Controversy & Clarity

In this episode, we discuss the following topics.

*What a combat engineer platoon does as part of a battalion landing team

*What it was like joining BLT 1/8

*Building trust between Everett’s platoon and BLT 1/8

*Everett’s advice to platoon commanders looking to build trust between units

*His platoon’s training plan for the 24th MEU workup

*Responding to complaints from Marines about a high-tempo schedule

*The platoon’s experiences on the 24th MEU prior to heading to HKIA

*When the possibility of deploying to HKIA first came on Everett’s radar

*His reaction and his Marines’ reactions to learning they would go to HKIA 

*Being labeled “the lead combat engineer for HKIA”

*The tough decision to leave Marines behind on ship

*The value of crossing training

*The first few days on the ground at HKIA

*Reactions to the news that the Taliban would cooperate with the Coalition

*Working at Abbey, East, and North Gates

*The last phase of the withdrawal

*Creativity and problem-solving at HKIA

*Radio communications during the NEO

*Everett’s advice for lieutenants who may find themselves in situations like at HKIA

*The training he received at Marine Corps Engineer School

*Enemy contact at HKIA

*Dismantling several of HKIA’s guard towers

*Command and control at HKIA

*Maneuver warfare concepts applied at HKIA

*What Everett was doing the day of the Abbey Gate Bombing

*Talking to his platoon about the Marine losses at HKIA

*What Everett observed in his Marines after the NEO

*Returning to Camp Lejeune

*Everett’s advice on talking to people who have experienced a mission as harrowing as HKIA

*The value of professional reading

*The role and value of mental health checks and mental health services

*The role of cell phones at HKIA

*Cleaning up various parts of HKIA

*The role of discipline 

*The most frustrating and rewarding aspects of the HKIA mission

*Everett’s pride in the performance of his Marines

*The most challenging decision he made at HKIA

*Where Everett excelled as a commander and decision-maker and where he could have done better

*The lessons he took away from HKIA, particularly as they apply to FD 2030 and the future Marine Corps

*The role and value of decision games to train and educate Marines for missions like HKIA

In this episode, we discuss the following topics.

*Josh’s joining 1/8

*Differences in morale and culture between units in the 1st and 2nd Marine Divisions

*The current culture and unit pride in 1/8

*Recent controversies involving Third Battalion, Sixth Marines

*The challenges and benefits of leading HKIA vets in his squad

*Winning the 2nd Marine Division Annual Rifle Squad Competition and Marine Corps-Wide Rifle Squad Competition

*How winning the competition affirmed Josh’s identity as an infantryman

*Struggling with imposter syndrome

*Josh’s experiences during his deployment to Haiti in support of Continuing Promise 2022

*What makes an ideal squad leader

*Josh’s use of military simulators like Squad and Arma 3 for training purposes

*Josh’s expectations for his:

Junior Marines

Fire team leaders

Fellow squad leaders

Platoon commander

Company commander

*The one thing he’d like current and future squad leaders to take away from this podcast

In this episode, we discuss the following topics.

*Josh’s experiences with squad leaders up to this point in his career

*How these leaders influenced him

*His experiences going through the reconnaissance training pipeline and serving with 3rd Recon Battalion

*His decision to leave the recon community and the shame he felt as a result

*Josh's deployments with the 31st MEU

*The “golden nuggets” of leadership he took from his first squad leader

*How Josh approaches corrective actions

*The benefits of having a strong NCO and squad leader core within a unit

*Creating such a core and the challenges to doing so

*Josh's thoughts on what makes a “real” deployment

*Why many Marines don’t see MEUs as "real" deployments

*Josh's advice for squad leaders on making the most of MEUs

*His experiences supporting operations on the US-Mexico border

*His advice for fighting complacency during monotonous missions

In this episode, we discuss the following topics.

*Andres’ operational experiences before joining 2/1

*The organization and strength of Weapons Company, 2/1, at the beginning of its deployment with the SP-MAGTF-CR

*The company’s deployment prior to heading to HKIA

*When the Afghanistan mission first appeared on the company’s radar

*Managing Marines’ expectations in the run-up to deploying to HKIA

*Preparing to leave for HKIA

*Weapons Company’s first day at HKIA

*The company’s initial taskings

*Andres’ reaction to the news that Coalition forces would work with the Taliban

*The challenges of commanding a dispersed company 

*Andres’ experiences at Abbey Gate before 26 August

*Interacting with the many Coalition forces at Abbey Gate

*How often Andres used the tools and concepts in MCDP-1 and MCDP 1-3

*Receiving messages from individuals and interest groups in the US asking for help evacuating people, and how these affected operations

