In this episode, we discuss:

*How the Germans and Soviets organized their forces in and near Ukraine on the eve of Operation Barbarossa and the principal senior commanders on each side

*Why the Southwestern Front put up a stouter resistance against Army Group South than did its counterparts against Army Groups North and Center

*The Uman encirclement and what this defeat meant for the Soviets

*The likelihood of a Soviet soldier captured in 1941 surviving until 1945

*The 3-month siege of the city of Odessa

*The capture of Crimea

*Where the Soviets thought the main German blow would land in the summer of 1942 and why

*The Second Battle of Kharkov

*The role the Dneper River plays in the fighting in Ukraine in 1941 and 1943

*Where the war in Ukraine stood by the end of 1943

*The Cherkassy Pocket

*Hube’s Wandering Pocket

*Stalin's role in military operations and how this changed over time

*Stalin’s working relationships with his generals and how these evolved

*Aspects of the war in Ukraine in WWII that Richard would like to research

*Two things Richard wants U.S. Marines and soldiers to know about Ukraine in World War II

*Some parallels between the fighting in Ukraine in WWII and the war there now

*Richard's assessment of the Russian and Ukrainian militaries’ performance so far

*How likely we are to see the war escalate to involve NATO forces

Links

The Russian Way of War: Operational Art, 1904-1940 by Richard Harrison

Architect of Soviet Victory in World War II: The Life and Theories of G.S. Isserson by Richard Harrison

The Soviet Army High Commands in War and Peace, 1941–1992 by Richard Harrison

When Titans Clashed: How the Red Army Stopped Hitler by David Glantz and Jonathan House

Errata

Near the beginning of the interview, I ask Richard about the “German” siege of Odessa in 1941. In fact, the Romanians besieged and captured the city, with some assistance from the Germans.