect of these two precepts was to inculcate in the Japanese soldier a spirit of contempt for Allied soldiers who surrendered, which, in defiance of the rules of war, was demonstrated in their ill-treatment of prisoners. They made no distinction between the soldier who fought honorably and courageously up to an inevitable surrender, and the soldier who surrendered without a fight. All enemy soldiers who surrendered under any circumstance were to be regarded as being disgraced and entitled to live only by the tolerance of their captors.

Surrender was unforgivable under their code, drilled into them through the Imperial Japanese education system and military. When the Japanese would come across vast swathes of the enemy surrendering, particularly if the enemy used up all their ammunition killing their comrades and then surrendered, well it added fuel to their brutality. One only needs to look at the deaths due to Banzai charges, take for example the incredibly massive one at the battle of Saipan seeing around 4000 dead Japanese. IJA officers brought ancestral katana’s to the war, the Japanese cut off the heads of the enemies as it was seen to be honorable. When faced with death, many chose to commit seppuku, the bushido propaganda was intense. 

A brutal practice emerged in the Pacific island hopping campaign, whereupon wounded Japanese would pretend to be dead or surrender only to explode grenades upon allied forces coming closer. This began to be noticed by US marines during the battle of Guadalcanal and Australians in New Guinea. This began a vicious cycle . There were of course Japanese who would surrender. Hell the Koreans forced into service often did try to surrender, but they would all be hampered by something. Because of the actions of those Japanese feinted death and taking down allied soldiers with them, the allied soldiers gradually began a practice of not bothering to accept surrender. It became a self fulfilling prophecy. Many Japanese made the allies believe all they could expect was a grenade death, thus the allies became more brutal to them. This simply led the Japanese to conclude their government was accurate about how the allies would treat them, so more and more did not surrender. An absolutely horrible cycle that went on to the very end of the war, though the allies did figure out means to get Japanese to surrender more in the last year. 

I think this is probably one of the most important factors, and its also one the “normies” would not know as much about. The Imperial Japanese military, more so the Army, had what I can only describe as a built in system of abuse. As described to me by the same university professor I keep bringing up in podcasts, picture a literal pecking order. Going from the highest ranked general to the very bottom grunt. Imagine each one who is higher than the other, routinely physically abuses them. For example, it was very typical for a colonel to slap a major across the face, the major would then strike one of his captains, and the abuse would continue through the ranks to the grunts who would have no one to abuse, thus they turned to POW’s or civilian populations. This was not just an accepted part of the Japanese Imperial Army it was indoctrinated. 

From day one of basic training, IJA officers taught their men, races like the Chinese were their blood enemies and racially inferior. These were people the Japanese would rule over one day. The trainers would toss the boys into rigorous training activities involving physical violence towards another alongside the notion any orders given by a higher ranking officer was infallible and to be treated as if the divine emperor himself, the living god was giving it. 

The Japanese army even taught methods of torture that would be employed in all areas they occupied. Among these tortures were the water treatment, burning, electric shocks, the knee spread, suspension, kneeling on sharp instruments and flogging. The Kempetai, were the ones doing the lionshare of these tortures. Other Army and Navy units, however, used the same methods as the Kempetai. Camp guards performed similar methods, local police forces organized by the Kempetai in the occupied territories also applied the same methods of torture. The Kempetai were administered by the War Ministry, trained at specialized schools who were maintained and operated by the War Ministry in Japan. Thus the conduct of Kempetai and the camp guards directly reflected the policy of the War Ministry. 

The Japanese army leadership made sure recruits were physically and mentally abused, they were given strenuously duty tasks and pushed to their absolute limit. During the war given where they were deployed, take guadalcanal for example, the Japanese soldiers would be facing starvation as well. Being half starved, beaten and suffering the effects of war would drive anyone to perform horrifying acts. The life of a Japanese solider was simply at the whims of an extremely toxic management culture. The lowest ranking echelons received the lionshare of abuse and they took out their frustration with whomever they could find deemed lower than them, ie: POW’s, civilians, etc.

All of these variables combined contributed to the creation of a military willing to perform just about any atrocity they thought necessary to win the war. It was a war they could not hope to win, but many of them went to their deaths trying to defeat the hands of fate. There are countless other reasons of course for the atrocities committed in cold or hot blood. Countless books have been written on this subject, please do check out the few I mentioned. With that again, a big thanks to you patreons, you guys are awesome. Please let me know what you think in the comments, and what you want to hear more about in the future. This has been the pacific war channel over and out.

Hello Youtube Members, Patreons and Pacific War week by week listeners. Yes this was intended to be an exclusive episode to join the 29 others over on my Youtube Membership and Patreon, but since we are drawing to the end of the Pacific War week by week series, I felt compelled to make some special episodes to answer some of the bigger questions. Why did Japan, or better said, why did Emperor Hirohito decide to finally surrender? It seems obvious on the face of it, but there is actually a lot more to it than bombs or Soviet invasions. I guess you can call this episode a teaser or a shameless plug for going over to my Youtube Membership or Patreon. There’s honestly a lot of interesting subjects such as ‘why was the japanese army so brutal”, “Hirohito’s war time responsibility”, “the 4 part Kanji Ishiwara series”. Thus if you liked this one please show some love and check out my other stuff on my Youtube Membership or over at www.patreon.com/pacificwarchannel.

Stating all of that lets just jump right into it.

We first need to start off briefly looking at Emperor Hirohito. 

Upon taking the throne, Emperor Hirohito in 1926 Hirohito inherited a financial crisis and a military that was increasingly seizing control of governmental policies. From the beginning, despite what many of you older audience members may have been told, Hirohito intensely followed all military decisions. Hirohito chose when to act and when not to. When the Kwantung Army assassinated Zhang Zuolin, he indulged their insubordination. This emboldened them to invade Manchuria in 1931, whereupon Hirohito was furious and demanded they be reigned in. Attempts were made, but they were heavily undermined by radicals. Hirohito could have put his foot down, but he chose not to. On September 22nd, at 4:20pm Hirohito said to the IJA Chief of General staff, Kanaya Hanzo “although this time it couldn’t be helped, the army had to be more careful in the future”. Thus Hirohito again acquiesced to the military, despite wanting them to stop or at least localize the conflict. The military had disregarded his wishes, they should have been severely punished. Why did Hirohito not take a firmer stance? 

Again for older audience members you may have heard, “hirohito was a hostage at the whim of his own military”. This narrative made it seem he was some sort of hostage emperor, but this is not the case at all. In fact Hirohito was instrumental in many military decisions from 1931-1945. The reason this, I will call it “myth” , went on was because after Japan’s surrender, the US basically rewrote the Japanese constitution and covered up the Emperor's involvement in all the nasty stuff, to maintain control over Japan. Yeah it sounds a bit conspiracy esque, but I assure you it was indeed the case. This narrative held firm all the way until Hirohito’s death, when finally meeting notes and personal accounts from those close to him came out, illuminating a lot. Though to this day, many records are still red -tapped.

The reason Hirohito did not stamp his foot down has to do with the Kokutai. 

The Kokutai

So before I carry on, I have to explain what exactly is the Kokutai. 

The Kokutai, loosely translated as "national essence," refers to the qualities that distinguish the Japanese identity. However, this concept is remarkably vague and poorly defined; even Japanese historians acknowledge this ambiguity. In contrast to Kokutai is seitai, or "form of government." While the Kokutai embodies the eternal and immutable aspects of Japanese polity—rooted in history, traditions, and customs centered around the Emperor—Japan's seitai has evolved significantly throughout its extensive history. For instance, shoguns governed for over 700 years until 1868, when the Meiji Restoration reinstated direct imperial rule.

Nevertheless, Emperor Meiji’s direct authority came to an end with the adoption of the Meiji Constitution in 1889, which established a constitutional monarchy, introducing significant complexities into the governance system.

Article 4 of the constitution declares: “The Emperor is the head of the Empire, combining in Himself the rights of sovereignty, uniting the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government, although subject to the consent of the Imperial Diet.” Under this framework, the Emperor alone possessed the power to appoint or dismiss ministers of state, declare war, negotiate peace, conclude treaties, direct national administration, and command the army and navy.

A glaring flaw in this arrangement is the inherent ambiguity of the Meiji Constitution. While it established a democratic parliament, it simultaneously afforded the Emperor absolute authority to usurp it. The document failed to clearly define the relationships between the executive, legislative, and judicial branches, and its language was intentionally vague. Most critically, the military—the army and navy—were not directly accountable to the civilian government. 

So with the kokutai, the Emperor is a divine figure who embodies the state's sovereignty. It was not necessarily the Emperor’s job to surrender on behalf of the official government of Japan, but he most certainly could do so, given the Japanese people still remained faithful to the kokutai. 

Now Hirohito did not live an ordinary life. According to the imperial custom, Japanese royals were raised apart from their parents, at the age of 3 he was placed in the care of the Kwamura family who vowed to raise him to be unselfish, persevering in the face of difficulties, respectful of the views of others and immune to fear. One thing that was absolutely indoctrinated into him was to defend the kokutai. It became his top mission as a monarch, it was the only mission in many ways. At the very core of how he saw the world and how he acted, it was always to protect the kokutai. 

So when the Japanese military began these insubordinate acts, Hirohito’s primary concern was to the kokutai, ie: anything that threatened his imperial authority and the imperial institution itself. Although the military usurped his authority, the operations had been successful. Hirohito was not at all opposed to seeing his empire expand. He understood the value of manchuria, he was fully onboard with the military plans to eventually seize control over it, but these radicals were accelerating things to quickly for everyone's liking. He turned a blind eye, dished light punishments and carried on. However the local conflict escalated. It traveled to Shanghai by 1932 and here Hirohito took action. He understood Shanghai was full of western powers. Nations like Britain and America could place economic sanctions on Japan if things were allowed to get out of hand here. So he ordered General Yoshinori Shirakawa to bring the Shanghai expedition to a close. 

During this period, two factions emerged within the Japanese military: the Kodoha, or “Imperial Way,” and the Toseiha, or “Control” faction. The Kodoha was founded by General Sadao Araki and his protégé, Jinzaburo Masaki. Their primary objective was a Shōwa Restoration aimed at purging Japan of corrupt politicians and businessmen, especially those associated with the zaibatsu. Composed mainly of young army officers, the Kodoha espoused a romanticized and radical interpretation of Bushido, idealizing pre-industrial Japan, which Araki believed had been tainted by Western influences. To achieve their goals, they resorted to assassinations and planned a coup d'état.

In response, the Toseiha faction was formed, initially led by Lt. General Tetsuzan Nagata and later by Hideki Tojo. Like the Kodoha, the Toseiha sought a Shōwa Restoration but adopted a more moderate and conservative approach. They recognized the importance of preserving traditional values while integrating Western ideals, advocating for a balanced perspective. The Toseiha promoted pragmatic military strategies to navigate the complexities of modern warfare. Although they acknowledged the existence of corrupt politicians and zaibatsu, they preferred to work within the existing political system, anticipating that future total wars would necessitate a strengthened industrial and military capacity. Their ranks primarily included promising graduates from the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) Academy, Army Staff College, and select naval members. The most significant distinction between the two factions was that the Toseiha explicitly rejected the use of a coup d'état in pursuit of their goals.

Between 1932-1936 radical officers, mostly of the Kodoha faction assassinated politicians and military leaders trying to usher in a showa restoration. You might be led to believe this was in the interest of Hirohito, you would be mistaken. Hirohito did not want a military dictatorship at the whim of the cult of the emperor. Ironic to say, given how WW2 turns out mind you. This really would have been a hostage situation. Hirohito wanted to maintain the exact ambiguous situation that was Showa Era Japan pre 1945. He saw this as the most ideal structure to defend the kokutai, because blame could not be placed solely upon his shoulders. He always maintained a get out of jail free card one could say. 

The February 26 incident of 1936, was the climax of the Kodoha faction. They performed a mutiny trying to usher in a SHowa restoration. They assumed when their messenger came to the emperor he would join them and take direct rule. Instead Hirohito was furious. His first thought was the mutineers were trying to enlist his brother Chichibu to overthrow him. He dragged his brother who was a fraternizer amongst the kodoha members mind you, into a meeting, demanding he never associate with them again nor attempt to challenge him. Then Hirohito furious demanded the mutineers be dealt with. At one point he even threatened to lead the imperial guards to put them down. The coup failed, the kodoha faction was destroyed. Ironically the toseiha faction were the ones to do it and thus they became the defacto ruling clique. 

The military, especially the kwantung army did not stop with their insubordination. 

On July 8th of 1937 the Kwangtung army performed the Marco Polo Bridge incident, ushering in the second sino-japanese war. This was one of many false flag operations they had pulled off over the years. Upon being told about this Hirohito’s first response was whether the USSR would invade Manchukuo over the matter. This is what he said to Prime Minister Konoe and army minister Sugiyama “What will you do if the Soviets attack us from the rear?” he asked the prince. Kan’in answered, “I believe the army will rise to the occasion.” The emperor repeated his question: “That’s no more than army dogma. What will you actually do in the unlikely event that Soviet [forces] attack?” The prince said only, “We will have no choice.” His Majesty seemed very dissatisfied. Hirohito furious demanded to know what contingency plans existed and his advisors told him before he gave his red seal of approval to invade northern china.

Henceforth he micromanaged a lot of the military decisions going forward and he oversaw the forming and dissolving of numerous cabinets and positions when things went his way or did not in the military and political scene.  Emperor Hirohito was presented with several opportunities to cause cease-fires or peace settlements during the war years. One of the best possible moments to end it all came during the attack on Nanking when Chiang Kai-sheks military were in disarray. On July 11 of 1938, the commander of the 19th division fought a border clash with the USSR known to us in the west as the battle of Lake Khasan. It was a costly defeat for Japan and in the diary of Harada Kumao he noted Hirohito scolded Army minister Itagaki “Hereafter not a single soldier is to be moved without my permission.” When it looked like the USSR would not press for a counter attack across the border, Hirohito gave the order for offensives in China to recommence, again an example of him deciding when to lay down the hammer.

By 1939 the US began threatening sanctions for what Japan was doing in China. Hirohito complained to his chief aide de camp Hata Shunroku on August 5th “It could be a great blow to scrap metal and oil”. Hirohito was livid and scolded many of his top officials and forced the appointment of General Abe to prime minister and demanded of him “to cooperate with the US and Britain and preserve internal order”.

Fast forward a bit, with war raging in Europe Hirohito, on June 19th of 1940 Hirohito asked if chief of staff Prince Kan’in and Army Minister Hata “At a time when peace will soon come in the European situation, will there be a deployment of troops to the Netherlands Indies and French Indochina?” This question highlighted Hirohito's belief at that time that Germany was close to achieving victory, which led him to gradually consider deploying troops to French Indochina and the Dutch East Indies since neither of those parent nations was in a position to protect their territories and vital resources. Regarding the war in China, the Japanese aimed to stop the flow of materials entering China from places like Hong Kong. Hirohito received reports indicating that Britain would not agree to block the shipment of materials into China via Hong Kong. The military recognized that an invasion of Hong Kong might be necessary, which would mean declaring war on Britain. When this was communicated to him, Hirohito responded, “If that occurs, I'm sure America will enforce an embargo, don’t you think?” In response, Kido, the lord of the privy seal, reassured him by stating, “The nation must be fully prepared to resist, proceeding with caution and avoiding being drawn into events instigated by foreign interests.”

Hirohito went through countless meetings, but eventually signed order number 458 authorizing the invasion of French Indochina, knowing full well the consequences. The US,UK and Netherlands began embargoes of oil, rubber and iron. In the words of Admiral Takagai “As time passes and this situation continues, our empire will either be totally defeated or forced to fight a hopeless war. Therefore we should pursue war and diplomacy together. If there is no prospect of securing our final line of national survival by diplomatic negotiations, we must be resolved to fight.” Hirohito understood the predicament full well, that each day Japan was wasting its oil reserves, if they were to strike it had to be quickly.

On October 13th Hirohito told his closest advisor Koichi Kido “In the present situation there seems to be little hope for the Japan–U.S. negotiations. If hostilities erupt this time, I think I may have to issue a declaration of war.”

The reason I am bringing up all this stuff is to solidify, Hirohito had agency, he was micromanaging and forming decisions. After the war broke out with the west, Hirohito did have the ability to stamp his foot down. Of course there could have been wild repercussions, his military could have usurped him with Chichibu, it was definitely possible. But you need to keep this mind set, as far as why Hirohito acts or doesn't, its always to protect the Kokutai. Thus one of the levers for peace, solely rested on Hirohito’s perception if the kokutai could be retained or not. 

From the outset of the Pacific War, Hirohito believed Germany was going to defeat the USSR. In line with his military leaders, they all believed Japan had to seize everything they could in the asia-pacific and thwart off the US until a negotiated peace could be met. Hirohito committed himself to overseeing the war, determined to achieve victory at any cost. He was a very cautious leader, he meticulously analyzed each campaign, anticipating potential setbacks and crafting worst-case scenario predictions. He maintained a skeptical view of the reports from his senior officials and was often harshly critical of high commanders.

While he did not frequently visit the front lines like other commanders in chief, Hirohito wielded significant influence over theater operations, shaping both planning and execution whenever he deemed necessary. Similar to his approach during the war in China, he issued the highest military orders from the Imperial Headquarters, conducted audited conferences, and made decisions communicated under his name. He regularly welcomed generals and admirals to the imperial palace for detailed briefings on the battlefront and visited various military bases, battleships, and army and naval headquarters. His inspections encompassed military schools and other significant military institutions, adding to his comprehensive involvement in the war effort.

Now the war went extremely well for Japan until the battle of Midway. This was as major setback, but Japan retained the initiative. Then the Guadalcanal campaign saw Japan lose the initiative to the Americans. Upon receiving the initial report of the Ichiki detachment’s destruction, Hirohito remarked, “I am sure it [Guadalcanal] can be held.” Despite the numerous reports detailing the devastating effects of tropical diseases and starvation on his troops, he persistently demanded greater efforts from them. Hirohito exerted continuous pressure on his naval and land commanders to retake the island. On September 15th, November 5th, and November 11th, he requested additional Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) troops and aircraft to be allocated to the cause.

General Sugiyama expressed concerns about dispatching more IJA pilots due to their inexperience in transoceanic combat, preferring to reinforce the North China Army for an attack on Chongqing instead. Hirohito pressed the issue again, but Sugiyama responded that the IJA had diverted its air resources to New Guinea and Rabaul. Undeterred by the objections from senior commanders, Hirohito persisted in his demands. By late November, it became evident that Guadalcanal was a lost cause.

At an Imperial Headquarters conference on December 31st, 1942, the chiefs of staff proposed canceling the attempts to recapture Guadalcanal. Hirohito sanctioned this decision but stated, “It is unacceptable to just give up on capturing Guadalcanal. We must launch an offensive elsewhere.” He insisted on this point, leading to the selection of new strategic targets in the Solomons, north of New Georgia, and in the Stanley Range on New Guinea. Hirohito even threatened to withhold authorization for withdrawing troops from Guadalcanal until a new plan was established. He later opposed the withdrawal from Munda Airfield, as it contradicted the newly defined defensive line.

As the defensive perimeter in the central and northern Solomons began to crumble, Hirohito continued to insist that the navy engage in decisive battles to regain the initiative, allowing for the transport of supplies to the many soldiers trapped on various islands. When he learned of the navy's failure to reinforce Lae on March 3rd, he asked, “Then why didn’t you change plans immediately and land at Madan? This is a failure, but it can teach us a good lesson and become a source of future success. Do this for me so I can have peace of mind for a while.” The phrase “Do this for me” would come to be his signature rallying cry.

After Guadal canal, it was loss after loss for Japan. By February of 1944, Hirohito forced Sugiyama to resign so Hideki Tojo could take his position as chief of the general staff, note Tojo was prime minister and army minister at this point. Hirohito worked alongside Tojo to plan some last ditch efforts to change the war situation. The most significant one was Operation Ichi-Go. As much damage as they did to China with that, Chiang Kai-Shek’s government survived. Hirohito watched as island by island fell to the Americans. When the Americans were poised to take Saipan he warned Tojo “If we ever lose Saipan, repeated air attacks on Tokyo will follow. No matter what it takes, we have to hold there.” Saipan fell, so Hirohito stopped supporting Tojo and allowed his rivals to take down his cabinet by june 18th of 1944. 

Hirohito remained resolute in his determination to wrest victory from the Allies. On October 18th, the Imperial Headquarters ordered a decisive naval engagement, leading to the Battle of Leyte Gulf. After the war, Hirohito publicly stated, "Contrary to the views of the Army and Navy General Staffs, I consented to the showdown battle at Leyte, believing that if we launched an attack and America hesitated, we might find an opportunity to negotiate." Leyte Gulf didnt work. The military began the kamikaze program. On new years day of 1945 Hirohito inspected the special last meal rations given to departing kamikaze units. Iwo Jima fell. Okinawa remained, and Hirohito lashed out “Is it because we failed to sink enemy transports that we’ve let the enemy get ashore? Isn’t there any way to defend Okinawa from the landing enemy forces?” On the second day of Okinawa’s invasion Hirohito ordered a counter landing by the 32nd army and urged the navy to counterattack in every way possible. It was a horrible failure, it cost the lives of up to 120,000 Japanese combatants, 170,000 noncombatants. The Americans lost 12,500 killed and 33,000 wounded. An absolute bloodbath. 

The Surrender time

Now we come to the time period where Japan seriously began looking for ways to surrender. In Europe Germany was heading to its defeat and Japan knew this. As for Japan, their army in Burma had been annihilated. Their forces in China were faring better after Operation Ichi-go, having opened up a land corridor along the main railway from Beiping to Wuhan and from throughout Guangdong but still stuck in a deadlock stalemate, facing a guerrilla war that was costing them 64% of their military expenditures. They deeply feared once the Soviets finished up with Germany, they would undoubtedly turn east against Manchuria. With the Soviets attacking from the north, the US would attack from the south, perhaps landing in Shanghai and the home islands. The Kamikaze tactics were proving formidable, but not nearly enough. By 1945, 43% of the IJA were now stationed in Japan, Korea and Formosa, bracing for the final stand. Former prime minister Reijiro Wakatsuki came out of retirement in may of 1945, having heard Germany collapsed, to urge Hirohito and the Prime Minister Kantaro Suzuki to open negotiations with the US as soon as possible. However he also said “the enemy must first be made to see the disadvantages of continuing the war”. To this Hirohito’s chief counselor Makino Nobuaki said that “the ultimate priority is to develop an advantageous war situation.” Advisor admiral Kesiuke Okada said Japan should wait for “a moment favorable for us,” then make peace. Advisors Kiichiro Hiranuma and Koki Hirota advised the emperor to fight on until the end.

Now I want to bring in a key player to the surrender decision, that of Prince Konoe. Konoe was very close to Hirohito and understood the emperors mentality, especially how he viewed things in relation to the kokutai. 

The senior statesman Prince Konoe had been consulting with Hirohito for over 18 months at this point trying to convey the message that if the war continued it would threaten the kokutai. Many months prior, he confided in the emperor's brother, Prince Takamatsu, that the army was suffering from “a cancer” in the form of the Toseiha faction. However, he noted that “Kido and others” did not share his perspective, while “his Majesty is relatively unconcerned with ideological issues.” For the past four years, he continued, the emperor had been advised and still believed that “the true extremists are the Kodoha faction.” In reality, the greater threat to the kokutai arose from the Toseiha faction. Konoe further asserted that if the war escalated, they would attempt to alter the kokutai.

Konoe speculated that whether the threat originated from communists within the nation, primarily referring to left-wing radicals in the Toseiha faction, or from the “Anglo-American enemy,” both would seek to preserve the emperor while pushing towards the country's communization.In his written report to the emperor on February 14, which Kido listened to attentively, Konoe elaborated on his conspiracy theory. He asserted that the Soviet Union regarded Japan as its primary threat in East Asia. The Soviets had allied with the Chinese Communists, the largest and most formidable Communist party in Asia, and were collaborating with the United States and Britain to drive Japan out of China. He warned that they would enter the war when the opportunity arose.

Defeat, he cautioned the emperor, was inevitable if the conflict persisted. However, he emphasized that a far greater fear was the potential destruction of the kokutai. The ongoing war was eroding the domestic status quo, unleashing forces that threatened Japan and its imperial institution from within as much as from external adversaries. The real danger lay in the emperor’s and Kido’s trust in the generals of the Toseiha faction, who were unintentionally facilitating the communization of Japan. Konoe implored for a swift peace settlement before a Communist revolution emerged, making the preservation of the kokutai impossible.

Hirohito agreed with Konoe but stated “ To end the war would be “very difficult unless we make one more military gain.” Konoe allegedly replied, “Is that possible? It must happen soon. If we have to wait much longer, . . . [a mere battle victory] will mean nothing.” Hirohito replied “If we hold out long enough in this war, we may be able to win, but what worries me is whether the nation will be able to endure it until then.”

On February 15th of 1945, Hirohito’s intelligence warned the Soviet Union would likely abrogate its Neutrality Pact with Japan. Even Tojo conceded there was a 50/50 chance the USSR would invade Manchuria. In March, the US began B-29 incendiary bombing raids over Tokyo, turning 40% of the capital into ash. On March 18th, Hirohito with some aides drove around the capital to witness the devastation. The civilians looked exhausted and bewildered to Hirohito. Factory production was collapsing, absenteeism was rising, instances of lese majeste were running rampant. For the next 5 months imperial family members and senior statesmen all began speaking to Hirohito about the “crises of the kokutai”. The threat Konoe had warned about for months was becoming the main talking point. It seemed like the Japanese people within the countryside and urban areas remained steadfast in the resolve to obey their leaders, work and sacrifice for their nation, but for how long would they feel so? 

It was only after the battle for Okinawa was lost and 60 Japanese cities had been leveled by American incendiary bombs that Hirohito openly indicated he wanted to negotiate a surrender.

Kido’s diary reveals the first clear indication that the emperor might be urged to consider an early peace on June 8, 1945, when Kido drafted his “Draft Plan for Controlling the Crisis Situation.” This marked a pivotal moment. It followed the unintentional bombing of the Imperial Palace, the complete loss of hope for saving Okinawa, and coincided with the day the Supreme War Leadership Council adopted the “Basic Policy for the Future Direction of the War.” With the fighting in Europe concluded, Japan found itself entirely isolated. Kido’s plan, although vague, proposed seeking the Soviet Union’s assistance as an intermediary to help Japan gain leverage in negotiations with its adversaries. By drafting this plan, Kido signaled the end of his long alliance with the military hard-liners. Hirohito’s acceptance of it indicated his readiness for an early peace.

Hirohito was moved to an underground bunker in the mountains of Matsushiro in Nagano prefecture where upon those around him noted he fell into a deep depression. On June 22nd  Hirohito informed the Supreme War Leadership Council he wanted them to open diplomatic maneuvers to end the war. In early July Soviet Ambassador Jacob Malik broke off inconclusive talks with Hirota. Hirohito stepped in immediately and ordered a new special envoy be sent to Moscow. However Hirohito nor the Suzuki government had concrete plans on how to mediate a surrender through the Soviets. The only things they did prioritize was a guarantee of the emperors political position and retainment of the imperial system, ie the kokutai. This was taken into consideration rather than ending the war as quickly as possible to save the lives of millions. 

From April 8, 1945, until Japan's capitulation, the Suzuki government’s chief war policy was “Ketsugo,” an advanced iteration of the “Shosango” (Victory Number 3) plan for defending the homeland. The hallmark of this strategy was a heavy reliance on suicide tactics, including deploying a massive number of kamikaze “special attack” planes, human torpedoes launched from submarines, dynamite-stuffed “crash boats” powered by truck engines, human rocket bombs carried by aircraft, and suicide assaults by specially trained ground units.

While preparations for Operation Ketsu progressed, the Imperial Diet convened on June 9 to pass a Wartime Emergency Measures Law, along with five additional measures aimed at mobilizing the entire nation for this final battle. On the same day, the emperor, who had yet to initiate efforts to end the war, issued another imperial rescript in conjunction with the Diet's convocation, instructing the nation to “smash the inordinate ambitions of the enemy nations” and “achieve the goals of the war.” Concurrently, the controlled press launched a daily die-for-the-emperor campaign to foster gratitude for the imperial benevolence and, from around mid-July onward, initiated a campaign to “protect the kokutai.”

The Americans countered with their own propaganda aimed at breaking Japan’s will to fight. B-29 bombers dropped millions of leaflets written in Japanese, announcing the next scheduled targets for bombing raids and urging surrender, while using the emperor to challenge the militarists. Leaflets bearing the chrysanthemum crest criticized the “military cliques” for “forcing the entire nation to commit suicide” and called on “everyone” to “exercise their constitutional right to make direct appeals [for peace] to the Emperor.” They asserted that “even the powerful military cliques cannot stop the mighty march for peace of the Emperor and the people.” One notable batch of seven million leaflets conveyed the terms of the “joint declaration” issued by the United States, Great Britain, and China. “Today we come not to bomb you,” they stated. “We are dropping this leaflet to inform you of the response from the United States government to your government’s request for conditions of surrender.... Whether the war stops immediately depends on your government. You will understand how to end the war if you read these two official notifications.”

Amid pressures from imperial edicts to continue preparations for a final battle and focus solely on victory, the Japanese people were also subjected to an intense American psychological warfare campaign in addition to aerial bombardment. During late July and August, prefectural governors, police chiefs, and officers of the “special higher police” submitted reports to the Home Ministry detailing the rapidly deteriorating national morale. 

Now on the other side, Roosevelt made it known back in January of 1943 at the Casablanca conference, the allies would only accept unconditional surrender. By 1945, the allies understood the predicament this left Japan with. On May 8th of 1945, Truman added “Japan’s surrender would not mean the extermination or enslavement of the Japanese people” trying to indicate a non vindictive spirit. However the Kokutai question always remained ambiguous. State Department Joseph Grew, the former ambassador to Japan, began arguing to Truman they needed to make public a clear definition of the terms to persuade Japan to surrender. As he argued to Truman: Emperor Hirohito was seen as the key figure in Japan’s surrender, likened to a "queen bee in a hive... surrounded by the attentions of the hive." Throughout the war, he was characterized in various ways—as a “puppet” of the militarists, a constitutional monarch, and a pacifist. Grew had immense faith in the influence exerted by what he referred to as the “moderates” surrounding the Japanese throne. 

However many of Grew’s colleagues argued the future existence of the monarchy was intolerable as it was akin to fascism. Many wanted to punish the emperor. Truman was in a tug of war. The Potsdam declaration issued on July 26th of 1945 came in the form of a ultimatum aiming to quicken japans surrender. Truman clarified the terms for the unconditional surrender at the end of its terms: "We call upon the government of Japan to proclaim now the unconditional surrender of all Japanese armed forces, and to provide proper and adequate assurances of their good faith in such action. The alternative for Japan is prompt and utter destruction." Zero mention of the emperor. Grew had argued to add “this may include a constitutional monarchy under the present dynasty.” But it was deleted from the article. The status of the emperor was not guaranteed, the kokutai was thus up in the air. 

The next day, the Suzuki cabinet rejected the terms. The Japanese leadership and Hirohito were still banking and awaiting Soviet replies to their terms. 

Lets talk about the Soviet talks now

Back on July 12th ambassador Naotake Satō sent this message to the Soviets: “His Majesty the Emperor, mindful of the fact that the present war daily brings greater evil and sacrifice upon the peoples of all the belligerent powers, desires from his heart that it may be quickly terminated. But so long as England and the United States insist upon unconditional surrender, the Japanese Empire has no alternative but to fight on with all its strength for the honor and existence of the Motherland”.  However the Soviets had made commitments to their allies, promising in fact to invade Japan to aid them. 

As for the Soviets their primary objective was to ensure unrestricted access to the Pacific Ocean. The year-round ice-free areas of the Soviet Pacific coastline, particularly Vladivostok, could be blockaded by air and sea from Sakhalin Island and the Kurile Islands. Securing these territories to guarantee free access to the Soya Strait was their main goal. Secondary objectives included acquiring leases for the Chinese Eastern Railway, the Southern Manchuria Railway, as well as gaining control over Dairen and Port Arthur.

To achieve these aims, Stalin and Molotov prolonged negotiations with the Japanese, creating a false sense of hope for a Soviet-mediated peace. Simultaneously, in their discussions with the United States and Britain, the Soviets insisted on strict adherence to the Cairo Declaration, which had been reaffirmed at the Yalta Conference. This declaration stipulated that the Allies would not accept a separate or conditional peace with Japan; thus, the Japanese would need to surrender unconditionally to all the Allies. The Soviets aimed to prolong the war by opposing any efforts to dilute this requirement. This approach would provide the Soviets with the necessary time to complete the transfer of their troops from the Western Front to the Far East and to conquer Manchuria, Inner Mongolia, northern Korea, South Sakhalin, the Kuriles, and potentially Hokkaidō, starting with an assault on Rumoi.

AUGUST 1945

Thus we come to at last the critical point, August of 1945. 

The Americans prepared for the deployment of atomic bombs and for an invasion of southern Kyushu, known as Operation Olympic, scheduled to commence on November 1. At 8:15 A.M. on August 6, a single B-29 bomber, the Enola Gay dropped little boy, devastating much of the undefended city of Hiroshima, instantly killing an estimated 100,000 to 140,000 people and leading to the deaths of possibly another 100,000 over the next five years. At the epicenter of the explosion, “a light appeared 3,000 times brighter than the sun,” creating a fireball that emitted thermal radiation capable of “instantly scorching humans, trees, and houses.” As the air heated and rushed upward, cold air surged in to ignite a firestorm. Hours later, a whirlwind escalated the flames to their peak until more than eight square miles were virtually reduced to cinders. Subsequently, black, muddy rain filled with radioactive fallout began to fall. Two days later, using Japan's rejection of the Potsdam Declaration as a pretext, the Soviet Union declared war on Japan. Then on August 9, the United States dropped a second atomic bomb on Nagasaki, resulting in the immediate deaths of approximately 35,000 to 40,000 people and injuring more than 60,000.

Meanwhile, in Tokyo, during the critical period between the Potsdam Declaration and the atomic bombing of Hiroshima, Emperor Hirohito remained silent about accepting the Potsdam terms. However, on July 25 and 31, he explicitly conveyed to Kido that the imperial regalia must be defended at all costs. The three sacred objects—a mirror, a curved jewel, and a sword—symbolized the legitimacy of his rule through the northern court and were integral to his identity as the divine sovereign. Hirohito’s focus was on protecting these symbols of office, as he insisted on having them brought to the palace. This fixation on maintaining his symbols occurred during a pivotal moment when the pressing issue was whether to accept immediate capitulation. Reflecting on this, he was unprepared to seize the opportunity to end the war himself.

Prime Minister Suzuki, following his initial rejection of the Potsdam ultimatum, also saw no need for further action. His Cabinet Advisory Council, which included the president of Asano Cement, the founder of the Nissan consortium, the vice president of the Bank of Japan, and other representatives from the nation’s leading business interests that had profited significantly from the war, convened on the morning of August 3. They recommended accepting the Potsdam terms, arguing that the United States would permit Japan to retain its non-military industries and continue participating in world trade. 

Here are some reactions to the two bombs and invasion of Manchuria. 

Yonai Mitsumasa said to admiral Takagi Sokichi, on August 12, that “I think the term is perhaps inappropriate, but the atomic bombs and the Soviet entry into the war are, in a sense, gifts from the gods [tenyu, also “heaven-sent blessings”]. This way we don’t have to say that we quit the war because of domestic circumstances. I’ve long been advocating control of our crisis, but neither from fear of an enemy attack nor because of the atomic bombs and the Soviet entry into the war. The main reason is my anxiety over the domestic situation. So, it is rather fortunate that we can now control matters without revealing the domestic situation”. 

Konoe’s characterized the Soviet involvement in the war as “a godsend for controlling the army,”. Kido viewed of both the atomic bombings and the Soviet entry into the conflict as “useful” elements for ensuring a smooth transition. A nascent power struggle was unfolding, rendering the potential death toll—whether one hundred thousand or two hundred thousand—immaterial to those involved, as long as their desired outcome was achieved: an end to the war that would leave the monarchy intact and capable of managing the discontent that defeat would inevitably provoke. Throughout the final acts of this wartime drama, the Japanese “moderates” found it easier to capitulate to external pressures than to take decisive action on their own to conclude the war.

Another illuminating looks at Japan’s elite's perspective on surrender terms was the document titled “Essentials of Peace Negotiations” (wahei kosho no yoryo). Drafted by Konoe and his adviser, retired Lt. Gen. Sakai Koji, after Konoe had reluctantly accepted a mission to Moscow, this document, stipulated the preservation of the emperor system, along with most of the imperial prerogatives, as the absolute minimum condition for peace. It defined the “original” or “essential homeland” as including the southern half of the Kurile Islands but showed a willingness to concede all overseas territories to the enemy, including Okinawa and the American-occupied Bonin Islands, as well as the southern half of Sakhalin. The “Essentials” also accepted complete disarmament for an unspecified period, thereby compromising on the issues of demobilizing and disarming the armed forces. More significantly, an “explanation” attached to the “Essentials” emphasized that “the main aim is to secure the imperial line and maintain the political role of the emperor.” 

Why Japan surrendered

We come to it atleast after a long podcast. Why did Japan ultimately surrender?

The twin psychological shocks of the first atomic bomb and the Soviet entry into the war, combined with Kido’s and the emperor’s concern over escalating public criticism of the throne and its occupant, fueled an almost paranoid fear that, sooner or later, the populace would react violently against their leaders if the war persisted much longer. These factors ultimately led Hirohito to accept, in principle, the terms of the Potsdam Declaration.

At the first meeting of the six member constituents of the Supreme War Leadership Council, held from 10:30 A.M. to 1:00 P.M. on August 9, Army Minister Anami Korechika, Chiefs of Staff Umezu Yoshijiro, representing the army, and Yonai, representing the navy, along with Tōgō, from the Foreign Ministry, were expected to discuss the acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration. Instead, the conversation revolved around whether to attempt a conditional surrender—specifically, should they insist on one condition, the preservation of the kokutai, or four?

After Suzuki addressed the assembly regarding the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and the Soviet attack, Yonai, as recounted by Navy Chief of Staff Toyoda, was the first to speak, framing the issue in terms of four conditions. “Let’s start to talk, Do we accept the Potsdam Declaration with no conditions? If not, and we wish to insist on attaching hopes and conditions, we may do so this way. First, preservation of the kokutai; then for the rest, the main items in the Potsdam Declaration: treatment of war criminals, method of disarmament, and the matter of sending in an army of occupation.” Thus, the participants identified what they perceived to be the ambiguous points within the Potsdam Declaration and used them as the foundation for their discussions.

The army insisted on four conditions: First, the preservation of the kokutai, which they considered distinct from the Potsdam Declaration itself. The other conditions proposed were, second, that the Imperial Headquarters assume responsibility for disarmament and demobilization; third, a prohibition on occupation; and fourth, the delegation of the punishment of war criminals to the Japanese government. The army equated the kokutai with the emperor’s right of supreme command. Their self-serving desire for autonomous war crimes trials was based on the belief that the Allies would use such trials to politically indict the military. Consequently, army leaders aimed to preempt the activities of any international tribunal by conducting their own trials—similar to the approach taken by the uninvaded and unrepentant Germans after World War I.

Supporting the military’s views during cabinet meetings that day were three civilian members of the Suzuki cabinet: Justice Minister Matsuzaka Hiromasa, Home Minister Yasui Toji, and Minister of Health Okada Tadahiko. At the imperial conference that night, which extended into the early hours of the tenth, Foreign Minister Tōgō’s interpretation of the “preservation of the kokutai” referred solely to the safeguarding of the Imperial House or dynasty, rather than the continuation of Hirohito’s reign.

Hiranuma, another advocate for the single condition, interpreted the kokutai as the “emperor’s sovereign right to rule the state [not] deriving from national law. Even if the entire nation is sacrificed to the war, we must preserve both the kokutai and the security of the imperial house.” This discrepancy illustrated that there was no completely unified understanding of what the kokutai entailed; the debate over one condition versus four represented conflicting visions for the future of the Japanese state and masked the competition for political power that was already unfolding.