*Some of the challenges Andres and his Marines experienced at Abbey Gate

*Two specific instances where Andres and his Marines helped evacuate Afghan children

*What Weapons Company and Andres were doing on 26 August 

*Weapons Company’s role in the demil process at Kabul

*What Andres observed in his Marines and himself after returning to Kuwait

*His advice on how to talk to leaders about harrowing experiences

*The use of cell phones at HKIA

*Andres’ interactions with US State Department officials at HKIA

*The logistics challenges of HKIA

*The discipline of Andres’ Marines at HKIA

*The most frustrating and rewarding aspects of the HKIA experience 

*Shifting between a combat mindset and a humanitarian mindset

*The most challenging decision Andres made at HKIA

*Where Andres performed well as a decision-maker and leader HKIA and where he could have performed better

*What lessons he took away from HKIA and how those might apply in the context of FD 2030

*Tactical decision game as tools to prepare Marines for operations like HKIA

Link

"Witnesses to the End" by Helene Cooper and Eric Schmitt, New York Times, 7 Nov 2021

 In this episode, we discuss:

*Mr. Smith joining 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines, in Vietnam and assuming command of his platoon 

*His staff NCOs, especially SSgt Richard Jackson and Gunnery Sergeant Alan Sora, and other Marines and Sailors who deeply influenced him

*Coping with the loss of subordinate leaders and advice on dealing with such losses

*Combat decision-making

*The challenges of returning home from war and transitioning to the civilian sector

*The Ken Burns’ documentary series The Vietnam War

*The US strategy in Vietnam 

*The role veterans played in building and expanding FedEx

*The cutting-edge technologies FedEx has used, emerging technologies, and the future of warfare

*The central role of logistics in war

*Leading FedEx through the Arab Oil Embargo Crisis of 1973 and advice for leaders dealing with crises

*How Mr. Smith’s approach to leadership has evolved

*The value of reading for leaders

Links

The Grunt Padre: Father Vincent Robert Capodanno, Vietnam, 1966-1967 by Father Daniel L. Mode

https://a.co/d/aCfeUeQ

The Vietnam War: A Film by Ken Burns

https://www.amazon.com/gp/video/detail/B0753XH4H2/ref=atv_dp_share_cu_r

For Country and Corps: The Life of General Oliver P. Smith by Gail B. Shisler

https://a.co/d/7IWlQ8l

Dereliction of Duty: Johnson, McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies that Led to Vietnam by H.R. McMaster

https://a.co/d/1xKTIl1

Call Sign: Chaos by James Mattis and Bing West

https://a.co/d/08lP0kg

Sapiens by Yuval Noah Harari  

https://a.co/d/7rsFs5g

In this episode, we discuss:

*Connor's time with Marine Security Forces

*Corporals Course

*Serving in 1/7 as a squad leader and overcoming the stigma of Security Forces NCOs

*The Advanced Infantry Marine Course

*Connor’s deployment to Darwin, Australia

*Keeping Marines in a forward-deployed mindset

*What excited Connor most about being a squad leader

*What concerned him most

*Some of the mistakes he’s made as a squad leader

*The atmosphere and culture he tried to create in his first squad

*The training and PME programs he implemented

*Balancing the demands of bureaucracy with preparing Marines for combat

*Connor’s expectations for his junior Marines, fire team leaders, fellow squad leaders, platoon sergeant, platoon commander, and company commander

*What makes an ideal squad leader

*Balancing one's personal life with dedication to the profession of arms

*What makes a squad leader from hell

*The most important thing squad leaders do besides leading Marines in combat and preparing them for it

*Connor’s experiences as a platoon sergeant in 1/8

*The one thing Connor would have liked to have known about his platoon before becoming its platoon sergeant

*The current culture and atmosphere in 1/8

*Connor’s philosophy of leadership and how it’s evolved

*His thoughts on TDGs and their facilitation 

In this episode, we discuss:

*Matt's decision to join the Marine Corps

*His experiences at boot camp and the School of Infantry-East

*His experiences with squad leaders up to this point in his career

*How well the Marine Corps is preparing him to be a squad leader

*The Advanced Infantry Marine Course

*Matt's experiences as a team leader, assistant patrol leader, and acting squad leader

*What makes an ideal squad leader

*What makes a squad leader from hell

*Matt's philosophy of leadership

*What excites him most about being a future squad leader

*What concerns him most

*His ideas for training his future squad

*The kind of atmosphere he wants to create in the squad

*The current culture and atmosphere in 1/8

*Matt's thoughts on maneuver warfare 

*Balancing the demands of bureaucracy with preparing Marines for combat

*The one thing Matt would like to know about his future squad before becoming its leader

*His expectations for his junior Marines, fire team leaders, fellow squad leaders, platoon sergeant, platoon commander, and company commander

*The value of tactical decision games (TDGs)

*1/8's summer 2023 TDG tournament

In this episode, we discuss:

*Col Glantz’s Vietnam service

*How his experiences in Vietnam influenced him as a military historian and researcher

*What led him to study the Nazi-Soviet War

*The Army’s Art of War Symposia from 1984-1987

*How the Soviet Army and US Army defined doctrine (move???)

