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My name is Abbey, and I work at cG on the Capacity Building team. I’m posting to share an informal update about our excitement for biosecurity capacity building.
We’ve seen incredible progress in the field of technical AI safety and governance, and a lot of that is thanks to fieldbuilding programs.
We now think that on the margin, it's likely that biosecurity is neglected relative to AI safety. AI progress will likely significantly increase the capability of a bad actor (including a rogue AI) to engineer dangerous pathogens, and we’d like to grow the number of people preparing defenses against that scenario.
Specifically, our Biosecurity and Pandemic Preparedness team's research suggests that there are four pillars of pathogen-agnostic defenses that can significantly reduce bio x-risk; and because these are defensive measures (with less dual-use potential), we want to broadly encourage people to work on them. Some projects, like red teaming, could involve infohazards that warrant more caution; you can check in with the BPP team if you want to do work like this or encourage it.
The measures are:
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First published:
Source:
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Narrated by TYPE III AUDIO.
By EA Forum TeamMy name is Abbey, and I work at cG on the Capacity Building team. I’m posting to share an informal update about our excitement for biosecurity capacity building.
We’ve seen incredible progress in the field of technical AI safety and governance, and a lot of that is thanks to fieldbuilding programs.
We now think that on the margin, it's likely that biosecurity is neglected relative to AI safety. AI progress will likely significantly increase the capability of a bad actor (including a rogue AI) to engineer dangerous pathogens, and we’d like to grow the number of people preparing defenses against that scenario.
Specifically, our Biosecurity and Pandemic Preparedness team's research suggests that there are four pillars of pathogen-agnostic defenses that can significantly reduce bio x-risk; and because these are defensive measures (with less dual-use potential), we want to broadly encourage people to work on them. Some projects, like red teaming, could involve infohazards that warrant more caution; you can check in with the BPP team if you want to do work like this or encourage it.
The measures are:
---
First published:
Source:
---
Narrated by TYPE III AUDIO.