It remains doubtful whether the emperor and Kido initially sided with Tōgō against the four conditions proposed by the senior military leaders. A more likely inference is that both men retained sympathies for the hardliners, both military and civilian, who preferred to continue the futile war rather than surrender immediately and unconditionally. This may explain why, on August 9, Konoe had Hosokawa Morisada approach Navy General Headquarters to urge the emperor’s brother, Prince Takamatsu, to pressure Hirohito (through Kido) to accept the Potsdam terms. Later that afternoon, Konoe enlisted the help of diplomat Shigemitsu Mamoru to persuade Kido to reconsider his stance on the four conditions. Ultimately, at the urging of Takamatsu and Shigemitsu, Kido did shift to support Tōgō’s position.

At the end of the war, as at its beginning and throughout every stage of its progression, Emperor Hirohito played a highly active role in supporting the actions carried out in his name. From the very beginning of the Asia-Pacific war, the emperor played a significant role in the unfolding events around him. Prior to the Battle of Okinawa, he consistently advocated for a decisive victory. Afterward, he acknowledged the necessity of pursuing an early peace, although he did not favor an immediate cessation of hostilities. Instead, he wavered, steering Japan toward ongoing warfare rather than direct negotiations with the Allies. When the final crisis fully unfolded, the only option left was unconditional surrender. Even then, he continued to procrastinate until the atomic bomb was dropped and the Soviets launched their attack.

The wartime emperor ideology that once sustained morale made it exceedingly difficult for Japan’s leaders to accept the act of surrender. Aware of their objective defeat, yet indifferent to the suffering the war inflicted on their own people—as well as on the populations of Asia, the Pacific, and the West whose lives they had disrupted—the emperor and his military leaders sought a means to lose without appearing to lose. They aimed to mitigate domestic criticism following surrender while preserving their power structure.

Blinded by their fixation on the fate of the imperial house and committed to an overly optimistic diplomacy toward the Soviet Union, Japan's leaders missed several opportunities to end their lost war. Would Japan’s leaders have surrendered more promptly if the Truman administration had “clarified” the status of the emperor before the cataclysmic double shocks of the atomic bomb and the Soviet entry into the war? Probably not. However, it is likely they would have surrendered to prevent the kokutai from being destroyed from within. The evidence suggests that the first atomic bomb and the Soviet declaration of war led Hirohito, Kido, and other members of the court to believe that continuing the war would inevitably result in that destruction. They recognized that the populace was war-weary and despondent, with rising hostility toward the military and the government, accompanied by increasing criticism of the emperor himself. More specifically, Kido and Hirohito were privy to Home Ministry reports, which contained information from governors and police chiefs nationwide. These reports indicated that citizens were beginning to label the emperor as an incompetent leader responsible for the deteriorating war situation.

This is the third variable, never spoken about. Many first look at the atomic bombs. Bigger brain people turn to the Soviet Invasion of Manchuria. But hardly anyone reads about how the collapse of Japan’s social fabric, scared the shit out of the Emperor and his closest advisors. You can’t have a kokutai, without a populace that worshiped you. 

When the emperor expressed in February, “What worries me is whether the nation [could] endure” long enough to achieve victory, he was not merely voicing concern for the suffering of his subjects; rather, he feared that such suffering could lead to social upheaval—in short, revolution. At that time, he referred to the ordinary, war-related hardships of food shortages, air raids, devastated cities, destruction of homes, and the omnipresent grief from the loss of loved ones. The atomic bomb escalated death, pain, and suffering to unimaginably higher levels, intensifying the threat from within. After the bombings of Japan and two atomic bombs, Hirohito was in a dark way, given a golden get out of jail free card. Hirohito could now save his suffering people from further anguish by surrendering, allowing him to deflect responsibility for leading them into misery while adopting an air of benevolence and care. Indeed, Hirohito did care—though not primarily for the Japanese people, but rather for the survival of his own imperial house and throne.

After the bombing of Hiroshima, Hirohito delayed for a full two days before instructing Kido, shortly before 10 A.M. on August 9, to “quickly control the situation” because “the Soviet [Union]” had declared war. Kido immediately communicated with Prime Minister Suzuki, who began arrangements for an Imperial Conference scheduled for later that night. Following the seidan of August 10, Chief Cabinet Secretary Sakomizu took charge of drafting the “Imperial Rescript Ending the War” based on Hirohito’s directives. Assisted by two scholars of the Chinese classics, Kawada Mizuho and Yasuoka Masahiro, Sakomizu worked tirelessly for over three days before submitting a version of the rescript to the Suzuki cabinet. After six hours of contentious discussion on the night of August 14, the cabinet modified and approved the document. Hirohito promptly signed it, and Shimomura and Kido persuaded him to record a suitably opaque final version for broadcast to the nation.

On the night of August 14, the Suzuki government notified the United States and other Allied nations that it had accepted both the Potsdam Declaration and the Byrnes letter of August 11. Accelerating the emperor’s actions during this climactic moment of the unconditional surrender drama was the American psychological warfare campaign. When a leaflet dropped from B-29 bombers came into Kido’s possession on the night of August 13 or the morning of the fourteenth, he conferred with the emperor and explained the gravity of the situation. The latest enemy leaflets were informing the Japanese people of the government’s notification of surrender under one condition, along with the full text of Byrnes’s response. If this continued, it would undermine the imperial government’s reliance on secrecy to obscure the true nature of the lost war and the reasons for the prolonged surrender delay.

Given Kido’s and the emperor’s concerns about rising signs of defeatism, including criticism of the throne, immediate action was necessary to prevent the populace from acting on their own initiative. Thus, the second seidan was convened. At noon on August 15, the Japanese people gathered around their radio receivers and heard, for the first time, the high-pitched voice of their emperor telling them: 

“After pondering deeply the general trends of the world and the actual conditions obtaining in Our Empire today, We have decided to effect a settlement of the present situation by resorting to an extraordinary measure.

We have ordered Our Government to communicate to the Governments of the United States, Great Britain, China and the Soviet Union that Our Empire accepts the provisions of their Joint Declaration.

To strive for the common prosperity and happiness of all nations as well as the security and well-being of Our subjects is the solemn obligation which has been handed down by Our Imperial Ancestors and which lies close to Our heart.

Indeed, We declared war on America and Britain out of Our sincere desire to ensure Japan's self-preservation and the stabilization of East Asia, it being far from Our thought either to infringe upon the sovereignty of other nations or to embark upon territorial aggrandizement.

But now the war has lasted for nearly four years. Despite the best that has been done by everyone—the gallant fighting of the military and naval forces, the diligence and assiduity of Our servants of the State, and the devoted service of Our one hundred million people—the war situation has developed not necessarily to Japan's advantage, while the general trends of the world have all turned against her interest.

Moreover, the enemy has begun to employ a new and most cruel bomb, the power of which to do damage is, indeed, incalculable, taking the toll of many innocent lives. Should we continue to fight, not only would it result in an ultimate collapse and obliteration of the Japanese nation, but also it would lead to the total extinction of human civilization.

Such being the case, how are We to save the millions of Our subjects, or to atone Ourselves before the hallowed spirits of Our Imperial Ancestors? This is the reason why We have ordered the acceptance of the provisions of the Joint Declaration of the Powers...

The hardships and sufferings to which Our nation is to be subjected hereafter will be certainly great. We are keenly aware of the inmost feelings of all of you, Our subjects. However, it is according to the dictates of time and fate that We have resolved to pave the way for a grand peace for all the generations to come by enduring the unendurable and suffering what is unsufferable”.

Clearly Hirohito sought to justify his decision to surrender by citing the dropping of the atomic bombs. He wanted to become the saviour of the Japanese people. Hirohito wanted to obfuscate the issue of accountability, to prevent expressions of strife and anger and to strengthen domestic unity around himself, to protect and raise the kokutai.  Interestingly, the surrender declaration to the civilian population was not the same one sent to the military. On August 17th Hirohito issued a second “rescript to soldiers and sailors” throughout the asia-pacific.

“ Now that the Soviet Union has entered the war against us, to continue . . . under the present conditions at home and abroad would only recklessly incur even more damage to ourselves and result in endangering the very foundation of the empire’s existence. Therefore, even though enormous fighting spirit still exists in the Imperial Navy and Army, I am going to make peace with the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union, as well as with Chungking, in order to maintain our glorious national polity”.

The lesser-known August 17 rescript to the army and navy specified Soviet participation as the sole reason for surrender, while maintaining the kokutai as the primary aim. Dissembling until the end—and even beyond—it was noted that the emperor presented two different justifications for his delayed surrender. Both statements were likely true.

Months later Hirohito’s said this about his decision to surrender “The main motive behind my decision at that time was that if we . . . did not act, the Japanese race would perish and I would be unable to protect my loyal subjects [sekishi—literally, “children”]. Second, Kido agreed with me on the matter of defending the kokutai. If the enemy landed near Ise Bay, both Ise and Atsuta Shrines would immediately come under their control. There would be no time to transfer the sacred treasures [regalia] of the imperial family and no hope of protecting them. Under these circumstances, protection of the kokutai would be difficult. For these reasons, I thought at the time that I must make peace even at the sacrifice of myself.” 

There exists this sort of childish argument today whether it was the atomic bombs or the Soviet Invasion that caused Japan to surrender. However, this overlooks as I think I’ve explained in 9000 words jeez, the influence of the kokutai. Defending the kokutai was Hirohito’s number one priority. The Soviets threatened it. Communism threatened it. What Japan perceived to be “democracy” threatened it. American victory threatened it. And the destruction of Japan’s social fabric threatened it. I love this one piece of history, that I have only come across in one book, that being the main one I am using here.

On August 12th, Hirohito came to the imperial family to tell them he had made the decision to surrender. His uncle Prince Yasuhiko Asaka asked him whether the war would be continued if the kokutai could not be preserved. Hirohito replied “of course”.

Last time we spoke about the surrender of Japan. Emperor Hirohito announced the surrender on August 15, prompting mixed public reactions: grief, shock, and sympathy for the Emperor, tempered by fear of hardship and occupation. The government’s response included resignations and suicide as new leadership was brought in under Prime Minister Higashikuni, with Mamoru Shigemitsu as Foreign Minister and Kawabe Torashiro heading a delegation to Manila. General MacArthur directed the occupation plan, “Blacklist,” prioritizing rapid, phased entry into key Japanese areas and Korea, while demobilizing enemy forces. The surrender ceremony occurred aboard the Missouri in Tokyo Bay on September 2, with Wainwright, Percival, Nimitz, and UN representatives in attendance. Civilians and soldiers across Asia began surrendering, and postwar rehabilitation, Indochina and Vietnam’s independence movements, and Southeast Asian transitions rapidly unfolded as Allied forces established control.

This episode is the Aftermath of the Pacific War

Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. 

The Pacific War has ended. Peace has been restored by the Allies and most of the places conquered by the Japanese Empire have been liberated. In this post-war period, new challenges would be faced for those who won the war; and from the ashes of an empire, a defeated nation was also seeking to rebuild. As the Japanese demobilized their armed forces, many young boys were set to return to their homeland, even if they had previously thought that they wouldn’t survive the ordeal. And yet, there were some cases of isolated men that would continue to fight for decades even, unaware that the war had already ended. 

As we last saw, after the Japanese surrender, General MacArthur’s forces began the occupation of the Japanese home islands, while their overseas empire was being dismantled by the Allies. To handle civil administration, MacArthur established the Military Government Section, commanded by Brigadier-General William Crist, staffed by hundreds of US experts trained in civil governance who were reassigned from Okinawa and the Philippines. As the occupation began, Americans dispatched tactical units and Military Government Teams to each prefecture to ensure that policies were faithfully carried out. By mid-September, General Eichelberger’s 8th Army had taken over the Tokyo Bay region and began deploying to occupy Hokkaido and the northern half of Honshu. Then General Krueger's 6th Army arrived in late September, taking southern Honshu and Shikoku, with its base in Kyoto. In December, 6th Army was relieved of its occupation duties; in January 1946, it was deactivated, leaving the 8th Army as the main garrison force. By late 1945, about 430,000 American soldiers were garrisoned across Japan. President Truman approved inviting Allied involvement on American terms, with occupation armies integrated into a US command structure. Yet with the Chinese civil war and Russia’s reluctance to place its forces under MacArthur’s control, only Australia, Britain, India, and New Zealand sent brigades, more than 40,000 troops in southwestern Japan.

Japanese troops were gradually disarmed by order of their own commanders, so the stigma of surrender would be less keenly felt by the individual soldier. In the homeland, about 1.5 million men were discharged and returned home by the end of August. Demobilization overseas, however, proceeded, not quickly, but as a long, difficult process of repatriation. In compliance with General Order No. 1, the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters disbanded on September 13 and was superseded by the Japanese War Department to manage demobilization. By November 1, the homeland had demobilized 2,228,761 personnel, roughly 97% of the Homeland Army. Yet some 6,413,215 men remained to be repatriated from overseas. On December 1, the Japanese War Ministry dissolved, and the First Demobilization Ministry took its place. The Second Demobilization Ministry was established to handle IJN demobilization, with 1,299,868 sailors, 81% of the Navy, demobilized by December 17. Japanese warships and merchant ships had their weapons rendered inoperative, and suicide craft were destroyed. Forty percent of naval vessels were allocated to evacuations in the Philippines, and 60% to evacuations of other Pacific islands. This effort eventually repatriated about 823,984 men to Japan by February 15, 1946. As repatriation accelerated, by October 15 only 1,909,401 men remained to be repatriated, most of them in the Soviet Union.

Meanwhile, the Higashikuni Cabinet and Foreign Minister Shigemitsu Mamoru managed to persuade MacArthur not to impose direct military rule or martial law over all of Japan. Instead, the occupation would be indirect, guided by the Japanese government under the Emperor’s direction. An early decision to feed occupation forces from American supplies, and to allow the Japanese to use their own limited food stores, helped ease a core fear: that Imperial forces would impose forced deliveries on the people they conquered. On September 17, MacArthur transferred his headquarters from Yokohama to Tokyo, setting up primary offices on the sixth floor of the Dai-Ichi Mutual Life Insurance Building, an imposing edifice overlooking the moat and the Imperial palace grounds in Hibiya, a symbolic heart of the nation. 

While the average soldier did not fit the rapacious image of wartime Japanese propagandists, occupation personnel often behaved like neo-colonial overlords. The conquerors claimed privileges unimaginable to most Japanese. Entire trains and train compartments, fitted with dining cars, were set aside for the exclusive use of occupation forces. These silenced, half-empty trains sped past crowded platforms, provoking ire as Japanese passengers were forced to enter and exit packed cars through punched-out windows, or perch on carriage roofs, couplings, and running boards, often with tragic consequences. The luxury express coaches became irresistible targets for anonymous stone-throwers. During the war, retrenchment measures had closed restaurants, cabarets, beer halls, geisha houses, and theatres in Tokyo and other large cities. Now, a vast leisure industry sprang up to cater to the needs of the foreign occupants. Reopened restaurants and theatres, along with train stations, buses, and streetcars, were sometimes kept off limits to Allied personnel, partly for security, partly to avoid burdening Japanese resources, but a costly service infrastructure was built to the occupiers’ specifications. Facilities reserved for occupation troops bore large signs reading “Japanese Keep Out” or “For Allied Personnel Only.” In downtown Tokyo, important public buildings requisitioned for occupation use had separate entrances for Americans and Japanese. The effect? A subtle but clear colour bar between the predominantly white conquerors and the conquered “Asiatic” Japanese.

Although MacArthur was ready to work through the Japanese government, he lacked the organizational infrastructure to administer a nation of 74 million. Consequently, on October 2, MacArthur dissolved the Military Government Section and inaugurated General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, a separate headquarters focused on civil affairs and operating in tandem with the Army high command. SCAP immediately assumed responsibility for administering the Japanese home islands. It commandeered every large building not burned down to house thousands of civilians and requisitioned vast tracts of prime real estate to quarter several hundred thousand troops in the Tokyo–Yokohama area alone. Amidst the rise of American privilege, entire buildings were refurbished as officers’ clubs, replete with slot machines and gambling parlours installed at occupation expense. The Stars and Stripes were hoisted over Tokyo, while the display of the Rising Sun was banned; and the downtown area, known as “Little America,” was transformed into a US enclave.

The enclave mentality of this cocooned existence was reinforced by the arrival within the first six months of roughly 700 American families. At the peak of the occupation, about 14,800 families employed some 25,000 Japanese servants to ease the “rigours” of overseas duty. Even enlisted men in the sparse quonset-hut towns around the city lived like kings compared with ordinary Japanese. Japanese workers cleaned barracks, did kitchen chores, and handled other base duties. The lowest private earned a 25% hardship bonus until these special allotments were discontinued in 1949.

Most military families quickly adjusted to a pampered lifestyle that went beyond maids and “boys,” including cooks, laundresses, babysitters, gardeners, and masseuses. Perks included spacious quarters with swimming pools, central heating, hot running water, and modern plumbing. Two observers compared GHQ to the British Raj at its height. George F. Kennan, head of the State Department’s Policy Planning Staff, warned during his 1948 mission to Japan that Americans had monopolized “everything that smacks of comfort or elegance or luxury,” criticizing what he called the “American brand of philistinism” and the “monumental imperviousness” of MacArthur’s staff to the Japanese suffering. This conqueror’s mentality also showed in the bullying attitudes many top occupation officials displayed toward the Japanese with whom they dealt. Major Faubion Bowers, MacArthur’s military secretary, later said, “I and nearly all the occupation people I knew were extremely conceited and extremely arrogant and used our power every inch of the way.”

Initially, there were spasms of defiance against the occupation forces, such as anonymous stone-throwing, while armed robbery and minor assaults against occupation personnel were rife in the weeks and months after capitulation. Yet active resistance was neither widespread nor organized. The Americans successfully completed their initial deployment without violence, an astonishing feat given a heavily armed and vastly superior enemy operating on home terrain. The average citizen regarded the occupation as akin to force majeure, the unfortunate but inevitable aftermath of a natural calamity. Japan lay prostrate. Industrial output had fallen to about 10% of pre-war levels, and as late as 1946, more than 13 million remained unemployed. Nearly 40% of Japan's urban areas had been turned to rubble, and some 9 million people were homeless. The war-displaced, many of them orphans, slept in doorways and hallways, in bombed-out ruins, dugouts and packing crates, under bridges or on pavements, and crowded the hallways of train and subway stations. As winter 1945 descended, with food, fuel, and clothing scarce, people froze to death. Bonfires lit the streets to ward off the chill. "The only warm hands I have shaken thus far in Japan belonged to Americans," Mark Gayn noted in December 1945. "The Japanese do not have much of a chance to thaw out, and their hands are cold and red." Unable to afford shoes, many wore straw sandals; those with geta felt themselves privileged. The sight of a man wearing a woman's high-buttoned shoes in winter epitomized the daily struggle to stay dry and warm. Shantytowns built of scrap wood, rusted metal, and scavenged odds and ends sprang up everywhere, resembling vast junk yards. The poorest searched smouldering refuse heaps for castoffs that might be bartered for a scrap to eat or wear. Black markets (yami'ichi) run by Japanese, Koreans, and For-mosans mushroomed to replace collapsed distribution channels and cash in on inflated prices. Tokyo became "a world of scarcity in which every nail, every rag, and even a tangerine peel [had a] market value." Psychologically numbed, disoriented, and disillusioned with their leaders, demobilized veterans and civilians alike struggled to get their bearings, shed militaristic ideologies, and begin to embrace new values. In the vacuum of defeat, the Japanese people appeared ready to reject the past and grasp at the straw held out by the former enemy.

Relations between occupier and occupied were not smooth, however. American troops comported themselves like conquerors, especially in the early weeks and months of occupation. Much of the violence was directed against women, with the first attacks beginning within hours after the landing of advance units. When US paratroopers landed in Sapporo, an orgy of looting, sexual violence, and drunken brawling ensued. Newspaper accounts reported 931 serious offences by GIs in the Yokohama area during the first week of occupation, including 487 armed robberies, 411 thefts of currency or goods, 9 rapes, 5 break-ins, 3 cases of assault and battery, and 16 other acts of lawlessness. In the first 10 days of occupation, there were 1,336 reported rapes by US soldiers in Kanagawa Prefecture alone. Americans were not the only perpetrators. A former prostitute recalled that when Australian troops arrived in Kure in early 1946, they “dragged young women into their jeeps, took them to the mountain, and then raped them. I heard them screaming for help nearly every night.” Such behaviour was commonplace, but news of criminal activity by occupation forces was quickly suppressed. On September 10, 1945, SCAP issued press and pre-censorship codes outlawing the publication of reports and statistics "inimical to the objectives of the occupation." In the sole instance of self-help General Eichelberger records in his memoirs, when locals formed a vigilante group and retaliated against off-duty GIs, 8th Army ordered armored vehicles into the streets and arrested the ringleaders, who received lengthy prison terms. Misbehavior ranged from black-market activity, petty theft, reckless driving, and disorderly conduct to vandalism, arson, murder, and rape. Soldiers and sailors often broke the law with impunity, and incidents of robbery, rape, and even murder were widely reported. Gang rapes and other sex atrocities were not infrequent; victims, shunned as outcasts, sometimes turned to prostitution in desperation, while others took their own lives to avoid bringing shame to their families. Military courts arrested relatively few soldiers for these offenses and convicted even fewer; Japanese attempts at self-defense were punished severely, and restitution for victims was rare.

Fearing the worst, Japanese authorities had already prepared countermeasures against the supposed rapacity of foreign soldiers. Imperial troops in East Asia and the Pacific had behaved brutally toward women, so the government established “sexual comfort-stations” manned by geisha, bar hostesses, and prostitutes to “satisfy the lust of the Occupation forces,” as the Higashikuni Cabinet put it. A budget of 100 million yen was set aside for these Recreation and Amusement Associations, financed initially with public funds but run as private enterprises under police supervision. Through these, the government hoped to protect the daughters of the well-born and middle class by turning to lower-class women to satisfy the soldiers’ sexual appetites.

By the end of 1945, brothel operators had rounded up an estimated 20,000 young women and herded them into RAA establishments nationwide. Eventually, as many as 70,000 are said to have ended up in the state-run sex industry. Thankfully, as military discipline took hold and fresh troops replaced the Allied veterans responsible for the early crime wave, violence subsided and the occupier’s patronising behavior and the ugly misdeeds of a lawless few were gradually overlooked. However, fraternisation was frowned upon by both sides, and segregation was practiced in principle, with the Japanese excluded from areas reserved for Allied personnel until September 1949, when MacArthur lifted virtually all restrictions on friendly association, stating that he was “establishing the same relations between occupation personnel and the Japanese population as exists between troops stationed in the United States and the American people.”

In principle, the Occupation’s administrative structure was highly complex. The Far Eastern Commission, based in Washington, included representatives from all 13 countries that had fought against Japan and was established in 1946 to formulate basic principles. The Allied Council for Japan was created in the same year to assist in developing and implementing surrender terms and in administering the country. It consisted of representatives from the USA, the USSR, Nationalist China, and the British Commonwealth. Although both bodies were active at first, they were largely ineffectual due to unwieldy decision-making, disagreements between the national delegations (especially the USA and USSR), and the obstructionism of General Douglas MacArthur. In practice, SCAP, the executive authority of the occupation, effectively ruled Japan from 1945 to 1952. And since it took orders only from the US government, the Occupation became primarily an American affair.

The US occupation program, effectively carried out by SCAP, was revolutionary and rested on a two-pronged approach. To ensure Japan would never again become a menace to the United States or to world peace, SCAP pursued disarmament and demilitarization, with continuing control over Japan’s capacity to make war. This involved destroying military supplies and installations, demobilizing more than five million Japanese soldiers, and thoroughly discrediting the military establishment. Accordingly, SCAP ordered the purge of tens of thousands of designated persons from public service positions, including accused war criminals, military officers, leaders of ultranationalist societies, leaders in the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, business leaders tied to overseas expansion, governors of former Japanese colonies, and national leaders who had steered Japan into war. In addition, MacArthur’s International Military Tribunal for the Far East established a military court in Tokyo. It had jurisdiction over those charged with Class A crimes, top leaders who had planned and directed the war. Also considered were Class B charges, covering conventional war crimes, and Class C charges, covering crimes against humanity. Yet the military court in Tokyo wouldn’t be the only one.

More than 5,700 lower-ranking personnel were charged with conventional war crimes in separate trials convened by Australia, China, France, the Dutch East Indies, the Philippines, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Of the 5,700 Japanese individuals indicted for Class B war crimes, 984 were sentenced to death; 475 received life sentences; 2,944 were given more limited prison terms; 1,018 were acquitted; and 279 were never brought to trial or not sentenced. Among these, many, like General Ando Rikichi and Lieutenant-General Nomi Toshio, chose to commit suicide before facing prosecution. Notable cases include Lieutenant-General Tani Hisao, who was sentenced to death by the Nanjing War Crimes Tribunal for his role in the Nanjing Massacre; Lieutenant-General Sakai Takashi, who was executed in Nanjing for the murder of British and Chinese civilians during the occupation of Hong Kong. General Okamura Yasuji was convicted of war crimes by the Tribunal, yet he was immediately protected by the personal order of Nationalist leader Chiang Kai-Shek, who kept him as a military adviser for the Kuomintang. In the Manila trials, General Yamashita Tomoyuki was sentenced to death as he was in overall command during the Sook Ching massacre, the Rape of Manila, and other atrocities. Lieutenant-General Homma Masaharu was likewise executed in Manila for atrocities committed by troops under his command during the Bataan Death March.

General Imamura Hitoshi was sentenced to ten years in prison, but he considered the punishment too light and even had a replica of the prison built in his garden, remaining there until his death in 1968. Lieutenant-General Kanda Masatane received a 14-year sentence for war crimes on Bougainville, though he served only four years. Lieutenant-General Adachi Hatazo was sentenced to life imprisonment for war crimes in New Guinea and subsequently committed suicide on September 10, 1947. Lieutenant-General Teshima Fusataro received three years of forced labour for using a hospital ship to transport troops. Lieutenant-General Baba Masao was sentenced to death for ordering the Sandakan Death Marches, during which over 2,200 Australian and British prisoners of war perished. Lieutenant-General Tanabe Moritake was sentenced to death by a Dutch military tribunal for unspecified war crimes. Rear-Admiral Sakaibara Shigematsu was executed in Guam for ordering the Wake Island massacre, in which 98 American civilians were murdered. Lieutenant-General Inoue Sadae was condemned to death in Guam for permitting subordinates to execute three downed American airmen captured in Palau, though his sentence was commuted to life imprisonment in 1951 and he was released in 1953. Lieutenant-General Tachibana Yoshio was sentenced to death in Guam for his role in the Chichijima Incident, in which eight American airmen were cannibalized.

By mid-1945, due to the Allied naval blockade, the 25,000 Japanese troops on Chichijima had run low on supplies. However, although the daily rice ration had been reduced from 400 grams per person per day to 240 grams, the troops were not at risk of starvation. In February and March 1945, in what would later be called the Chichijima incident, Tachibana Yoshio’s senior staff turned to cannibalism. Nine American airmen had escaped from their planes after being shot down during bombing raids on Chichijima, eight of whom were captured. The ninth, the only one to evade capture, was future US President George H. W. Bush, then a 20-year-old pilot. Over several months, the prisoners were executed, and reportedly by the order of Major Matoba Sueyo, their bodies were butchered by the division’s medical orderlies, with the livers and other organs consumed by the senior staff, including Matoba’s superior Tachibana. In the Yokohama War Crimes Trials, Lieutenant-Generals Inada Masazumi and Yokoyama Isamu were convicted for their complicity in vivisection and other human medical experiments performed at Kyushu Imperial University on downed Allied airmen.

The Tokyo War Crimes Trial, which began in May 1946 and lasted two and a half years, resulted in the execution by hanging of Generals Doihara Kenji and Itagaki Seishiro, and former Prime Ministers Hirota Koki and Tojo Hideki, for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and crimes against peace, specifically for the escalation of the Pacific War and for permitting the inhumane treatment of prisoners of war. Also sentenced to death were Lieutenant-General Muto Akira for his role in the Nanjing and Manila massacres; General Kimura Heitaro for planning the war strategy in China and Southeast Asia and for laxity in preventing atrocities against prisoners of war in Burma; and General Matsui Iwane for his involvement in the Rape of Nanjing. The seven defendants who were sentenced to death were executed at Sugamo Prison in Ikebukuro on December 23, 1948. Sixteen others were sentenced to life imprisonment, including the last Field Marshal Hata Shunroku, Generals Araki Sadao, Minami Hiro, and Umezu Shojiro, Admiral Shimada Shigetaro, former Prime Ministers Hiranuma Kiichiro and Koiso Kuniaki, Marquis Kido Koichi, and Colonel Hashimoto Kingoro, a major instigator of the second Sino-Japanese War. Additionally, former Foreign Ministers Togo Shigenori and Shigemitsu Mamoru received seven- and twenty-year sentences, respectively. The Soviet Union and Chinese Communist forces also held trials of Japanese war criminals, including the Khabarovsk War Crime Trials, which tried and found guilty some members of Japan’s bacteriological and chemical warfare unit known as Unit 731. However, those who surrendered to the Americans were never brought to trial, as MacArthur granted immunity to Lieutenant-General Ishii Shiro and all members of the bacteriological research units in exchange for germ-w warfare data derived from human experimentation. If you would like to learn more about what I like to call Japan’s Operation Paper clip, whereupon the US grabbed many scientists from Unit 731, check out my exclusive podcast.

The SCAP-turn to democratization began with the drafting of a new constitution in 1947, addressing Japan’s enduring feudal social structure. In the charter, sovereignty was vested in the people, and the emperor was designated a “symbol of the state and the unity of the people, deriving his position from the will of the people in whom resides sovereign power.” Because the emperor now possessed fewer powers than European constitutional monarchs, some have gone so far as to say that Japan became “a republic in fact if not in name.” Yet the retention of the emperor was, in fact, a compromise that suited both those who wanted to preserve the essence of the nation for stability and those who demanded that the emperor system, though not necessarily the emperor, should be expunged. In line with the democratic spirit of the new constitution, the peerage was abolished and the two-chamber Diet, to which the cabinet was now responsible, became the highest organ of state. The judiciary was made independent and local autonomy was granted in vital areas of jurisdiction such as education and the police. Moreover, the constitution stipulated that “the people shall not be prevented from enjoying any of the fundamental human rights,” that they “shall be respected as individuals,” and that “their right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness shall … be the supreme consideration in legislation.” Its 29 articles guaranteed basic human rights: equality, freedom from discrimination on the basis of race, creed, sex, social status or family origin, freedom of thought and freedom of religion. Finally, in its most controversial section, Article 9, the “peace clause,” Japan “renounce[d] war as a sovereign right of the nation” and vowed not to maintain any military forces and “other war potential.”

To instill a thoroughly democratic ethos, reforms touched every facet of society. The dissolution of the zaibatsu decentralised economic power; the 1945 Labour Union Law and the 1946 Labour Relations Act guaranteed workers the right to collective action; the 1947 Labour Standards Law established basic working standards for men and women; and the revised Civil Code of 1948 abolished the patriarchal household and enshrined sexual equality. Reflecting core American principles, SCAP introduced a 6-3-3 schooling system, six years of compulsory elementary education, three years of junior high, and an optional three years of senior high, along with the aim of secular, locally controlled education. More crucially, ideological reform followed: censorship of feudal material in media, revision of textbooks, and prohibition of ideas glorifying war, dying for the emperor, or venerating war heroes. With women enfranchised and young people shaped to counter militarism and ultranationalism, rural Japan was transformed to undermine lingering class divisions.

The land reform program provided for the purchase of all land held by absentee landlords, allowed resident landlords and owner-farmers to retain a set amount of land, and required that the remaining land be sold to the government so it could be offered to existing tenants. In 1948, amid the intensifying tensions of the Cold War that would soon culminate in the Korean War, the occupation’s focus shifted from demilitarization and democratization toward economic rehabilitation and, ultimately, the remilitarization of Japan, an shift now known as the “Reverse Course.” The country was thus rebuilt as the Pacific region’s primary bulwark against the spread of Communism. An Economic Stabilisation Programme was introduced, including a five-year plan to coordinate production and target capital through the Reconstruction Finance Bank. In 1949, the anti-inflationary Dodge Plan was adopted, advocating balanced budgets, fixing the exchange rate at 360 yen to the dollar, and ending broad government intervention. Additionally, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry was formed and supported the formation of conglomerates centered around banks, which encouraged the reemergence of a somewhat weakened set of zaibatsu, including Mitsui and Mitsubishi. By the end of the Occupation era, Japan was on the verge of surpassing its 1934–1936 levels of economic growth. Equally important was Japan’s rearmament in alignment with American foreign policy: a National Police Reserve of about 75,000 was created with the outbreak of the Korean War; by 1952 it had expanded to 110,000 and was renamed the Self-Defense Force after the inclusion of an air force. However, the Reverse Course also facilitated the reestablishment of conservative politics and the rollback of gains made by women and the reforms of local autonomy and education.

As the Occupation progressed, the Americans permitted greater Japanese initiative, and power gradually shifted from the reformers to the moderates. By 1949, the purge of the right came under review, and many who had been condemned began returning to influence, if not to the Diet, then to behind-the-scenes power. At the same time, Japanese authorities, with MacArthur’s support, began purging left-wing activists. In June 1950, for example, the central office of the Japan Communist Party and the editorial board of The Red Flag were purged. The gains made by women also seemed to be reversed. Women were elected to 8% of available seats in the first lower-house election in 1946, but to only 2% in 1952, a trend not reversed until the so-called Madonna Boom of the 1980s. Although the number of women voting continued to rise, female politicisation remained more superficial than might be imagined. Women’s employment also appeared little affected by labour legislation: though women formed nearly 40% of the labor force in 1952, they earned only 45% as much as men. Indeed, women’s attitudes toward labor were influenced less by the new ethos of fulfilling individual potential than by traditional views of family and workplace responsibilities. In the areas of local autonomy and education, substantial modifications were made to the reforms. Because local authorities lacked sufficient power to tax, they were unable to realise their extensive powers, and, as a result, key responsibilities were transferred back to national jurisdiction. In 1951, for example, 90% of villages and towns placed their police forces under the control of the newly formed National Police Agency. Central control over education was also gradually reasserted; in 1951, the Yoshida government attempted to reintroduce ethics classes, proposed tighter central oversight of textbooks, and recommended abolishing local school board elections. By the end of the decade, all these changes had been implemented.

The Soviet occupation of the Kurile Islands and the Habomai Islets was completed with Russian troops fully deployed by September 5. Immediately after the onset of the occupation, amid a climate of insecurity and fear marked by reports of sporadic rape and physical assault and widespread looting by occupying troops, an estimated 4,000 islanders fled to Hokkaido rather than face an uncertain repatriation. As Soviet forces moved in, they seized or destroyed telephone and telegraph installations and halted ship movements into and out of the islands, leaving residents without adequate food and other winter provisions. Yet, unlike Manchuria, where Japanese civilians faced widespread sexual violence and pillage, systematic violence against the civilian population on the Kuriles appears to have been exceptional. A series of military government proclamations assured islanders of safety so long as they did not resist Soviet rule and carried on normally; however, these orders also prohibited activities not explicitly authorized by the Red Army, which imposed many hardships on civilians. Residents endured harsh conditions under Soviet rule until late 1948, when Japanese repatriation out of the Kurils was completed. The Kuriles posed a special diplomatic problem, as the occupation of the southernmost islands—the Northern Territories—ignited a long-standing dispute between Tokyo and Moscow that continues to impede the normalisation of relations today. Although the Kuriles were promised to the Soviet Union in the Yalta agreement, Japan and the United States argued that this did not apply to the Northern Territories, since they were not part of the Kurile Islands.

A substantial dispute regarding the status of the Kurile Islands arose between the United States and the Soviet Union during the preparation of the Treaty of San Francisco, which was intended as a permanent peace treaty between Japan and the Allied Powers of World War II. The treaty was ultimately signed by 49 nations in San Francisco on September 8, 1951, and came into force on April 28, 1952. It ended Japan’s role as an imperial power, allocated compensation to Allied nations and former prisoners of war who had suffered Japanese war crimes, ended the Allied post-war occupation of Japan, and returned full sovereignty to Japan. Effectively, the document officially renounced Japan’s treaty rights derived from the Boxer Protocol of 1901 and its rights to Korea, Formosa and the Pescadores, the Kurile Islands, the Spratly Islands, Antarctica, and South Sakhalin. Japan’s South Seas Mandate, namely the Mariana Islands, Marshall Islands, and Caroline Islands, had already been formally revoked by the United Nations on July 18, 1947, making the United States responsible for administration of those islands under a UN trusteeship agreement that established the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. In turn, the Bonin, Volcano, and Ryukyu Islands were progressively restored to Japan between 1953 and 1972, along with the Senkaku Islands, which were disputed by both Communist and Nationalist China. In addition, alongside the Treaty of San Francisco, Japan and the United States signed a Security Treaty that established a long-lasting military alliance between them. Although Japan renounced its rights to the Kuriles, the U.S. State Department later clarified that “the Habomai Islands and Shikotan ... are properly part of Hokkaido and that Japan is entitled to sovereignty over them,” hence why the Soviets refused to sign the treaty.

Britain and the United States agreed that territorial rights would not be granted to nations that did not sign the Treaty of San Francisco, and as a result the Kurile Islands were not formally recognized as Soviet territory. A separate peace treaty, the Treaty of Taipei (formally the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty), was signed in Taipei on April 28, 1952 between Japan and the Kuomintang, and on June 9 of that year the Treaty of Peace Between Japan and India followed. Finally, Japan and the Soviet Union ended their formal state of war with the Soviet–Japanese Joint Declaration of 1956, though this did not settle the Kurile Islands dispute. Even after these formal steps, Japan as a nation was not in a formal state of war, and many Japanese continued to believe the war was ongoing; those who held out after the surrender came to be known as Japanese holdouts. 

Captain Oba Sakae and his medical company participated in the Saipan campaign beginning on July 7, 1944, and took part in what would become the largest banzai charge of the Pacific War. After 15 hours of intense hand-to-hand combat, almost 4,300 Japanese soldiers were dead, and Oba and his men were presumed among them. In reality, however, he survived the battle and gradually assumed command of over a hundred additional soldiers. Only five men from his original unit survived the battle, two of whom died in the following months. Oba then led over 200 Japanese civilians deeper into the jungles to evade capture, organizing them into mountain caves and hidden jungle villages. When the soldiers were not assisting the civilians with survival tasks, Oba and his men continued their battle against the garrison of US Marines. He used the 1,552‑ft Mount Tapochau as their primary base, which offered an unobstructed 360-degree view of the island. From their base camp on the western slope of the mountain, Oba and his men occasionally conducted guerrilla-style raids on American positions. Due to the speed and stealth of these operations, and the Marines’ frustrated attempts to find him, the Saipan Marines eventually referred to Oba as “The Fox.” Oba and his men held out on the island for 512 days, or about 16 months. On November 27, 1945, former Major-General Amo Umahachi was able to draw out some of the Japanese in hiding by singing the anthem of the Japanese infantry branch. Amo was then able to present documents from the defunct IGHQ to Oba ordering him and his 46 remaining men to surrender themselves to the Americans. On December 1, the Japanese soldiers gathered on Tapochau and sang a song of departure to the spirits of the war dead; Oba led his people out of the jungle and they presented themselves to the Marines of the 18th Anti-Aircraft Artillery Company. With great formality and commensurate dignity, Oba surrendered his sword to Lieutenant Colonel Howard G. Kirgis, and his men surrendered their arms and colors. On January 2, 1946, 20 Japanese soldiers hiding in a tunnel at Corregidor Island surrendered after learning the war had ended from a newspaper found while collecting water. In that same month, 120 Japanese were routed after a battle in the mountains 150 miles south of Manila. In April, during a seven-week campaign to clear Lubang Island, 41 more Japanese emerged from the jungle, unaware that the war had ended; however, a group of four Japanese continued to resist.

In early 1947, Lieutenant Yamaguchi Ei and his band of 33 soldiers renewed fighting with the small Marine garrison on Peleliu, prompting reinforcements under Rear-Admiral Charles Pownall to be brought to the island to hunt down the guerrilla group. Along with them came former Rear-Admiral Sumikawa Michio, who ultimately convinced Yamaguchi to surrender in April after almost three years of guerrilla warfare. Also in April, seven Japanese emerged from Palawan Island and fifteen armed stragglers emerged from Luzon. In January 1948, 200 troops surrendered on Mindanao; and on May 12, the Associated Press reported that two unnamed Japanese soldiers had surrendered to civilian policemen in Guam the day before. On January 6, 1949, two former IJN soldiers, machine gunners Matsudo Rikio and Yamakage Kufuku, were discovered on Iwo Jima and surrendered peacefully. In March 1950, Private Akatsu Yūichi surrendered in the village of Looc, leaving only three Japanese still resisting on Lubang.

