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The Pragmatics of Knowledge, Counter-Examples to Pragmatic Contaminations of Knowledge, Pragmatic Inconsistencies, and the Knowledge Norm of Assertion
Igal Kvart (Jerusalem) gives a talk at the MCMP Colloquium (20 June, 2013) titled "The Pragmatics of Knowledge, Counter-Examples to Pragmatic Contaminations of Knowledge, Pragmatic Inconsistencies, and the Knowledge Norm of Assertion". Abstract: In this paper, I start with briefly summarizing my account of the pragmatics of Knowledge, contrasting it with the competing accounts favoring the pragmatic contamination of the semantics of knowledge ascriptions, such as Epistemic Contextualism and Pragmatic Encroachment (most notably represented by Subject-Sensitive Invariantism – SSI). The proposed pragmatic account, I claim, explains the examples in question, obviating the need for accounts that invoke pragmatic contamination of the semantics of knowledge ascriptions. I then further propose two different counter-examples to the above Pragmatic Contamination of Knowledge accounts, which in turn hold out in the light of, and are well explained by, the pragmatic account of knowledge I offer. I proceed to offer the notion of Pragmatic Inconsistencies associated with the Steering Role of Knowledge, which is a main feature of the pragmatic account I suggest. I will claim such a pragmatic inconsistency character for Moorean variants, use it against Stanley's Certainty Norm of Assertion, and argue against Williamson's version of the Knowledge Norm of Assertion, arguing for an alternative version of my own.
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By MCMP TeamIgal Kvart (Jerusalem) gives a talk at the MCMP Colloquium (20 June, 2013) titled "The Pragmatics of Knowledge, Counter-Examples to Pragmatic Contaminations of Knowledge, Pragmatic Inconsistencies, and the Knowledge Norm of Assertion". Abstract: In this paper, I start with briefly summarizing my account of the pragmatics of Knowledge, contrasting it with the competing accounts favoring the pragmatic contamination of the semantics of knowledge ascriptions, such as Epistemic Contextualism and Pragmatic Encroachment (most notably represented by Subject-Sensitive Invariantism – SSI). The proposed pragmatic account, I claim, explains the examples in question, obviating the need for accounts that invoke pragmatic contamination of the semantics of knowledge ascriptions. I then further propose two different counter-examples to the above Pragmatic Contamination of Knowledge accounts, which in turn hold out in the light of, and are well explained by, the pragmatic account of knowledge I offer. I proceed to offer the notion of Pragmatic Inconsistencies associated with the Steering Role of Knowledge, which is a main feature of the pragmatic account I suggest. I will claim such a pragmatic inconsistency character for Moorean variants, use it against Stanley's Certainty Norm of Assertion, and argue against Williamson's version of the Knowledge Norm of Assertion, arguing for an alternative version of my own.
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