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Whatever degrees of freedom we may have, they seem to be "contained" in the Imaginary. The Lacanian Imaginary makes whole and complete what is neither whole nor complete, which is the Real. But it is this "non-relation" between wholeness in the Register of the Imaginary and "lack" in the Register of the Real that allows our imaginary projections into the void to be somewhat indeterminate, or to contain relative degrees of freedom. These imaginary projections are types of illusions, which might be thought of in terms of the Lacanian virtual object that he called "Object-small-a." Virtual objects appear as if real, even though they are imaginary projections. Lacanian psychoanalysis was to open up whatever degrees of freedom are available to the analysand by "traversing the fantasy" of this virtual projection. The analysand must distantiate from the virtual object enough to realize the difference between the object of desire, which is what the fantasy is projected on to, and the object-cause-of-desire, which is the obstacle that constitutes the imaginary projection as a positivization of lack. The freedom of the Imaginary is given by the realization of this gap because it is the gap of indeterminacy in determinate being that is given by the void of nonbeing. And it is the indeterminacy of desire that allows for a reinterpretation of a determinate symptom.
The relation between being and nonbeing gives the open indeterminacy of virtuality, which might be thought of as the relative degrees of freedom contained in "actual possibility." The virtual does have a sort of reality because as Deleuze put it, the virtual is "actualized" but not "realized" possibility. The phenomenological intention works in this same way. It imagines noumenal reality as phenomenal objects. We perceive the world in Gestalt Wholes, not as it is "in-itself." Our freedom is given to us when the wholes given by the concepts of the Symbolic fail to be whole, which is the gap given by the relation of whole objects to what resists objectification completely, which is the Lacanian Real. Zizek formulates this freedom as the failure of the Symbolic to interpolate being in the register of the Real. For example, our personal identity is singular because our "irreducible ambiguity," in Levinas's famous locution, cannot be interpolated into the Symbolic. We are the relation formed at the intersection of the Symbolic and its failure, and this relation is indeterminate. Our freedom is exactly here with this indeterminacy, which Heidegger formulated as determinate being's relation to the void, or the creativity of the imagination. Paul Ricoeur's Hermeneutics demonstrate how this imaginal freedom is properly employed.
Baddass vibes mixed by James Reeves of Midnight Radio: jamesreeves.co
By https://www.martinessig.comWhatever degrees of freedom we may have, they seem to be "contained" in the Imaginary. The Lacanian Imaginary makes whole and complete what is neither whole nor complete, which is the Real. But it is this "non-relation" between wholeness in the Register of the Imaginary and "lack" in the Register of the Real that allows our imaginary projections into the void to be somewhat indeterminate, or to contain relative degrees of freedom. These imaginary projections are types of illusions, which might be thought of in terms of the Lacanian virtual object that he called "Object-small-a." Virtual objects appear as if real, even though they are imaginary projections. Lacanian psychoanalysis was to open up whatever degrees of freedom are available to the analysand by "traversing the fantasy" of this virtual projection. The analysand must distantiate from the virtual object enough to realize the difference between the object of desire, which is what the fantasy is projected on to, and the object-cause-of-desire, which is the obstacle that constitutes the imaginary projection as a positivization of lack. The freedom of the Imaginary is given by the realization of this gap because it is the gap of indeterminacy in determinate being that is given by the void of nonbeing. And it is the indeterminacy of desire that allows for a reinterpretation of a determinate symptom.
The relation between being and nonbeing gives the open indeterminacy of virtuality, which might be thought of as the relative degrees of freedom contained in "actual possibility." The virtual does have a sort of reality because as Deleuze put it, the virtual is "actualized" but not "realized" possibility. The phenomenological intention works in this same way. It imagines noumenal reality as phenomenal objects. We perceive the world in Gestalt Wholes, not as it is "in-itself." Our freedom is given to us when the wholes given by the concepts of the Symbolic fail to be whole, which is the gap given by the relation of whole objects to what resists objectification completely, which is the Lacanian Real. Zizek formulates this freedom as the failure of the Symbolic to interpolate being in the register of the Real. For example, our personal identity is singular because our "irreducible ambiguity," in Levinas's famous locution, cannot be interpolated into the Symbolic. We are the relation formed at the intersection of the Symbolic and its failure, and this relation is indeterminate. Our freedom is exactly here with this indeterminacy, which Heidegger formulated as determinate being's relation to the void, or the creativity of the imagination. Paul Ricoeur's Hermeneutics demonstrate how this imaginal freedom is properly employed.
Baddass vibes mixed by James Reeves of Midnight Radio: jamesreeves.co