By 1951 a group of Japanese on Anatahan Island refused to believe that the war was over and resisted every attempt by the Navy to remove them. This group was first discovered in February 1945, when several Chamorros from Saipan were sent to the island to recover the bodies of a Saipan-based B-29. The Chamorros reported that there were about thirty Japanese survivors from three ships sunk in June 1944, one of which was an Okinawan woman. Personal aggravations developed from the close confines of a small group on a small island and from tuba drinking; among the holdouts, 6 of 11 deaths were the result of violence, and one man displayed 13 knife wounds. The presence of only one woman, Higa Kazuko, caused considerable difficulty as she would transfer her affections among at least four men after each of them mysteriously disappeared, purportedly “swallowed by the waves while fishing.” According to the more sensational versions of the Anatahan tale, 11 of the 30 navy sailors stranded on the island died due to violent struggles over her affections. In July 1950, Higa went to the beach when an American vessel appeared offshore and finally asked to be removed from the island. She was taken to Saipan aboard the Miss Susie and, upon arrival, told authorities that the men on the island did not believe the war was over. As the Japanese government showed interest in the situation on Anatahan, the families of the holdouts were contacted in Japan and urged by the Navy to write letters stating that the war was over and that the holdouts should surrender. The letters were dropped by air on June 26 and ultimately convinced the holdouts to give themselves up. Thus, six years after the end of World War II, “Operation Removal” commenced from Saipan under the command of Lt. Commander James B. Johnson, USNR, aboard the Navy Tug USS Cocopa. Johnson and an interpreter went ashore by rubber boat and formally accepted the surrender on the morning of June 30, 1951. The Anatahan femme fatale story later inspired the 1953 Japanese film Anatahan and the 1998 novel Cage on the Sea. In 1953, Murata Susumu, the last holdout on Tinian, was finally captured. The next year, on May 7, Corporal Sumada Shoichi was killed in a clash with Filipino soldiers, leaving only two Japanese still resisting on Lubang. In November 1955, Seaman Kinoshita Noboru was captured in the Luzon jungle but soon after committed suicide rather than “return to Japan in defeat.” That same year, four Japanese airmen surrendered at Hollandia in Dutch New Guinea; and in 1956, nine soldiers were located and sent home from Morotai, while four men surrendered on Mindoro.

In May 1960, Sergeant Ito Masashi became one of the last Japanese to surrender at Guam after the capture of his comrade Private Minagawa Bunzo, but the final surrender at Guam would come later with Sergeant Yokoi Shoichi. Sergeant Yokoi Shoichi survived in the jungles of Guam by living for years in an elaborately dug hole, subsisting on snails and lizards, a fate that, while undignified, showcased his ingenuity and resilience and earned him a warm welcome on his return to Japan. His capture was not heroic in the traditional sense: he was found half-starving by a group of villagers while foraging for shrimp in a stream, and the broader context included his awareness as early as 1952 that the war had ended. He explained that the wartime bushido code, emphasizing self-sacrifice or suicide rather than self-preservation, had left him fearing that repatriation would label him a deserter and likely lead to execution. Emerging from the jungle, Yokoi also became a vocal critic of Japan’s wartime leadership, including Emperor Hirohito, which fits a view of him as a product of, and a prisoner within, his own education, military training, and the censorship and propaganda of the era. When asked by a young nephew how he survived so long on an island just a short distance from a major American airbase, he replied simply, “I was really good at hide and seek.” 

That same year, Private Kozuka Kinshichi was killed in a shootout with Philippine police in October, leaving Lieutenant Onoda Hiroo still resisting on Lubang. Lieutenant Onoda Hiroo had been on Lubang since 1944, a few months before the Americans retook the Philippines. The last instructions he had received from his immediate superior ordered him to retreat to the interior of the island and harass the Allied occupying forces until the IJA eventually returned. Despite efforts by the Philippine Army, letters and newspapers left for him, radio broadcasts, and even a plea from Onoda's brother, he did not believe the war was over. On February 20, 1974, Onoda encountered a young Japanese university dropout named Suzuki Norio, who was traveling the world and had told friends that he planned to “look for Lieutenant Onoda, a panda, and the abominable snowman, in that order.” The two became friends, but Onoda stated that he was waiting for orders from one of his commanders. On March 9, 1974, Onoda went to an agreed-upon place and found a note left by Suzuki. Suzuki had brought along Onoda’s former commander, Major Taniguchi, who delivered the oral orders for Onoda to surrender. Intelligence Officer 2nd Lt. Onoda Hiroo thus emerged from Lubang’s jungle with his .25 caliber rifle, 500 rounds of ammunition, and several hand grenades. He surrendered 29 years after Japan’s formal surrender, and 15 years after being declared legally dead in Japan. When he accepted that the war was over, he wept openly. He received a hero’s welcome upon his return to Japan in 1974. The Japanese government offered him a large sum of money in back pay, which he refused. When money was pressed on him by well-wishers, he donated it to Yasukuni Shrine. Onoda was reportedly unhappy with the attention and what he saw as the withering of traditional Japanese values. He wrote No Surrender: My Thirty-Year War, a best-selling autobiography published in 1974.

Yet the last Japanese to surrender would be Private Nakamura Teruo, an Amis aborigine from Formosa and a member of the Takasago Volunteers. Private Nakamura Teruo spent the tail end of World War II with a dwindling band on Morotai, repeatedly dispersing and reassembling in the jungle as they hunted for food. The group suffered continuous losses to starvation and disease, and survivors described Nakamura as highly self-sufficient. He left to live alone somewhere in the Morotai highlands between 1946 and 1947, rejoined the main group in 1950, and then disappeared again a few years later. Nakamura hinted in print that he fled into the jungle because he feared the other holdouts might murder him. He survives for decades beyond the war, eventually being found by 11 Indonesian soldiers. The emergence of an indigenous Taiwanese soldier among the search party embarrassed Japan as it sought to move past its imperial past. Many Japanese felt Nakamura deserved compensation for decades of loyalty, only to learn that his back pay for three decades of service amounted to 68,000 yen.

Nakamura’s experience of peace was complex. When a journalist asked how he felt about “wasting” three decades of his life on Morotai, he replied that the years had not been wasted; he had been serving his country. Yet the country he returned to was Taiwan, and upon disembarking in Taipei in early January 1975, he learned that his wife had a son he had never met and that she had remarried a decade after his official death. Nakamura eventually lived with a daughter, and his story concluded with a bittersweet note when his wife reconsidered and reconciled with him.

Several Japanese soldiers joined local Communist and insurgent groups after the war to avoid surrender. Notably, in 1956 and 1958, two soldiers returned to Japan after service in China’s People’s Liberation Army. Two others who defected with a larger group to the Malayan Communist Party around 1945 laid down their arms in 1989 and repatriated the next year, becoming among the last to return home. That is all for today, but fear not I will provide a few more goodies over the next few weeks. I will be releasing some of my exclusive podcast episodes from my youtube membership and patreon that are about pacific war subjects. Like I promised the first one will be on why Emperor Hirohito surrendered. Until then if you need your fix you know where to find me: eastern front week by week, fall and rise of china, echoes of war or on my Youtube membership of patreon at www.patreon.com/pacificwarchannel.

Last time we spoke about the Soviet Victory in Asia. After atomic bombings and Japan’s surrender, the Soviets launched a rapid Manchurian invasion, driving toward Harbin, Mukden, Changchun, and Beijing. Shenyang was taken, seeing the capture of the last Emperor of China, Pu Yi. The Soviets continued their advances into Korea with port captures at Gensan and Pyongyang, and occupation of South Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands, ahead of anticipated American intervention. Stalin pushed for speed to avoid US naval landings, coordinating with Chinese forces and leveraging the Sino-Soviet pact while balancing relations with Chiang Kai-shek. As fronts closed, tens of thousands of Japanese POWs were taken, while harsh wartime reprisals, looting, and mass sexual violence against Japanese, Korean, and Chinese civilians were reported. 

This episode is the Surrender of Japan

Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. 

With the Manchurian Campaign over and Japan’s surrender confirmed, we’ve reached the end of the Pacific War and the ushering of a new era. This journey took us 3 years, 8 months, and 27 days and it's been a rollercoaster. We’ve gone over numerous stories of heroism and horror, victory and defeat, trying to peel back a part of WW2 that often gets overshadowed by the war in Europe. Certainly the China War is almost completely ignored by the west, but fortunately for you all, as I end this series we have just entered the China war over at the Fall and Rise of China Podcast. Unlike this series where, to be blunt, I am hamstrung by the week by week format, over there I can tackle the subject as I see fit, full of personal accounts. I implore you if you want to revisit some of that action in China, jump over to the other podcast, I will be continuing it until the end of the Chinese civil war. One could say it will soon be a bit of a sequel to this one. Of course if you love this format and want more, you can check out the brand new Eastern Front week by week podcast, which really does match the horror of the Pacific war. Lastly if you just love hearing my dumb voice, come check out my podcast which also is in video format on the Pacific War Channel on Youtube, the Echoes of War podcast. Me and my co-host Gaurav tackle history from Ancient to Modern, often with guests and we blend the dialogue with maps, photos and clips. But stating all of that, lets get into it, the surrender of Japan.

As we last saw, while the Soviet invasion of Manchuria raged, Emperor Hirohito announced the unconditional surrender of the Japanese Empire on August 15. Public reaction varied, yet most were stunned and bewildered, unable to grasp that Japan had surrendered for the first time in its history. Many wept openly as they listened to the Emperor's solemn message; others directed swift anger at the nation's leaders and the fighting services for failing to avert defeat; and some blamed themselves for falling short in their war effort. Above all, there was a deep sympathy for the Emperor, who had been forced to make such a tragic and painful decision. 

In the wake of the Emperor’s broadcast, war factories across the country dismissed their workers and shut their doors. Newspapers that had been ordered to pause their usual morning editions appeared in the afternoon, each carrying the Imperial Rescript, an unabridged translation of the Potsdam Declaration, and the notes exchanged with the Allied Powers. In Tokyo, crowds of weeping citizens gathered all afternoon in the vast plaza before the Imperial Palace and at the Meiji and Yasukuni Shrines to bow in reverence and prayer. The shock and grief of the moment, coupled with the dark uncertainty about the future, prevented any widespread sense of relief that the fighting had ended. Bombings and bloodshed were over, but defeat seemed likely to bring only continued hardship and privation. Starvation already gripped the land, and the nation faced the looming breakdown of public discipline and order, acts of violence and oppression by occupying forces, and a heavy burden of reparations. Yet despite the grim outlook, the Emperor’s assurance that he would remain to guide the people through the difficult days ahead offered a measure of solace and courage. His appeal for strict compliance with the Imperial will left a lasting impression, and the refrain “Reverent Obedience to the Rescript” became the rallying cry as the nation prepared to endure the consequences of capitulation.

Immediately after the Emperor's broadcast, Prime Minister Suzuki’s cabinet tendered its collective resignation, yet Hirohito commanded them to remain in office until a new cabinet could be formed. Accordingly, Suzuki delivered another broadcast that evening, urging the nation to unite in absolute loyalty to the throne in this grave national crisis, and stressing that the Emperor’s decision to end the war had been taken out of compassion for his subjects and in careful consideration of the circumstances. Thus, the shocked and grief-stricken population understood that this decision represented the Emperor’s actual will rather than a ratified act of the Government, assuring that the nation as a whole would obediently accept the Imperial command. Consequently, most Japanese simply went on with their lives as best they could; yet some military officers, such as General Anami, chose suicide over surrender.

Another key figure who committed seppuku between August 15 and 16 was Vice-Admiral Onishi Takijiro, the father of the kamikaze. Onishi’s suicide note apologized to the roughly 4,000 pilots he had sent to their deaths and urged all surviving young civilians to work toward rebuilding Japan and fostering peace among nations. Additionally, despite being called “the hero of the August 15 incident” for his peacekeeping role in the attempted coup d’état, General Tanaka felt responsible for the damage done to Tokyo and shot himself on August 24. Following the final Imperial conference on 14 August, the Army’s “Big Three”, War Minister Anami, Chief of the Army General Staff Umezu, and Inspectorate-General of Military Training General Kenji Doihara, met at the War Ministry together with Field Marshals Hata and Sugiyama, the senior operational commanders of the homeland’s Army forces. These five men affixed their seals to a joint resolution pledging that the Army would “conduct itself in accordance with the Imperial decision to the last.” The resolution was endorsed immediately afterward by General Masakazu Kawabe, the overall commander of the Army air forces in the homeland. In accordance with this decision, General Anami and General Umezu separately convened meetings of their senior subordinates during the afternoon of the 14th, informing them of the outcome of the final Imperial conference and directing strict obedience to the Emperor’s command. Shortly thereafter, special instructions to the same effect were radioed to all top operational commanders jointly in the names of the War Minister and Chief of Army General Staff. The Army and Navy authorities acted promptly, and their decisive stance proved, for the most part, highly effective. In the Army, where the threat of upheaval was most acute, the final, unequivocal decision of its top leaders to heed the Emperor’s will delivered a crippling blow to the smoldering coup plot by the young officers to block the surrender. The conspirators had based their plans on unified action by the Army as a whole; with that unified stance effectively ruled out, most of the principal plotters reluctantly abandoned the coup d’état scheme on the afternoon of 14 August.

At the same time, the weakened Imperial Japanese Navy took steps to ensure disciplined compliance with the surrender decision. Only Admiral Ugaki chose to challenge this with his final actions. After listening to Japan’s defeat, Admiral Ugaki Kayō’s diary recorded that he had not yet received an official cease-fire order, and that, since he alone was to blame for the failure of Japanese aviators to stop the American advance, he would fly one last mission himself to embody the true spirit of bushido. His subordinates protested, and even after Ugaki had climbed into the back seat of a Yokosuka D4Y4 of the 701st Kokutai dive bomber piloted by Lieutenant Tatsuo Nakatsuru, Warrant Officer Akiyoshi Endo, whose place in the kamikaze roster Ugaki had usurped, also climbed into the same space that the admiral had already occupied. Thus, the aircraft containing Ugaki took off with three men piloted by Nakatsuru, with Endo providing reconnaissance, and Ugaki himself, rather than the two crew members that filled the other ten aircraft. Before boarding his aircraft, Ugaki posed for pictures and removed his rank insignia from his dark green uniform, taking only a ceremonial short sword given to him by Admiral Yamamoto.

Elements of this last flight most likely followed the Ryukyu flyway southwest to the many small islands north of Okinawa, where U.S. forces were still on alert at the potential end of hostilities. Endo served as radioman during the mission, sending Ugaki's final messages, the last of which at 19:24 reported that the plane had begun its dive onto an American vessel. However, U.S. Navy records do not indicate any successful kamikaze attack on that day, and it is likely that all aircraft on the mission with the exception of three that returned due to engine problems crashed into the ocean, struck down by American anti-aircraft fire. Although there are no precise accounts of an intercept made by Navy or Marine fighters or Pacific Fleet surface units against enemy aircraft in this vicinity at the time of surrender. it is likely the aircraft crashed into the ocean or was shot down by American anti-aircraft fire. In any event, the crew of LST-926 reported finding the still-smoldering remains of a cockpit with three bodies on the beach of Iheyajima Island, with Ugaki’s remains allegedly among them.

Meanwhile, we have already covered the Truman–Stalin agreement that Japanese forces north of the 38th parallel would surrender to the Soviets while those to the south would surrender to the Americans, along with the subsequent Soviet occupation of Manchuria, North Korea, South Sakhalin, and the Kurile Islands. Yet even before the first atomic bomb was dropped, and well before the Potsdam Conference, General MacArthur and his staff were planning a peaceful occupation of Japan and the Korean Peninsula. The first edition of this plan, designated “Blacklist,” appeared on July 16 and called for a progressive, orderly occupation in strength of an estimated fourteen major areas in Japan and three to six areas in Korea, so that the Allies could exercise unhampered control over the various phases of administration. These operations would employ 22 divisions and 3 regiments, together with air and naval elements, and would utilize all United States forces immediately available in the Pacific. The plan also provided for the maximum use of existing Japanese political and administrative organizations, since these agencies already exerted effective control over the population and could be employed to good advantage by the Allies. The final edition of “Blacklist,” issued on August 8, was divided into three main phases of occupation. The first phase included the Kanto Plain, the Kobe–Osaka–Kyoto areas, the Nagasaki–Sasebo area in Kyushu, the Keijo district in Korea, and the Aomori–Ominato area of northern Honshu. The second phase covered the Shimonoseki–Fukuoka and Nagoya areas, Sapporo in Hokkaido, and Fusan in Korea. The third phase comprised the Hiroshima–Kure area, Kochi in Shikoku, the Okayama, Tsuruga, and Niigata areas, Sendai in northern Honshu, Otomari in Karafuto, and the Gunzan–Zenshu area in Korea.

Although the Joint Chiefs of Staff initially favored Admiral Nimitz’s “Campus” Plan, which envisioned entry into Japan by Army forces only after an emergency occupation of Tokyo Bay by advanced naval units and the seizure of key positions ashore near each anchorage, MacArthur argued that naval forces were not designed to perform the preliminary occupation of a hostile country whose ground divisions remained intact, and he contended that occupying large land areas was fundamentally an Army mission. He ultimately convinced them that occupation by a weak Allied force might provoke resistance from dissident Japanese elements among the bomb-shattered population and could therefore lead to grave repercussions. The formal directive for the occupation of Japan, Korea, and the China coast was issued by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on August 11. The immediate objectives were to secure the early entry of occupying forces into major strategic areas, to control critical ports, port facilities, and airfields, and to demobilize and disarm enemy troops. First priority went to the prompt occupation of Japan, second to the consolidation of Keijo in Korea, and third to operations on the China coast and in Formosa. MacArthur was to assume responsibility for the forces entering Japan and Korea; General Wedemeyer was assigned operational control of the forces landing on the China coast and was instructed to coordinate his plans with the Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek; and Japanese forces in Southeast Asia were earmarked for surrender to Admiral Mountbatten. With the agreement of the Soviet, Chinese, and British governments, President Truman designated MacArthur as Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers on August 15, thereby granting him final authority for the execution of the terms of surrender and occupation.

In this capacity, MacArthur promptly notified the Emperor and the Japanese Government that he was authorized to arrange for the cessation of hostilities at the earliest practicable date and directed that the Japanese forces terminate hostilities immediately and that he be notified at once of the effective date and hour of such termination. He further directed that Japan send to Manila on August 17 “a competent representative empowered to receive in the name of the Emperor of Japan, the Japanese Imperial Government, and the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters certain requirements for carrying into effect the terms of surrender.” General MacArthur’s stipulations to the Japanese Government included specific instructions regarding the journey of the Japanese representatives to Manila. The emissaries were to leave Sata Misaki, at the southern tip of Kyushu, on the morning of August 17. They were to travel in a Douglas DC-3-type transport plane, painted white and marked with green crosses on the wings and fuselage, and to fly under Allied escort to an airdrome on Lejima in the Ryukyus. From there, the Japanese would be transported to Manila in a United States plane. The code designation chosen for communication between the Japanese plane and US forces was the symbolic word “Bataan.”

Implementation challenges arose almost immediately due to disagreements within Imperial General Headquarters and the Foreign Office over the exact nature of the mission. Some officials interpreted the instructions as requiring the delegates to carry full powers to receive and agree to the actual terms of surrender, effectively making them top representatives of the Government and High Command. Others understood the mission to be strictly preparatory, aimed only at working out technical surrender arrangements and procedures. Late in the afternoon of August 16, a message was sent to MacArthur’s headquarters seeking clarification and more time to organize the mission. MacArthur replied that signing the surrender terms would not be among the tasks of the Japanese representatives dispatched to Manila, assured the Japanese that their proposed measures were satisfactory, and pledged that every precaution would be taken to ensure the safety of the Emperor’s representatives on their mission.

Although preparations were made with all possible speed, on August 16 the Japanese notified that this delegation would be somewhat delayed due to the scarcity of time allowed for its formation. At the same time, MacArthur was notified that Hirohito had issued an order commanding the entire armed forces of his nation to halt their fighting immediately. The wide dispersion and the disrupted communications of the Japanese forces, however, made the rapid and complete implementation of such an order exceedingly difficult, so it was expected that the Imperial order would take approximately two to twelve days to reach forces throughout the Pacific and Asiatic areas. On August 17, the Emperor personally backed up these orders with a special Rescript to the armed services, carefully worded to assuage military aversion to surrender. Suzuki was also replaced on this date, with the former commander of the General Defense Army, General Prince Higashikuni Naruhiko, becoming the new Prime Minister with the initial tasks to hastily form a new cabinet capable of effecting the difficult transition to peace swiftly and without incident.

The Government and Imperial General Headquarters moved quickly to hasten the preparations, but the appointment of the mission’s head was held up pending the installation of the Higashikuni Cabinet. The premier-designate pressed for a rapid formation of the government, and on the afternoon of the 17th the official ceremony of installation took place in the Emperor’s presence. Until General Shimomura could be summoned to Tokyo from the North China Area Army, Prince Higashikuni himself assumed the portfolio of War Minister concurrently with the premiership, Admiral Mitsumasa Yonai remaining in the critical post of Navy Minister, and Prince Ayamaro Konoe, by Marquis Kido’s recommendation, entered the Cabinet as Minister without Portfolio to act as Higashikuni’s closest advisor. The Foreign Minister role went to Mamoru Shigemitsu, who had previously served in the Koiso Cabinet. With the new government installed, Prince Higashikuni broadcast to the nation on the evening of 17 August, declaring that his policies as Premier would conform to the Emperor’s wishes as expressed in the Imperial mandate to form a Cabinet. These policies were to control the armed forces, maintain public order, and surmount the national crisis, with scrupulous respect for the Constitution and the Imperial Rescript terminating the war. The cabinet’s installation removed one delay, and in the afternoon of the same day a message from General MacArthur’s headquarters clarified the mission’s nature and purpose. Based on this clarification, it was promptly decided that Lieutenant General Torashiro Kawabe, Deputy Chief of the Army General Staff, should head a delegation of sixteen members, mainly representing the Army and Navy General Staffs. Kawabe was formally appointed by the Emperor on 18 August. By late afternoon that same day, the data required by the Allied Supreme Commander had largely been assembled, and a message was dispatched to Manila informing General MacArthur’s headquarters that the mission was prepared to depart the following morning. The itinerary received prompt approval from the Supreme Commander. Indeed, the decision to appoint a member of the Imperial Family who had a respectable career in the armed forces was aimed both at appeasing the population and at reassuring the military.

MacArthur appointed General Eichelberger’s 8th Army to initiate the occupation unassisted through September 22, at which point General Krueger’s 6th Army would join the effort. General Hodge’s 24th Corps was assigned to execute Operation Blacklist Forty, the occupation of the Korean Peninsula south of the 38th Parallel. MacArthur’s tentative schedule for the occupation outlined an initial advance party of 150 communications experts and engineers under Colonel Charles Tench, which would land at Atsugi Airfield on August 23. Naval forces under Admiral Halsey’s 3rd Fleet were to enter Tokyo Bay on August 24, followed by MacArthur’s arrival at Atsugi the next day and the start of the main landings of airborne troops and naval and marine forces. The formal surrender instrument was to be signed aboard an American battleship in Tokyo Bay on August 28, with initial troop landings in southern Kyushu planned for August 29–30. By September 4, Hodge’s 24th Corps was to land at Inchon and begin the occupation of South Korea. In the meantime, per MacArthur’s directions, a sixteen-man Japanese delegation headed by Lieutenant-General Kawabe Torashiro, Vice-Chief of the Army General Staff, left Sata Misaki on the morning of August 19; after landing at Iejima, the delegation transferred to an American transport and arrived at Nichols Field at about 18:00. That night, the representatives held their first conference with MacArthur’s staff, led by Lieutenant-General Richard Sutherland.

During the two days of conference, American linguists scanned, translated, and photostated the various reports, maps, and charts the Japanese had brought with them. Negotiations also resulted in permission for the Japanese to supervise the disarmament and demobilization of their own armed forces under Allied supervision, and provided for three extra days of preparation before the first occupying unit landed on the Japanese home islands on August 26. At the close of the conference, Kawabe was handed the documents containing the “Requirements of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers,” which concerned the arrival of the first echelons of Allied forces, the formal surrender ceremony, and the reception of the occupation forces. Also given were a draft Imperial Proclamation by which the Emperor would accept the terms of the Potsdam Declaration and command his subjects to cease hostilities, a copy of General Order No. 1 by which Imperial General Headquarters would direct all military and naval commanders to lay down their arms and surrender their units to designated Allied commanders, and the Instrument of Surrender itself, which would later be signed on board an American battleship in Tokyo Bay. After the Manila Conference ended, the Japanese delegation began its return to Japan at 13:00 on August 20; but due to mechanical problems and a forced landing near Hamamatsu, they did not reach Tokyo until August 21. With the scheduled arrival of the advanced party of the Allied occupation forces only five days away, the Japanese immediately began disarming combat units in the initial-occupation areas and evacuating them from those areas. The basic orders stated that Allied forces would begin occupying the homeland on 26 August and reaffirmed the intention ofImperial General Headquarters "to insure absolute obedience to the Imperial Rescript of 14 August, to prevent the occurrence of trouble with the occupying forces, and thus to demonstrate Japan's sincerity to the world."

The Japanese government announced that all phases of the occupation by Allied troops would be peaceful and urged the public not to panic or resort to violence against the occupying forces. While they sought to reassure the population, they faced die-hard anti-surrender elements within the IJN, with ominous signs of trouble both from Kyushu, where many sea and air special-attack units were poised to meet an invasion, and from Atsugi, the main entry point for Allied airborne troops into the Tokyo Bay area. At Kanoya, Ugaki’s successor, Vice-Admiral Kusaka Ryonosuke, hastened the separation of units from their weapons and the evacuation of naval personnel.

At Atsugi, an even more threatening situation developed in the Navy's 302nd Air Group. Immediately after the announcement of the surrender, extremist elements in the group led by Captain Kozono Yasuna flew over Atsugi and the surrounding area, scattering leaflets urging the continuation of the war on the ground and claiming that the surrender edict was not the Emperor’s true will but the machination of "traitors around the Throne." The extremists, numbering 83 junior officers and noncommissioned officers, did not commit hostile acts but refused to obey orders from their superior commanders. On August 19, Prince Takamatsu, the Emperor’s brother and a navy captain, telephoned Atsugi and personally appealed to Captain Kozono and his followers to obey the Imperial decision. This intervention did not end the incident; on August 21 the extremists seized a number of aircraft and flew them to Army airfields in Saitama Prefecture in hopes of gaining support from Army air units. They failed in this attempt, and it was not until August 25 that all members of the group had surrendered.

As a result of the Atsugi incident, on August 22 the Emperor dispatched Captain Prince Takamatsu Nabuhito and Vice-Admiral Prince Kuni Asaakira to various naval commands on Honshu and Kyushu to reiterate the necessity of strict obedience to the surrender decision. Both princes immediately left Tokyo to carry out this mission, but the situation improved over the next two days, and they were recalled before completing their tours. By this point, a typhoon struck the Kanto region on the night of August 22, causing heavy damage and interrupting communications and transport vital for evacuating troops from the occupation zone. This led to further delays in Japanese preparations for the arrival of occupation forces, and the Americans ultimately agreed to a two-day postponement of the preliminary landings.

On August 27 at 10:30, elements of the 3rd Fleet entered Sagami Bay as the first step in the delayed occupation schedule. At 09:00 on August 28, Tench’s advanced party landed at Atsugi to complete technical arrangements for the arrival of the main forces. Two days later, the main body of the airborne occupation forces began streaming into Atsugi, while naval and marine forces simultaneously landed at Yokosuka on the south shore of Tokyo Bay. There were no signs of resistance, and the initial occupation proceeded successfully. 

Shortly after 1400, a famous C-54  the name “Bataan” in large letters on its nose circled the field and glided in for a landing. General MacArthur stepped from the aircraft, accompanied by General Sutherland and his staff officers. The operation proceeded smoothly. MacArthur paused momentarily to inspect the airfield, then climbed into a waiting automobile for the drive to Yokohama. Thousands of Japanese troops were posted along the fifteen miles of road from Atsugi to Yokohama to guard the route of the Allied motor cavalcade as it proceeded to the temporary SCAP Headquarters in Japan’s great seaport city. The Supreme Commander established his headquarters provisionally in the Yokohama Customs House. The headquarters of the American Eighth Army and the Far East Air Force were also established in Yokohama, and representatives of the United States Pacific Fleet were attached to the Supreme Commander’s headquarters.

The intensive preparation and excitement surrounding the first landings on the Japanese mainland did not interfere with the mission of affording relief and rescue to Allied personnel who were internees or prisoners in Japan. Despite bad weather delaying the occupation operation, units of the Far East Air Forces and planes from the Third Fleet continued their surveillance missions. On 25 August they began dropping relief supplies, food, medicine, and clothing, to Allied soldiers and civilians in prisoner-of-war and internment camps across the main islands. While the advance echelon of the occupation forces was still on Okinawa, “mercy teams” were organized to accompany the first elements of the Eighth Army Headquarters. Immediately after the initial landings, these teams established contact with the Swiss and Swedish Legations, the International Red Cross, the United States Navy, and the Japanese Liaison Office, and rushed to expedite the release and evacuation, where necessary, of thousands of Allied internees.

 On September 1, the Reconnaissance Troop of the 11th Airborne Division conducted a subsidiary airlift operation, flying from Atsugi to occupy Kisarazu Airfield; and on the morning of September 2, the 1st Cavalry Division began landing at Yokohama to secure most of the strategic areas along the shores of Tokyo Bay, with Tokyo itself remaining unoccupied. Concurrently, the surrender ceremony took place aboard Halsey’s flagship, the battleship Missouri, crowded with representatives of the United Nations that had participated in the Pacific War. 

General MacArthur presided over the epoch-making ceremony, and with the following words he inaugurated the proceedings which would ring down the curtain of war in the Pacific “We are gathered here, representatives of the major warring powers, to conclude a solemn agreement whereby peace may be restored. The issues, involving divergent ideals and ideologies, have been determined on the battlefields of the world and hence are not for our discussion or debate. Nor is it for us here to meet, representing as we do a majority of the people of the earth, in a spirit of distrust, malice or hatred. But rather it is for us, both victors and vanquished, to rise to that higher dignity which alone befits the sacred purposes we are about to serve, committing all our peoples unreservedly to faithful compliance with the understandings they are here formally to assume. It is my earnest hope, and indeed the hope of all mankind, that from this solemn occasion a better world shall emerge out of the blood and carnage of the past — a world dedicated to the dignity of man and the fulfillment of his most cherished wish for freedom, tolerance and justice. The terms and conditions upon which surrender of the Japanese Imperial Forces is here to be given and accepted are contained in the instrument of surrender now before you…”. 

The Supreme Commander then invited the two Japanese plenipotentiaries to sign the duplicate surrender documents : Foreign Minister Shigemitsu, on behalf of the Emperor and the Japanese Government, and General Umezu, for the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters. He then called forward two famous former prisoners of the Japanese to stand behind him while he himself affixed his signature to the formal acceptance of the surrender : Gen. Jonathan M. Wainwright, hero of Bataan and Corregidor and Lt. Gen. Sir Arthur E. Percival, who had been forced to yield the British stronghold at Singapore. General MacArthur was followed in turn by Admiral Nimitz, who signed on behalf of the United States.

Alongside the recently liberated Generals Wainwright and Percival, who had been captured during the Japanese conquest of the Philippines and Singapore respectively, MacArthur then signed the surrender documents, followed by Admiral Nimitz and representatives of the other United Nations present. The Instrument of Surrender was completely signed within twenty minutes. Shortly afterwards, MacArthur broadcast the announcement of peace to the world, famously saying, “Today the guns are silent.” Immediately following the signing of the surrender articles, the Imperial Proclamation of capitulation was issued, commanding overseas forces to cease hostilities and lay down their arms; however, it would take many days, and in some cases weeks, for the official word of surrender to be carried along Japan’s badly disrupted communications channels. Various devices were employed by American commanders to transmit news of final defeat to dispersed and isolated enemy troops, such as plane-strewn leaflets, loudspeaker broadcasts, strategically placed signboards, and prisoner-of-war volunteers.

Already, the bypassed Japanese garrison at Mille Atoll had surrendered on August 22; yet the first large-scale surrender of Japanese forces came on August 27, when Lieutenant-General Ishii Yoshio surrendered Morotai and Halmahera to the 93rd Division. On August 30, a British Pacific Fleet force under Rear-Admiral Cecil Harcourt entered Victoria Harbour to begin the liberation of Hong Kong; and the following day, Rear-Admiral Matsubara Masata surrendered Minami-Torishima. In the Marianas, the Japanese commanders on Rota and Pagan Islands relinquished their commands almost simultaneously with the Tokyo Bay ceremony of September 2. Later that day, the same was done by Lieutenant-General Inoue Sadae in the Palaus and by Lieutenant-General Mugikura Shunzaburo and Vice-Admiral Hara Chuichi at Truk in the Carolines. Additionally, as part of Operation Jurist, a British detachment under Vice-Admiral Harold Walker received the surrender of the Japanese garrison on Penang Island.

In the Philippines, local commanders in the central Bukidnon Province, Infanta, the Bataan Peninsula, and the Cagayan Valley had already surrendered by September 2. On September 3, General Yamashita and Vice-Admiral Okawachi Denshichi met with General Wainwright, General Percival, and Lieutenant-General Wilhelm Styer, Commanding General of Army Forces of the Western Pacific, to sign the formal surrender of the Japanese forces in the Philippines. With Yamashita’s capitulation, subordinate commanders throughout the islands began surrendering in increasing numbers, though some stragglers remained unaware of the capitulation. Concurrently, while Yamashita was yielding his Philippine forces, Lieutenant-General Tachibana Yoshio’s 109th Division surrendered in the Bonins on September 3. On September 4, Rear-Admiral Sakaibara Shigematsu and Colonel Chikamori Shigeharu surrendered their garrison on Wake Island, as did the garrison on Aguigan Island in the Marianas. Also on September 4, an advanced party of the 24th Corps landed at Kimpo Airfield near Keijo to prepare the groundwork for the occupation of South Korea; and under Operation Tiderace, Mountbatten’s large British and French naval force arrived off Singapore and accepted the surrender of Japanese forces there. On September 5, Rear-Admiral Masuda Nisuke surrendered his garrison on Jaluit Atoll in the Marshalls, as did the garrison of Yap Island. The overall surrender of Japanese forces in the Solomons and Bismarcks and in the Wewak area of New Guinea was finally signed on September 6 by General Imamura Hitoshi and Vice-Admiral Kusaka Jinichi aboard the aircraft carrier Glory off Rabaul, the former center of Japanese power in the South Pacific. Furthermore, Lieutenant-General Nomi Toshio, representing remaining Japanese naval and army forces in the Ryukyus, officially capitulated on September 7 at the headquarters of General Stilwell’s 10th Army on Okinawa.

The following day, Tokyo was finally occupied by the Americans, and looking south, General Kanda and Vice-Admiral Baron Samejima Tomoshige agreed to travel to General Savige’s headquarters at Torokina to sign the surrender of Bougainville. On September 8, Rear-Admiral Kamada Michiaki’s 22nd Naval Special Base Force at Samarinda surrendered to General Milford’s 7th Australian Division, as did the Japanese garrison on Kosrae Island in the Carolines. On September 9, a wave of surrenders continued: the official capitulation of all Japanese forces in the China Theater occurred at the Central Military Academy in Nanking, with General Okamura surrendering to General He Yingqin, the commander-in-chief of the Republic of China National Revolutionary Army; subsequently, on October 10, 47 divisions from the former Imperial Japanese Army officially surrendered to Chinese military officials and allied representatives at the Forbidden City in Beijing. The broader context of rehabilitation and reconstruction after the protracted war was daunting, with the Nationalists weakened and Chiang Kai-shek’s policies contributing to Mao Zedong’s strengthened position, shaping the early dynamics of the resumption of the Chinese Civil War. Meanwhile, on September 9, Hodge landed the 7th Division at Inchon to begin the occupation of South Korea. In the throne room of the Governor’s Palace at Keijo, soon to be renamed Seoul, the surrender instrument was signed by General Abe Nobuyuki, the Governor-General of Korea; Lieutenant-General Kozuki Yoshio, commander of the 17th Area Army and of the Korean Army; and Vice-Admiral Yamaguchi Gisaburo, commander of the Japanese Naval Forces in Korea.

The sequence continued with the 25th Indian Division landing in Selangor and Negeri Sembilan on Malaya to capture Port Dickson, while Lieutenant-General Teshima Fusataro’s 2nd Army officially surrendered to General Blamey at Morotai, enabling Australian occupation of much of the eastern Dutch East Indies. On September 10, the Japanese garrisons on the Wotje and Maloelap Atolls in the Marshalls surrendered, and Lieutenant-General Baba Masao surrendered all Japanese forces in North Borneo to General Wootten’s 9th Australian Division. After Imamura’s surrender, Major-General Kenneth Eather’s 11th Australian Division landed at Rabaul to begin occupation, and the garrison on Muschu and Kairiru Islands also capitulated. On September 11, General Adachi finally surrendered his 18th Army in the Wewak area, concluding the bloody New Guinea Campaign, while Major-General Yamamura Hyoe’s 71st Independent Mixed Brigade surrendered at Kuching and Lieutenant-General Watanabe Masao’s 52nd Independent Mixed Brigade surrendered on Ponape Island in the Carolines. Additionally, the 20th Indian Division, with French troops, arrived at Saigon as part of Operation Masterdom and accepted the surrender of Lieutenant-General Tsuchihashi Yuitsu, who had already met with Viet Minh envoys and agreed to turn power over to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. 

When the Japanese surrendered to the Allies on 15 August 1945, the Viet Minh immediately launched the insurrection they had prepared for a long time. Across the countryside, “People’s Revolutionary Committees” took over administrative positions, often acting on their own initiative, and in the cities the Japanese stood by as the Vietnamese took control. By the morning of August 19, the Viet Minh had seized Hanoi, rapidly expanding their control over northern Vietnam in the following days. The Nguyen dynasty, with its puppet government led by Tran Trong Kim, collapsed when Emperor Bao Dai abdicated on August 25. By late August, the Viet Minh controlled most of Vietnam. On 2 September, in Hanoi’s Ba Dinh Square, Ho Chi Minh proclaimed the independence of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. As the Viet Minh began extending control across the country, the new government’s attention turned to the arrival of Allied troops and the French attempt to reassert colonial authority, signaling the onset of a new and contentious phase in Vietnam’s struggle. 

French Indochina had been left in chaos by the Japanese occupation. On 11 September British and Indian troops of the 20th Indian Division under Major General Douglas Gracey arrived at Saigon as part of Operation Masterdom. After the Japanese surrender, all French prisoners had been gathered on the outskirts of Saigon and Hanoi, and the sentries disappeared on 18 September; six months of captivity cost an additional 1,500 lives. By 22 September 1945, all prisoners were liberated by Gracey’s men, armed, and dispatched in combat units toward Saigon to conquer it from the Viet Minh, later joined by the French Far East Expeditionary Corps, established to fight the Japanese arriving a few weeks later. Around the same time, General Lu Han’s 200,000 Chinese National Revolutionary Army troops of the 1st Front Army occupied Indochina north of the 16th parallel, with 90,000 arriving by October; the 62nd Army came on 26 September to Nam Dinh and Haiphong, Lang Son and Cao Bang were occupied by the Guangxi 62nd Army Corps, and the Red River region and Lai Cai were occupied by a column from Yunnan. Lu Han occupied the French governor-general’s palace after ejecting the French staff under Sainteny. Consequently, while General Lu Han’s Chinese troops occupied northern Indochina and allowed the Vietnamese Provisional Government to remain in control there, the British and French forces would have to contest control of Saigon.

