We’ve previously looked at dualism and the mind, and what the physicalist approach is — what about philosophical zombies?

They’ve had a bit of a popularity surge in recent years, what with TV shows, fiction books and pop culture, but there’s also an interest in these fictional creatures in the field of philosophy. For example, the proposal of property dualism — it is not the same as physicalism as it claims that experiences such as smell, sight, emotions and the like are new properties, are distinct from mental and physical properties, although there are correlations. There’s something else that makes these properties of consciousness separate from the physical world.

With the philosophical zombie — it used to be a human being, but to all intents and purposes, but it doesn’t have a working brain and yet is undead (while it might be searching for brains… it isn’t a conscious being). Therefore the physical capabilities to be conscious are absent from it, and yet it exists. Property dualists would argue that if zombies are metaphysically possible, then consciousness is not identical to any physical properties. There’s a number of great resources on the topic, including a radio interview — but if you have any arguments yourself on why zombies (including the fact that we just see them in horror movies!) aren’t a good argument for property dualism, let me know on the comments of the blog at 365daysofphilosophy.com.

Further Resources:

Radio National Philosopher’s Zone — Zombies and Consciousness

Stanford Encyclopaedia on Zombies

The Philosophical Zombies Argument