*The case for an operational level of war

*The introduction of the operational level of war to US Army doctrine

*The origins of the US Army’s AirLand Battle doctrine

*The 11 January 1976 Incident

*The evolution of Soviet operational mobile groups, tank corps, tank armies, and mechanized corps

*The concept of lessons learned and Col Glantz’s critique of it

*The Soviet approach to lessons learned, including the practice of Socialist Criticism

*The effect Stalin’s purges on the officer corps had on the Soviet military’s performance in World War II

*Col Glantz’s thoughts on why the Soviets didn’t march on Berlin in February 1945

*Comparing and Contrasting Zhukov and Rokossovsky

*How and why Operation Barbarossa, the German invasion of the Soviet Union, failed

*Turning points of the Eastern Front

*Forgotten battles of the war

*Major myths of the war

*Correlation of forces

*Initiative and risk-taking in the Red Army

*Improvements in Soviet training

*German and Soviet penal battalions

*The work of Jack Radey and Charles Sharp

*Notable Soviet and German amphibious operations

*Some of the discoveries Col Glantz made in writing his trilogy on Stalingrad

*Similarities between the Soviet storm groups and the German stormtrooper units of WWII

*The 7th and 8th Guards Tank Armies as a potential “pocket

*The relative levels of military-theoretical development the Soviets and Western Allies had reached by May 1945

*The Russian-language military history websites Col Glantz uses for research

*The movies Enemy at the Gates and Stalingrad

*Persistent errors, misconceptions, and faulty interpretations in the literature of the Nazi-Soviet war

*Col Glantz’s advice to young scholars of the Soviet-Nazi War

*What service members can learn from the Eastern Front today, and Col Glantz’s advice on studying the war

*Areas of the Nazi-Soviet War we know relatively little about and where Col Glantz would like to see research done

*Col Glantz’s current projects

*His thoughts on the war in Ukraine

Errata

*Col Glantz states that Hermann Balck was the commander of 48th Panzer Corps during the German relief attempt of the Stalingrad Pocket. Balck, however, was the commander of 11th Panzer Division, a subordinate formation of 48th Panzer Corps.

Links

Col Glantz’s Amazon page

Col Glantz’s website for his self-published atlases and works

When Titans Clashed by Col David Glantz

Zhukov’s Greatest Defeat by Col David Glantz

The Soviet-German War: Myths and Realities by Col David Glantz

Commanding the Red Army's Sherman Tanks: The World War II Memoirs of Hero of the Soviet Union Dmitriy Loza

Fighting for the Soviet Motherland: Recollections from the Eastern Front by Dmitriy Loza

The Defense of Moscow 1941: The Northern Flank

Kharkov 1942: Anatomy of a Military Disaster Through Soviet Eyes by Col David Glantz

Stumbling Colossus: The Red Army on the Eve of World War II by Col David Glantz

In this episode, we discuss the following topics.

*What drew Kendrick to study military innovation

*How he defines military innovation

*What conventional wisdom says about military innovation

*How innovation differs from adaption

*Some recent historical examples of military innovation

*Whether military innovation fails more often than it succeeds

*Popular instances of military innovation in the West

*Kendrick’s essay “Dangerous Changes: When Military Innovation Harms Combat Effectiveness” 

*What drives innovation in military organizations

*Warped innovation

*Incremental vs. radical innovation 

*What drew Kendrick to studying British armored warfare innovation during the Interwar Period and the British Army’s experiences in North Africa as a case of military innovation

*The US Army’s Pentomic Divisions 

*Guarding or hedging against dangerous innovations

*The claim that the character of war is changing rapidly

*Force Design 2030

*Communication strategies in support of military innovation efforts

*The innovator's dilemma as it applies to the military innovator

*Innovation and adaptation in Ukraine 

*Recommended books on military innovation and military effectiveness

*Defining and measuring military effectiveness

*The prospect of the US forces fighting another counterinsurgency war or low-intensity conflict 