On September 12, a surrender instrument was signed at the Singapore Municipal Building for all Southern Army forces in Southeast Asia, the Dutch East Indies, and the eastern islands; General Terauchi, then in a hospital in Saigon after a stroke, learned of Burma’s fall and had his deputy commander and leader of the 7th Area Army, Lieutenant-General Itagaki Seishiro, surrender on his behalf to Mountbatten, after which a British military administration was formed to govern the island until March 1946. The Japanese Burma Area Army surrendered the same day as Mountbatten’s ceremony in Singapore, and Indian forces in Malaya reached Kuala Lumpur to liberate the Malay capital, though the British were slow to reestablish control over all of Malaya, with eastern Pahang remaining beyond reach for three more weeks. On September 13, the Japanese garrisons on Nauru and Ocean Islands surrendered to Brigadier John Stevenson, and three days later Major-General Okada Umekichi and Vice-Admiral Fujita Ruitaro formally signed the instrument of surrender at Hong Kong. In the meantime, following the Allied call for surrender, Japan had decided to grant Indonesian independence to complicate Dutch reoccupation: Sukarno and Mohammad Hatta signed Indonesia’s Proclamation of Independence on August 17 and were appointed president and vice-president the next day, with Indonesian youths spreading news across Java via Japanese news and telegraph facilities and Bandung’s news broadcast by radio.

The Dutch, as the former colonial power, viewed the republicans as collaborators with the Japanese and sought to restore their colonial rule due to lingering political and economic interests in the former Dutch East Indies, a stance that helped trigger a four-year war for Indonesian independence. Fighting also erupted in Sumatra and the Celebes, though the 26th Indian Division managed to land at Padang on October 10. On October 21, Lieutenant-General Tanabe Moritake and Vice-Admiral Hirose Sueto surrendered all Japanese forces on Sumatra, yet British control over the country would dwindle in the ensuing civil conflict. Meanwhile, Formosa (Taiwan) was placed under the control of the Kuomintang-led Republic of China by General Order No. 1 and the Instrument of Surrender; Chiang Kai-shek appointed General Chen Yi as Chief Executive of Taiwan Province and commander of the Taiwan Garrison Command on September 1. After several days of preparation, an advance party moved into Taihoku on October 5, with additional personnel arriving from Shanghai and Chongqing between October 5 and 24, and on October 25 General Ando Rikichi signed the surrender document at Taipei City Hall. But that’s the end for this week, and for the Pacific War. 

Boy oh boy, its been a long journey hasn't it? Now before letting you orphans go into the wild, I will remind you, while this podcast has come to an end, I still write and narrate Kings and Generals Eastern Front week by week and the Fall and Rise of China Podcasts. Atop all that I have my own video-podcast Echoes of War, that can be found on Youtube or all podcast platforms. I really hope to continue entertaining you guys, so if you venture over to the other podcasts, comment you came from here! I also have some parting gifts to you all, I have decided to release a few Pacific War related exclusive episodes from my Youtuber Membership / patreon at www.patreon.com/pacificwarchannel. At the time I am writing this, over there I have roughly 32 episodes, one is uploaded every month alongside countless other goodies. Thank you all for being part of this long lasting journey. Kings and Generals literally grabbed me out of the blue when I was but a small silly person doing youtube videos using an old camera, I have barely gotten any better at it. I loved making this series, and I look forward to continuing other series going forward! You know where to find me, if you have any requests going forward the best way to reach me is just comment on my Youtube channel or email me, the email address can be found on my youtube channel. This has been Craig of the Pacific War Channel and narrator of the Pacific war week by week podcast, over and out!

Last time we spoke about the Battle for South Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands. In August 1945, as Japan teetered on the edge of destruction following the atomic bombings, a desperate situation unfolded. The Soviet Union launched a sudden invasion of Manchuria, catching Japanese forces off guard. On August 14, Japan's decision to surrender was made, announced to the world the following day. However, the Kwantung Army resisted fiercely, engaging in frantic evacuations. In South Sakhalin, Japanese defenders clashed with advancing Soviet troops, facing overwhelming odds. By August 18, chaos reigned on the Japanese side, with forces surrendering and civilians in panic. As the Soviets pushed forward, the situation became increasingly dire for Japan. Despite valiant resistance, the imminent defeat became clear. In a moment of critical decision, Emperor Hirohito accepted the surrender terms, officially sealing Japan's fate and marking the end of the Pacific War. However the Soviets had not yet stopped their onslaught. 

This episode is the Soviet Victory in Asia

Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. 

We are drawing near to the real conclusion of this series! Japan has officially surrendered, however the Soviets are not done just yet. East asia is a delicious piece of cake, laid wide open and Stalin intends to take every piece he can grab before the curtain falls. Now as we last left off it was August 18, and General Yamada’s Kwantung Army had surrendered to the Soviet forces led by Marshal Vasilevsky, who were advancing rapidly through Manchuria. Yet, some Japanese units, like those at Kalgan, continued to resist occupation until the month's end. On August 19, following Yamada's announcement that all military operations had ceased, a Soviet delegation arrived at Hsinking. 

A daring operation took place, where a 225-strong detachment from the 6th Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade, part of the 5th Guards Tank Corps, was airlifted to the city’s main airfield. This mission, along with others, was carried out under orders from Marshal Vasilevsky on August 18, following the commander's initial offer of surrender from the Kwantung Army. Vasilevsky’s directive was urgent: “The Japanese resistance is broken, and the challenging road conditions hinder the swift advance of our main forces. We need to deploy specially formed, fast-moving, and well-equipped units to capture Changchun, Mukden, Jilin, and Harbin immediately. These units should remain flexible for future missions, regardless of their distance from the main forces.”The push to accelerate operations came directly from Stalin himself. In Kulichkin's biography of Marshal Vasilevsky, he recounts a pivotal phone call on August 15. Stalin was informed that the Japanese had “lost command and control” and were unable to mount a strong defense, with their forces divided into several fragmented groups. Vasilevsky confidently stated, “Even a miracle cannot save the Japanese from total defeat,” stressing the need to maintain the momentum of the offensive. Stalin’s response was straightforward: “Good. We need to increase the pace. What proposals do you have?” Vasilevsky revealed plans to use airborne assault forces against larger cities like Harbin, Changchun, Jilin, and Mukden, alongside advanced mobile units across all combined arms armies. These units, consisting of tanks and assault guns, were fully equipped with desantniki, ready to engage firmly in the ongoing operations.

The landing at Shenyang revealed a remarkable twist of fate. Waiting at the airfield for evacuation to Japan was none other than the recently abdicated Emperor Puyi of Manchukuo. On August 15, 1945, Puyi tuned in to the radio and listened to Emperor Hirohito's address announcing Japan's surrender. In this historic speech, the Showa Emperor referred to the Americans’ use of a "most unusual and cruel bomb," which had just devastated Hiroshima and Nagasaki. For Puyi, this was the first revelation of the atomic bombings, information that the Japanese had conveniently withheld from him until that moment. The aircraft carrying Major Chelyshev’s force, escorted by fighter planes, landed at 1:15 PM without any opposition and captured him. This small unit's survival hinged on remaining unchallenged, and they successfully secured the airfield. They also freed several Allied personnel held at the nearby Hoten prisoner-of-war camp. As soon as the landing was secured, additional reinforcements were airlifted in later that day, led by General Kravchenko, the commander of the 6th Guards Tank Army. He formally accepted the city's surrender, and the Soviets then transported Puyi to the Siberian town of Chita. 

Meanwhile, Vasilevsky's ground offensive pressed on, mostly unopposed, though some resistance persisted. In the Transbaikal Front, Marshal Malinovsky’s General Pliyev led his cavalry-mechanized units against the Japanese forces at Kalgan. Other units reached Jehol and accepted the surrender of the 108th Division. General Danilov's 17th Army secured the Shanhaiguan coast, while General Managarov’s 53rd Army pushed towards Kailu. The main force of General Kravchenko’s 6th Guards Tank Army regrouped at Tungliao and Kaitung, preparing to advance south toward Mukden. General Lyudnikov’s 39th Army steadily approached Changchun, confronting the bypassed 107th Division, and General Luchinsky’s 36th Army occupied Tsitsihar, accepting the surrender of the 136th Independent Mixed Brigade.

At the same time, on General Purkayev’s 2nd Far Eastern Front, General Teryokhin’s 2nd Red Banner Army continued its siege of the Aihun fortified region. Meanwhile, a forward detachment moved slowly south through the Lesser Khinghan Mountains. General Mamonov’s 15th Army began capturing and processing prisoners from the many retreating Japanese units after a successful amphibious assault secured Sansing. The Amur Flotilla supported the army's push towards Harbin, while General Pashkov’s 5th Rifle Corps finally reached Poli, which had already been occupied by other Soviet units. In Marshal Meretskov’s 1st Far Eastern Front, forward detachments of General Zakhvatayev’s 35th Army began arriving at Linkou, focusing on the surrender of Japanese units in the area. Rear elements effectively eliminated the last traces of enemy resistance in the Hutou fortified area. 

After a challenging struggle through the wetlands and the capture of Mishan on August 12, advanced detachments of the 35th Army’s main force, the 66th and 363rd Rifle Divisions, continued their advance against minimal opposition. The situation was starkly different to their rear, where the 1056th Rifle Regiment of the 264th Rifle Division, supported by the heavily reinforced 109th Fortified Region, worked to dismantle the now-isolated Hutou fortified area. Despite the dire circumstances, the garrison refused to surrender. Thus, the focus shifted to systematically eliminating their defenses, which became a painstaking task. The attackers deployed an artillery destruction group, secured air supremacy, and utilized well-trained assault formations. Their techniques included pouring kerosene or gasoline into ventilation shafts of underground structures, sometimes in alarming quantities. For instance, two tonnes of gasoline were recorded being poured into a single installation before ignition was applied. Despite the brutal and methodical obliteration of their positions, the defenders continued to ignore orders to surrender. Notably, on August 18, a Japanese prisoner was sent under a flag of truce to inform those still holding out that the war was officially over; tragically, he was hacked to death by a sword-wielding officer. Ultimately, this stubbornness led to catastrophic consequences: about 3,000 defenders were killed, blasted and burned, before a small number finally capitulated.

Additionally, advanced detachments of General Beloborodov’s 1st Red Banner Army reached Shangzhi before continuing towards Harbin, and forward elements of General Krylov’s 5th Army pushed on toward Jilin. General Chistyakov’s 25th Army commenced disarming General Murakami’s 3rd Army, while the 10th Mechanized Corps advanced rapidly westward, crossing the Laoilin Mountain passes to arrive at Tunhua by nightfall. Over in North Korea, the 335th Rifle Division successfully landed in Chongjin, as General Kabanov’s Southern Defense Region prepared for an assault on Gensan. In South Sakhalin, despite the surrender of the 125th Regiment and ongoing negotiations with General Mineki’s 88th Division, Soviet forces opted to proceed with the planned landing at Maoka. Consequently, Admiral Andreyev’s Northern Pacific Flotilla departed from Sovetskaya Gavan in the morning, carrying the bulk of the 113th Rifle Brigade along with a battalion of marines for the long and challenging voyage to Maoka.

On Shumshu Island, as General Gnechko’s forces were landing their artillery to renew their assault, Japanese officers unexpectedly approached the Soviets under flags of truce, carrying a letter from General Tsutsumi proposing negotiations for surrender. Representatives from both sides began discussions, and by 6 PM, the 91st Division formally surrendered the garrisons of Shumshu, Paramushir, and Onekotan. On August 20, Gnechko dispatched a small detachment on six vessels to seize control of the airfield at Kataoka. However, as they crossed the Second Kuril Strait, batteries on both sides of the narrow waterway opened heavy fire on the Soviet ships, forcing them to withdraw. This breach of the surrender agreement sparked a renewed offensive at 1 PM, coordinated with air strikes. The bases at Kataoka and Kashiwabar were bombed by 61 aircraft, which dropped over 200 bombs, enabling ground troops to push forward up to six kilometers. It was not until General Tsutsumi intervened that the Soviets were assured the Japanese would indeed lay down their arms. Meanwhile, Andreyev’s convoy arrived at Maoka harbor on the morning of August 20, successfully landing the first wave of marines amid heavy fog. They quickly spread out and secured the area while the second and third waves of infantry followed behind. By noon, the port area was secured, and the marines began advancing eastward into the city, supported by infantry on their flanks. Taken by surprise, the Japanese defenders were ultimately compelled to retreat, with the 113th Rifle Brigade pursuing them through the mountains to the villages of Futamata and Osaka.

In Manchuria, between August 20 and 21, Vasilevsky’s units continued their advance to occupy the region's main centers. Stalin urged for greater speed, fearing that any delay might prompt President Truman to order General MacArthur's air-naval assault forces to land there. Notably, Pliyev’s first column successfully captured Kalgan, while his second column moved south toward Beijing, securing Gubeikou at the border. Located in one of the passes through the Great Wall, marking the border between Manchukuo and China, the town was garrisoned by Japanese units. These forces surrendered upon the approach of the Soviet troops, who then quickly advanced toward Beijing, about 100 kilometers away. Although not the former capital itself, this area was under the control of Chinese Communist forces known as the 8th Route Army, who aligned with the Soviets. Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek was acutely aware that any Japanese capitulation to the Communists in northern China would allow the latter to occupy vital territories, making their removal difficult. Consequently, he commanded the 8th Route Army not to accept any Japanese surrenders, insisting they only surrender to Nationalist forces, with dire punishments threatened for defiance. Adding to the complexity, the Soviet Union and China had signed the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance, discussed at Yalta, just six days earlier on August 14. This treaty promised mutual respect for sovereignty and non-interference in each other's internal affairs. The Soviets had also committed to providing “moral support and aid in military supplies and other material resources” exclusively to the National Government as the legitimate central authority of China. Thus, a significant political and military predicament loomed. However, the Soviets quickly extricated themselves from this situation when Malinovsky issued an order forbidding Pliyev’s forces from crossing the border. As Pliyev recounted, his formations were poised just halfway between Chengde and Beijing, needing “only one 'leap' to the Chinese capital.” He noted, “I had to suspend the offensive and move north beyond the Great Wall.”

Units from the 6th Guards Tank Army occupied both Changchun and Mukden, initiating a rail movement towards Port Arthur and Dairen. For those curious, at Pingfan and Changchun, General Shiro Ishii and the remaining personnel from Units 731 and 100 were captured by Soviet forces. In a tragic turn of events, all test subjects were murdered and cremated, while the Japanese attempted to destroy evidence of their facilities but were unable to do so in time. Following their capture, the Soviets launched an extensive campaign to uncover the secrets behind Units 731 and 100, leading to the Khabarovsk Trial. If you want to learn more about what I would call “japans operation paperclip”, the secret dealings between Unit 731 and the Allies after the war, I did make an episode about it over on my patreon. Its pretty gruesome stuff so big disclaimer there.’ The Soviets arrived to Dairen on 24 August, although these places had surrendered to air-landed forces two days earlier. This was, no doubt, much to the relief of Stalin, as these were amongst the main locations where he most feared American intervention. Indeed, on the day of the landing he had told Vasilevsky to ‘keep in mind’ the fact that any delay could mean ‘Truman will order General MacArthur to land his naval assault forces’.

The long-resisting 135th Independent Mixed Brigade finally surrendered at Aihun, while advanced units of the 2nd Red Banner Army secured Nencheng and Peian before pushing towards Tsitsihar and Harbin. Forward detachments from the 15th and 1st Red Banner Armies also reached the already-occupied Harbin. Furthermore, advanced units of the 5th and 25th Armies arrived in Jilin to reinforce the air-landed detachment there. Additionally, units from the 88th Rifle Corps and the 10th Mechanized Corps began their southward movement into Korea, heading toward the 38th Parallel. In North Korea, Kabanov dispatched a marine battalion and other units, totaling around 2,000 men, to occupy the fortified port of Gensan on August 20. The following morning, the landing force arrived and disembarked without opposition. However, the Japanese garrison refused to surrender until orders from higher command were received. Meanwhile, Japanese troops began to peacefully surround the harbor area, while Soviet sailors and marines, in a similarly calm manner, took up their defensive positions. As Kabanov noted, “An incomprehensible situation arose, neither peace nor war. The enemy has numerical superiority, but he neither fights nor wants to capitulate.” Unsurprisingly, he added, “the night passed in suspense.” The surreal situation was resolved when Rear Admiral Hori Yugoro and Colonel Tado boarded the frigate EK-3 to meet with Captain Studenichnikov on the morning of August 22. During their discussions, they attempted to negotiate terms, but the Soviet captain issued a bold threat of an immediate large-scale air strike and the initiation of hostilities at the port unless they surrendered unconditionally. While the latter was likely an empty threat, the Japanese officers signed the surrender agreement nonetheless. The process of surrendering the garrison began that evening and continued until August 26. In total, the Soviets captured more than 7,000 officers and men, along with all their military equipment.

Looking toward the northern Kuriles, Japanese forces on Shumshu finally began to lay down their weapons on the afternoon of August 22, as Gnechko’s units spread out to secure the island. In Manchuria, airborne detachments were also landed at Dairen and Port Arthur to secure these key administrative centers before the Americans could take control. Vanguard units of the 6th Guards Tank Army arrived to reinforce them two days later. Meanwhile, in South Sakhalin, heavy fighting persisted at Futamata despite Mineki’s ceasefire agreement on August 22. Soviet air strikes supported the ground forces when weather conditions allowed, and the Japanese finally surrendered by the nightfall of August 23. At the same time, Andreyev dispatched three marine battalions on a small convoy to capture Otomari. However, a fierce storm forced the flotilla to seek refuge in the port of Honto on the morning of August 24. Once the storm subsided that evening, the force left a company of marines to garrison the port and resumed their voyage to Otomari, arriving there on the morning of August 25, just as elements of the 113th Rifle Brigade reached the eastern outskirts of the city. By noon, the 88th Division surrendered, and the city was secured. Shortly after, the 214th Tank Brigade arrived at Toyohara to secure South Sakhalin’s administrative center. Thus, the South Sakhalin operation concluded with nearly 18,320 Japanese soldiers taken prisoner.

Yet, this wouldn’t mark the end of operations for General Cheremisov’s 16th Army. Stalin pushed for the 87th and 135th Rifle Brigades, along with three marine battalions, to assemble at Otomari and execute amphibious landings on the southern Kurile Islands, specifically, Etorofu, Shikotan, and Kunashiri, and the islets of the Habomai group. The failure to include the Kuril Islands in the areas designated for surrender to Soviet forces in Truman’s General Order No. 1, originally issued on August 15, exacerbated Stalin’s inherent suspicions regarding American intentions. Consequently, Vasilevsky was instructed to organize landings on the Kurils, ensuring that, similar to Port Arthur, Soviet occupation would manifest physically through boots on the ground. Despite Truman’s subsequent correction of the omission, mistrust endured, as did the directive to occupy the islands. However, where Stalin hesitated was concerning Hokkaido. Truman’s somewhat abrupt rejection of Stalin’s demand for a portion of Hokkaido undoubtedly irritated the Soviet dictator, yet he chose not to take further action. Scholarly debates have arisen around the rationale behind Stalin’s ‘retreat.’ When viewed within the framework of his stated geostrategic goal of securing the Soviet Union’s sea lines of communication in the Pacific, it becomes understandable. Churchill once likened the Soviet Union’s challenges in this regard to those of a “giant with his nostrils pinched.” A look at the map reveals that control of the Kurils would significantly alleviate this pressure in the Far East, making their acquisition crucial. Similarly, occupying southern Sakhalin would allow the Soviet Union to control the northern side of the La Pérouse Strait, which connects the Sea of Japan to the Sea of Okhotsk. The strait's opposite shore is formed by the northern coast of Hokkaido, and possessing this area would undeniably enhance the security of communications and is therefore highly desirable. However, any unilateral action in this regard would incur a significant and public breach with the Americans, the consequences of which could not be easily predicted. Given that Stalin’s claim to the Kurils was firmly based on the agreement reached at Yalta, an agreement which Truman honored, his choice to avoid completely rupturing relations with the U.S. was motivated by strategic self-interest.

Consequently, Andreyev’s flotilla, carrying these units, departed Otomari on August 27, reaching the west coast of Etorofu at 3:15 AM on August 28. The landing, conducted using small boats, went unopposed and was met by the surrender of General Ogawa’s 89th Division. The occupation of the other islands was also peaceful, with the Soviets securing Kunashiri by September 2, and Shikotan and the Habomai islets by September 5. The remaining northern Kurile Islands surrendered without incident as elements of Gnechko’s Kamchatka forces arrived at Paramushir on August 24, Onekotan and Shiashkotan on August 25, Matsuwa by August 26, Shimushiru on August 27, and Uruppu by August 29. In total, 63,840 prisoners were taken throughout the Kuriles. On August 24, air-landed detachments arrived at the cities of Pyongyang and Kange to secure the last administrative centers in North Korea. Two days later, units of the 25th Army reached Gensan. With this move, albeit with some geographical liberties, Chistyakov asserted that "the troops of the 25th Army, on the orders of Marshal Meretskov, reached the 38th Parallel.” In the days that followed, units of General Kushibuchi’s 34th Army gradually began to surrender and disarm.

Finally, in Manchuria, most of Yamada’s units had surrendered and were being disarmed. However, one unit continued to resist until the end of the month. The bypassed and encircled 107th Division was engaged in fierce fighting for survival against the 94th Rifle Corps. Due to a lack of communication with Kwantung Army Headquarters, they did not receive any ceasefire orders. As a result, a staff officer from General Iida’s 30th Army was dispatched by plane to locate the division and deliver the ceasefire orders. The 107th Division was found near Chalai, and the plane made a forced landing between the Japanese troops and the opposing Soviet forces. The staff officer successfully delivered the orders terminating hostilities in that sector on August 30, which the Japanese troops promptly complied with. By September 1, units of the 53rd Army occupied Kailu, Chaoyang, Fuhsin, and Gushanbeitseifu, while forward detachments secured the Chinchou area on the Liaotung Peninsula. This marked the conclusion of the Manchurian campaign, with the Soviets claiming to have captured between 594,000 and 609,000 prisoners of war across Inner Mongolia, Manchuria, and North Korea.

The captured Japanese military personnel were subjected to forced labor in Siberian internment camps, as well as camps in Sakhalin, Manchuria, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Mongolia. A significant number were assigned to the construction of the Baikal-Amur Mainline. Unfortunately, the treatment of prisoners of war was deemed inhumane and mishandled. Many suffered from malnutrition, overwork, cave-ins, floods, unsanitary working conditions leading to epidemics, harsh winter weather, violent guards, and brutal suppression of even mild resistance. Disturbingly, some Japanese prisoners were even lynched by their fellow captives. Estimates suggest that between 60,000 and 347,000 Japanese died in captivity. Although 18,616 prisoners were released in 1946, the process of repatriating prisoners of war extended into the 1950s. Those who remained after 1950 were detained for various convictions. However, their release began in 1953 under different amnesties. Following Josef Stalin's death and the subsequent Khrushchev Thaw, the Soviet attitude toward the remaining Japanese prisoners shifted significantly. Accompanied by Soviet officials, they were taken on tours of cities and allowed to purchase gifts for their families. Before repatriation, a banquet in Khabarovsk, hosted by Nikolai Gagen, included high-ranking prisoners such as Jun Ushiroku as attendees. The last major group of 1,025 Japanese POWs was released on December 23, 1956. After that, some Japanese POWs were released in small groups, with some only returning in the 1990s following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Interestingly, some prisoners who had been held for decades, many of whom had married and started families during their captivity, chose not to return permanently to Japan.

The Soviets committed numerous war crimes during their invasion and occupation of Manchuria and other Japanese territories. During the invasion, Soviet soldiers killed and raped Japanese civilians and looted civilian property. Following the Soviet invasion of Manchuria on August 9, 1945, a large number of Japanese citizens residing in the region sought to repatriate to Japan. The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers supervised this mass movement and, in October 1945, delegated responsibility to Japan’s Ministry of Health and Welfare. The Kwantung Army, which was meant to protect the Japanese settlers in Manchuria, quickly retreated and abandoned them. With most able-bodied men drafted into the army, the majority of those left behind were women, children, and the elderly, rendering them highly vulnerable to attacks from Soviet soldiers and local Chinese seeking revenge.In Soviet-occupied Manchuria and North Korea, the repatriation of Japanese civilians was characterized by violent expulsions, accompanied by widespread looting, mass killings, and rampant sexual violence perpetrated by both Soviet soldiers and local populations seeking retribution. Many Japanese civilians succumbed to starvation, disease, mass killings, and mass suicides. Approximately 223,000 Japanese civilians residing in the Soviet-occupied zones died, most within a year and a half after August 9, 1945. Regarding the extensive rape of Japanese women and girls by Soviet soldiers, a former Japanese soldier, Wakatsuki Yoshio, detailed these grim experiences in his memoir, The Records of Postwar Repatriation “What word can possibly describe the violence committed by the Soviet soldiers on Japanese women? I can only think of the word “hideous”. The victim could be a girl of twelve or thirteen years old or an old lady of almost seventy years old. These soldiers did not choose the sites where they raped them, in public, in broad daylight, even on snow-covered roads”.

The Soviet invasion of Manchuria in 1945 left many Japanese women stranded after their male family members were either conscripted or killed. These women, including young girls, endured severe hardships, facing gang rapes by Soviet soldiers and local Chinese militia groups. In a desperate effort to survive, many were forced to marry Chinese men, either out of necessity or in exchange for assistance in repatriating their remaining family members. Disturbingly, some victims were as young as thirteen. Some women were held in groups and subjected to repeated sexual violence over extended periods. In certain instances, to ensure the safety of the group, members of the Japanese community offered women to their perpetrators. There were also reports of women voluntarily submitting themselves to protect their families, younger peers, or others in their communities. After Japan’s defeat in 1945, leaders of the Kurokawa Settler Group in Manchuria offered approximately 15 young women, aged 17 to 21, to Soviet soldiers in exchange for protection. This tragic practice continued from September to November 1945, with some of the women later being offered to Chinese soldiers as well.

With no protection from Japanese soldiers, Japanese women often had to devise unique strategies to avoid rape. Memoirs from female repatriates detail various escape tactics. Some women hid in attics every night, narrowly avoiding capture or even gunfire. Others managed to trap intruders in rooms before fleeing or bribed Soviet soldiers with valuables, such as wristwatches, to secure their escape. Notably, some women, particularly former geisha and bar workers, voluntarily went with Soviet soldiers to protect others. These women were referred to as tokkōtai (kamikaze) for their self-sacrifice. Additionally, it wasn't just Japanese women who suffered; Korean and Chinese women were also victims of sexual violence at the hands of various perpetrators in Manchuria. British and American reports indicate that Soviet Red Army troops looted and terrorized the local population in Shenyang, a city in Manchuria. A foreign witness described how Soviet troops, formerly stationed in Berlin, were permitted by the Soviet military to enter Shenyang for "three days of rape and pillage." In Harbin, Soviet forces ignored protests from leaders of the Chinese Communist Party regarding the widespread mass rape and looting committed by their troops. In the immediate aftermath of the war in 1945, in areas of Manchuria occupied by the National Revolutionary Army, 176 Koreans were killed, 1,866 were injured, 3,468 were detained, and 320 were raped by armed Chinese mobs. The attacks against Korean residents in Manchuria were believed to stem from a perception of Korean collaboration with Japanese colonial rule.

One of the most infamous instances was the Gegenmiao massacre. On August 10 and 11, Xing'an was bombed, nearly destroying its urban functions. It is estimated that 3,000 of the 4,000 civilians. Anticipating the Soviet invasion, Xing'an had prepared an evacuation plan divided into three groups based on residential area and workplace. The Kwantung Army, however, failed to inform the General Office officials about their retreat. As a result, residents in the eastern area, many of whom were self-employed or office workers, had difficulty obtaining information and securing transportation, while those in the western area had military personnel who were first to learn of the situation. Some of the civilians with a handful of armed men had proceeded on foot towards Gegenmiao Township, about 35 kilometers southeast of Xing'an Street, to wait for a train at Gegenmiao Station and then evacuate to Baichengzi. They aimed to receive protection from the Kwantung Army in Baichengzi.

Around 11:40 AM on August 14 in the vicinity of Gegenmyo Hill, where a Lamaist temple was located, they encountered an infantry unit consisting of 14 Soviet medium tanks and 20 trucks. The column reportedly stretched for two kilometers, with about a hundred survivors among them. Soviet troops launched an attack from the hilltop, deploying tanks with machine-gun fire. The tanks attacked multiple times, and when they ceased, Soviet soldiers disembarked and ruthlessly shot and bayoneted survivors. Many who escaped death from gunfire were still severely injured or witnessed family members being killed. Some were left holding their loved ones or chose to commit suicide. It is estimated that only about a hundred survivors were later confirmed, including nearly 200 schoolchildren from the Xing'an Street Zaiman National School.

Kwantung Army units, which were supposed to escort the civilians and counterattack, had already retreated southward. Even after the Soviet soldiers left, sporadic gunfire continued, presumably due to suicides. Local residents began to plunder the bodies, stripping them of clothes and valuables. Others drowned in the river while attempting to escape. Reports tell of one woman who had her child killed by Soviet soldiers, only to later face an attack from Chinese militia, who stripped her of her clothes and mutilated her. Surviving mothers and children were also attacked, and those separated were often taken by the Chinese. At the time, it was common for Japanese boys to be sold for 300 yen and girls for 500 yen. Some survivors gathered together and began committing mass suicide, killing those who wished to end their lives. Others expressed intentions to form a death squad with rifles for revenge but ultimately did not resist.

After the war ended on August 15, attacks on displaced persons continued. A 12-year-old girl who joined a group of about ten women after the incident reported that they were attacked and robbed, taking over a week to reach Zhenxi Station, 10 kilometers from Gegenmiao Station. The women sought shelter in an abandoned house near the station but were discovered by Soviet soldiers that night who assaulted them until midnight. Afterward, the soldiers piled dry grass into the house, setting it ablaze in an attempt to burn the women alive. The girl and her sister managed to escape through a window, but many others could not flee in time due to the fire's rapid spread. The girl was forced to live as a residual orphan afterward. Fortunately, some Chinese, Mongolians, and Koreans provided food for the survivors, with some Chinese showing kindness towards the children. Those orphaned children, whose parents had been killed, became known as residual orphans, with about 30 in this unfortunate situation. Many women were forced to become residual women as well. Tragically, around 200 students from a local school, including the headmaster and his wife, were killed during this chaos.

Some historians believe the attack stemmed from Soviet soldiers mistaking the refugees for armed Japanese troops because men within the group were carrying firearms for protection. In general, displaced persons at this time often carried small weapons like rifles, and some groups were even armed with light machine guns. In the pioneer groups, women sometimes participated in fighting against bandits, and in the Sado pioneer group incident, children above the fifth grade were forced into combat, regardless of gender. There may also have been prior skirmishes with other Japanese civilian groups before the war's end, further complicating the situation as the Soviet Army, which included female soldiers, may have regarded these mixed civilian and armed groups as a threat. According to Soviet military combat records, on August 14, the Soviet 17th Guards Rifle Division, 19th Guards Rifle Division, 91st Guards Rifle Division, and 61st Tank Division were stationed northwest of Gezhne Temple, but there was no combat activity in the area. On August 15, this unit advanced toward Bai Chengzi and occupied Bai Chengzi Station, which was then taken over by tanks from the 61st Tank Division. Despite extensive documentation, nothing about this incident was revealed until 2014 during the process of perestroika.

Reports from British and American sources indicate that the 700,000 Soviet troops occupying Manchuria also terrorized and looted the local population in Mukden. They were not deterred by Soviet authorities and engaged in what was described as "three days of rape and pillage," with similar atrocities occurring in Harbin and across the country. Amid the mass repatriation of Japanese civilians living in the region, Japanese women in Manchuria faced repeated sexual violence at the hands of Russian soldiers every day. In North Korea, it was similarly reported that Soviet soldiers raped both Japanese and Korean women. Additionally, Soviet soldiers looted the property of Japanese, Chinese, and Koreans residing in Manchuria and North Korea.

I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me.

Amid chaotic surrenders, Emperor Hirohito accepted defeat, but Soviet advances continued relentlessly. As they pushed deeper, the Soviets captured key cities, including Harbin, while Japan’s soldiers and civilians struggled for survival against the onslaught. War crimes committed by Soviet troops added to the tragedy, with rampant violence against Japanese civilians. Amidst political tensions, the Soviets secured territory, culminating in the surrender of remaining Japanese forces. The grim conclusion of this campaign marked a profound shift in the power dynamics of East Asia and paved the way for post-war ramifications.

Last time we spoke about the Soviet invasion of Manchuria. Following the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki amidst relentless Allied aerial campaigns, chaos engulfed Japan. Prime Minister Suzuki's cabinet debated surrendering to avoid annihilation while fearing for the imperial family's future. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union launched an unexpected invasion of Manchuria, rapidly advancing and catching Japanese forces off guard. As negotiations unfolded, a group of military conspirators, led by Major Hatanaka, attempted a coup to halt the surrender, believing they could rally support. They seized the Imperial Palace but failed to find the Emperor's recorded surrender speech amid the chaos. In a decisive moment, Emperor Hirohito accepted the Potsdam Declaration, stipulating the emperor's continuation, thus sealing Japan's fate. That same day, the world learned of Japan's capitulation, marking the end of the Pacific War. The once powerful nation now lay in ruins, yet the Emperor’s decision bore the weight of a nation saved from further destruction, embodying a fragile hope for the future amidst the horrors of war.

This episode is the Battle for South Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands

Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. 

As we previously discussed, the Japanese Empire made the difficult decision to surrender on August 14, amid the turmoil of the Soviet invasion of Manchuria and South Sakhalin. The following day, this decision was announced to the world. However, in Manchuria, General Yamada’s Kwantung Army chose to continue fighting until they received a clear ceasefire order. At this moment, several developments unfolded. General Hongo’s 44th Army was on a forced retreat toward the Hsinking-Mukden line under General Ushiroku's command, leaving their 107th Division trapped behind Soviet lines. Meanwhile, General Iida’s 30th Army was redeploying to Hsinking, which was starting to be evacuated, while General Uemura’s 4th Army had orders to withdraw to Meihokou, taking over positions left by the 30th Army. 

The advance of enemy armored columns in the west was severely hindering the evacuation of Japanese nationals. On the 10th, the Kwantung Army requested the Manchukuoan Government to facilitate the evacuation of Japanese residents in Hainking and its surroundings. They directed the Continental Railway Command to prepare ten trains for this purpose, with the first train scheduled to depart from Hsinking that same day. However, the Manchukuoan Government found it nearly impossible to carry out the withdrawal swiftly. They managed to transport only the families of officers and civilians linked to the army, and these families had to flee with just a few hours’ notice, taking almost nothing but the clothes on their backs. By the 12th, Hsinking was in a state of chaos. The advance of enemy armored units, coupled with the retreat of the main force of the 44th Army, led to the evacuation of the capital by the Kwantung Army General Headquarters. This turmoil coincided with the arrival of the first refugee trains, carrying Japanese evacuees from the western border areas, causing widespread panic among local residents. Many hurried to the already overcrowded train station, desperate to escape the unfolding crisis.

In the face of enemy pressure, the 80th Independent Mixed Brigade and the 119th Division continued to resist assaults at Hailar and Pokotu, respectively. The 123rd Division and the 135th Independent Mixed Brigade were heavily engaged in the fortified regions of Sunwu and Aihun, and the 136th Independent Mixed Brigade was directed to reinforce Tsitsihar, while the 134th Division retreated to Fangcheng. General Shimizu’s 5th Army prepared for a last stand at Mutanchiang, while the isolated 124th Division made plans to withdraw. The 132nd Independent Mixed Brigade had already retreated to Tachienchang, and the 128th Division was getting ready to confront the enemy advance at Lotzokou, with General Murakami’s 3rd Army holding strong in the Tumen fortified region. Meanwhile, the Nanam Divisional District Unit successfully repelled an amphibious invasion in Chongjin, and the 88th Division’s 125th Regiment staunchly defended Furuton on South Sakhalin. In a desperate bid to avoid further disaster, Yamada finally instructed Ushiroku to adhere to their original plan and prepare for a withdrawal to the Hunjen area, even if it meant leaving Japanese citizens and their cities vulnerable to the approaching Soviets. Ushiroku hesitantly agreed to the order but never got the chance to act on it.

On August 15, Marshal Vasilevsky’s offensive advanced much like the previous days, facing an enemy that continued to resist fiercely. To counter this, orders came to intensify the assault to gain control of key operational and strategic points as quickly as possible. In Marshal Malinovsky’s Transbaikal Front, General Pliyev’s cavalry-mechanized units encountered heavy opposition from the Inner Mongolian 3rd, 5th, and 7th Cavalry Divisions at Kanbao. Meanwhile, General Danilov’s 17th Army pressed toward Chihfeng but was hindered by water shortages, intense heat, and challenging sandy terrain. General Managarov’s 53rd Army began its advance toward Kailu, while General Kravchenko’s 6th Guards Tank Army continued its march along two fronts. The 7th Guards Mechanized Corps moved east toward Changchun, while both the 9th Guards Mechanized Corps and the 5th Guards Tank Corps advanced southeast toward Mukden. Notably, General Lyudnikov’s 39th Army finally captured Tepossi and Wangyemiao. 

Heavy Japanese resistance persisted in the sector of the 36th Army, notably in the Hailar Fortified Region and along the road and rail line through the Grand Khingan Mountains leading to Pokotu. The Japanese 119th Infantry Division put up a determined defense of Pokotu, successfully delaying the Soviet forces of the 2nd Rifle Corps from August 15 to 17, despite heavy rainfall. Meanwhile, in the rear of the 36th Army, the fighting in Hailar remained intense. The 86th Rifle Corps employed heavy artillery to systematically dismantle enemy strongholds in the hills to the northwest and southwest of the city. Position after position fell to relentless artillery bombardments, combined with sapper and infantry assaults. Ultimately, the Soviets extinguished the last vestiges of Japanese resistance in Hailar on August 18 when the remaining garrison of 3,827 men surrendered. Concurrently, in Marshal Meretskov’s 1st Far Eastern Front, forward detachments of General Zakhvatayev’s 35th Army secured Poli. General Beloborodov’s 1st Red Banner Army broke through the frontline of the 135th Division and initiated an assault on the last Japanese positions just outside Yehho. Meanwhile, General Krylov’s 5th Army, having successfully breached the Ssutaoling heights the previous evening, launched attacks against the 126th Division’s positions at Aiho but was ultimately repelled by the defenders. In light of these developments, Generals Kita and Shimizu decided to order a withdrawal toward Hengtaohotzu, which they executed successfully after sunset, leaving behind some units to cover the retreat.

Further south, General Chistyakov’s 25th Army split into two columns at Heitosai. The 17th Rifle Corps and the 72nd Mechanized Brigade advanced west toward the Taipingling Pass, while the 39th Rifle Corps, along with the 72nd and 257th Tank Brigades, headed southwest toward Wangching. The 17th Rifle Corps effectively breached the main defenses of the Japanese 128th Division, forcing it to retreat to second-line positions southwest of Taipingling. On the morning of August 15, enemy air activity against Army Headquarters intensified significantly. Meanwhile, the Army Commander and several staff officers set out via Pataohotzu to inspect the defenses in the Hoeryong area, where the 101st Regiment was retreating from the Chonghak sector. At noon, while at the headquarters of the 127th Division in Pataohotzu, General Murakami and his accompanying staff listened to the Emperor's broadcast announcing the termination of the war. Opinions among the officers were divided regarding the veracity of this broadcast. After a brief discussion, they decided to continue military operations as per existing instructions until they received a formal cessation order. Later that night, a formal order arrived from First Area Army Headquarters, directing that all active resistance be halted, though self-defense measures were still to be implemented if necessary. Around the same time, a report came in from the 1st Mobile Brigade indicating that their positions in the Wangching area, about 25 miles northeast of Army Headquarters at Yenchi, were under attack by a sizable Soviet tank force. In response, a counterattack force was hastily assembled, consisting of two infantry battalions from the 127th Division. They were directed to advance to Wangching along the Yenchi-Chiulungping road to confront the enemy tanks. These battalions likely included the 3rd Battalion of the 280th Regiment and the 3rd Battalion of the 281st Regiment.

Additionally, the 88th Rifle Corps took control of Hunchun and crossed the Inanho River, where they encountered well-entrenched Japanese forces from the 112th Division. To further pressure the enemy, the 258th Rifle Division crossed the Tumen River at Hunyong to attack the Japanese right flank. In General Purkayev’s 2nd Far Eastern Front, General Mamonov’s 15th Army continued its two-pronged advance toward Chiamussu, while General Pashkov’s 5th Rifle Corps pushed forward to Poli. Meanwhile, General Teryokhin’s 2nd Red Banner Army assigned some elements to maintain the siege of Sunwu and Aihun while forward detachments bypassed these fortified regions, moving south toward Nencheng and Peian. In South Sakhalin, General Cheremisov’s 16th Army faced fierce resistance from Japanese forces at Furuton. Admiral Andreyev’s Northern Pacific Flotilla prepared for an amphibious landing at Toro, while the Pacific Fleet, under Admiral Yumashev, successfully landed Major-General Vasily Trushin’s 13th Naval Infantry Brigade at Chongjin in the early hours of August 15. This effort aimed to relieve the besieged Soviet naval units and gradually push back against the defending Japanese forces.

