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In this episode, we discuss the following topics.

*Aaron’s thoughts on the two-year anniversary of Copperhead Company’s arrival at HKIA

*His experiences as a rifle platoon commander with the 26th MEU and combat advisor with TF Southwest and how these influenced the way he led at HKIA

*C/1/8’s deployment with the 24th MEU prior to heading to HKIA

*The company’s training and preparations for the NEO

*TDGs and the benefits they provide for learning ROEs

*How TDGs translated to real-world application at HKIA

*When C/1/8 first got news it was heading to Kabul for sure and the reaction of the Marines

*Aaron’s understanding of the situation on the ground before getting to HKIA

*C/1/8’s first day there, 15 August

*The company’s role in the fight for the airfield and perimeter security

*1/8’s employment of maneuver warfare concepts and tools

*Aaron’s reaction to the National Strike Unit’s clearing of the airfield 

*Instances where Coppehead Company came under fire

*Concerns that Coalition forces might have to carry out an “Alamo” operation in northern HKIA

*Aaron’s reaction to the news that Coalition forces would work with the Taliban

*Charlie Company’s opening of North and East Gates as evacuation control centers

*A detailed summary of events and commentary on gate operations at East Gate

*What it was like working with the Taliban

*The need to become emotionally hardened while working with the crowds 

*How these crowds could quickly become the enemy in situations

*Charlie Company’s fight to provide and maintain a sense of calm, order, and process for the crowd

*The appearance of the NSU at East Gate

*The concepts of unity of command and battlespace and their application at East Gate

*Special operators and special missions and the effects these had on gate operations 

*The decision to give up the picket line at East Gate

*The continued relevance of MCDP-1 Warfighting

*What C/1/8 was doing on 26 August, the day of the Abbey Gate Bombing, and how it responded to the situation

*The company’s actions between 27 August and its departure from HKIA

*The rules of engagement at HKIA

*What Aaron observed in himself and his Marines your Marines in the aftermath of the mission  

*His advice for future leaders on talking to their people about going through situations like HKIA

*The role of mental health checks, mental services, and other kinds of support

*What it was like returning home to Camp Lejeune

*The influence and role of cell phones at HKIA

*The demil efforts

*The order to clean up trash

*The ROEs at HKIA

*Aaron’s interactions with the State Department

*Support provided by the BLT’s engineer platoon

*The MEU’s Female Search Team?

*Creating and maintaining a culture of discipline within Charlie Company

*The roles that exhaustion and discipline played at HKIA

*The actions of Coppehead Company that make Aaron proudest 

*His self-assessment as a leader and decision-maker at HKIA

*The lessons he took away from HKIA, including those with potential implications for FD 2030

*Operating in a way that accounts for long-term implications of decisions

*The one thing Aaron would like Marines and other service members to know about what C/1/8 did at HKIA