*Kendrick’s upcoming articles

Links

“Dangerous Changes: When Military Innovation Harms Combat Effectiveness,” by Kendrick Kuo, International Security

https://direct.mit.edu/isec/article/47/2/48/113546/Dangerous-Changes-When-Military-Innovation-Harms

“The Future of Military Innovation Studies” by Adam Grissom, Journal of Strategic Studies (paywall)

https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01402390600901067?journalCode=fjss20

“What is a Military Innovation and Why It Matters” by Michael Horowitz and Shira Pindyck, Journal of Strategic Studies (paywall)

https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01402390.2022.2038572

“Aircraft Carriers Versus Battleships in War and Myth” with James R. FitzSimonds, YouTube

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hD43yEnbfL4

“Future Visions and Planned Obsolescence: Implementing 30-Year Horizons in Defense Planning” by Travis Reese and Dylan Phillips-Levine, CIMSEC

https://cimsec.org/future-visions-and-planned-obsolescence-implementing-30-year-horizons-in-defense-planning/

Steve Rosen, Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military

https://a.co/d/88ckH5T

Military Innovation in the Interwar Period (revised edition) edited by Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett 

https://a.co/d/1gUNGcc

The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany Between the World Wars by Barry Posen

https://a.co/d/dEJSypm

Technological Change and the Future of Warfare by Michael O’Hanlon

https://a.co/d/5NBsZl6

The Innovation Delusion: How Our Obsession with the New Has Disrupted the Work That Matters Most by Lee Vinsel and Andrew Russell 

https://a.co/d/gFFzzHH

The Shock Of The Old: Technology and Global History since 1900 by David Edgerton

https://a.co/d/6oaUtZk

“Superiority,” a short story by Arthur C. Clarke

https://www.baen.com/Chapters/1439133476/1439133476___5.htm

Please visit: www.oarfoundation.org

In this episode, we discuss the following topics.

*Aaron’s thoughts on the two-year anniversary of Copperhead Company’s arrival at HKIA

*His experiences as a rifle platoon commander with the 26th MEU and combat advisor with TF Southwest and how these influenced the way he led at HKIA

*C/1/8’s deployment with the 24th MEU prior to heading to HKIA

*The company’s training and preparations for the NEO

*TDGs and the benefits they provide for learning ROEs

*How TDGs translated to real-world application at HKIA

*When C/1/8 first got news it was heading to Kabul for sure and the reaction of the Marines

*Aaron’s understanding of the situation on the ground before getting to HKIA

*C/1/8’s first day there, 15 August

*The company’s role in the fight for the airfield and perimeter security

*1/8’s employment of maneuver warfare concepts and tools

*Aaron’s reaction to the National Strike Unit’s clearing of the airfield 

*Instances where Coppehead Company came under fire

*Concerns that Coalition forces might have to carry out an “Alamo” operation in northern HKIA

*Aaron’s reaction to the news that Coalition forces would work with the Taliban

*Charlie Company’s opening of North and East Gates as evacuation control centers

*A detailed summary of events and commentary on gate operations at East Gate

*What it was like working with the Taliban

*The need to become emotionally hardened while working with the crowds 

*How these crowds could quickly become the enemy in situations

*Charlie Company’s fight to provide and maintain a sense of calm, order, and process for the crowd

*The appearance of the NSU at East Gate

*The concepts of unity of command and battlespace and their application at East Gate

*Special operators and special missions and the effects these had on gate operations 

*The decision to give up the picket line at East Gate

*The continued relevance of MCDP-1 Warfighting

*What C/1/8 was doing on 26 August, the day of the Abbey Gate Bombing, and how it responded to the situation

*The company’s actions between 27 August and its departure from HKIA

*The rules of engagement at HKIA

*What Aaron observed in himself and his Marines your Marines in the aftermath of the mission  

*His advice for future leaders on talking to their people about going through situations like HKIA

*The role of mental health checks, mental services, and other kinds of support

*What it was like returning home to Camp Lejeune

*The influence and role of cell phones at HKIA

*The demil efforts

*The order to clean up trash

*The ROEs at HKIA

*Aaron’s interactions with the State Department

*Support provided by the BLT’s engineer platoon

*The MEU’s Female Search Team?

*Creating and maintaining a culture of discipline within Charlie Company

*The roles that exhaustion and discipline played at HKIA

*The actions of Coppehead Company that make Aaron proudest 

*His self-assessment as a leader and decision-maker at HKIA

*The lessons he took away from HKIA, including those with potential implications for FD 2030

*Operating in a way that accounts for long-term implications of decisions

*The one thing Aaron would like Marines and other service members to know about what C/1/8 did at HKIA