On August 16, the entire Soviet force, commanded by Lieutenant-General Sergey Kabanov, secured Chongjin city and its port after overcoming strong resistance, just as the 393rd Rifle Division was arriving in the area. Simultaneously, Andreyev’s fleet departed from Sovetskaya Gavan and approached Toro in the early hours of the day. At 05:17, 141 marines from the initial reconnaissance detachment successfully landed ashore quietly, and by 06:00, they had taken the port with virtually no opposition. The reconnaissance group then advanced about three kilometers east, where they encountered heavy resistance; meanwhile, the rest of the marine battalion landed successfully by 10:00. After securing Shakhtyorsk at midday, the Soviet marines began their push south toward Esutoru, their main objective, while a supporting infantry battalion landed behind them. To the north, the 56th Rifle Corps managed to break through and capture Furuton, though it failed to seize the strategically significant Happo Mountain. In Manchuria, the 88th Rifle Corps continued its attacks on the 112th and 79th Divisions but was unsuccessful. The 39th Rifle Corps column advanced toward Tumen and Yenchi, while the 17th Rifle Corps column effectively expelled Japanese forces from the Taipingling area to secure the pass. By evening, units from the 1st Red Banner Army cleared Mutanchiang, and the 5th Army units moved south of the city to continue their southwest advance toward Ningan. The 15th Army executed a coordinated amphibious assault, successfully capturing Chiamussu. The 39th Army advanced along the railroad from Wangyemiao to Changchun, with its main force ultimately securing Taonan by the end of the day, while other units reduced the Halung-Arshaan fortified region. Finally, forward detachments of the 5th Guards Tank Corps and the 9th Guards Mechanized Corps secured Tungliao and Kaitung, respectively.

On August 17, Prince Takeda Tsuneyoshi, on behalf of the Emperor, arrived at Hsinking to deliver the official ceasefire order. However, this did not cancel ongoing operational missions, as the order stipulated that the cessation of hostilities did not apply to unavoidable acts of self-defense during enemy attacks made before the completion of armistice negotiations. Tokyo’s orders demonstrated that Yamada was authorized to conduct on-the-spot negotiations for an armistice with the Soviets. Consequently, the Manchurian Campaign continued amidst the negotiations. Pliyev’s Soviet-Mongolian units successfully defeated the Inner Mongolians at Kanbao; the 17th Army overcame light opposition from the 108th Division to occupy Chihfeng; the 39th Army concentrated its forces at Taonan while the 94th Rifle Corps mopped up rear areas; and the 36th Army defeated the 119th Division to capture Pokotu. Simultaneously, the 2nd Red Banner Army directed heavy artillery and air strikes to reduce the Aihun and Sunwu Fortified Regions, while the 15th Army initiated a push south along the Sungari River toward Sansing. The 363rd Rifle Division passed through Chihsi, with the 66th Rifle Division focusing on Poli. Units from the 1st Red Banner Army advanced northwest toward Harbin, and the 72nd Rifle Corps marched southward along the east bank of the Mutan River, attempting unsuccessfully to cross the river north of Ningan. The 17th Rifle Corps pursued the 128th Division, and forward elements of the 10th Mechanized Corps moved sixty kilometers from the Taipingling Pass to secure the critical rail and road junction at Tahsingkou. Additionally, the reinforced 72nd Tank Brigade intercepted the counterattacking force of the 127th Division at Nianyantsun. The 39th Rifle Corps broke through the northern defenses of the 79th Division to seize the outskirts of Tumen, while the 88th Rifle Corps successfully pushed aside enemy defenders at Mayusan to occupy Onsang. At South Sakhalin, as the marine force surrounded Esutoru, the 22nd Independent Machinegun Company was deployed to support the marine assault, which quickly penetrated the urban area and secured the city by midday. Meanwhile, fighting continued around Mount Happo, where the 214th Tank Brigade was dispatched south toward the ultimate objective of Toyohara. However, given the distance involved, it was decided to conduct a second amphibious assault on the port of Maoka. On August 18, Yamada finally issued the ceasefire orders to the 1st, 3rd, and 17th Area Armies, as well as to the 4th Army and the 2nd Air Army. His chief of staff, Lieutenant-General Hata Hikosaburo, met with Marshal Vasilevsky in Harbin to discuss procedures for disarmament, the protection of Japanese nationals in Manchuria, and related matters. Meanwhile, the Kwantung Army Headquarters made extensive efforts to relay as much information as possible about the termination of hostilities and disarmament to its subordinate commands using all available communication methods. However, these efforts were hindered by the wide dispersal of forces, many of which initially refused to surrender. General Higuchi’s 5th Area Army received the ceasefire orders on August 17. Although he quickly notified his units—particularly those in Sakhalin and the Kuriles, war continued in these islands for a short period as he sought to prevent a potential invasion of Hokkaido. In Sakhalin, Major Yoshio Suzuki, the Chief of Staff of the 88th Division, received Higuchi's combat order on the afternoon of August 16, preparations for ceasefire were already underway, such as the disbandment of mobilized units, the discharge of some troops, and the disposal of the regimental flag. The division had no tanks or aircraft, and certainly no anti-tank or anti-aircraft weapons that could withstand Soviet forces. In light of this, Suzuki quickly ordered the re-arming of units and the occupation of positions, in accordance with the desire of Mineki and Higuchi to prevent the fall of South Sakhalin and a possible invasion of Hokkaido. Civilians, at this point, were already voicing complaints, wondering if the military was still going to continue fighting. After the surrender of the 125th Infantry Regiment, the Japanese command in the Northern District was effectively assumed by the staff of the 88th Division stationed at Kamishikika. During the fighting on the central military road, by the morning of August 17, evacuation of the civilian population from Kamishikika had been completed, and the town was burned to the ground by Japanese forces' scorched earth tactics, along with an air raid by 20 Soviet aircraft. Kamishikika was abandoned on August 20, marking the start of a full retreat. The construction of a defensive line involving the destruction of the Uro Bridge and the Chidori River Bridge was considered but ultimately abandoned due to the presence of evacuees. Meanwhile, in the Kuriles, a new operation was unfolding.

According to Vasilevsky’s orders, once operations against Manchuria and South Sakhalin were sufficiently advanced, a small force from the Kamchatka Defense Region, supported by naval units from the Petropavlovsk Naval Base, was to conduct amphibious assaults on the Kuril Islands in preparation for a future landing at the port of Rumoi on Hokkaido’s west coast On August 15, President Truman and Soviet Premier Stalin agreed that Japanese forces north of the 38th Parallel would surrender to the Soviets, while those to the south would surrender to the Americans. Stalin’s agreement surprised the US, as there was little chance of American forces landing on the Korean peninsula at that time. In what many scholars interpret as an attempt to achieve reciprocal generosity from Truman, Stalin proposed amending the order to include the northern half of Hokkaido and all of the Kuril Islands in the region of surrender to Soviet forces. This northern portion, he stated, should be demarcated by a line drawn ‘from the town of Kushiro on the eastern coast . . . to the town of Rumoe (Rumoi) on the western coast . . .’, with both towns included in the occupation area However, Truman only acquiesced concerning the Kuriles, honoring the pact reached at Yalta, while specifying that all the islands of mainland Japan were to surrender to General MacArthur. Nonetheless, concerned by the exclusion of the Kuriles from the original agreement, Stalin instructed Vasilevsky to organize landings to occupy the islands. This mission was assigned to Purkayev’s 2nd Far Eastern Front and Yumashev’s Pacific Fleet, which, in turn, designated Major-General Aleksei Gnechko’s Kamchatka Defense Region and Captain Dmitri Ponomarev’s Petropavlovsk Naval Base to execute the first landings on Shumshu and Paramushir, followed by a subsequent amphibious assault on Onekotan.

These inexperienced commanders had limited time to plan for their operations, assemble the necessary commercial vessels for transportation, and hurriedly gather the army units dispersed across Kamchatka. Ultimately, the primary unit chosen for the landings was Major-General Porfiry Dyakov’s 101st Rifle Division, supplemented by a battalion of marines. Meanwhile, Ponomarev managed to gather an invasion flotilla of 64 vessels. Although the Soviets had air superiority, it was unreliable due to the peculiar climatic conditions. “There were very peculiar climatic conditions in the Far East and Sakhalin; almost every airfield had its own special microclimate. In the coastal zone, frequent outbursts of moist sea air, forming a curtain of thick fog, caused a lot of trouble.”.

The limited firepower of Ponomarev’s flotilla forced the Soviets to land on the northeast corner of Shumshu, which could be targeted by the coastal guns at Cape Lopatka. Additionally, Gnechko planned a diversionary landing on the southeast side of the island. Opposing the Soviets, Higuchi had Lieutenant-General Tsutsumi Fusaki’s 91st Division garrisoning the northern islands of Shumshu and Paramushir, the 41st Independent Mixed Regiment on Matsuwa Island, the 129th Independent Mixed Brigade on Uruppu Island, and Lieutenant-General Ogawa Gonosuke’s 89th Division stationed on the southern islands of Etorofu, Shikotan, and Kunashiri. 

Shumshu is the northernmost island in the Kuril chain, separated from Cape Lopatka, the southernmost tip of the Kamchatka Peninsula, by the 11-kilometer-wide First Kuril Strait. Covering an area of approximately 388 square kilometers and roughly oval in shape , Shumshu’s proximity to Soviet territory, similar to its larger neighbor to the south, Paramushir, ensured that it was strongly defended. The garrison on Shumshu comprised about 8,500 troops, whereas the larger island boasted a garrison of approximately 14,500. The strait between the two islands narrows to about 2.5 kilometers at its smallest point, thus allowing these garrisons to provide mutual support. As Slavinsky notes: “Shumshu and Paramushir, with their naval bases located opposite each other on both sides of the Second Kuril Strait, were, in essence, a single key position.” The capture of Shumshu was crucial to the success of subsequent island operations. While there were several airfields on these islands, they housed very few aircraft, which had been withdrawn earlier to the Japanese main islands in preparation for the anticipated “final battle” with the Americans. However, Shumshu was defended by a tank force from the 11th Tank Regiment, commanded by Colonel Sueo Ikeda. This force consisted of thirty-nine medium tanks, including nineteen Type-97 Chi-Ha tanks and twenty Type-97 ShinHoTo Chi-Ha (improved Type-97) tanks, alongside twenty-five Type-95 Ha-Go light tanks.

Both Shumshu and Paramushir were equipped with permanent defensive works along the coast and inland. On Shumshu, these defenses included 34 bunkers and 24 pillboxes within several powerful strongpoints, featuring around 100 guns of varying calibers, some reaching up to 100mm. Approximately 300 prepared firing points were established for both heavy and light machine guns. Most of Shumshu’s coast is bordered by cliffs, leading to a concentration of the strongest defenses in areas deemed vulnerable to amphibious assault. Notably, a battery was installed in the wreck of the Soviet tanker Mariupol, which had become stranded on the beach between Cape Kokutan and Cape Kotomari in 1943. Although the island is relatively flat, it possesses several hills with sides that are nearly bare of trees, and these heights also housed additional strongpoints. Shumshu features 120 kilometers of roads, which facilitated terrestrial communication between various points. Additionally, the garrison constructed numerous dummy installations to mislead reconnaissance efforts.

Nevertheless, Ponomarev’s flotilla departed from Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky at approximately 05:00 on August 17, moving slowly and stealthily toward their objective in foggy conditions. This weather ultimately forced Gnechko to cancel the planned diversionary landing. In any event, the first landing craft approached the beach at 04:22 hours on 18 August still hidden in the murk, but were forced to halt some 100–150m from shore in water up to 2m deep; they had been overloaded which prevented them getting closer in. The troops of the advanced detachment (two companies of marines, a maritime border guard company, and a submachine gun company) had then to wade, heavily burdened, to dry land. This went on undisturbed until personnel on one of the landing craft opened fire; this, spreading to the other ships, alerted the defenders, who replied with ‘promiscuous’ machine-gun fire. Nevertheless, by 05:00 hours, and having suffered only ‘insignificant’ losses, the advanced detachment was ashore and its main force, under Major Pyotr Shutov, was moving off the beach into the interior of the island. Two groups of marines moved left and right to deal with enemy positions on the capes flanking the landing ground. They managed to destroy several firing points, but were too few to overcome the stronger resistance nests protecting the gun positions. A series of hills inland formed the initial objective of the advance.

Behind them, Dyatlov’s first wave faced heavy bombardment from Japanese artillery, suffering significant casualties as the troops struggled to scramble ashore by 09:00. The second wave experienced a similar fate but managed to disembark by 13:00, joining the first wave in advancing on the high ground to the southwest. This second wave successfully repelled a series of Japanese tank counterattacks, resulting in the loss of Colonel Sueo. Despite being pushed back somewhat, the Soviets held their position while their aircraft targeted the naval bases on the island's southern side, aiming to hinder reinforcements from Paramushir. By nightfall, Gnechko’s forces had secured a beachhead approximately 4 kilometers wide and 5 kilometers deep, while assault groups successfully destroyed Japanese artillery positions on Cape Kokutan and Cape Kotomari. Meanwhile, Kabanov’s new Southern Defense Region command was ordered to quickly land naval units at Odaejin and Gensan to prevent the Japanese from evacuating their forces from Korea to the Home Islands. Consequently, a small naval force from the 13th Naval Infantry Brigade departed from Chongjin, successfully landing unopposed at Odaejin at 08:00 on August 18. Elsewhere in eastern Manchuria, the 25th Army consolidated its hold on northeastern Korea, dispatching the 10th Mechanized Corps west toward Tunhua and Kirin and northwest toward Tungchingcheng amidst the surrender of Murakami’s 3rd Army. The 72nd Rifle Corps successfully crossed the Mutan River north of Ningan, while units from the 1st Red Banner Army and the 5th Army were deployed to receive and process surrendering Japanese units of Shimizu’s 5th Army. To the north, the 2nd Red Banner Army maintained pressure on the Aihun and Sunwu Fortified Regions, leading to the surrender of the 123rd Division, although the 135th Independent Mixed Brigade continued to resist at Aihun.

Be that as it may, the Japanese artillery positioned at Cape Kokutan and Cape Kotomari wreaked havoc on the second echelon, which was comprised of the 373rd Rifle Regiment. During this engagement, a patrol boat and four landing craft were lost, while eight others sustained serious damage. Once again, Soviet troops were forced to improvise ways to reach dry land; however, this time, the echelon's commander, Colonel P.A. Artyushen, along with his headquarters, managed to land via a torpedo boat. It took until 13:00 hours to fully disembark the second echelon, by which point its forward units had linked up with those forces advancing on the high ground to the southwest. By then, Artyushen had assumed command of all the forces ashore. While the number of troops was considerable, they still lacked heavy weapons, with only four 45mm anti-tank guns having been landed.

Unsurprisingly, the Japanese counterattacked as soon as possible, with the advanced forward units under Shutov bearing the brunt of the assault. In a reversal of the combat situations previously encountered throughout the war with Japan, Soviet infantry now found themselves facing several tank attacks from the Japanese. One of these assaults was personally led by Colonel Sueo Ikeda, the commander of the 11th Tank Regiment, who was reported to be waving a samurai sword and Japanese flag from the turret, according to some accounts. Fortunately for the Soviets, these Japanese tanks were relatively weak compared to the T-34. While they posed a threat to unsupported infantry, they proved vulnerable to Degtyarev PTRD-41 anti-tank rifles and RPG-43 anti-tank grenades. The tank-led attacks were ultimately repelled, with Colonel Sueo perishing in the fighting. Despite being pushed back somewhat, the Soviets managed to withstand the onslaught. For his heroism during this challenging combat situation, in which he was wounded three times, Shutov was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, along with the Order of Lenin and the Golden Star medal.

Despite being somewhat pushed back, the Soviets held their ground while their aircraft targeted the naval bases on the southern side of the island to hinder reinforcements from Paramushir. The weather cleared sufficiently in the late morning, allowing Soviet air strikes to commence that afternoon. These strikes involved groups of eight to sixteen aircraft and were primarily directed at the Kataoka and Kashiwabar naval bases, successfully preventing the transfer of Japanese reinforcements from Paramushir. However, the sky remained cloudy enough to hinder any close battlefield support. As Zakharov et al. described it, the situation on the ground “remained tense.” The thinning fog later allowed seven Japanese aircraft to appear at 10:30 hours, attempting to strike at the shipping gathered off the landing beach. Their first strike targeted the Kirov, but it was unsuccessful, and the attackers were driven off by anti-aircraft fire. A second attempt at 12:00 hours focused on the minesweeper T-525, which also failed, resulting in two of the attacking aircraft being shot down by gunfire. 

By nightfall on 18 August, it was evident that the Soviet landing had succeeded to the point where the forces would not be driven back into the sea. The invasion force had established a beachhead approximately 4 kilometers wide and 5 kilometers deep, and they were capable of defending this position against any immediate Japanese counterattacks, despite most of their artillery still being stuck offshore. Gnechko, stationed at Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky, ordered that enough artillery be transported ashore overnight to resume the offensive, with the goal of occupying the island by the end of 19 August. He also dispatched several self-propelled barges and kungas (shallow-draft boats used for fishing or transport) to assist with the unloading, although these vessels could not arrive until the following morning. To eliminate further artillery attacks on shipping, assault groups were formed to attack and destroy the Japanese strongpoints on Cape Kokutan and Cape Kotomari during the hours of darkness.

Shortly after midnight on 17 August, a second order regarding the cessation of hostilities was received from the First Area Army, directing that all fighting be stopped. At daybreak, General Murakami dispatched his intelligence chief, Lt. Col. Fujimoto, to Chiulungping to inform the Soviet tank battalion commander of the end of hostilities. Simultaneously, he ordered all divisions under his command to cease all combat operations. At approximately 16:00 hours, the Soviet tank battalion commander arrived at the Army Officers Club in Yenchi, where he conferred with Major General Hanjiro Iketani, the Army Chief of Staff. The following day, General Iketani traveled to Wangching to conduct armistice negotiations.

The 72nd Rifle Corps finally crossed the Mutan River north of Ningan, while units from the 1st Red Banner Army and the 5th Army were deployed to receive and process the surrendering Japanese units of Shimizu’s 5th Army. Since the Army began its withdrawal, communications with Area Army Headquarters in Tunhua had been completely disrupted. On the morning of the 17th, a member of the Manchurian Telegraph and Telephone Company's Harbin office sent a message via railway telephone concerning disarmament, stating that he had been asked by the First Area Army Headquarters to relay the information. The Army Commander and his staff, however, suspected it might be another ruse from the enemy's fifth column. They agreed to exercise caution in addressing the matter and decided to send Staff Officer Maeda to Area Army Headquarters in Tunhua by railway gasoline engine car to verify the truth. Colonel Maeda proceeded to the railway station, and while preparing to depart, he received a railway telephone call from Staff Officer Tsumori at Area Army Headquarters regarding the cease-fire order. Subsequently, around 14:00 hours, the Army convened a meeting with representatives from each unit to announce the cease-fire orders. That evening, Soviet forces began entering Hengtaohotzu and immediately started disarming Japanese forces. 

Looking west, the bulk of the 36th Army advanced southward and seized the railroad station at Chalantun amid the surrender of the 119th Division. The 86th Rifle Corps, after several days of intense artillery bombardment, finally extinguished the last remnants of Japanese resistance at Hailar, forcing the 80th Independent Mixed Brigade to surrender. Meanwhile, the 39th Army forces prepared for transport to Changchun and then on to the Liaotung Peninsula. The 17th Army moved toward the coast, capturing Pingchuan and Linguan before reaching the coastline at Shanhaiguan, directly across from the Liaotung Peninsula. Additionally, Pliyev’s Soviet-Mongolian forces approached the outskirts of Kalgan, where they encountered a small contingent of the China Expeditionary Army. Indeed, with the surrender of the Kwantung Army, the war was coming to an end. However, several independent units, including the one mentioned, would continue to resist into the last days of August, thereby prolonging the Pacific War by another week.

I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me.

In August 1945, amidst Japan's turmoil, the Soviet Union surprisingly invaded Manchuria. As chaos ensued, Japanese forces in South Sakhalin faced robust Soviet resistance. Ultimately, Japan's surrender shattered its imperial power, marking a historic end to the Pacific War, leaving a nation in ruins yet igniting a fragile hope for the future beyond the horrors of conflict.

Last time we spoke about the atomic bombing of Nagasaki. In the summer of 1945, Japan faced its most devastating siege, characterized by an aerial campaign called "Starvation" that crippled its industrial capabilities. As resources dwindled and chaos reigned, the Allies intensified their firebombing efforts, targeting major cities. By July, Japan was on the brink of collapse, culminating in the atomic bombing of Hiroshima, where over 140,000 lives were altered or lost in a blinding flash. As the nation reeled from the destruction, the Japanese leadership was torn between surrender and continuing the fight. They faced not just the threat of American bombs, but also a Soviet invasion looming on the horizon. Days after Hiroshima, the atomic bomb "Fat Man" was dropped on Nagasaki on August 9, resulting in catastrophic casualties and extensive industrial losses. This attack further devastated an already weakened Japan, leaving the Emperor and his government grappling with the dire consequences.

This episode is the Invasion of Manchuria

Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. 

August 9 stands as a catastrophic day in Japanese history. On this day, the nation faced the devastating impact of a second atomic bomb dropped on Nagasaki, along with the relentless Soviet invasion of Manchuria. Admiral Ivan Yumashev’s Pacific Fleet moved to disrupt Japan's maritime communications in the Sea of Japan and provide support for offensive operations. At the same time, Soviet air forces targeted cities across Northeast Asia, striking both Manchuria and North Korea, as well as Japanese convoys in the Sea of Japan. General Twinning led a diversionary B-29 raid on Amagasaki, followed by a significant attack involving 108 aircraft on the rail yards at Marifu. In addition, Admiral Halsey’s 3rd Fleet launched more strikes against airfields in northern Honshu and Hokkaido, where U.S. intelligence suspected a large Japanese air fleet and commando force was preparing for a desperate mission to Okinawa. Japanese paratroopers were gearing up for a new mission, codenamed Ken-go, but this time their target wasn’t Okinawa. Similar to the earlier May 24 Raid on Yontan Airfield, Lieutenant General Sugawara Michio's Giretsu Kuteitai, also known as the “Heroic Paratroopers,” set their sights on the B-29 complex in the Mariana Islands for nighttime suicide raids. This operation marked the second planned assault on bases within the Mariana Islands, specifically aimed at destroying B-29 bombers. The plan involved deploying 60 transport aircraft to deliver 900 commandos during the nights of August 19 to 23. Around 300 personnel from Lieutenant Commander Daiji Yamaoka’s 1st Kure Special Naval Landing Force initiated preparations at the end of June. Originally established for submarine-delivered raids on U.S.-held islands, these forces were now adapted to be flown in 30 Mitsubishi G4M 'Betty' twin-engine bombers, which had the necessary range for an unrefueled, one-way trip to the Marianas. The raid was initially scheduled for July 24. However, ten days earlier, U.S. carrier-based warplanes had attacked Misawa naval air base on Honshu Island, damaging or destroying many of the operation's bombers. Consequently, the raid was postponed to August 19, with the addition of 30 transport planes and 300 paratroopers from the army’s 1st Raiding Regiment. Ultimately, however, on August 15, Japan surrendered, and Operation Ken-go was cancelled.

Meanwhile, Admiral Shafroth's Bombardment Group unleashed heavy damage on the Kamaishi steel mill. The day after, to assist the Soviets, Halsey ordered additional airstrikes on northern Japanese airfields, causing extensive destruction. However, these were not isolated incidents; they were part of a sustained air-sea siege that had been intensifying for several months. The Allied blockade of Japan had severely impacted food imports, and industrial activity had nearly ground to a halt due to the ongoing blockade and bombings. By this point, six of Japan's ten largest cities had been completely destroyed, and over sixty smaller cities had been reduced to ashes from relentless incendiary raids. This scenario was a powerful manifestation of War Plan Orange in action. More critically, with the reality of Hiroshima's destruction echoing loudly, the Japanese government now grappled with the impending threat of complete annihilation, a grim reality they had never faced before in this war. Though they had recognized their defeat with the loss of Saipan and the initial Yawata raid, the stubborn resolve of the Japanese leadership had pushed them to prolong the conflict for an agonizing 14 months, clinging to the hope of a different outcome.

Many now believed that peace was the only path to survival for the Japanese nation. As the crisis intensified, Prime Minister Suzuki and his cabinet engaged in heated discussions. He sought to persuade War Minister General Anami Korechika and Chief of the Army General Staff General Umezu Yoshijiro to accept the Potsdam Declaration on August 9. However, Suzuki and the militants could only agree that if there were any surrender, then it should ensure that the "national polity" or imperial family would continue in any postwar settlement. Anami and Umezu pushed for further, more favourable conditions. First, Japan would demobilize and disarm any IJA or IJN forces overseas. Second, Japanese courts would prosecute any war criminals. Third, after surrender the Allies would not occupy Japan. Chief of the Navy General Staff, Admiral Toyoda Soemu, agreed with Anami and Umezu.

To break this deadlock, it became necessary to involve the Emperor directly. Around 2:00 AM on August 10, the cabinet convened with Emperor Hirohito, who ultimately agreed to accept the Potsdam Declaration and ordered an end to all military efforts, initiating the surrender process. Faced with no viable alternatives, all present reached a unanimous agreement. That morning, the Japanese government, through Swedish and Swiss intermediaries, sent an offer to accept the Potsdam Declaration, stipulating one condition: there would be no change to Japan's government structure, with Hirohito retaining his title as Emperor and sovereign ruler. Months afte the war Hirohito said this about his decision to surrender “The main motive behind my decision at that time was that if we . . . did not act, the Japanese race would perish and I would be unable to protect my loyal subjects [sekishi—literally, “children”]. Second, Kido agreed with me on the matter of defending the kokutai. If the enemy landed near Ise Bay, both Ise and Atsuta Shrines would immediately come under their control. There would be no time to transfer the sacred treasures [regalia] of the imperial family and no hope of protecting them. Under these circumstances, protection of the kokutai would be difficult. For these reasons, I thought at the time that I must make peace even at the sacrifice of myself.”

Simultaneously, a new military campaign was underway, and several units of General Yamada’s Kwantung Army were unexpectedly caught off-guard in Manchuria. In response, he implemented emergency measures and ordered commands to proceed with their plans for delaying operations. Upon learning of the Soviet declaration of war and the subsequent invasion led by Marshal Vasilevsky’s Far East Command, Tokyo decided to place General Kozuki’s 17th Area Army under the Kwantung Army. Furthermore, they instructed General Okamura Yasuji’s China Expeditionary Army to transfer one army headquarters, along with six divisions and six brigades, to support this effort.

As directed by Tokyo, the primary objective of the Kwantung Army was to defend Japanese territory in Korea. However, by the end of the first day of conflict, several border observation units had been completely destroyed while attempting to defend their positions. In the east, Lieutenant General Shimizu Noritsune’s 5th Army, supported by the reinforced 128th Division, was confronting the main assault by Marshal Meretskov’s 1st Far Eastern Front. To the south, Lieutenant General Murakami Keisaku’s 3rd Army was engaged in defending against multiple penetrations along the border. In the northern sector, the 134th Division at Chiamussu was withdrawing towards Fangcheng, as planned, while flames engulfed Japanese houses in the city. General Uemura’s 4th Army was preparing to face what they expected to be the main assault from General Purkayev’s 2nd Far Eastern Front. Meanwhile, the 119th Division had already departed Hailar for Wunoerh, leaving only the 80th Independent Mixed Brigade behind. To the west, Lieutenant General Hongo Yoshio’s 44th Army was confronting the formidable armored spearhead of Marshal Malinovsky’s Transbaikal Front. Southwest of their position, the 108th Division was redeploying to the Chinhsien area. On August 10, the offensive led by Vasilevsky continued, as Colonel General Ivan Managarov’s 53rd Army began crossing the border behind the now distant 6th Guards Tank Army. Recognizing that the 44th Army was not prepared to engage the overwhelming enemy armor in guerrilla warfare across the expansive terrain of western Manchuria, General Ushiroku made the independent decision to order Hongo to retreat to the Dairen-Hsinking line. This was where Lieutenant General Iida Shojiro’s 30th Army was already establishing defensive positions. This decision contradicted Yamada’s main strategy, which called for delaying the enemy advance at the borders.  Faced with what they deemed an illegal order, the Kwantung Army Headquarters convened an urgent staff conference. During this meeting, several opinions emerged: a sudden shift from established plans would likely create confusion; any attempt to counterattack after a withdrawal would likely fail if the enemy advanced quickly; and abandoning forward airfields prematurely would enable the enemy to advance unimpeded. To most participants, General Ushiroku’s decision seemed to deliver a potentially fatal blow to the overall operational direction of the Kwantung Army Headquarters. However, since the 44th Army had already begun its withdrawal as ordered by General Ushiroku, Kwantung Army Headquarters was left with a fait accompli. Thus, they felt compelled to uphold the decision of the Third Area Army Commander, which was subsequently approved by General Yamada.

Meanwhile, General Pliyev’s cavalry-mechanized units advanced rapidly toward Kalgan and Dolonnor, reaching the foothills of the Grand Khingan Mountains. General Danilov’s 17th Army also continued to encounter weak resistance, covering an additional 40 kilometers. General Lyudnikov’s 39th Army bypassed the encircled 107th Division in the Halung-Arshaan and Wuchakou Fortified Regions. Here, the 5th Guards Rifle Corps moved toward Solun and Tepossi, while the 113th Rifle Corps advanced southeast toward Wangyemiao. The 94th Rifle Corps had to divert southward to support the 124th Rifle Division. In the east, General Luchinsky’s 36th Army launched ongoing attacks against Hailar, with the 2nd Rifle Corps bypassing it to the east. Meanwhile, General Kravchenko’s 6th Guards Tank Army reorganized its right-wing column and began crossing the Grand Khingan Mountains during the night, with both columns entering the central Manchurian plain by August 11. To the east, Meretskov continued his offensive. The 17th, 65th, and 72nd Rifle Corps of General Krylov’s 5th Army advanced swiftly west and south, ultimately securing Machiacho, Laotsaiying, Suiyang, and Suifenho. This maneuver widened the zone of penetration to 75 kilometers and forced the 126th and 135th Divisions to withdraw their main forces to Yehho. In support, General Beloborodov’s 1st Red Banner Army to the north broke through into open terrain, pushing rapidly westward to occupy parts of the cities of Pamientung and Lishuchen, along with their vital bridges across the Muleng River. Further south, General Chistyakov’s 25th Army captured Tungning and successfully reduced its fortified region. Units in that area also secured Tumentzu, Hunchun, and Wuchiatzu. Lastly, General Zakhvatayev’s 35th Army continued its operations far to the north. The 264th Rifle Division and the 109th Fortified Region seized Hutou and initiated a movement west along the railroad toward Hulin, while the 363rd and 66th Rifle Divisions pressed on with their advance northwestward.

In northern Manchuria, General Purkayev continued his main assault, with General Mamonov’s 15th Army reconnoitering key enemy strongholds south of the Amur River. After successfully crossing the river, the 34th Rifle Division and the 203rd Tank Brigade occupied Lopei and advanced through Fenghsiang to bypass the Hsingshanchen Fortified Region, leaving a force behind to reduce it. Meanwhile, the 361st Rifle Division captured Tungchiang, and the 388th Rifle Division secured Chienchingkou, preparing for an advance toward Fuchin. In support of these operations, General Pashkov’s 5th Rifle Corps cleared Japanese forces from the Jaoho Fortified Region, while General Teryokhin’s 2nd Red Banner Army was preparing to launch its offensive the following morning. On August 11, forward units landed at Heiho, Aihun, and Holomoching under the cover of artillery fire, quickly establishing a beachhead as additional forces crossed the Amur. However, due to a lack of crossing equipment, it took five days to transport all units across the river. Consequently, Teryokhin had to commit his forces piecemeal against the 123rd Division and the 135th Independent Mixed Brigade. This was not the only new offensive operation initiated by Purkayev on this day. A new target had emerged: South Sakhalin, known as Karafuto to the Japanese. As per Vasilevsky’s plans, Major-General Leonty Cheremisov’s 16th Army was deployed on North Sakhalin and along the mainland coast of the Tatar Strait, stretching from Sovetskaya Gavan to Nikolaevsk-on-Amur. If the invasion of Manchuria continued to progress favorably, this force was set to attack the Japanese-controlled portion of the island alongside the Northern Pacific Flotilla, commanded by Vice-Admiral Vladimir Andreyev, which was prepared to conduct amphibious operations against Esutoru and Maoka on the island's west coast.

Opposing the Soviet forces, General Higuchi of the 5th Area Army positioned Lieutenant General Mineki Toichiro’s 88th Division in the southern part of South Sakhalin, with only the 125th Regiment stationed to the north. Sakhalin shared many characteristics with several of the Manchukuoan border areas, presenting challenging terrain for mechanized warfare. The only viable invasion route south from the border at the 50th Parallel followed the Poronay River, located more or less in the center of the island. This river flows southward, flanked to the east and west by forested mountain ranges, as well as countless swamps and bogs. Both sides recognized the strategic importance of this potential invasion route and constructed extensive fortification networks. The Japanese fortifications were collectively known as the Koton, or Haramitog, fortified region. These defenses were built in three interlinked layers, with their western flanks anchored in the mountain range and eastern flanks in the wooded, swampy river valley. The permanent defenses spanned approximately 12 kilometers in frontage and extended up to 30 kilometers in depth, containing over 350 bunkers, pillboxes, artillery positions, and similar fortifications. These were protected by an elaborate network of infantry trenches, anti-tank ditches, minefields, and barbed wire. The heavy forest and brush made it challenging to locate these defenses. While enough vegetation had been cleared to allow for effective defensive fire, sufficient cover remained to obscure them from an attacking force. Consequently, the 16th Army would confront these formidable defenses without the advantage of surprise.

At daybreak on August 9, reports emerged that the Soviet Army had unexpectedly invaded Manchuria from multiple directions. By 8:00 AM, telegraph lines were cut near Handa, a village located at the center of the Russo-Japanese border in Sakhalin. An excellent military road connected Handa to Kamishikuks, a region known as the Central Military Road area. At the same time, reports indicated that enemy forces were attacking the observation posts in this area. On August 10,  observation posts were forced to withdraw as the Soviet Army gradually advanced toward our main position in the Happo Mountains, situated about 10 kilometers south of the border. That evening, it was reported that the 125th Infantry had engaged in a skirmish, during which the Isunisawa Platoon, fighting near the Handa River bridge for over five hours, was wiped out. On that same day, the commander of the Fifth Area Army declared that not only had the Army engaged Soviet forces, but civilians in the area, including office workers and laborers, had also joined the battle in a desperate attempt to halt the advancing Soviet Army. By August 13, the National Volunteer Combat Teams were summoned. The recruitment of these volunteer combat teams from the general populace was unique to the Sakhalin campaign, aimed at creating the appearance of military readiness to deter the Soviet advance.

Additionally, the 125th Regiment executed demolitions while retreating to establish stronger defensive positions on the western flank of Happo Mountain, northwest of Furuton. Given the unexpectedly favorable developments in Manchuria, the invasion of South Sakhalin was authorized on August 10. General Yumashev further directed Vice-Admiral Andreyev’s naval forces to commence attacks on both South Sakhalin and the Kuriles. Major General Georgii Dziuba’s air forces joined the effort, conducting reconnaissance flights over key Japanese ports that revealed Toro and Esutoru were almost entirely unprotected. In the early hours of August 11, the 56th Rifle Corps crossed the border and began its main advance along the central military road but encountered resistance at Handa, where around 100 defenders held them up for an entire day. Back in northern Manchuria, the 5th Rifle Corps embarked on a challenging march southwest toward Paoching, while Mamonov launched a bombing raid followed by an attack on Fuchin, which ultimately fell after a coordinated tank-infantry assault. Concurrently, the 4th Army headquarters and the bulk of the 149th Division received orders to retreat from Tsitsihar to Harbin. To the south, the 112th Fortified Region and the 6th Field Fortified Region crossed the Muleng River south of Mishan during the night. In the following days, they collaborated with units from the 35th Army to secure the Mishan Fortified Region.

More importantly, the 26th and 59th Rifle Corps successfully secured Pamientung and Lishuchen, initiating a pursuit of withdrawing Japanese forces to the west and southwest. On August 11, the 5th Army advance continued, with reinforced forward detachments of the 65th and 72nd Rifle Corps reaching the Muleng River and preparing for an advance on Mutanchiang. At this juncture, Meretskov reassessed the situation and determined that his best opportunity for successful exploitation in the front zone lay within the 25th Army area. Consequently, he attached the 17th and 88th Rifle Corps to this command and placed the 10th Mechanized Corps in army reserve. This allowed the 17th and 39th Rifle Corps to commence a coordinated advance toward Wangching, Tumen, Tunhua, and Kirin. Looking west, Pliyev’s units continued to encounter minimal resistance. The 17th Army was finally nearing the western foothills of the Grand Khingan Mountains. The lead brigade of the 5th Guards Tank Corps reached Lupei, while the 7th Guards Mechanized Corps completed its crossing of the Grand Khingan Mountains. The 39th Army maintained its holding operations against the Halung-Arshaan and Wuchakou Fortified Regions, coupled with main advances toward Solun and Wangyemiao. The 2nd Rifle Corps and the 205th Tank Brigade advanced along the railroad to Yakoshih. The 94th Rifle Division, supported by air and artillery, launched an assault and captured the southwestern portion of Hailar city before being reinforced by the entire 86th Rifle Corps. Meanwhile, the Soviet operational group on the right flank of the 36th Army broke through Japanese resistance at Manchouli, moving eastward along the rail line to join the Soviet forces besieging Hailar.

As the Soviet armored units in the west made an unexpectedly swift advance, they were anticipated to reach Hsinking by August 15. On this same day, Yamada decided to relocate his headquarters to Tunghua. Additionally, during the night, a small naval force successfully conducted an assault landing at Yuki in North Korea, securing the port unopposed on August 12. Simultaneously, the 393rd Rifle Division pushed south into North Korea, quickly reaching Yuki before continuing toward Rashin. There, another small naval force landed on August 12, facing minimal resistance except for artillery fire. Meanwhile, the 25th Army advanced up to 40 kilometers in its main march southwest, prompting the commitment of the 10th Mechanized Corps to exploit further toward Wangching and beyond. The 5th Army had to eliminate a strong enemy position east of Taimakou before it could resume its advance to Mutanchiang. The 1st Red Banner Army pressed forward relentlessly, with the 26th Rifle Corps successfully bypassing Tzuhsingtun to advance on Hsientung, cutting the Linkou-Mutanchiang railroad line. The 363rd Rifle Division occupied Mishan while the 264th Rifle Division secured Hulin. The 171st Tank Brigade began a challenging advance southwest toward Chiamussu as the 15th Army reduced the Fuchin fortified region. Forward detachments of the 2nd Red Banner Army engaged Japanese advanced positions south of Holomoching and north of Aihun. After reducing Handa, the 56th Rifle Corps commenced an advance toward Furuton, although it faced delays from small enemy forces. Furthermore, in western Manchuria, Pliyev’s Soviet-Mongolian formations and the 17th Army continued their advance through Inner Mongolia largely unopposed for the next two days. Throughout 12 and 13 August on the Trans-Baikal Front's right flank, the Soviet-Mongolian formations of General Pliyev swept across the Inner Mongolian deserts towards Dolonnor and Kalgan at a rate of ninety to one hundred kilometers a day, rudely shunting aside local cavalry forces. Pliyev's principal concern was providing his forces in the vast desert wastes sufficient food, fuel, fodder, and water.

The 6th Guards Tank Army had to temporarily halt its advance as the 7th Guards Mechanized Corps reached Tuchuan. This pause was necessary due to severe fuel shortages, requiring an increase in fuel supplies before the offensive could resume. This situation allowed Ushiroku to withdraw the 63rd and 117th Divisions before they could be engaged. However, the 107th Division was less fortunate, as it was attacked by the 5th Guards Rifle Corps on the road to Solun. On the northern flank, the 36th Army continued its siege of the Hailar fortifications while the 2nd Rifle Corps seized Yakoshih and advanced up to Wunoerh. That day, Japan also received the initial Allied response to its surrender offer, penned by Secretary of State James Byrnes and approved by the British, Chinese, and Soviet governments. A critic of the Japanese imperial system, Byrnes insisted on an unconditional surrender but remained ambiguous regarding the future of the imperial family’s position. The response included a statement that Japan's future form of government should be “established by the freely expressed will of the Japanese people.” Thus, even though the Soviet and Chinese governments aimed for the abolition of the imperial system, the Japanese could choose to retain their emperor, and likely would. Meanwhile, Secretary Stimson urged President Truman to accept the peace offer immediately, believing that, without an organized surrender supported by the emperor, U.S. forces would face “a score of bloody Iwo Jimas and Okinawas” across China and Southeast Asia. He cautioned that without the immediate capitulation of the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy, rogue military commanders might continue to resist. Retaining Hirohito would also aid Allied efforts to achieve a swift and orderly reconstruction while maintaining a compliant populace.

The Japanese cabinet deliberated over the Allied response, with Anami and Suzuki, among other key military figures, arguing for its rejection unless an explicit guarantee for the imperial system was provided. Ultimately, however, Foreign Minister Togo and Marquess Kido Koichi succeeded in persuading Suzuki to support the acceptance of Byrnes' reply. Meanwhile, President Truman issued instructions prohibiting any further atomic weapons from being dropped on Japan without his approval, and he later ordered a complete halt to all bombings. Despite this, Halsey’s 3rd Fleet remained in the area, preparing to launch additional strikes. Admiral Rawlings’ Task Force 37 unfortunately had to retire at this point, though a token force was integrated into Admiral McCain’s Task Force 38 to ensure British support until the end. 

The Olympic timetable had called for Third Fleet to retire to Eniwetok and Manus in mid-August, but late on the night of August 10 Missouri intercepted a cryptic radio transmission: “Through the Swiss government, Japan has stated that she is willing to accept Allied surrender ultimatum at Potsdam, provided they can keep their Emperor.” Halsey had long predicted an early Japanese collapse, and had accordingly kept his logistic pipeline full. The following morning, August 11, flagships Missouri and King George V refueled simultaneously alongside oiler USS Sabine. Halsey recalled, “I went across to the ‘Cagey Five’ as we called her, on an aerial trolley, just to drink a toast with Vice Admiral Rawlings.” Although Japan teetered near collapse, TF-37 lacked its own fast oilers and would have to retire immediately. With Nimitz’s permission Halsey offered to sustain a token British force with Third Fleet so that the Royal Navy would be in “at the death.” Rawlings enthusiastically accepted. After replenishment, King George V, Indefatigable, Gambia, Newfoundland, and ten destroyers were re-designated TG-38.5 and absorbed into McCain’s TF-38. The rest of TF-37, under Vian, reluctantly retired for Manus. In a truly desultory attack the following day, August 12, a single Japanese plane penetrated Buckner Bay, Okinawa undetected and torpedoed TF-95’s just-arrived battleship Pennsylvania. Twenty Americans were killed, while Oldendorf and nine others were wounded. Back off Honshu, Halsey canceled August 12 strikes due to a typhoon. Late that night Third Fleet intercepted a confusing and ambiguous radio bulletin announcing that Japan had, with qualifications, accepted Allied terms. After a heated staff conference Halsey decided that, without firmer information, the following day’s strikes were still on. Nevertheless, the prolonged negotiations were causing the Third Fleet considerable logistical problems; Halsey recalled, “Our galleys were reduced to serving dehydrated carrot salad. If the war was over, we could provision on the spot; if it was not, we would have to retire, reprovision, and return.”

That night, a group of officers led by Major Hatanaka Kenji and Colonel Arao Okikatsu approached Anami, seeking his backing for a coup d'état to prevent Japan's surrender. Anami refused, leaving Hatanaka’s conspirators to attempt the coup on their own. At the recommendation of American psychological operations experts, B-29 bombers spent August 13 dropping leaflets over Japan detailing the Japanese offer of surrender and the Allied response. In stark contrast, that same day, McCain’s newly Anglo-American TF-38 launched 1,167 sorties against Tokyo, expending 372 tons of bombs and 2,175 rockets. Only seven planes and one pilot were lost, none to combat. Airborne opposition was virtually nil, as Lieutenant-General Kanetoshi Kondo, commander of Tokyo’s defending 10th Hiko Shidan, “failed to urge his men to press the attack to the utmost, because it seemed absurd to incur additional losses with the war obviously lost and its termination due in a matter of days.”  Simultaneously, Suzuki’s cabinet debated their reply to the Allied response late into the night but remained deadlocked. Back in Manchuria, on August 13, the 6th Guards Tank Army resumed its offensive by pushing reconnaissance units toward Tungliao and Taonan.

The 39th Army continued its assault on Japanese units at Halung-Arshaan, while the 5th Guards Rifle Corps attacked and captured Solun. To the north, as the battle for Hailar raged on, the 2nd Rifle Corps engaged the determined 119th Division for control of the Grand Khingan passes west of Pokotu, achieving little progress over the next two days. Looking east, the 2nd Red Banner Army gathered sufficient forces to resume its offensive, successfully penetrating the defenses of the 123rd Division at Shenwutan and Chiko. They destroyed small Japanese outposts at Huma and Santaoka, further pushing the 135th Independent Mixed Brigade toward the main fortified region at Aihun. Additionally, the 15th Army reduced the fortified positions at Fuchin, while the 171st Tank Brigade continued its advance toward Chiamussu. To the south, the 66th Rifle Division finally occupied Tungan, cutting the highway and railroad to Hutou. Meanwhile, the 59th Rifle Corps reached and secured Linkou before turning south toward Mutanchiang. Advance elements of the 26th Rifle Corps attacked and occupied the railroad station at Hualin, though they could not secure crossing sites over the Mutan River due to the fierce resistance of a single battalion. During the night, heavy Japanese counterattacks forced Soviet forces back to a hill northeast of Hualin. More importantly, while the 45th Rifle Corps continued to reduce remaining Japanese strongpoints in the Volynsk, Suifenho, and Lumintai centers of resistance, the bulk of the 5th Army advanced 30 kilometers along the road and rail line, successfully approaching the outer fortifications of Mutanchiang by nightfall. Even farther south, the 25th Army pushed southwestward, with its three formations sharing a single road along the military rail line through the mountainous, heavily wooded area from Laoheishan to Heitosai.

In South Sakhalin, the 56th Rifle Corps launched a siege attack against Furuton. However, the fierce resistance of the 125th Regiment successfully repelled Soviet assaults for the next three days. On the same day, in preparation for an amphibious invasion of Toro, two naval patrol craft reconnoitered Esutoru. Additionally, Meretskov approved the Seishin Operation in North Korea, leading to another small naval force landing successfully at Chongjin that afternoon. Soon after, they faced a strong Japanese counterattack, which drove the landing force out of the port and inflicted heavy losses on the Russians. The following morning, a naval infantry battalion was landed to retake Chongjin, but Japanese reinforcements from the Nanam Divisional District Unit arrived to contest the port. As the Russians were pushed back again, Yumashev decided to embark the 13th Naval Infantry Brigade for a third assault scheduled for August 15. To the north, the 393rd Rifle Division advanced south along the coast, reaching Kwangjuryong by August 14. Concurrently, after breaking through the 128th Division’s main defenses at Lotzukou, the 25th Army reached Heitosai and prepared to launch its main attack against Murakami’s 3rd Army. The 5th Army struck the right flank of Shimizu’s 5th Army at Ssutaoling and in the hills southeast of Mutanchiang, while the 1st Red Banner Army attacked the northern and eastern flanks of the city and the railroad station at Yehho on the eastern bank of the Mutan River. The 35th Army began a rapid advance toward Poli and Linkou, encountering negligible opposition. Meanwhile, the 5th Rifle Corps reached Paoching, drove off its garrison, and continued marching toward Poli.

In addition, the 15th Army finally reduced the Hsingshanchen Fortified Region, opening a more direct advance route toward Chiamussu. Meanwhile, the 2nd Red Banner Army succeeded in breaking through the outer Japanese defenses to besiege the Sunwu Fortified Region and surround the Aihun Fortified Region. To the west, the 36th Army continued to encounter strong resistance at Hailar and Wunoerh. The 5th Guards Rifle Corps initiated a southeastward pursuit along the railroad toward Wangyemiao, eventually catching elements of the 107th Division at Tepossi, while also engaging Japanese units retreating from the Wuchakou area. The forward detachment of the 7th Guards Mechanized Corps occupied Taonan after a march hindered by wet weather and Japanese kamikaze attacks. The 17th Army captured Taopanshin, and Pliyev's left column overcame a small Manchurian cavalry force, entering Dolonnor at the east end of the pass across the southern Grand Khingan Mountains. Back in the Pacific, the Allies grew restless as they awaited a Japanese response, ultimately interpreting the silence as a non-acceptance of the imposed peace terms. Consequently, Truman ordered a resumption of attacks against Japan at maximum intensity. More than 400 B-29 bombers launched daylight attacks, while over 300 conducted night raids, culminating in what would become the largest and longest bombing raid of the Pacific War. Furthermore, Truman began planning to drop a third atomic bomb on Tokyo. However, before he could proceed, Emperor Hirohito met with the most senior Army and Navy officers in the early hours of August 14, convincing them to cooperate in ending the war.

The cabinet immediately convened and unanimously ratified the Emperor's wishes for an unconditional surrender. They also decided to destroy vast amounts of material related to war crimes and the war responsibilities of the nation's highest leaders. Shortly after concluding the conference, a group of senior army officers, including Anami, gathered in a nearby room and signed an agreement to execute the Emperor's order of surrender. This decision would significantly impede any attempts to incite a coup in Tokyo. During this meeting, General Kawabe Torashirō, Vice Chief of the Army General Staff, proposed that the senior officers present should each sign an agreement to carry out the Emperor's order of surrender, "The Army will act in accordance with the Imperial Decision to the last." An agreement was ultimately signed by each of the most important officers present, including Minister of War Anami, Chief of the Army General Staff Umezu, commander of the 1st General Army Field Marshal Sugiyama Hajime, commander of the 2nd General Army Field Marshal Hata Shunroku and Inspector-General of Military Training Doihara Kenji. When Umezu voiced concern about air units causing trouble, Vice Minister of War Wakamatsu Tadaichi took the agreement next door to the Air General Army headquarters, where its commander Kawabe Masakazu, the brother of Torashirō also signed. The document would serve to seriously impede any attempt to incite a coup in Tokyo.

Simultaneously, the Foreign Ministry transmitted orders to its embassies in Switzerland and Sweden to accept the Allied terms of surrender, which were received in Washington at 02:49 on August 14. Anticipating difficulties with senior commanders on distant war fronts, three princes of the Imperial Family, who held military commissions, were dispatched to deliver the news personally. By 19:00, the text of the Imperial Rescript on surrender was finalized, transcribed by the official court calligrapher, and presented to the cabinet for their signatures. Around 23:00, the Emperor, with assistance from an NHK recording crew, made a gramophone record of himself reading the rescript. At long last, Japan had admitted defeat. 

However at around 21:30 on 14 August, the conspirators led by Hatanaka set their plan into motion. The Second Regiment of the First Imperial Guards had entered the palace grounds, doubling the strength of the battalion already stationed there, presumably to provide extra protection against Hatanaka's rebellion. But Hatanaka, along with Lt. Col. Shiizaki Jirō, convinced the commander of the 2nd Regiment of the First Imperial Guards, Colonel Haga Toyojirō, of their cause, by telling him (falsely) that Generals Anami and Umezu, and the commanders of the Eastern District Army and Imperial Guards Divisions were all in on the plan. Hatanaka also went to the office of Tanaka Shizuichi, commander of the Eastern region of the army, to try to persuade him to join the coup. Tanaka refused, and ordered Hatanaka to go home. Hatanaka ignored the order. Originally, Hatanaka hoped that simply occupying the palace and showing the beginnings of a rebellion would inspire the rest of the Army to rise up against the move to surrender. This notion guided him through much of the last days and hours and gave him the blind optimism to move ahead with the plan, despite having little support from his superiors. Having set all the pieces into position, Hatanaka and his co-conspirators decided that the Guard would take over the palace at 02:00. The hours until then were spent in continued attempts to convince their superiors in the Army to join the coup. Hatanaka, Shiizaki, Ida, and Captain Shigetarō Uehara (of the Air Force Academy) went to the office of Lt. Gen. Takeshi Mori to ask him to join the coup. Mori was in a meeting with his brother-in-law Michinori Shiraishi. The cooperation of Mori, who was the commander of the 1st Imperial Guards Division, was vital. When Mori refused to side with Hatanaka, Hatanaka killed him, fearing Mori would order the Guards to stop the rebellion. Uehara killed Shiraishi. These were the only two murders of the night. Hatanaka then used General Mori's official stamp to authorize Imperial Guards Division Strategic Order No. 584, a false set of orders created by his co-conspirators, which would greatly increase the strength of the forces occupying the Imperial Palace and Imperial Household Ministry, and "protecting" the Emperor.

The rebels, led by Hatanaka, spent the next several hours fruitlessly searching for the recordings of the surrender speech, failing to locate them amid a blackout caused by American bombings. Around the same time, another group of Hatanaka’s rebels, led by Captain Takeo Sasaki, targeted Prime Minister Suzuki's office with the intent to kill him. When they found it empty, they opened fire with machine guns, devastating the office, and then set the building ablaze before departing for Suzuki's home. Fortunately, Hisatsune Sakomizu, the chief secretary to Suzuki's Cabinet, had warned Suzuki, enabling him to escape just minutes before the assassins arrived. After setting fire to Suzuki's residence, the rebels then proceeded to the estate of Kiichirō Hiranuma, aiming to assassinate him as well. Hiranuma managed to escape through a side gate, but the rebels torched his house too. In the aftermath, Suzuki spent the remainder of August under police protection, sleeping in a different bed each night to avoid detection. Around 03:00, Hatanaka was informed that the Eastern District Army was on its way to the palace to confront him and urged him to surrender. As Hatanaka saw his plan collapse around him, he pleaded with Tatsuhiko Takashima, the Chief of Staff of the Eastern District Army, for airtime on NHK radio to explain his intentions to the Japanese people. His request was denied. Meanwhile, Colonel Haga, commander of the 2nd Regiment of the First Imperial Guards, learned that the Army did not support Hatanaka's rebellion and ordered him to vacate the palace grounds. Just before 05:00, while his rebels continued their search, Major Hatanaka went to the NHK studios, desperately trying to secure airtime to convey his actions. However, slightly over an hour later, after receiving a phone call from the Eastern District Army, Hatanaka finally conceded defeat. He gathered his officers and left the NHK studio, feeling the weight of his failed coup. At dawn, General Tanaka learned that the palace had been invaded, so he went there to confront the rebellious officers. He berated them for acting against the spirit of the Japanese army and ultimately convinced them to return to their barracks. By 08:00 on August 15, the rebellion was entirely dismantled. Although they had held the palace grounds for much of the night, they ultimately failed to find the recordings. After his failed coup, Hatanaka took his own life before witnessing Japan’s surrender.

While TF-38 refueled on August 14, Halsey signaled McCain, stating, “I intend to strike the same general target area on the fifteenth.” McCain informed TF-38, “Our orders to strike indicate the enemy may have dropped an unacceptable joker into the surrender terms. This war could last many months longer. We cannot afford to relax. Now is the time to pour it on.” In fact, the Western Allies had sunk their last Japanese ships of the war that day, when submarines USS Torsk (SS-423) and USS Spikefish (SS-404) torpedoed I-373 and two small escort ships in the East China Sea, resulting in the death of 112 Japanese sailors. The following morning, August 15, the Third Fleet launched its first strike of 103 aircraft at 04:15 hours. At 06:14, just as the first strike was returning and the second strike was five minutes from the target, Halsey was ordered by Nimitz, “Air attack will be suspended. Acknowledge.” Shortly afterward, an officer burst in, waving a transcript—President Truman’s official peace announcement. Halsey erupted with exuberance, “pounding the shoulders of everyone within reach.” He recalled, “My first thought at the great news was, ‘Victory!’ My second was, ‘God be thanked, I’ll never have to order another man out to die.’” However, within minutes, four retiring Hancock Hellcats were attacked by seven Japanese fighters, resulting in the Hellcats shooting down four without loss. Over Tokorazawa airfield, northwest of Tokyo, 20 IJAAF Ki-84 “Franks” ambushed six VF-88 Hellcats from Yorktown. The Hellcats managed to shoot down nine Franks but lost four of their own, along with their pilots. Rawlings’ dawn strikes were intercepted by about 12 Zeros. Escorting Seafires shot down eight Zeros but lost one, while an Avenger downed a ninth Zero. Tragically, seven TF-38 flyers never returned. During the morning, Halsey launched his last strike of the war, but was soon ordered by Admiral Nimitz to suspend all air attacks. At 12:00, the Emperor's recorded speech to the nation, reading the Imperial Rescript on the Termination of the War, was finally broadcast. The war was over… or was it really?

I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me.

As Prime Minister Suzuki and his cabinet debated surrender, the Emperor Hirohito finally accepted the Potsdam Declaration, conditionally ensuring the imperial family's continuity. However, conspirators attempted a coup to prevent the surrender, ultimately failing. By August 15, Japan officially surrendered, marking the end of the Pacific War.

Last time we spoke about the Siege of Japan. In the summer of 1945, Japan faced its most devastating siege. A pivotal component was the aerial mining campaign entitled "Starvation," masterminded by General Curtis LeMay. B-29 Superfortress bombers were deployed to lay mines in critical waterways, cutting off resources and crippling Japan’s industrial capabilities. This silent assault inflicted chaos on Japan’s shipping lanes, sinking over 670 vessels and significantly disrupting supply lines. Amid this turmoil, the Allies intensified their firebombing campaigns, targeting urban centers like Tokyo, Osaka, and Kobe, leading to extensive devastation and loss of life. By August, Japan's civilian and military morale crumbled under the weight of destruction. The climax of this siege came with the atomic bombing of Hiroshima, which unleashed unparalleled destruction. As Japan’s leadership struggled for options, the nation was effectively brought to its knees. The relentless siege had achieved its goal, Japan was irrevocably broken, marking a profound moment in history.

This episode is the Atomic Bombing of Nagasaki

Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. 

Hello there, again like in the previous episode, this one is just going to state what happened, I am not going to delve into the why’s just yet. I am currently writing an entire special episode on why exactly Japan surrendered, focused on the actions of Emperor Hirohito, who I will argue prolonged the 15 year war to protect the Kokutai. So a bit of a spoiler there I guess. 

The worst has come to pass for the Japanese Empire. An atomic bomb has fallen, devastating an entire city. In a blinding flash, over 140,000 lives were lost or forever altered. But this was merely the beginning. The Americans were poised to unleash destruction from the skies, a scale of devastation never before witnessed on this planet. The choices were grim: surrender or complete annihilation.The Japanese faced not only this overwhelming threat but also another peril. The Soviet Union prepared to invade Manchuria and other crucial territories within its reach.

As we last left off, the Americans had been conducting a prolonged and devastating air and naval siege of the Japanese Home Islands in preparation for the invasion of Kyushu. This campaign culminated in the atomic bombing of Hiroshima on August 6, reducing the once-great city to ruins and leaving a staggering casualty toll that would forever haunt the Japanese people. Survivor accounts recount the haunting experience of wandering through the destruction, disoriented and unsure of where to go. They spoke of hearing the desperate cries of those trapped beneath crushed buildings or suffering from horrific burns. As small fires ignited by the blast began to spread, they coalesced into a firestorm that surged through the rubble, claiming the lives of many still trapped inside. Frightened residents jumped into the rivers of Hiroshima, only to drown in their desperate attempts to escape the flames. Over 90% of the doctors and 93% of the nurses in Hiroshima perished or were injured, and most hospitals were either destroyed or heavily damaged. By early afternoon, police and volunteers worked tirelessly to establish evacuation centers at hospitals, schools, and tram stations. Yet, tragically, many would die before receiving aid, leaving behind grim rings of corpses around these facilities. Some survivors who initially appeared unharmed would succumb within hours or days to what would later be identified as radiation sickness. Most members of General Hata’s 2nd General Army headquarters were undergoing physical training on the grounds of Hiroshima Castle, barely 900 yards from the hypocenter. As a result, 3,243 troops lost their lives on the parade ground. Miraculously, Hata himself survived the explosion with only minor injuries, but many of his staff were not so fortunate, including Lieutenant-Colonel Yi U, a prince of the Korean imperial family, who was killed or fatally wounded.

In total, the 2nd General Army, 59th Army, 5th Division, and other combat units in the city lost an estimated 20,000 troops. Survivors regrouped at the Ujina Air Base on the outskirts of Hiroshima, where they organized relief efforts and maintained public order once martial law was declared. With Mayor Awaya Senkichi killed at the mayoral residence, Hata assumed control of the city’s administration and coordinated relief efforts. The initial reaction of the Japanese government to the devastation in Hiroshima was mixed. The Imperial Japanese Army and Imperial Japanese Navy military leadership received only fragmentary reports about the tragedy, as communications with Hiroshima had been severed. Meanwhile, American and British radio broadcasts promptly informed ordinary Japanese civilians and their government about the atomic bomb attack on August 7.

The following day, Tokyo issued a press release confirming the bombing of Hiroshima, but it notably did not state that the United States had dropped an atomic weapon. After technical teams visited the site of the bombing, they concluded that the enemy B-29s had indeed used a nuclear device. At this juncture, the diplomatic situation within Japan was chaotic. Many members of the Japanese cabinet believed that surrender was the only viable option, while others, particularly military figures like Hata, were determined to continue the fight. Looking back, between July 17 and August 2, Soviet leader Joseph Stalin, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, and U.S. President Harry Truman convened in Potsdam to negotiate terms for the end of World War II. The Potsdam Conference is perhaps best known for President Truman’s conversation with Soviet leader Joseph Stalin on July 24, during which Truman informed Stalin that the United States had successfully detonated the first atomic bomb on July 16. Prior to leaving for the conference, a top-level civilian Interim Committee, led by Secretary of War Henry Stimson, suggested that Truman inform Stalin about America’s new nuclear capability. This was intended to prevent the Soviets from learning about the bomb through leaked information, and Truman agreed to share this news. Historians have often interpreted Truman’s somewhat firm stance during negotiations as a reflection of the U.S. negotiating team’s belief that their nuclear capability would enhance their bargaining power. However, Stalin was already well-informed about the American nuclear program, courtesy of the Soviet intelligence network. This understanding enabled him to hold firm in his positions, complicating the negotiations. In the end, the leaders of the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union, despite their differences, remained allied throughout the war. However, they would never meet again collectively to discuss cooperation in postwar reconstruction. One of the critical topics discussed was how to handle Japan. During the conference, Truman sought and received Stalin's final assurance of entering the war on August 9, in accordance with the agreements made among the Allies during the Yalta Conference in February 1945.

On April 5, Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov informed Tokyo of the Soviet Union's unilateral abrogation of the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact. He assured Japan that the treaty would remain in effect until April 1946, even though the Soviets were already planning an offensive in the Far East. A Soviet invasion would prove beneficial for the Americans, as it could prevent the movement of hostile troops from Manchuria, Korea, and North China to the Home Islands of Japan before an invasion of Kyushu was launched. On July 26, the United States, Great Britain, and China released a declaration demanding Japan's immediate surrender. The declaration called for the dismemberment of Japan's remaining empire, the demobilization of all military forces, trials for war criminals, and the elimination of Japan's capacity for future belligerence. While the declaration did not alter the requirement for unconditional surrender, critically it left ambiguous how the Japanese people might shape their future government, as it did not specify a direct end to or continuation of the imperial dynasty. The crux of that matter was the preservation of the Kokutai.

The Kokutai was the national essence of Japan. It was all aspects of Japanese polity, derived from history, tradition and customs all focused around the cult of the Emperor. The government run by politicians was secondary, at any given time the kokutai was the belief the Emperor could come in and directly rule. If you are confused, dont worry, I am too haha. Its confusing. The Meiji constitution was extremely ambiguous. It dictated a form of constitutional monarchy with the kokutai sovereign emperor and the “seitai” that being the actual government. Basically on paper the government runs things, but the feeling of the Japanese people was that the wishes of the emperor should be followed. Thus the kokutai was like an extra-judicial structure built into the constitution without real legal framework, its a nightmare I know. Let me make an example, most of you are American I imagine. Your congress and senate actually run the country, wink wink lets forget about lobbyists from raytheon. The president does not have executive powers to override any and all things, but what if all American voters simply felt he did. So the president goes above his jurisdiction, and the American people violently attack Congress and the Senate if they don’t abide by the president's wishes. That’s kind of how it works for a lack of better words. Again in the specials I will roll out soon, it will make more sense after I blabber about it in roughly 7000 words. Now, in response, Prime Minister Suzuki Kantaro expressed to the Japanese press on July 29 his belief that the Potsdam Declaration was nothing new and held no "significant value." This statement was interpreted by Truman and his administration as a rejection of the declaration. In reality, since the Yalta Conference, Japan had repeatedly approached the Soviet Union in an attempt to extend the Neutrality Pact and to enlist the Russians in negotiating peace with the Allies, offering attractive territorial concessions in return. 

The Japanese, therefore, chose not to officially respond to the Potsdam Declaration as they awaited a reply from the Soviet Union. However, this response never materialized. The Soviet Union was preparing for an invasion of Manchuria, fully aware that Japan had become a weakened nation after suffering several defeats in the Pacific. In contrast, the once-inadequate Russian military had transformed into one of the strongest forces of the time. They had successfully absorbed powerful German offensives in 1941, 1942, and 1943, and rebounded with their own offensives in 1944 and 1945, ultimately crushing the military might of Nazi Germany. Motivated by Allied requests for support and the desire to solidify the Soviet Union's post-war position in the Far East, Soviet leaders began planning in March for a final campaign to reclaim Manchuria, northern Korea, southern Sakhalin, and the Kuril Islands from Japan. However, most Soviet troops were stationed more than 10,000 kilometers away in Europe. As a result, forces and equipment designated for deployment to Manchuria had to be transported along a fragile and limited-capacity network over a five-month period from April to August. Initially, they stockpiled equipment in the Far East to re-equip units already present in that region. Then, a massive regrouping of forces to the east commenced in May, with units still arriving even as the campaign opened in August. This shift, involving nearly one million men, effectively doubled the strength of Soviet forces in the Far East from forty to more than eighty divisions.

Opposing Valisevsky’s Far East Command was General Yamada Otozo’s Kwantung Army, along with its Manchukuoan and Inner Mongolian auxiliaries. Once the most prestigious and powerful unit of the Imperial Japanese Army, the Kwantung Army had significantly eroded in strength and quality over the past few years due to the diversion of its main assets to other theaters. Consequently, many experienced units were siphoned off and replaced by formations made up of draft levies, reservists, and smaller, cannibalized units. By August, the Kwantung Army consisted of General Kita Seiichi’s 1st Area Army in eastern Manchuria, which included the 3rd and 5th Armies, alongside two divisions under direct area army control. General Ushiroku Jun commanded the 3rd Area Army in central and western Manchuria, encompassing the 30th and 44th Armies, plus two divisions, three independent mixed brigades, and one independent tank brigade under his direct command. In northern Manchuria, Lieutenant-General Uemura Mikio led the 4th Army, which was composed of three divisions and four independent mixed brigades.

Additionally, the army of Manchukuo contributed eight infantry and seven cavalry divisions, along with fourteen brigades of infantry and cavalry. Mengjiang added six cavalry formations and other garrison forces from Inner Mongolia. Furthermore, Lieutenant-General Kozuki Yoshio’s 17th Area Army was stationed in central and southern Korea, totaling seven divisions and three independent mixed brigades. In northern Korea, Lieutenant-General Kushibuchi Senichi’s 34th Army consisted of two divisions and one independent mixed brigade. Recognizing that his forces lacked adequate training and equipment, Yamada’s plans called for a delay at the borders, followed by a defense consisting of successive positions culminating in a final stand at a stronghold constructed in the Tunghua area. This strategy would see roughly one-third of the Japanese forces deployed in the border region, while the remaining two-thirds would be concentrated in operational depth to create a series of defensive lines.

By July 25, Soviet force deployments to the Far East were virtually complete. The Soviets meticulously tailored all military units, from the front level down to army, corps, division, brigade, and battalion, to effectively achieve specific missions. This tailoring took into account not only the strength and dispositions of enemy forces but also the terrain where the unit would operate and the desired speed of the operation. Each unit was equipped with the necessary artillery, anti-tank, tank, air defense, and engineer support. For instance, the 1st Far Eastern Front received heavy artillery attachments to provide the firepower needed to breach heavily fortified Japanese positions. In contrast, the Transbaikal Front was given heavy vehicular and motorized rifle support, enabling it to conduct rapid, balanced combined arms operations across the broad expanses of western Manchuria and Inner Mongolia. Within each front, armies assigned to assault strong enemy fortified zones had significantly more artillery assets compared to those operating on open axes of advance. Units deployed in difficult terrain were afforded extensive engineer support to facilitate their operations. At the lowest tactical levels, specially tailored forward detachments from rifle divisions and tank and mechanized corps, alongside assault groups from rifle regiments and battalions, ensured the firepower and mobility necessary to execute high-speed operations.

However, the final decision to attack would not be made until August 7, when Vasilevsky committed the Transbaikal and 1st Far Eastern Fronts to a simultaneous assault scheduled for August 9. It is believed that the detonation of the atomic bomb the previous day prompted this hasty decision, resulting in the short two-day period between the decision and the planned attack. Vasilevsky’s strategy called for a double envelopment conducted by Soviet forces along three axes to secure Manchuria and destroy a significant portion of the Kwantung Army. The Transbaikal Front was tasked with attacking eastward into western Manchuria, while the 1st Far Eastern Front would move westward into eastern Manchuria. Both offensives were to converge in the Mukden, Changchun, Harbin, and Kirin areas of south-central Manchuria. Meanwhile, the 2nd Far Eastern Front would conduct a supporting attack into northern Manchuria, driving southward toward Harbin and Tsitsihar.

Moreover, the timing of on-order operations against southern Sakhalin and the Kuriles would depend on the progress of these main attacks. For the western pincer, Malinovsky’s plan involved the 17th and 39th Armies and the 6th Guards Tank Army, followed by the 53rd Army, launching the primary assault. Their objective was to bypass the Halung-Arshaan Fortified Region to the south and advance toward Changchun. The success of the Transbaikal Front operation hinged on speed, surprise, and the deployment of mobile forces across virtually every sector, aiming to preempt effective Japanese defenses. To achieve this swiftness and surprise, tank formations were positioned in the first echelon of units at all command levels. The operation required tank-heavy forward detachments at each command level, with the 6th Guards Tank Army designated to spearhead the front's efforts. A tank division would lead the advance of the 39th Army, supported by tank brigades assigned to the first-echelon corps and divisions. Planned rates of advance were ambitious: 23 kilometers per day for combined arms units and an impressive 70 kilometers for tank units. However, the operation involved significant risks. If Japanese units responded quickly to the Soviet attack, or if even nominal forces occupied strategic positions in the Grand Khingan mountain passes, the Soviet advance could be severely hampered. Additionally, the success of the operation relied heavily on logistical units' capability to supply these fast-moving formations deep into Manchuria. Despite these challenges, the Soviets confidently accepted the risks involved. Their mission was to crush the enemy in the border regions, cross the Grand Khingan Mountains, and occupy positions in the central Manchurian plain from Lupei to Solun by the tenth to fifteenth day of the operation.In support, the Soviet-Mongolian Cavalry-Mechanized Group was to attack across the Inner Mongolian desert and southern Grand Khingan Mountains toward Kalgan and Dolonnor. Simultaneously, the 36th Army was set to advance from Duroy and Staro-Tsurukaytuy across the Argun River to secure Hailar.

In the next phase, for the second pincer, Meretskov’s plan involved the 1st Red Banner Army, the 5th Army, and the 10th Mechanized Corps launching the main attack from the Grodekova area, located northwest of Vladivostok. Their objective was to advance toward Mutanchiang to exploit and secure the Kirin, Changchun, and Harbin regions, while coordinating with Soviet forces from the Transbaikal Front. Additionally, the 35th Army was tasked with attacking from the Lesozavodsk-Iman area, north of Lake Khanka, to capture Mishan, Linkou, and Poli. Meanwhile, the 25th Army would launch an offensive from northwest of Ussurysk to secure the Tungning, Wangching, and Yenchi areas. Once the 1st Far Eastern and Transbaikal Fronts converged in the Changchun area, they would advance together to eliminate the final Japanese resistance on the Liaotung Peninsula and secure the strategic naval base at Port Arthur. Furthermore, Purkayev’s 2nd Far Eastern Front was to advance on a broad front across the Amur and Ussuri rivers, extending from Blagoveshchensk to south of Khabarovsk. This movement aimed to exert maximum pressure on Japanese forces in northern Manchuria. The 15th Army would spearhead the main attack across the Amur River in the Leninskoye area, advancing southward into the regions around the Sungari and Ruhe rivers. In support, the 2nd Red Banner Army was designated to attack across the Amur River from the Blagoveshchensk area to Sunwu and then advance southward to Tsitsihar. The 5th Rifle Corps would also be involved, attacking from Bikin to secure Paoching and Poli. This multifront operational plan aimed for the complete destruction of Kwantung Army units in Manchuria with maximum speed, effectively cutting off Japanese troops from reinforcements coming from northern China or Korea. These relentless mobile attacks, deployed across the broadest of fronts, were designed to prevent the Japanese from reallocating forces, leading to their ultimate collapse and piecemeal defeat.

As planned, the Japanese were caught completely by surprise when they received the Soviet declaration of war just an hour before midnight on August 8. At the same time, they were facing a critical decision in response to the recent bombing of Hiroshima. After learning about the success of Colonel Tibbets’ mission, President Truman released a pre-approved statement that detailed the atomic bomb’s destructive capabilities and warned that if Japan did not accept the Potsdam Declaration, "they may expect a rain of ruin from the air, the like of which has never been seen on this earth." Although Truman had only the plutonium Fat Man device remaining for use, he had been informed that a third bomb might be ready sometime in August. Among American military leaders, including Admiral Nimitz and Generals Spaatz, LeMay, and Twining, there was a belief that this third nuclear weapon should be dropped on Tokyo if Japan did not surrender.

Conversely, some Japanese senior officials, like Admiral Toyoda, speculated that even if the Allies had used an atomic bomb, they likely would not have many more at their disposal. They argued that the Japanese people should be prepared to defend their home islands to the death if favorable terms of surrender could not be secured. However, on August 8, Prime Minister Suzuki instructed Foreign Minister Togo Shigenori, who advocated for negotiating with the United States, to inform Emperor Hirohito about the devastation caused by the atomic bomb in Hiroshima. Hirohito responded by authorizing foreign minister Togo to notify the world on August 10th that Japan would accept the allied terms of surrender with one condition “that the said declaration does not comprise any demand which prejudices the prerogatives of His Majesty as a Sovereign Ruler.” 

In the meantime, to increase pressure on the Japanese, Twinning launched additional conventional B-29 raids. A total of 412 B-29s targeted the Nakajima aircraft plant in Musashino during a daylight attack on August 8. However, the United States also needed to demonstrate to the Japanese government and people that Little Boy was not just an isolated experimental device. As a result, a decision was made to drop the Fat Man plutonium bomb on either the primary target of Kokura or the secondary target of Nagasaki, with this mission scheduled for August 9. For this operation, Tibbets selected Major Charles Sweeney to pilot the B-29 named Bockscar and deliver the device. The leading B-29 would decide the ultimate target based on weather reports from two reconnaissance B-29s, followed by two additional aircraft assigned to scientific and photographic missions. To prepare for takeoff, the bomb was armed by installing three plugs. At 03:49 on August 9, Sweeney departed from Tinian, heading toward Yakushima Island to rendezvous with his escorts.

The mission began with complications that only escalated. A typhoon near Iwo Jima forced mission planners to relocate the planned rendezvous between Bockscar and her escorts to Yakushima, an island south of Kyushu. Sweeney took off at 03:49 on August 9 and headed north, but strong headwinds hindered her progress toward Yakushima. A further issue arose when a photographic specialist assigned to the support aircraft Full House was barred from flying due to forgetting his parachute. Consequently, Major Hopkins on Full House had to break radio silence to seek instructions on operating the camera. However, a more critical situation was uncovered when Commander Ashworth and his assistant discovered that an indicator was showing that Fat Man's electronic fusing circuits had closed, indicating that arming was complete. A faulty switch, with incorrectly installed wiring, posed the risk of a premature explosion. As the mission continued over Yakushima, Sweeney successfully met up with Captain Bock, piloting the scientific support B-29, but failed to rendezvous with Major Hopkins. This meant that Bockscar would only have The Great Artiste to accompany it for the final leg of its mission. According to Ashworth's log, they arrived at the rendezvous point at 09:00 and saw Bock at 09:20, while Full House waited south of the arranged position. Sweeney had initially agreed to circle Yakushima for only 15 minutes; however, he ended up waiting approximately 50 minutes for Hopkins to arrive, wasting precious fuel in the process. Due to the weather conditions, Hopkins had lost visual contact with the other B-29s and had to break radio silence again to locate Bockscar, but Sweeney did not respond. Despite reports indicating 30% cloud cover over Kokura, Sweeney chose to proceed there, believing the haze over the city would clear. Bockscar arrived at the initial start point for the bomb run over Kokura at 10:44, but unfortunately, heavy cloud cover had settled over the city, preventing a successful bomb delivery. After three unsuccessful bomb runs, which consumed an additional 45 minutes of fuel, a flight engineer discovered that a fuel pump had malfunctioned, trapping 600 gallons of fuel in the auxiliary bomb bay fuel tanks.

Despite fuel concerns, Sweeney chose to proceed with the mission, heading south and then east toward Nagasaki, which he reached at 11:50. Unfortunately, the weather there was as poor as it had been at Kokura, prompting Sweeney to make the controversial decision to drop Fat Man using radar guidance. Due to the fuel shortage, he only conducted a single bomb run. Just before initiating the radar approach, a hole in the clouds opened, revealing the aim point: the Mitsubishi Steel and Arms Works located on the Urakami River. Fat Man was dropped at 11:58 and detonated approximately 1,650 feet above the target after a 50-second descent. Initial reports indicated that the explosion occurred about 500 yards north of the Mitsubishi plant and roughly 0.8 miles south of another Mitsubishi facility. While Fat Man had a more powerful detonation, the damage and casualties were not as extensive as those caused by the lower-yield Little Boy. The topography of Nagasaki, surrounded by hills, confined the explosion to the bowl-shaped center of the city, in stark contrast to Hiroshima’s relatively flat landscape. Of the 7,500 Japanese employees at the Mitsubishi plant, 6,200 were killed, with an additional 17,000 to 22,000 employees at other war plants and factories also perishing. Unlike Hiroshima, where the military death toll was high, only about 150 Japanese soldiers were killed instantly, alongside at least 8 prisoners of war. Overall, it is estimated that around 45,000 civilians lost their lives due to the explosion, with between 50,000 and 60,000 sustaining injuries. The radius of total destruction extended about one mile, with fires spreading across the northern portion of the city to two miles south of the impact point. Thankfully, no firestorm developed as it had in Hiroshima.

Bomb damage to physical structures in Nagasaki was erratic. Some areas, such as the Nagasaki Arsenal and the Mitsubishi plant, experienced significant destruction, while nearby locations appeared almost untouched. Despite this, Sweeney's mission resulted in an estimated 68.3% loss of pre-existing industrial production, excluding the harbor facilities, without disrupting the critical north-south National Railway track. While Fat Man's debut was historic, its destructive capability was comparable to other B-29 incendiary night raids. After circling Fat Man's expanding mushroom cloud, Sweeney headed toward Okinawa at 12:05, with only 300 gallons of fuel remaining. Fortunately, Bockscar's crew managed to return to Yontan Field with just seven gallons of fuel left, successfully making their way back to Tinian later that same day. 

Simultaneously, Vasilevsky's Far East Command began its offensive just ten minutes after midnight on August 9. Reconnaissance units, forward detachments, and advanced guard units of the Transbaikal Front crossed the border into Inner Mongolia and Manchuria. Initially, attacking units faced resistance primarily in the 36th Army zone, where their attack routes passed through fortified Japanese border installations. However, most assault units advanced with little opposition. By 04:30, main force units had begun to follow closely behind the assault troops. Colonel-General Issa Pliyev's Soviet-Mongolian Cavalry-Mechanized Group advanced in two march columns, 200 kilometers apart. By nightfall, they had penetrated 55 miles into the arid expanses of Inner Mongolia, moving southward toward Dolonnor and Kalgan while sweeping aside small detachments of Inner Mongolian cavalry. Meanwhile, Lieutenant-General Aleksei Danilov's 17th Army entered Inner Mongolia virtually unopposed in two columns, advancing approximately 70 kilometers by nightfall.

To the left, Colonel-General Andrey Kravchenko’s 6th Guards Tank Army led the main attack into Inner Mongolia in two columns, encountering limited opposition and rapidly advancing about 150 kilometers until reaching the foothills of the Grand Khingan Mountains, west and north of Khorokhon Pass, by nightfall. Simultaneously, Colonel-General Ivan Lyudnikov’s 39th Army advanced along two divergent axes. The 5th Guards and 113th Rifle Corps gained 60 kilometers as they bypassed the Halung-Arshaan and Wuchakou Fortified Regions to the south. Meanwhile, the 94th Rifle Corps struck northeast towards the rear of the Hailar Fortified Region, swiftly overcoming light resistance. The 124th Rifle Division was also deployed between both axes to probe toward the Halung-Arshaan Fortified Region. Lieutenant-General Alexander Luchinsky’s 36th Army advanced on two fronts, with the 2nd and 86th Rifle Corps successfully crossing the rain-swollen Argun River between Staro-Tsurukhaytuy and Duroy and securing key bridges north of Hailar. Additionally, an operational group of two rifle divisions attacked across the border, establishing a foothold in the small fortified post at Manchouli. During the night, Luchinsky sent the 205th Tank Brigade to assault Hailar from the northeast, while the 152nd Rifle Regiment maneuvered to attack from the southeast. This offensive succeeded only in capturing the railroad station in the northern part of Hailar, as the southern and eastern sections of the city fell the following day. However, the 80th Independent Mixed Brigade continued to delay the Soviet advance, while the 119th Division moved eastward to fortify positions in the Grand Khingan Mountains, stretching from Yakoshih to Pokotu. Despite these setbacks, the 36th Army had advanced 60 kilometers into Manchuria and had partially secured Hailar.

Meanwhile, to the east, drenched by inundating thunderstorms, the 1st Far Eastern Front advanced under the worst weather conditions during the dark of night. This totally surprised the Japanese defenders and led to the rapid reduction of many unsuspecting border posts. Colonel-General Nikolay Krylov’s 5th Army spearheaded the main attack, with the 17th, 65th, and 72nd Rifle Corps quickly breaking through the Volynsk center of resistance. They achieved a penetration of 16 to 22 kilometers toward Laotsaiying and Machiacho. Meanwhile, the 105th Fortified Region and assault engineer units attacked the Suifenho center of resistance, successfully seizing critical railroad tunnels on the main rail line into Manchuria. In support, Colonel-General Afanasy Beloborodov’s 1st Red Banner Army to the north launched an assault with the 26th and 59th Rifle Corps over a 16-kilometer sector through heavily wooded, wet terrain. As they advanced, they constructed roads through the forest. By nightfall, forward divisional elements had advanced five to six kilometers deep into Manchuria, crossing the Shitouho River and half of the forested region. At the same time, the 6th Field Fortified Region and the 112th Fortified Region stormed several Japanese border positions and slowly advanced north towards Mishan. This assault supported Lieutenant-General Nikanor Zakhvatayev’s 35th Army, which deployed the 66th and 363rd Rifle Divisions to cross the Sungacha River and attack towards Mishan. The 264th Rifle Division and the 109th Fortified Region assaulted across the Ussuri River against Hutou. After securing a crossing over the Sungacha, the 66th Division penetrated deep into the swamps, managing to advance 12 kilometers into Tachiao. Meanwhile, the 363rd Division successfully broke through an enemy strongpoint at Maly Huankang, ultimately reaching the southwest edge of Tachiao. In turn, the 264th Division crossed the Ussuri River and outflanked Hutou to the south, capturing the railroad depot and cutting the highway to Hulin.

Lastly, Colonel-General Ivan Chistyakov’s 25th Army launched an attack along two principal axes. The 39th Rifle Corps and the 259th Tank Brigade targeted Tungning, while border guard units, along with the 108th and 113th Fortified Regions, crossed the Hunchun and Tumen rivers to engage Japanese defenses in Korea and at Hunchun. Shielded by rain, the Russians swiftly captured or subdued the Japanese forward defenses along the front. By nightfall, the 39th Rifle Corps had advanced ten to twelve kilometers into the Japanese rear along the Pad Sennaya River. Lead elements, reinforced by the 72nd Tank Brigade, began their assault on the town of Tungning and the vital railroad line to Tumen. To the north, the 2nd Far Eastern Front deployed its forces across three separate sectors. Lieutenant-General Stepan Mamonov’s 15th Army was tasked with the main attack across the Amur River in the center of the front sector. Lieutenant-General Makar Teryokhin’s 2nd Red Banner Army was assigned to conduct a supporting attack against the Aihun and Sunwu Fortified Regions, while Major-General Ivan Pashkov’s 5th Rifle Corps aimed to seize the fortified region at Jaoho. Supported by the Amur Naval Flotilla, reconnaissance and advanced detachments of the 15th Army launched assaults without artillery preparation and rapidly secured major islands in the Amur River. Mamonov’s rifle divisions then sent reconnaissance units across to the south bank of the river, which was likewise secured against light opposition. Throughout the remainder of the day, reconnaissance units and advanced battalions of the 15th Army consolidated their positions on the islands and the south bank, while main forces concentrated on conducting a challenging river crossing, hampered by heavy rains, high water, and mud.

At the same time, assault units and reconnaissance detachments of the 5th Rifle Corps crossed the Ussuri River, successfully securing a beachhead north of Jaoho while the remainder of the corps was transported across the river. From August 9 to 11, the forces of the 2nd Red Banner Army limited their activities to reconnaissance, focusing on seizing islands in the Amur River and harassing Japanese installations. This operation occurred at a critical moment for the Japanese, who were still reeling from the impacts of two atomic bombings. The Soviet Union had successfully initiated its invasion of Manchuria, setting the stage for a campaign that, although brief, was just beginning.

I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me.

Two atomic bombs have been dropped and the Soviet Union has invaded Manchuria. For months the Japanese had been working tirelessly to obtain better peace terms through the Soviets, hoping above all else to preserve the Kokutai. It was all for nothing. The Americans offered terms, leaving the Kokutai ambiguous. What would Japan, or better said, the Emperor do?

Last time we spoke about Operation Downfall. The Allies, under General Krueger, initiated a decisive campaign to clear the Japanese from Luzon. As they faced the entrenched Shobu Group, challenges included treacherous terrain and a resilient enemy. Simultaneously, Japan braced for an invasion, mobilizing reinforcements and devising defensive strategies to ward off the impending Allied assault. As July approached, General Yamashita’s forces prepared to execute a final breakout, but progress was hampered by relentless guerrilla attacks and adverse weather conditions. With Operation Downfall looming, Allied troops focused on strategic landings in Kyushu and Honshu, driven by a relentless determination to defeat the Japanese militarily. The intense battles of Luzon became a precursor to this monumental operation, marking a turning point in the Pacific War. 

This episode is The Siege of Japan

Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. 

Boy I have been waiting a long time to come to this point. One of the most significant events in human history that deeply affects us to this very day. Nuclear war is as much a threat today as it was during the cold war. The dropping of the Atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki were deeply complicated events fraught with issues of morality. It goes without saying whether or not the bombs needed to be dropped, their actual impact on the surrender of Japan and so forth are still issues hotly debated to this very day. I have spoken on the issue countless times on my personal channel and podcast, but I figure to do this subject justice I will create a full episode for it. Thus in this episode we are going to just cover what happened, but rest assured I will come back to this later on.

As we last explored, following the successful invasion of Luzon in the Philippines, along with the fall of Iwo Jima and Okinawa, American forces began preparing for the final invasion of the Japanese Home Islands. This operation was codenamed Operation Downfall. One key initiative leading up to this invasion was a comprehensive air-sea blockade and bombardment campaign against Japan itself. Previously, we detailed the extensive firebombing and precision bombing efforts executed by General LeMay’s 21st Bomber Command. However, during this crucial period, the B-29 Superfortress bombers undertook a distinct operation under the codename Starvation. This single operation would be one of the largest factors that contributed to the surrender of Japan and its one most people have never heard of.

In July 1944, Admiral Chester W. Nimitz proposed a bold plan to use B-29 Superfortress bombers to mine the waterways surrounding the Japanese Home Islands. Although Generals Henry H. Arnold and Walter Hansell expressed concerns that this mining campaign could distract from the B-29's primary role as a strategic bombardment aircraft, they eventually agreed to assign one bomber group to focus on aerial mining when conditions permitted. On December 22, Hansell's 21st Bomber Command was directed to formulate a naval mining program aimed at executing between 150 to 200 sorties each month, which was set to begin in April 1945. However, by this time, General Curtis LeMay had taken command of the 21st Bomber Command. LeMay was notably enthusiastic about the idea and successfully recommended to Washington an upgraded mining program that aimed to deploy up to 1,500 mines each month using a full B-29 wing. LeMay viewed aerial mining in a different light than Arnold or Hansell, seeing it as a vital extension of strategic bombing. He recognized that most of Japan's war production materials, as well as a significant portion of its food supplies, were imported from regions such as China, Southeast Asia, and the Dutch East Indies. Japan's industrial heartland is primarily found on Honshu, its largest and most industrialized island, while Shikoku, another island, also lacks essential resources such as iron ore and high-quality coal. These crucial materials were sourced from Kyushu and Hokkaido, both of which are other Japanese islands. All these resources were transported by sea, so without easy access to raw materials, Japan’s industrial output would come to a grinding halt. The only aircraft capable of deploying mines effectively where they were needed were the B-29s. Areas such as the Inland Sea, the Sea of Japan, and the Korean Peninsula were out of reach for other Allied aircraft. Additionally, Allied submarines could only venture into these perilous waters with great risk. Notably, about 80% of Japan's merchant fleet utilized the Shimonoseki Strait, a critical waterway that separates Kyushu from Honshu. Understanding the strategic advantage of closing this strait, LeMay decided to allocate an entire wing of B-29s specifically to mine this vital route.

Brigadier General John Davies commanded the 313th Bombardment Wing, tasked with deploying approximately 2,000 naval mines each month into Japanese waters. The primary goals of this operation were to prevent essential raw materials and food supplies from reaching the Home Islands, hinder the supply and mobilization of Japanese military forces, and disrupt transportation routes in the Inland Sea of Japan. Between March 27 and April 12, Davies’ bombers targeted key enemy shipping bases located in Kure, Sasebo, and Hiroshima. They also focused on the Shimonoseki Strait, a narrow and strategically important waterway that links the Inland Sea with the Tsushima Strait. Notably, after these attacks, this strait was successfully closed for two weeks. On May 3 and 5, the 313th Bombardment Wing laid down a total of 1,422 mines in the waters surrounding the Shimonoseki Strait, as well as near major urban centers like Tokyo, Nagoya, Kobe, and Osaka. These efforts aimed to severely disrupt maritime commerce between Japan’s major industrial areas. Just a week later, the minefields expanded from the Shimonoseki Strait to include Kyushu, the southernmost of Japan’s four main islands, and northwest Honshu, the largest island containing Tokyo. By the end of that month, these mines were proving remarkably effective, accounting for the sinking of more ships than Japanese submarines. In fact, within the Shimonoseki Strait alone, 113 ships had been sunk.

Between June 7 and July 8, American forces expanded and fortified minefields along the western coast of Japan while also replenishing the existing minefields in the Shimonoseki Strait and the Inland Sea. During this effort, they successfully laid a total of 3,542 mines across 14 missions. The "total blockade" officially commenced on July 9 and continued until the end of the war. Throughout this period, American forces executed 474 sorties, dropping another 3,746 mines that replenished existing minefields and extended coverage to harbors in Korea. In total, Brigadier General Davies conducted 46 missions that laid down 26 minefields containing 12,135 mines. Remarkably, only 15 B-29s were lost during these operations. In turn, the mines accounted for the sinking or damaging of 670 Japanese ships, with a total loss of 1.25 million tons. This mining campaign effectively strangled Japanese industry, as the denial of essential raw materials to factories proved more disruptive than the direct bombing of the plants themselves. 

Despite the clear vulnerability of Japan’s economy to disruptions in coastal shipping, Japanese authorities were alarmingly unprepared to address the threat posed by air-dropped mines. By August 1945, Japan had committed 349 ships and 20,000 personnel to counter the Starvation campaign, but these efforts were overwhelmingly ineffective. The shipping crisis escalated to such a degree that searchlights and anti-aircraft batteries were redeployed from urban centers to defend expected mining targets. Additionally, suicide boats were employed in desperate attempts to clear the minefields. Royal Navy historian S.W. Roskill commented on the situation, stating, “The blockade had, in fact, been far more successful than we realized at the time. Although submarines initially played a critical role in enforcing the blockade, it was the air-laid mines that ultimately strangled Japan.” Japanese officials shared this assessment. A director from a Tokyo steel company reflected on the situation, noting that the denial of essential raw materials to factories caused far greater disruption than the direct bombing of the plants themselves. This contradicted the views of US Army Air Forces experts back in Washington. In a striking remark after the war, a Japanese minesweeping officer told American forces, “The result of B-29 mining was so effective against shipping that it eventually starved the country. You could have likely shortened the war by starting this campaign earlier.”

Meanwhile, General LeMay continued his firebombing campaign against Japan. By the end of May, urban areas around Tokyo Bay had been devastated, prompting the 21st Bomber Command to shift focus westward toward the densely populated industrial complexes lining Osaka Bay. On June 1, 521 B-29s were dispatched to bomb industrial targets situated along the Yodo River, with an escort of 148 P-51 fighters. Unfortunately, an undetected thunderstorm struck en route, which meant only 27 P-51s reached Osaka, while another 27 crashed, and the remaining fighters had to return to Iwo Jima. Despite these complications, the B-29s bombed from altitudes ranging between 18,000 and 28,500 feet, successfully dropping 2,788 tons of incendiary bombs on Osaka. The attack resulted in the burning of 3.15 square miles, destroying 136,107 houses and 4,222 factories.

Four days later, on June 3, 530 unescorted B-29 Superfortresses launched a bombing raid on the city of Kobe. Of those, 473 aircraft targeted the city, resulting in the destruction of 4.35 square miles. This devastating strike led to the demolition of 51,399 buildings, while another 928 suffered significant damage. The raid, however, came with losses, as 11 bombers were downed, and 176 were damaged in the operation. On June 7, 449 B-29s returned to Osaka. Despite facing heavy cloud cover that restricted visibility, they managed to burn an additional 2.21 square miles of the city, destroying another 55,333 buildings. 

By the conclusion of General Curtis LeMay’s maximum-effort area bombing campaign, the six most significant industrial cities in Japan, Tokyo, Nagoya, Kobe, Osaka, Yokohama, and Kawasaki, had been left in ruins. Major factories were either destroyed or severely damaged, while thousands of smaller household and feeder industrial units were consumed by flames. Casualty figures surged into six figures, leaving millions of people homeless. The evacuation of survivors further complicated efforts to secure labor for the factories that remained operational. Japan's air-raid protection system proved woefully inadequate to withstand a protracted siege by very heavy bombers. The system lacked sufficient organization, trained personnel, shelters, fire-fighting equipment, and facilities for relief and evacuation. Additionally, there was a significant deficiency in civilian indoctrination regarding emergency procedures. Under the relentless pressure of repeated major attacks, local Air Raid Precaution organizations collapsed, adding strain to an already overburdened imperial government. Japanese civilians, who had been conditioned by victory propaganda, displayed little of the discipline that helped German citizens endure years of aerial bombardment. As news of military defeats and the impact of B-29 precision strikes filtered into the great cities, residents began to lose confidence in their leaders’ ability to protect them or care for the victims of the attacks. Abe Motoki, the Minister of Home Affairs at the time, later remarked, “I believe that after the raids on Tokyo on May 23-24, 1945, civilian defense measures in that city, as well as in other parts of Japan, were considered a futile effort.” Regarding the operational cost of this campaign for the 21st Bomber Command, it was not considered excessively burdensome. Over the course of 17 maximum-effort incendiary attacks, LeMay dispatched a total of 6,960 B-29s, which dropped 41,592 tons of bombs. The losses amounted to 136 B-29s, averaging only 1.9% of the sorties, a rate significantly lower than what had been endured in earlier months, and quite acceptable by the standards of conventional strategic bombing.

Meteorologists predicted that the summer monsoon would keep Japan’s skies covered with clouds for most of the upcoming months, from June to August. As a result, LeMay shifted strategies under what became known as the Empire Plan. This approach prioritized targeting industrial and military sites during daylight hours when the weather permitted, while secondary cities that had sufficient industrial capability became targets for nighttime area attacks. This change meant that since no single target warranted a full four-wing maximum effort, multiple missions could be scheduled in a single day. Accordingly, on June 9, 110 B-29s attacked three aircraft factories located in Narao, Atsuta, and Akashi. The strikes successfully destroyed the factories in Narao and Atsuta, but an unfortunate miscalculation led to the bombing of the town near Akashi. The following day, June 10, a force of 280 B-29s, escorted by 107 P-51 Mustang fighters, targeted six distinct sites in the Tokyo Bay area. The mission yielded significant results, with all targets sustaining heavy damage. Finally, on June 15, 516 B-29s were dispatched for one last firebombing raid against Osaka and the neighboring city of Amagasaki. In this combined assault, 444 bombers dropped over 1,350 tons of incendiary bombs, incinerating an additional 1.9 square miles in Osaka and more than half a square mile in Amagasaki.

Starting on June 17, General Curtis LeMay’s firebombing campaigns began to focus on medium-sized secondary cities across Japan. On that day, 477 B-29 Superfortresses targeted the cities of Omuta, Hamamatsu, Yokkaichi, and Kagoshima, burning a combined total of six square miles in these urban areas. The success of this initial multi-target mission ensured the continuation of the program, establishing an operational pattern that would remain standard during the final weeks of the war. In total, multiple incendiary attacks were conducted on sixteen occasions, averaging about two missions per week. Between June 17 and August 14, American forces carried out 8,014 sorties, dropping a staggering 54,184 tons of incendiaries across 58 secondary cities. On June 22, 446 B-29s were dispatched to strike six targets located in southern Honshu, including the crucial Kure Naval Arsenal. In this mission, 382 bombers released 2,103 tons of bombs, inflicting heavy damage to these essential manufacturing facilities. Just four days later, on June 26, a force of 510 B-29s, accompanied by 148 P-51 Mustang escorts, targeted locations in southern Honshu and the nearby island of Shikoku. However, dense clouds over much of the area complicated assembly and forced many aircraft to attack targets of opportunity individually or in small groups. As a result, adverse weather conditions would delay subsequent daytime raids until July 24. 

In the coordinated strike program that commenced in June, the decision to focus on either the Empire Plan or urban industrial targets was largely influenced by weather conditions. As the program took shape, the 315th Bombardment Wing (VH) became available for combat operations. This wing operated somewhat independently from the other bomber units, with its activities significantly guided by the specialized equipment of its aircraft. Authorized for deployment in the Pacific in December 1944, the 315th settled at Northwest Field, Guam, during May and June. Its commander, Brigadier General Frank A. Armstrong, Jr., was a seasoned veteran of the strategic air offensive against Germany. The B-29s of the 315th Wing differed in two key respects from those of other units. They were equipped with the AN/APQ-7 (Eagle) radar, a sophisticated radar system designed for bombing, instead of the conventional AN/APQ-13 radar. The latter had primarily served as a navigational aid. While crews had become adept at using the AN/APQ-13 for night or poor-weather bombing, it lacked the precision necessary for accurate strikes. The Eagle radar, however, offered significantly greater definition and, although it required a long bomb run averaging seventy miles, this was not considered a serious hindrance in the tactical context of Japan. To further enhance its night-bombing capabilities, the Superfortresses had been stripped of all armament except for the tail gun. This modification, along with the Eagle radar, clearly marked the 315th as a dedicated night-bombing unit. There were various proposals for the use of these specially equipped B-29s, including high-altitude bombing, area bombing, and aerial mining. However, by the time the 315th Wing was ready for combat, the 313th Bombardment Wing had already gained proficiency in aerial mining, while all wings had become adept at area bombing using the AN/APQ-13. Training for the 315th had focused heavily on night radar tactics, with less emphasis on visual bombing and daytime formation flights. It was evident that if the Eagle radar was to undergo a thorough scientific evaluation, it should be tested against a specific set of targets that were preferably large in size and located along the coastline. In the view of the 21st Bomber Command, the oil industry met these requirements perfectly.

The 315th Bombardment Wing initiated its specialized campaign on June 26 with a targeted strike against the Utsube Oil Refinery in Yokkaichi, the top-priority target. By August 14, the wing had conducted 15 additional missions against a total of 10 targets, which included various petroleum refineries and synthetic plants, such as the Maruzen Oil Company in Wakayama, Mitsubishi Oil Company in Kawasaki, and Nippon Oil Company plants spread across Akita, Kansai, Kudamatsu, and Amagasaki, as well as the Imperial Fuel Industry Company in Ube and Toa Fuel Industry in Wakayama. During the campaign, the 315th Wing dispatched a total of 1,200 B-29s, 1,095 of which successfully bombed their primary targets, dropping 9,084 tons of 500-pound general-purpose bombs deemed particularly effective against the scattered installations.

The increase in bomb load capacity was made possible by stripping the planes of unnecessary equipment and conducting bombing missions individually at night. As the crews gained experience, they were able to increase the average weight carried from 14,631 pounds during the first mission to 20,684 pounds by August 9. Despite concerns about safety from removing most of the aircraft's armaments, only four planes were lost and 66 sustained damage throughout the campaign. The 20th Air Force estimated that the B-29 attacks led to the destruction of approximately 6 million barrels of tank storage capacity, and the United States Strategic Bombing Survey (USSBS) reported that refining capacity had been reduced from 90,000 barrels a day in December 1941 to around 17,000 barrels. However, the strategic impact was more apparent than real, as many storage tanks were empty and refinery production had fallen to just 4% of capacity before the very heavy bomber campaign began. The lack of precise intelligence regarding the state of Japan’s economy had justified the emphasis on the oil program as a form of reinsurance. Nevertheless, the blockade had effectively severed the nation's oil resources, resulting in tankers remaining idle at the docks.

On July 1, Admiral Halsey’s 3rd Fleet departed San Pedro Bay to initiate the first preliminary strikes in preparation for Operation Olympic. This operation involved battleships and heavy cruisers conducting surface bombardments of industrial targets in eastern Japan, while lighter forces performed anti-shipping sweeps along the coast. Additionally, a fleet of submarines advanced ahead of Admiral McCain’s Task Force 38 to eliminate picket boats and establish lifeguard positions. At 18:15 on July 9, the force began its 25-knot approach toward the Home Islands, launching its first strikes against the Tokyo area at 04:00 on July 10. A total of 1,732 sorties were executed, targeting locations from Koriyama to Hamamatsu, dropping 454 tons of bombs and 1,648 rockets over Honshu with negligible opposition. American airmen reported the destruction of 109 enemy aircraft and damage to 231 during these strikes.

Following this, Halsey’s fleet moved north to bombard Hokkaido and northern Honshu, which were beyond the effective range of the B-29s and had previously evaded attack. At 05:59 on July 14, Rear-Admiral John Shafroth’s Bombardment Group Able, consisting primarily of three battleships and two heavy cruisers, was tasked with attacking the Kamaishi Works of the Japan Iron Company. By midday, Shafroth’s forces had opened fire on Kamaishi, marking the first surface bombardment of Japan by a hostile fleet in over 80 years. Between 12:10 and 14:19, a total of 802 16-inch shells, 728 8-inch shells, and 825 5-inch shells were expended, setting the town ablaze as key industrial and residential targets were hit and resulting in the sinking of one oil tanker, two barges, and one small ship in the harbor. Simultaneously, McCain’s carriers closed to within 80 nautical miles of Japan, launching 1,391 sorties against Hokkaido and northern Honshu to target railways, shipping, and airfields, again facing only light resistance.

In the ensuing strikes, American planes sank over 50,000 tons of shipping and naval craft, including the destroyer Tachibana, four minesweepers, eight naval auxiliaries, and around 20 merchant vessels, with significant losses occurring at Muroran and Hakodate. In addition, 25 enemy planes were destroyed, while American losses totaled 24 aircraft and 17 airmen, about half of whom were lost in combat. Task Force 38 launched another assault on July 15, executing 966 combat sorties that dropped 355 tons of bombs and expended 2,093 rockets. This operation resulted in the sinking of 65 vessels and damaging 128 others, as well as the destruction of 48 locomotives and damage to 28. Widespread destruction was inflicted on several facilities, particularly the Aomori–Hakodate railcar ferry system, which transported 30% of the coal between Hokkaido and Honshu. The strikes devastated the ferry system, sinking eight ferries, beaching eight more, and damaging two. In total, 70 auxiliary sailing colliers were sunk, and 11 were damaged, along with 10 steel freighters lost and 7 damaged. The ferry strikes were the brainchild of Halsey’s operations officer, Captain Ralph “Rollo” Wilson. “When the first action reports began to sift in,” Halsey related: He snatched them up and pored over them; the ferries were not mentioned. Later reports also ignored them. Rollo was sulking and cursing when the final reports arrived. I heard him whistle and saw him beam. “Six ferries sunk!” he said. “Pretty soon we’ll have ‘em moving their stuff by oxcarts and skiffs!” 

Additionally, 20 city blocks in Kushiro were razed. The most significant outcome of these operations was the virtual severance of Hokkaido from Honshu. By the end of the raids, Halsey’s 3rd Fleet had achieved the sinking of 140 ships and small craft, damaging 235 others, and destroying 38 planes while damaging 46. Meanwhile, Rear-Admiral Oscar Badger’s Bombardment Group Baker, composed of three battleships, two light cruisers, and eight destroyers, was assigned to bombard Muroran. Between 09:36 and 10:25, this group fired 860 16-inch shells at the Nihon Steel Company and the Wanishi Ironworks, targeting both the coal liquefaction plant and coke ovens. This bombardment inflicted severe damage on those facilities and resulted in the destruction or damage of 2,541 houses in Muroran. As Hasley recalled “These sweeps and bombardments accomplished more than destruction. they showed the enemy that we made no bones about playing in his front yard. From now on, we patrolled his channels and shelled his coast almost every night that the weather permitted.” Additionally, Rear-Admiral James Cary Jones’ four light cruisers conducted a sweep along the east coast of Honshu to hunt for Japanese shipping; however, they reported no contacts during their mission.

Early on July 16, Task Force 38 retired east of Honshu to begin refueling and rendezvoused with Admiral Rawlings’ Task Force 37, which agreed to operate closely as an additional task group for Admiral Halsey. At 03:50 on July 17, the two task forces began launching strikes against central Honshu despite adverse weather conditions. The American forces executed 205 sorties targeting the Mito area, while British aircraft flew 87 sorties against airfields and railyards along the northwest coast of Honshu. Despite the bad weather, several small craft and locomotives were destroyed, though the operation resulted in the loss of nine aircraft and four airmen. Later that afternoon, Halsey detached Badger’s augmented Bombardment Group to attack Hitachi, a significant industrial and electronics-producing city. The 53-minute bombardment commenced in fog and rain at 23:14, during which 1,207 16-inch shells, 267 14-inch shells, and 292 6-inch rounds were expended against the Tago and Mito Works of the Hitachi Manufacturing Company, as well as the Yamate Plant and copper refining facilities of Hitachi Mine, resulting in severe devastation. On July 18, McCain’s two leading carriers launched a total of 592 sorties against Yokosuka, specifically targeting the heavily camouflaged battleship Nagato at the naval base. The attacks resulted in the sinking of one old cruiser, one minesweeper, one submarine, one incomplete destroyer, and three patrol vessels, in addition to damaging one subchaser, one old destroyer, and one old battleship. Although Nagato was hit multiple times and suffered heavy damage, it managed to stay afloat. Meanwhile, three carriers also targeted airfields and other opportunities in Tokyo, while Task Force 37 attacked a seaplane base at Kitaura and airfields at Nobara, Naruto, Chosi, Kanoike, Natori, and Kitakawa.

The recent raids resulted in the destruction of 43 enemy planes and damage to 77 others on the ground, along with the destruction of three locomotives and the derailing of four electrified train cars by rockets. However, the American forces incurred losses of 14 aircraft and 18 aircrew, as the 3rd Fleet flyers reported encountering the fiercest anti-aircraft fire they had yet experienced. Additionally, Rear-Admiral Carl Holden’s four light cruisers were detached during the night to sweep shipping off Sagami Bay and to target the radar site at Cape Nojima. On July 21, Captain Thomas Hederman’s Destroyer Squadron 61, consisting of nine destroyers, was assigned to conduct another anti-shipping sweep off Sagami Bay. Pursuing four radar contacts, the destroyers engaged targets at midnight on July 22, firing guns and torpedoes from 7,000 yards. This action resulted in the sinking of the 800-ton freighter No.5 Hakutetsu Maru and damaging the 6,919-ton Enbun Maru. In response, Japanese coastal artillery, the minesweeper W-1, and subchaser Ch-42 returned fire, but Hederman’s squadron successfully retired without damage. Although minor in scale, the Battle of Sagami Bay would ultimately be the last surface action of the war. Meanwhile, as part of Operation Barney, a planned submarine penetration of the Sea of Japan, nine submarines succeeded in sinking 27 Japanese merchant vessels and one submarine, totaling 54,786 tons. 

On June 8, the submarine Barb commenced her twelfth patrol, tasked with terrorizing the Sea of Okhotsk using her newly installed 5-inch rocket launchers. Over the following weeks, Skipper Commander Eugene “Luckey” Fluckey executed successful rocket bombardments on Shari, Hokkaido, and targets in Shikuka, Kashiho, and Shiritoru on Karafuto (southern Sakhalin), also employing the submarine's deck guns to destroy 35 sampans in the town of Kaihyo To. Observing Karafuto trains transporting military supplies to ports, Fluckey devised a plan to intercept these trains. Engineman Third Class Billy Hatfield recalled how, as a child, he had placed nuts on railroad ties and watched as the weight of passing trains cracked them between rail and tie. Realizing this principle could be adapted, he suggested rigging an automatic detonator. Fluckey had many volunteers for the mission, including a Japanese POW, and carefully selected Hatfield and seven others, deciding against leading the shore party himself.

Just after midnight on July 23, 1945, Fluckey maneuvered Barb to within 950 yards of the Karafuto coast. Led by Lieutenant William Walker, the team launched two rubber rafts at 00:30. Before they left, Fluckey instructed them, “Boys, if you get stuck, head for Siberia, 130 miles north, following the mountain ranges. Good luck.” Upon reaching the shore, the Americans located the tracks and buried a 55-pound scuttling charge and battery beneath the rails, positioning it under a water tower they planned to use as a lookout. As Motor Machinist’s Mate First Class John Markuson climbed up, he unexpectedly found he was scaling a sentry tower, causing him to retreat without alerting the sleeping guard. When a train passed, the team dove for cover before resuming their work after it had gone by. Shortly after 01:30, Walker’s team signaled their return to Barb, which was now just 600 yards offshore. Fifteen minutes later, while the boats were halfway back, Fluckey heard the rumble of an approaching train. He hoisted a megaphone and urged the crew to “Paddle like the devil, boys!” At 01:47, a 16-car Japanese train struck Hatfield’s detonator, resulting in a massive explosion that sent debris soaring 200 feet into the air and reportedly killed 150 Japanese. Minutes later, all eight Americans were safely aboard Barb, which then slipped back into the night, having successfully executed the only amphibious invasion of Japan during World War II. Returning to the main action, Halsey aimed to eliminate the remnants of the Combined Fleet at the heavily fortified Kure Naval Base. Consequently, Task Force 38 began launching the first of 1,363 sorties against ships and airfields in Kyushu, Shikoku, and Honshu, ringing the Inland Sea at 04:40 on July 24.

A total of 599 tons of bombs and 1,615 rockets were unleashed over Kure, resulting in the sinking or damaging of 22 warships, which totaled 258,000 tons. Among the affected vessels were the battleships Hyuga, Ise, and Haruna; fleet carriers Amagi and Katsuragi; the escort carrier Kaiyo; heavy cruisers Tone and Aoba; as well as light cruisers Oyodo and Kitakami. In addition, another 53 vessels amounting to 17,000 tons were sunk at various locations, including Hiroshima Bay, Niihama, Bungo Channel, and Kii Channel. At Kobe, the incomplete fleet carrier Aso was also attacked and damaged. American Hellcats and Corsairs effectively swept aside Japanese aerial opposition, shooting down 18 enemy planes while destroying 40 aircraft and damaging another 80 on the ground.

Furthermore, around the Inland Sea, 16 locomotives were destroyed and five were damaged, while 20 hangars sustained damage. Three oil tanks were set ablaze at Kure and one at Tano. Additionally, four electric trains and a roundhouse were strafed at Hamamatsu, and various military installations, including barracks, warehouses, power plants, and factories around the airfields, received significant damage. Simultaneously, Rear-Admiral Rawlings’ Task Force 37 conducted 257 sorties against targets in Japan and the surrounding offshore areas, sinking the escort carrier Shimane Maru in Shido Bay, along with a number of destroyers, small escorts, and coasters. Meanwhile, Jones’ light cruisers swept through the Kii Channel before bombarding the Kushimoto seaplane base and airfields at Cape Shionomisaki during the night. Supporting these efforts, General LeMay dispatched 625 B-29s against seven targets in the Nagoya and Osaka areas, successfully inflicting heavy damage on all of them despite the spotty weather, marking this as the last major attack on the Japanese mainland during the war, as two weeks of cloudy weather ensued.

In the early hours of July 25, McCain’s aircraft carriers resumed launching strikes against airfields and shipping in the Inland Sea and the Nagoya-Osaka areas. During this operation, they executed a total of 655 sorties, expending 185 tons of bombs and 1,162 rockets, successfully sinking nine ships totaling 8,000 tons and damaging another 35 vessels. The strikes also resulted in the downing of 21 Japanese planes, with an additional 61 aircraft destroyed on the ground and 68 damaged. After refueling on July 27, Halsey’s carrier forces moved to launch points located 96 nautical miles off Shikoku. At 04:43 on July 28, they resumed strikes over the Inland Sea, focusing on targets from northern Kyushu to Nagoya, as well as airfields across Honshu along the Sea of Japan. This resulted in McCain flying a total of 1,602 sorties, dropping 605 tons of bombs and expending 2,050 rockets. These attacks sank 27 ships, amounting to 43,000 tons, including the battleships Ise and Haruna, the fleet carrier Amagi, and the Combined Fleet flagship Oyodo. Additionally, 78 vessels totaling 216,000 tons were reported damaged, among them the fleet carrier Katsuragi, heavy cruiser Tone, and light cruiser Kitakami.

American pilots reported the destruction of 21 Japanese aircraft in the air and claimed 115 destroyed on the ground across 30 area airfields. They also successfully destroyed 14 locomotives, four oil cars, two roundhouses, three oil tanks, three warehouses, one hangar, and a transformer station. In support of these efforts, Task Force 37 conducted 260 sorties against the eastern Inland Sea, targeting the dockyard at Harima and sinking or severely damaging four corvettes at Maizuru. Meanwhile, the 7th Air Force’s 11th and 494th Bombardment Groups carried out a day-long raid on Kure, successfully sinking the heavy cruiser Aoba. By sunset that evening, the Imperial Japanese Navy had effectively ceased to exist, though the cost for the Americans was steep, with losses amounting to 101 planes and 88 men since July 24. As Halsey moved east to target the Osaka-Nagoya area, Shafroth’s reinforced Bombardment Group was detached on July 29 to bombard Hamamatsu. During the night, they successfully unloaded 810 16-inch shells, 265 14-inch shells, and 1,035 8-inch shells, damaging the Imperial Government Railway locomotive works, igniting a blaze at the Japanese Musical Instrument Company, and wreaking havoc on infrastructure along the critical Tokaido main line.

The following day, McCain’s carriers conducted 1,224 sorties against airfields in Osaka, Kobe, Maizuru, and Nagoya, expending 397 tons of bombs and 2,532 rockets. These strikes resulted in the sinking of 20 vessels totaling 6,000 tons and damaging another 56 ships. The pilots also claimed destruction of 115 enemy aircraft on the ground, while inflicting severe damage on numerous industrial targets, including aircraft factories and naval docks in Maizuru. In Miyazu Bay, the destroyer Hatsushino struck an air-dropped naval mine, marking the final loss of 129 Japanese destroyers sunk during the war. That night, seven destroyers advanced deep into Suruga Bay, unleashing 1,100 5-inch shells on Shimizu within seven minutes, successfully destroying or damaging 118 industrial buildings.

Typhoon weather would impede the operations of the 3rd Fleet for the next two weeks, as Admiral Nimitz ordered Halsey to steer clear of southern Japan, which was set to become the target of a new and deadly weapon: the atomic bomb. The U.S. Army had begun its project to develop an atomic bomb on August 16, 1942, under the auspices of the Manhattan Project. The project was directed by Major-General Leslie Groves and involved renowned scientists such as Robert Oppenheimer, Enrico Fermi, Niels Bohr, Richard Feynman, and Albert Einstein. Over time, it expanded to include a design center at Los Alamos and two production facilities at Hanford and Clinton.

By August 1945, the teams at Los Alamos had successfully designed, developed, and built a gun-type atomic bomb capable of forcing five pounds of uranium-235 against another 17 pounds at high speed, thereby achieving critical mass and releasing immense heat, light, blast, and radiation. The team was also experimenting with an even more powerful device: the plutonium bomb, which utilized an implosion method whereby a sphere of plutonium was compressed by conventional explosives to reach criticality. By early August, scientists had managed to produce enough nuclear material to create only one uranium device, known as Little Boy, and one plutonium bomb, referred to as Fat Man. Each weapon had the potential to annihilate an entire city, and American leaders were prepared to use them if it could compel the Japanese Empire to surrender without necessitating an invasion of Japan. A Targeting Committee led by Groves, consisting of Manhattan Project and Air Force personnel, recommended Hiroshima, Niigata, Kokura, and Nagasaki as primary targets. 

Groves' Targeting Committee employed several criteria to select sites for atomic bomb targets. The chosen targets had to possess strategic value to the Japanese and be situated between Tokyo and Nagasaki. Additionally, the target needed to feature a large urban area with a minimum diameter of three miles and must be relatively untouched by previous bombings, ironically spared for potential atomic destruction at a later stage. A crucial condition was that, to the best of their knowledge, these areas should harbor no concentrations of Allied prisoners of war. However, this requirement was challenging to ascertain accurately due to a lack of reliable information about the locations of prisoners. Initially, the committee considered 17 candidates and selected five primary targets: Hiroshima, Yokohama, Kokura, Niigata, and Kyoto. On May 28, they narrowed the list to three: Kyoto, Niigata, and Hiroshima. Hiroshima was significant as it housed Hata's 2nd General Army headquarters and featured a large shipyard, while Niigata was a major industrial city with an important port. Moreover, Kyoto held considerable cultural and religious significance for the Japanese. Secretary of War Stimson, having previously cautioned General Arnold about the humanitarian consequences of targeting cities with incendiary bombings, insisted on removing Kyoto from the list after intense discussions with Groves. On July 21, President Truman concurred with Stimson during their meetings in Potsdam, deciding that Kyoto should be spared. Subsequently, Kokura, known for its large arsenal and ordnance works, replaced Kyoto. Additionally, LeMay's staff reportedly included Nagasaki as an alternate target due to potential weather issues, as it was home to Mitsubishi's arms factories, electric production facilities, ordnance works, and extensive dockyards, making it a valuable target. Meanwhile, a high-level civilian Interim Committee, under Secretary of War Henry Stimson, ultimately advised President Truman on the use of nuclear weapons, reasoning that their deployment would be no worse than the current incendiary bombing campaigns against Japan.

The committee also recommended that an atomic bomb be deployed as soon as possible, without warning, to maximize shock value and target a "war plant… surrounded by workers' houses." Following a successful operational test of the experimental plutonium bomb conducted at Trinity on July 16, President Truman authorized General Spaatz to prepare for the bomb drops before August 3. Colonel Paul Tibbets’ 509th Composite Group had been specially organized in secret since September 1944 to deliver nuclear weapons, and by June, it had arrived at Tinian under the command of LeMay’s 21st Bomber Command. General Twinning replaced LeMay as commander of the 21st on August 1, and he would ultimately issue the direct orders for Tibbets to drop the atomic bomb. The atomic bomb mission had a convoluted command structure. The Joint Chiefs of Staff were largely left out of the chain of command. LeMay was Tibbet's nominal commander; however, Groves still had extensive control over the operation through his deputy Brigadier General Thomas Farrell on Tinian. The 21st Bomber Command would determine when the atomic bomb mission was launched, based on suitable weather conditions. Even at this stage, General of the Air Force Henry "Hap" Arnold and LeMay were still skeptical about the Manhattan Project; they thought B-29 incendiary and high-explosive bombing operations would suffice to end the war soon. LeMay even questioned the 509th CG pilots' ability to conduct the mission; he wanted seasoned Pacific B-29 veteran crews to drop the nuclear cargo.

While the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) and Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) prepared for an impending invasion, the U.S. Army Air Forces (USAAF) continued its bombing campaign against Japan. The crews of the 509th Composite Group needed to acclimate to the navigational challenges, varied weather conditions, extensive distances, and the geography of the region, all while becoming accustomed to combat situations. Training commenced at Tinian on June 30, with conventional operational missions over Japan beginning on July 20. To prepare for their atomic missions, the crews trained with "pumpkins," which were specially constructed bombs designed to mimic the appearance and weight of nuclear weapons. This allowed them to practice handling and releasing the bombs. They also rehearsed navigational procedures, visual bomb release techniques, and dropping the weapon at an altitude of approximately 30,000 feet. Following the drop, the crew conducted high-speed, radical turns to evade the nuclear effects after detonation. During their first mission, a B-29 from the 509th sought an alternative target in Tokyo. The crew aimed to drop their 10,000-pound "pumpkin" on the Imperial Palace, but unfortunately, they missed their target. Had they succeeded in killing the emperor, it could have significantly impacted Japan's decision-making process, potentially fortifying the Japanese people's resolve to continue the war. Military leaders might have seized control in the aftermath, pushing their forces to keep fighting. Throughout their training, the units of the 21st Bomber Command intentionally avoided targeting Hiroshima, Niigata, Kokura, and Nagasaki during these practice runs. In total, Tibbets directed his crews on numerous combat missions that targeted 28 cities and involved the dropping of 49 "pumpkins." Remarkably, the 509th lost no aircraft during these operations.

While Tibbets focused on perfecting the delivery method, the weapons Little Boy and Fat Man were being transported to Tinian. Some weapon assemblies were delivered by C-54 and B-29 aircraft from Kirtland Field near Albuquerque, while the cruiser Indianapolis delivered the fissionable material for Little Boy from San Francisco on July 26. Four days later, the submarine I-58 unexpectedly attacked the Indianapolis with six torpedoes while the cruiser was en route to Guam, successfully sinking it. Of the crew, 850 Americans survived the sinking, and another 316 were belatedly rescued by August 8. By July 31, most of the assembly of Little Boy had been completed. However, a detonation expert would need to emplace the cordite charges to fire the uranium "bullet" through the gun device to the uranium core after take-off, minimizing the risk of an inadvertent nuclear explosion in the event of a B-29 crash. Additionally, the crew carrying the atomic bomb had to exercise caution when descending once Little Boy was armed because the primary radar or a backup barometric fuse could potentially trigger an explosion if the aircraft descended too rapidly with the fuses in place.

On August 2, B-29 crews arrived at Tinian with the assemblies for Fat Man. On that same day, General Twinning and President Truman approved the plan to bomb Hiroshima. Two days later, Colonel Tibbets briefed the crews about the mission, confirming that he would pilot the aircraft carrying the atomic bomb. Tibbets' B-29 No. 82, later named Enola Gay, was supported by three weather reconnaissance aircraft that reported conditions at Hiroshima, Kokura, and Nagasaki, as well as two additional B-29s assigned to conduct scientific and photographic missions. At 02:45 on August 6, Enola Gay took off from Tinian, with diversionary attacks by 604 B-29s throughout Japan also scheduled for that day, as coordinated by Twinning. After passing through Iwo Jima at approximately 05:55, Captain William Parsons and Second-Lieutenant Morris Jeppson armed the bomb at 07:30. Throughout the journey, the B-29s ascended slowly, reaching an altitude of over 30,000 feet as they crossed Shikoku and Honshu, finally reaching Hiroshima at 31,060 feet. At 09:12, Tibbets executed his final approach from the 'initial point', flying east-west over the city towards the intersection of the Ota and Motoyasu Rivers. Approximately at 09:15, Little Boy was released, and Enola Gay immediately began its turn away to escape the impending explosion. However, the bomb mistakenly descended towards the Shima Surgical Hospital rather than the intended target, the Aioi Bridge. At 09:16, Little Boy detonated at an altitude of 1,890 feet, just as Tibbets was about six miles away from the blast point.

As a result of the atomic blast, the immediate area around the epicenter was heated to an astonishing 1 million degrees Celsius, instantly incinerating or vaporizing all people, animals, buildings, and other items within that zone. Hiroshima police officials estimated that immediate casualties amounted to 71,379 individuals who were either killed or reported missing. In the surrounding areas, the blast effects crushed unreinforced structures before igniting them, resulting in an additional 68,023 wounded, with 19,691 of those injuries classified as serious. Subsequent assessments, potentially incorporating the impacts of radiation sickness or more precise accounting, recorded 30,524 individuals as seriously wounded and 48,606 as slightly wounded. Just two minutes after detonation, a growing mushroom cloud of highly radioactive dust and debris soared to a height of 20,000 feet. Within eight minutes, Tibbets' crew could observe the mushroom cloud from 390 miles away. Ultimately, the dust cloud peaked at approximately 60,000 feet in altitude. Soon after, a thick, black, radioactive rain fell upon the areas beneath the cloud. The center of the city was utterly devastated; over four square miles of the urban center, which encompassed seven square miles in total, were completely flattened, resulting in about 60% of the city’s area being destroyed. An additional 0.6 square miles suffered damage, while more than 75% of the city’s 90,000 buildings were obliterated. The ensuing fires compounded the devastation, contributing to countless deaths and injuries. Tragically, some American prisoners of war were present in Hiroshima and lost their lives in the explosion. Meanwhile, Enola Gay safely returned to Tinian at 14:58, where Tibbets was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross, while the rest of the crew received Distinguished Flying Crosses for their participation in the mission.

I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me.

Japan was broken. To be perfectly honest she had been broken long ago. Her leadership had been spending months trying to figure out the best possible way to surrender, while the civilians and troops were suffering horribly. Aerial mining strangled her of food, high explosive and incendiary bombs, killed untold scores of people, and then the Atomic weapons were let loose upon her. It was over.

Last time we spoke about the fall of Wewak. In June 1945, Allied forces, led by General George Stevens, intensified their campaign to capture the strategic town of Wewak in New Guinea. After years of grueling combat, they relentlessly pressed against entrenched Japanese defenses, including the remnants of General Mano's 41st Division. The Australians achieved critical victories by securing vital supply routes and establishing new airfields, facilitating their advance. By May 8, after intense fighting, Australian troops effectively seized Wewak Point, eliminating entrenched Japanese soldiers in bunkers and caves. Despite suffering casualties, the Australians distinguished themselves through bravery and tactical ingenuity. Ultimately, the successful capture of Wewak marked a pivotal moment in the Pacific campaign, showcasing the determination and spirit of the Allies as they pushed towards victory in the Pacific Theater, bringing an end to a crucial chapter of the war.

This episode is Operation Downfall

Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. 

After the fall of Okinawa, the Allies were mopping up campaigns across the Asia-Pacific and planning for what was assumed to be the most cataclysmic battle yet, the invasion of the Japanese home islands. First we are going to travel back to Luzon. By mid-June, General Krueger’s 6th Army had successfully captured all key objectives in northern Luzon, southern Luzon, and the area east of Manila, which serves as the capital of the Philippines. Although General Yokoyama’s poorly equipped 41st Army had been rapidly scattered and forced into hiding, General Yamashita’s Shobu Group still retained enough strength to continue its resistance in northern Luzon. The Shobu Group was primarily gathering its units in a desperate last-stand position along the rugged valley of the Asin River, an area known for its difficult terrain. Interestingly, General Krueger underestimated Yamashita's strategic intentions, still expecting him to make his final stand in the Cagayan Valley, located in the northern part of Luzon. With this assumption, Krueger believed that if General Beigthler’s 37th Division could maintain its rapid advance towards Aparri, situated at the northern tip of Luzon, they might be able to conclude the Luzon Campaign in a pivotal stroke.

However, intelligence indicated that units of the Shobu Group were retreating into the Cordillera Central mountain range, a formidable natural barrier, located between Routes 4 and 11. In response, Krueger ordered the 1st Corps to exert strong pressure on this mountainous region from the north, south, and west. To implement this strategy, General Swift directed the 6th, 25th, and 33rd Divisions to clear the supply route between Baguio and Aritao, ultimately sealing off Yamashita's last-stand position from the south. Meanwhile, Colonel Volckmann's guerrilla forces were instructed to advance east from Cervantes to capture the crucial junction of Routes 4 and 11 at Sabangan. Recognizing the importance of controlling key roadways, the 63rd Regiment was tasked with pushing up Route 4 to seize the strategic location of Kiangan. In the south, the 130th Regiment began probing southeast towards Pigkian, while the 20th Regiment continued to apply pressure on the remnants of the now-battered 2nd Tank Division. Ultimately, General Iwanaka’s weakened forces narrowly avoided entrapment along the Bambang-Pingkian road, retreating northward via treacherous mountain trails and river valleys. They reached the Tubliao area just as early July arrived, illustrating the persistent and relentless nature of this campaign.

Looking northward from Cervantes, Volckmann’s guerrilla fighters launched attacks toward both Mankayan and Sabangan. By the end of June, their efforts had pressured the beleaguered 19th Division to hastily withdraw from Bontoc, a significant town located in central Luzon, and Sabangan. However, General Ozaki’s forces maintained a formidable defensive position at the Lepanto Mine, an area known for its mineral wealth and strategic significance. On June 16, the 63rd Regiment began its advance up Route 4, which runs north through the central highlands toward Kiangan, a town that was critical for controlling the region. By the evening of the following day, American forces had successfully breached the defensive line established by the 105th Division at the Rayambugan Farm School, a local educational institution that was repurposed for military use during the conflict. Continuing their push, the 63rd Regiment encountered the main defenses of General Tsuda on June 19 along Route 4. However, over five days of fierce fighting, utilizing only one battalion for the attack, gained little ground for the Americans. Recognizing the need for greater force, they reinforced their assault on June 24. By June 26, the 63rd began to break through towards Hucab, a small settlement, and by June 29, they had overcome the last organized resistance in the area.

Meanwhile, the 37th Division also made significant advances. Resuming its drive up Route 5 on June 17, the 148th Regiment successfully pushed forward to Naguilian, a town that marks a key waypoint on this route. Two days later, the front-line troops reached Bangag, yet here they encountered increased resistance. They were now facing elements of Major-General Yuguchi Shuntaro’s 80th Brigade, which was attempting to move south along Route 5. In a series of running engagements from June 19 to 23, the 37th Division inflicted heavy casualties, killing over 600 Japanese soldiers and capturing nearly 285 more in the challenging fifteen-mile stretch between Bangag and Balasig. The remnants of the Yuguchi Force were ultimately forced to retreat eastward into the rugged and uncharted wilderness of the Sierra Madre mountain range, illustrating the intense and chaotic nature of the conflict.

General Krueger deemed it essential to execute an airborne operation over the northern Cagayan Valley to ensure the success of the 37th Division's advance. It’s possible that Krueger’s motivation also stemmed from a desire to secure northern Luzon before the 8th Army took control of operations, which was scheduled for July 1. Despite contrary reports from various sources, including the United States Armed Forces in the Philippines Northern Luzon, 1st Corps, the 37th Division, and ALAMO scout teams, Krueger concluded that Japanese forces in the Cagayan Valley were retreating "in wild disorder on Highway 5 towards Aparri." It’s worth noting that, in actuality, the general movement of Japanese troops had been southward for weeks, and no Japanese unit intended to take refuge in Aparri, a flatland area surrounded by mountains that made it a poor defensive position. Based on his assessment of the situation, Krueger decided that in order to achieve the complete destruction of the fleeing enemy forces, he would launch a vertical envelopment of airborne troops to close any escape routes and prevent the Japanese from evading capture in Aparri. Consequently, on June 21, Krueger ordered a battalion combat team from the 511th Parachute Infantry of the 11th Airborne Division to parachute near Aparri on June 23. However, on June 21, the Connolly Task Force entered Aparri without facing any opposition. By the evening of June 22, elements of the Task Force had advanced ten miles south along Route 5, managing to secure the Camalaniugan Airstrip, a crucial airfield integral to the logistics of both sides. Despite the successes of the reinforced Connolly Task Force, Krueger did not change his mind about the desirability and necessity for the airdrop. Instead, he concluded that the "seizure of Aparri without opposition by elements of the Connolly Task Force on 21 June 1945, together with the almost unopposed advance of the 37th Division, indicated clearly that the time had come for mounting the airborne troops to block the enemy's retreat in the Cagayan Valley." It is not clear just what retreat Krueger expected to block.

On the morning of June 23, the paratroopers dropped into Camalaniugan unchallenged and immediately began their advance southward to make contact with the 37th Division. That same day, the 129th Regiment took over the offensive, heading north towards Tuguegarao, a significant town in the region. Tuguegarao fell without resistance by June 25. By nightfall, forward elements of the 129th had pushed ten miles beyond Tuguegarao, reaching the town of Iguig. The following day, June 26, the forces made contact with the paratroopers at the Paret River, further solidifying their position. By the close of June, Japanese resistance in the Cagayan Valley had subsided, and General Yamashita’s Shobu Group, still capable of fighting, found itself encircled in a last-stand area that would become known as the Kiangan Pocket, named by the Filipino-American forces engaged in its reduction. As the campaign progressed, the last elements of the 25th and 33rd Divisions were relieved. General Gill’s 32nd Division took over control of the Baguio-Ambuclao sector, while the bulk of General Hurdis’ 6th Division assembled at Hucab. This marked a significant transition as it signaled the conclusion of operations for Krueger’s 6th Army and Swift’s 1st Corps. The command would soon shift to General Eichelberger’s 8th Army and General Griswold’s 14th Corps, who would carry out further operations throughout Luzon.

General Griswold's plans called for relentless pressure to be maintained against the Shobu Group, which was concentrated in an area known as the Kiangan Pocket. In line with this strategy, Volckmann’s guerrilla fighters continued their assaults towards key locations such as Mankayan, Sabangan, and Bontoc. The 126th and 127th Regiments advanced north along Route 11 and into the Agno Valley, engaging mixed forces from the 58th Independent Mixed Brigade and the 19th Division. Simultaneously, the 20th and 63rd Regiments were preparing to renew their attack against the 105th Division located at Kiangan, as the advance led by General Hurdis had been halted by torrential rains that had severely damaged roads and bridges. Meanwhile, the 1st Regiment made its own push northward along Route 4 towards Banaue, a town famous for its rice terraces and mountainous landscape.

On July 9, Volckmann’s 15th Regiment finally secured Sabangan. The following day, the 11th Regiment captured Bontoc while the 66th Regiment began to break through the defenses set up by General Ozaki in the Lepanto Mines-Mankayan area. By July 12, Kiangan fell to the 63rd Regiment; however, they soon faced even heavier rains, which compelled General Hurdis to halt his advance once again. On July 20, the 1st Regiment reached Banaue. The next day, they made contact with elements of the guerrilla 11th Regiment at Polis Pass before turning east along Route 389. Here, they aimed to engage a concentration of around 2,500 Japanese soldiers from the 103rd Division and the 4th Air Division. Back in the west, Mankayan also fell on July 20. Five days later, elements of the 15th and 66th Regiments made contact at the junction where Routes 11 and 393 intersect. The 19th Division was withdrawing into the upper Agno Valley to establish defensive positions, blocking the northern, western, and southern approaches to Toccucan, a small but strategically important area. The 15th and 121st Regiments began their assaults toward Toccucan, but they soon encountered remnants of the 19th Division, who proved to be still capable of effective resistance. At the same time, the 66th Regiment moved south along Route 11 to establish contact with troops from the 32nd Division, pressing the offensive forward.

Looking east on July 24, the 20th Regiment took over positions at Kiangan and began an advance towards Kiangkiang and the Asin River. However, the Americans encountered greater resistance than anticipated along this route, making only a meager gain of three miles by August 15. At the same time, other units were dispatched south towards Tubliao to block the retreat of General Iwanaka’s remaining forces. On July 29, elements of the 66th and 127th Regiments finally established contact near Gambang. They then shifted east into the Agno Valley, close to Buguias, and initiated a southward drive to link up with the 126th Regiment, which they successfully met on August 8. By August 15, Volckmann’s guerrillas found themselves four miles short of Toccucan from the northwest and a mile and a half short from the west. In the eastern front, elements of the 1st and 11th Regiments advanced south from Banaue along Route 390, reaching a point about five miles south of Banaue by August 9. That same day, they also cleared Route 389 to the east, securing additional pathways for movement. Additionally, during this time, the 37th Division conducted vigorous patrols east of the Cagayan River, pushing enemy troops deeper into the Sierra Madre mountains. Unfortunately, this relentless pressure resulted in an estimated 1,000 Japanese casualties by August 15. Throughout a month and a half of grueling fighting in steep, treacherous terrain and under miserable weather conditions, the Filipino-American forces struggled to project any significant strength into the Asin Valley. They suffered approximately 1,650 casualties in total. In contrast, the 8th Army estimated that Japanese casualties during the same period reached around 13,500, with many killed or succumbing to starvation and disease.

This marked the effective conclusion of the Luzon Campaign, a campaign that would soon be overshadowed by Japan's surrender. General Yamashita estimated in June that he had sufficient supplies to sustain his forces until mid-September. Given the scale of effort the 8th Army was willing to dedicate to the campaign between July 1 and August 15, it seems likely that Yamashita would have met this deadline. When food supplies were depleted, Yamashita planned for his most effective remaining troops to attempt a breakout from the Asin Valley into the mountains of far northwestern Luzon, where he hoped to find more provisions. Those not involved in the breakout were to conduct banzai attacks along all fronts to cover the retreat of the main forces. Yamashita anticipated that whether or not the breakout succeeded, it would signal the complete disintegration of his forces. He even planned to commit hara-kiri amidst the chaos of battle. As a result, the end of the war arrived about a month before Yamashita was prepared to officially acknowledge his defeat. By any measure, the Shobu Group accomplished the delaying mission that Yamashita had envisioned. Throughout the 6th Army's control of operations on Luzon, the maximum commitment of major ground forces against the Shobu Group included four reinforced U.S. Army infantry divisions, one separate regiment combat team, an armored group, Volckmann’s , and the Buena Vista Regiment. When hostilities ceased on August 15, the Shobu Group was still "entertaining" three reinforced divisions: the 6th, 32nd, and 37th. Additionally, it had a significantly strengthened, the Buena Vista Regiment, and various other guerrilla units. After the war concluded, approximately 50,500 Japanese troops emerged from the mountains of northern Luzon, with nearly 40,000 of these coming from the Asin Valley's last-stand area. Ultimately, the war ended with about a third of the Shobu Group's peak strength still alive and capable of conducting organized and determined delaying operations. It is clear that, over the seven and a half months since January 9, the Shobu Group executed a remarkably effective delaying action. Despite the circumstances, the 14th Area Army had achieved its objective of tying down as many Allied forces as possible in Luzon. This diversion was critical, as it allowed the Japanese Empire valuable time to fortify its defenses in the Home Islands. 

Reflecting back to January, General Prince Higashikuni Naruhiko’s General Defense Command was operating with a modest force for the land and air defense of Honshu, Shikoku, Kyushu, and the Izu Islands. The primary focus had been on building naval and air power for Operation Sho-Go. In Kyushu and southwestern Honshu, the Western District Army, led by Lieutenant-General Yokoyama Isamu, consisted of only the 86th Division and the 12th Air Division. Meanwhile, the Central District Army, commanded by Lieutenant-General Kawabe Masakazu in central Honshu and Shikoku, had the 44th and 73rd Divisions supported by the 11th Air Division. To the northeast, in Honshu and the Izu Islands, General Fujie Keisuke's Eastern District Army maintained the 72nd Division, along with both the 1st and 3rd Imperial Guards Divisions, the 66th and 67th Independent Mixed Brigades, and the 10th Air Division. Additionally, Lieutenant-General Uemura Toshimichi’s 36th Army was positioned as a mobile reserve in the Kanto and Shizuoka area, comprised of the 81st and 93rd Divisions, along with the 4th Tank Division. Further north, Lieutenant-General Higuchi Kiichiro’s 5th Area Army had deployed the 7th and 77th Divisions, the 1st Air Division, and the 12th Air Fleet stationed in Hokkaido. It also maintained a mixed brigade at Karafuto. Lieutenant-General Terakura Shozo commanded the 27th Army in the Kuril Islands, which included the 42nd and 91st Divisions, along with the 43rd and 69th Independent Mixed Brigades, and the 3rd and 4th Amphibious Brigades, as well as the Chishima 1st Brigade and Naval Base Force. The air situation was equally dire; Japan had only around 550 aircraft available for offensive operations and a total of about 770 aircraft and 1,200 anti-aircraft guns designated for defensive roles.

As preparations for Operation Ten-Go unfolded, the air and ground units in Japan underwent significant reorganization in February. This restructuring led to the formation of several military commands, including Admiral Ugaki's 5th Air Fleet based in Kyushu, Vice-Admiral Maeda Minoru's 10th Air Fleet in Kanto, Lieutenant-General Yoshimoto Teiichi’s 11th Area Army in northeast Honshu, derived from the now-defunct 27th Army, and additional area armies such as Fujie’s 12th in east-central Honshu, Lieutenant-General Okada Tasuku’s 13th in west-central Honshu, Kawabe’s 15th in western Honshu and Shikoku, and Yokoyama’s 16th in Kyushu. The reorganization of high-level military headquarters was not the sole initiative at this time. The Japanese Empire also approved a large-scale mobilization plan that called for the deployment of 42 divisions, 18 independent mixed brigades, and six tank brigades, amounting to approximately 1.5 million personnel. Following the fall of Iwo Jima and Okinawa, and with intelligence indicating that the Soviet Union was redeploying troops from the European theater to the Far East, Japan began preparing for the defense of its homeland.

This preparation involved activating the 1st and 2nd General Armies to replace the General Defense Command and implementing Operation Ketsu-Go. The strategy for Operation Ketsu-Go outlined that the Imperial Japanese Army would strive to defeat American forces while their invasion fleet remained at sea. The plan aimed to deliver a decisive blow against the American naval forces by first destroying as many aircraft carriers as possible, utilizing the special attack units from both the Air Force and Navy. As the amphibious forces approached the range of homeland airbases, the entire air combat strength would be deployed for continuous day and night assaults against these ships. The focus of these air operations was to disrupt American landing plans, targeting primarily troop and equipment transports. Should any American forces successfully land, these would be swiftly assaulted by the IJA to secure a decisive victory. The primary objective of the ground operation was to eliminate the American landing force right on the beach. Operation Ketsu-Go was designed as a comprehensive joint defense effort, mobilizing the full capabilities of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. The Navy's essential role was to protect the coasts by attacking invasion fleets using combined surface, submarine, and air forces. The Air General Army would closely coordinate with the Navy to locate and destroy American transports at sea. If the invasion forces succeeded in landing, the local Area Army would take command of all naval ground forces in its assigned territory and would exercise operational control over air units in support of the ground operations. A key component of the Ketsu-Go operational planning involved reinforcing sectors under attack by units transferred from other regions. Given that U.S. air raids had already severely impacted the transportation network, plans were made for troop movements to be conducted on foot. If the battle at the beach held no promise of a successful outcome, the conflict would inevitably shift to fighting inland. To prepare for this, interior resistance was planned. Guard units and Civilian Defense Corps personnel, along with elements of field forces serving as a nucleus, would be utilized as resistance troops. Their mission would involve attriting American forces through guerrilla warfare, espionage, deception, disruption of supply areas, and blockades as enemy landing forces advanced inland. This operation divided Japanese territory into seven zones, where air and naval special attack forces were directed to eliminate invading forces at sea and to establish an aggressive coastal defense. Field Marshal Sugiyama Hashime’s 1st General Army established its headquarters in Tokyo, assuming control over the 11th, 12th, and 13th Area Armies. Meanwhile, Field Marshal Hata Shunroku’s 2nd General Army set up its headquarters in Hiroshima, overseeing the 15th and 16th Area Armies. Additionally, to provide a cohesive command structure for all Army air units participating in the campaign, an Air General Army headquarters was formed under Kawabe. On the naval front, Admiral Toyoda took command of the General Navy Command, granting him supreme operational authority over all Navy surface and air forces.

In the coming months, the Japanese continued to prepare for the anticipated invasion by mobilizing new units and diverting existing forces from Manchuria and other regions. By August, Yoshimoto’s 11th Area Army had been reinforced to include seven infantry divisions and two infantry brigades. The 12th Area Army, now under General Tanaka Shizuichi, was significantly larger, comprising 20 infantry divisions, two tank divisions, eight infantry brigades, three tank brigades, three artillery brigades, and one anti-aircraft brigade. Okada’s 13th Area Army was organized with six infantry divisions, three infantry brigades, one tank brigade, one artillery brigade, and one anti-aircraft brigade. The 15th Area Army, under the command of Lieutenant-General Uchiyama Eitaro, was formed with eight infantry divisions, three infantry brigades, one artillery brigade, one anti-aircraft brigade, and two tank regiments. Yokoyama’s 16th Area Army included a substantial force of 15 infantry divisions, eight infantry brigades, three tank brigades, three artillery brigades, and one anti-aircraft brigade. Additionally, Higuchi’s 5th Area Army consisted of six infantry divisions and two infantry brigades.

In tandem with these ground preparations, Lieutenant-General Sugawara Michio’s 6th Air Army and Ugaki’s 5th Air Fleet were assigned the critical role of launching a powerful air counterattack against the American invasion fleet, targeting carriers, gunnery ships, and transport vessels. In conjunction with elements from the 1st Air Army, 5th Air Army, 3rd Air Fleet, and 10th Air Fleet, the Japanese strategy focused on executing strikes against US carriers. For this task, 330 IJNAF aircraft were specifically assigned. An additional 250 aircraft from both the IJAAF and IJNAF were designated to target gunnery ships, while transports would be subjected to round-the-clock suicide attacks over a span of 10 days. Various aircraft types,including trainers, transports, float planes, bombers, and obsolete fighters, would be used in kamikaze missions. The air assaults on the transports would also incorporate all available aircraft not assigned to other operational duties. Although Japanese fighters had limited effectiveness against B-29 raids, they were expected to inflict damage on the invasion fleet. It was essential, however, that IJAAF and IJNAF fighters first establish air superiority over the targeted areas. Achieving this goal was a questionable assumption, especially given the formidable strength of US air power. By the end of June, nearly 8,000 aircraft, predominantly kamikazes, had been assembled for what was expected to be a decisive battle, with an estimated additional 2,500 planes likely to be produced by the end of September. To enhance their efforts, Kaiten suicide midget submarines and various special attack units were also designated to target any invading fleet, underscoring the significance of suicide attacks in Japanese military strategy. The hope was that these suicide, or tokko, units would inflict a 30 to 50 percent loss on the invading forces. However, as of June 30, only 1,235 surface special-attack boats and 324 underwater types had been produced, significantly hampering Japan's preparations for the impending decisive battle.

In preparation for the seizure of Japan's industrial heart through an amphibious invasion, General MacArthur was laying the groundwork for a significant military operation. On April 3, the Joint Chiefs of Staff designated him as the Commander in Chief of the United States Army Forces in the Pacific. This appointment granted him administrative control over all Army resources in the Pacific, with the exceptions of the 20th Air Force, the Alaskan Command, and the Southeast Pacific forces. Additionally, all naval resources in the Pacific, except those in the Southeast Pacific Area, were placed under Admiral Nimitz's control, making them available for major operations against Japan. With the conclusion of the war in Europe, plans were proposed to redeploy 10 infantry divisions, 5 armored divisions, and 72 air groups to the Pacific. Consequently, the total forces in the Pacific were set to increase from approximately 1.4 million Army troops as of June 30 to nearly 2,439,400 by December 31. On June 2, the 20th Air Force was reorganized into the U.S. Army Strategic Air Force under General Carl Spaatz. This command would oversee the newly formed 20th Air Force led by Lieutenant-General Nathan Twinning, which had been reorganized from the 21st Bomber Command, and Lieutenant-General James Doolittle’s 8th Air Force, which was restructured from the 20th Bomber Command and slated for deployment in the Ryukyus. Simultaneously, MacArthur was developing plans for Operation Downfall, the ambitious strategy for invading Japan. This operation envisaged a massive offensive against the islands of Kyushu and Honshu, utilizing all available combined resources from the Army, Navy, and Air Forces.

The invasion plan consisted of two key operations: Operation Olympic and Operation Coronet. The American plan for the invasion of Kyushu focused on seizing only the southern part of the island, delineated by a line extending from Tsuno on the east coast to Sendai on the west. The 3,000 square miles included within this boundary were considered sufficient to provide the necessary air bases for short-range support in the final operations planned against the industrial centers of Honshu. Within the selected southern region for invasion, known as the "Olympic" plan, there were four lowland areas identified as suitable for the development of major airfields. The first area extended from Kagoshima, located on the western shore of Kagoshima Bay, through a narrow corridor to the Kushikino plain along the East China Sea. The second area ran northward from Shibushi on Ariake Bay, traversing a winding valley to Miyakonojo. The third area began at Kanoya, situated east of Kagoshima Bay, and followed the coastline of Ariake Bay. The fourth and largest area was located north of Miyazaki on the east coast.

Four months after American troops first landed on Kyushu, the next decisive amphibious operation against Japan was set to be launched. Code-named Coronet, this invasion targeted the Kanto Plain area of Honshu and was scheduled for March 1, 1945. The operation was tasked to two armies: the First and the Eighth, assigned to conduct a major assault against the heartland of Japan. Their immediate objective was to destroy all opposition and secure the Tokyo-Yokohama area. General MacArthur would personally command the landing forces and oversee ground operations on the mainland. Accompanying him would be the advance echelon of his General Headquarters, which would operate as the Army Group Headquarters in the field. The initial landings would involve 10 reinforced infantry divisions, 3 marine divisions, and 2 armored divisions. These forces, launched from the Philippines and Central Pacific bases, would be continuously protected by the ships and aircraft of the Pacific Fleet, alongside land-based air support. Thirty days after the initial assault, each army was set to be reinforced by a corps of 3 additional divisions. Five days following this reinforcement, an airborne division and an AFPAC Reserve Corps consisting of another 3 divisions would be made available. In total, these 25 divisions were tasked with seizing the Kanto Plain, including the general areas of Tokyo and Yokohama, and carrying out any further operations necessary to overcome Japanese resistance. The strategic reserve for the entire operation would comprise a corps of 3 divisions located in the Philippines, along with sufficient reinforcements from the United States, allowing for the deployment of 4 divisions per month.

For Operation Olympic, General Krueger’s 6th Army was appointed to lead the effort, employing a total of 14 divisions that were already positioned in the Pacific. Meanwhile, the 1st and 8th Armies were designated to conduct Operation Coronet, comprising a total of 25 divisions primarily sourced from the redeployment of troops and equipment from the European theater. Eichelberger’s 8th Army planned to land on Sagami Bay and subsequently fan out to secure the western shores of Tokyo Bay, reaching as far north as Yokohama. Concurrently, General Courtney Hodges’ 1st Army was set to land at the Kujukuri beaches, with the objective of pushing west and south to clear the eastern shores of both Tokyo and Sagami Bays. To mitigate the risks associated with landing on the heavily fortified and well-garrisoned islands of Japan, a comprehensive campaign of air-sea blockade and bombardment was advocated. 

The 20th Air Force, launching from bases in the Marianas and the Ryukyus, aimed to cripple Japan's industrial capacity by ruthlessly attacking factories and transportation systems. This steady assault from the massive B-29 bombers was expected to severely diminish Japan's ability to sustain its large military organization and effectively distribute its remaining power. Simultaneously, carrier task forces would conduct repeated raids on crucial coastal areas, targeting enemy naval and air forces, disrupting shore and sea communications, and supporting long-range bombers in their strikes against strategic objectives. The Far East Air Force, also based in the Ryukyus, would focus on selected targets intended to dismantle Japan's air capabilities both in the homeland and in nearby regions of North China and Korea. By intercepting shipping and shattering communication lines, the Far East Air Force aimed to complete the isolation of southern Kyushu, preparing it for an amphibious assault. As the target date approached, it was planned that these air raids would intensify, culminating in an all-out effort from X-10 to X-Day. In the final ten days before the landing phase, the combined bombing power of all available planes, both land-based and carrier-based, would be unleashed in a massive assault. The objectives included reducing enemy defenses, destroying remaining air forces, isolating the target area, and facilitating preliminary minesweeping and naval bombardment operations. The fortifications within the designated landing areas would be overwhelmed by tons of explosives, while naval vessels and engineering units worked to eliminate underwater mines and barriers. With such concentrated power backing them, it was anticipated that the amphibious forces would be able to execute their assault landings with minimal losses. This strategy aimed to minimize casualties, further diminish Japan's air capabilities, and cut off reinforcements from Asia. There was even a possibility that such measures could compel Japan to surrender, thus eliminating the need for a significant landing on the Home Islands. In a notable first, Admiral Spruance’s 5th Fleet and Admiral Halsey’s 3rd Fleet were to operate simultaneously. Admiral Spruance's fleet would focus on the landing operations, while Admiral Halsey’s fleet would provide strategic support through raids on Honshu and Hokkaido.

On July 28, the 16 fast carriers of Admiral McCain’s Task Force 38 and the four British carriers of Admiral Rawlings’ Task Force 37 commenced operations to weaken the air, naval, and shipping capabilities of the Home Islands. By mid-August, Vice-Admiral John Towers was assigned command of a reinforced Task Force 38, tasked with executing a series of strikes against Japan east of the 135th meridian, while General Kenney’s Ryukyus-based Far Eastern Air Forces targeted objectives to the west. Additionally, Rawlings’ Task Force 37, enhanced to nine carriers, launched diversionary strikes against Hong Kong and Canton. Starting on October 18, the 3rd Fleet began aggressive operations against aircraft, airfields, and shipping in Kyushu, Shikoku, and Honshu to isolate the assault area for the upcoming Kyushu invasion. Six days later, the Fast Carrier Task Force was divided into Task Force 38 and Task Force 58. Task Force 38 retained 12 fast carriers specifically for strikes against Japan. The pre-invasion air strikes, surface bombardments, and minesweeping operations in the Kyushu landing zones commenced, steadily increasing in intensity as they approached X-Day on November 1. The ten fast carriers of Vice-Admiral Frederick Sherman’s Task Force 58 would provide direct support for the Kyushu landings, which were to be conducted by Admiral Turner’s Task Force 40, consisting of 800 warships and 1,500 transports. In this effort, three Fire Support groups, each accompanied by an escort carrier group, would launch preemptive assaults on the designated Olympic landing zones. 

Off southeastern Kyushu’s Ariake Bay, Rear Admiral Richard Connolly's 3rd Fire Support Group (TG 41.3), comprising 6 old battleships, 6 cruisers, 13 destroyers, and 34 support craft, was tasked with eliminating coastal batteries at Toi Misaka, Hi Saki, and Ariake Bay. Additionally, they would target seaplane bases and suicide boat/submarine pens at Oshima, Odatsu, Biro Jima, and Sakida, followed by softening defenses at the XI Corps landing beaches. Meanwhile, approximately 30 miles north along Kyushu’s southeastern coast, Rear Admiral Ingolf Kiland’s 7th Fire Support Group (TG 41.7), consisting of 3 old battleships, 8 cruisers, 11 destroyers, and 35 support craft, would bombard coastal batteries, suicide-boat nests, and seaplane bases located at Tozaki Hana, Hososhima, and Miyazaki. This group would also destroy rail junctions at Tsumo Jogasaki and Tsuno to disrupt reinforcements heading south, before finally shelling the I Corps invasion beaches near Miyazaki. Off southwestern Kyushu, Rear Admiral Giraud Wright’s 5th Fire Support Group (TG 41.5), with 4 old battleships, 10 cruisers, 14 destroyers, and 74 support craft, was set to hammer fortifications within the Koshiki Retto and at the beaches between Kaminokawa and Kushikino. Their mission included knocking out Noma Misaki and Hashimi Saki coastal batteries, the Akune seaplane base, and Kushikino’s airfield, while also cutting the Akune–Kushikino road and rail lines. Ultimately, they would provide heavy fire support for the V Amphibious Corps landing beaches. Meanwhile, General Krueger planned to first secure Kagoshima and Ariake Bays as crucial ports of entry. Following that, the objective was to push inland as far as the Tsuno-Sendai line to block mountain defiles and prevent any enemy reinforcements from the north.

As a preliminary operation, on October 28, the reinforced 40th Division, now under Brigadier-General Donald Myers, was assigned to seize positions in the Koshiki Island group opposite Sendai. The objective was to establish emergency naval and seaplane bases on these islands while also clearing the sea routes to the coastal invasion area of Kushikino. The 40th Division was also tasked with making preliminary landings on the four islands of Tanega, Make, Take, and Lo off the southern tip of Kyushu, with the goal of safeguarding the passage of friendly shipping through the strategic Osumi Strait. On November 1, General Krueger's three main corps were set to conduct simultaneous assault landings in the designated objective areas. Major-General Harry Schmidt’s 5th Amphibious Corps would land near Kushikino, drive eastward to secure the western shore of Kagoshima Bay, and then turn north to block the movement of enemy reinforcements from upper Kyushu. Meanwhile, General Hall’s 11th Corps was to land at Ariake Bay, capture Kanoya, advance to the eastern shore of Kagoshima Bay, and then move northwestward to Miyakonojo. Following this, Swift’s 1st Corps would assault Miyazaki on the east coast, subsequently moving southwest to occupy Miyakonojo and clear the northern shore of Kagoshima Bay, thereby protecting the northeast flank. Additionally, Major-General Charles Ryder’s 9th Corps, initially held in reserve, was selected to execute a diversionary feint off the island of Shikoku while the other three assault corps advanced on the actual landing beaches. Finally, Krueger kept the 77th Division and the 11th Airborne Division in Area Reserve, prepared to follow up the invasion forces. Should these units prove insufficient to fulfill their assigned tasks, a buildup from units earmarked for Coronet would be initiated at a rate of three divisions per month.

On the other side, the Japanese anticipated that Kyushu would be the next target and identified the same beaches selected for Operation Olympic as the most likely landing sites. In response, Generals Hata and Yokoyama concentrated the formidable 57th Army under Lieutenant-General Nishihara Kanji around the areas of Ariake Bay and Miyazaki. Meanwhile, Lieutenant-General Nakazawa Mitsuo commanded the 40th Army, which was positioned in the Ijuin-Kagoshima sector to the west. Hata's mobile reserves were stationed near Mount Kurishima, consisting of at least five divisions and several independent brigades, prepared to swiftly engage enemy forces before they could establish secure beachheads. Although Yokoyama and Hata did not anticipate an invasion in northern and central Kyushu, they had many units distributed throughout the region. The Japanese government prioritized defensive preparations for Kyushu over those for Honshu, hoping that a fierce defense of Kyushu would deter American forces from attempting a similar operation on Honshu.

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General Krueger's forces tackled Japan's Shobu Group in Luzon, while preparing for Operation Downfall, the invasion of Japan itself. Despite tough terrain, American forces made significant gains, encircling the Japanese. Meanwhile, Japan readied for defense, mobilizing troops and launching air counterattacks. As the Allies pressed forward, the impending invasion loomed, with strategies developed to land on Kyushu and Honshu. Ultimately, intense battles shaped the eve of an operation that would determine the war’s fate and change history forever.