The US election is approaching quickly with implications for America's allies in the world. Professors Margarita Šešelgyte (Vilnius University), Daunis Auers (University of Latvia), and Andres Kasekamp (University of Toronto) join a roundtable discussion on the impact that a Kamala Harris or Donald Trump presidency could have on the security and future outlook of the Baltic countries and broader Europe, and how people in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are feeling about the state of democracy in the US. This episode was recorded on September 25, 2024.
Transcript
Indra Ekmanis: Thank you everyone for joining me in this discussion today. As we all know, the US presidential campaign has been rather unprecedented on many fronts this cycle. There's been the late change in the candidates at the top of the Democratic ticket from Joe Biden to Kamala Harris. And now we've had already multiple assassination attempts on the Republican candidate Donald Trump.
And we know that whatever happens in November will certainly have effects on Americans, but it will also have reverberations around the world. And so I'm very glad to today be in discussion with you all about the potential impacts in the Baltic countries. But before we jump in, I'd like to ask you all to briefly introduce yourselves.
Andres Kasekamp: I'm Andres Kasekamp. I'm the Professor of Estonian Studies at the University of Toronto. I used to be the Director of the Estonian Foreign Policy Institute in Tallinn and a Professor at the University of Toronto.
Daunis Auers: Hi, I'm Daunis Auers, a professor at the University of Latvia and also the director of a new think tank Certus in Riga.
Margarita Šešelgytė: Hello, I'm Margarita Šešelgytė, and I'm a professor of security studies, but also a director of the Institute of International Relations and Political Science at Vilnius University.
IE: Well, thank you all. So, I'd like to start with what is perhaps top of mind when people are thinking about the impacts of the US elections on the Baltic countries, and that's security, NATO, and Russia's war in Ukraine.
So if we start with NATO: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania marked two decades in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization this year. The alliance itself is now 75 years old, celebrating at its summit in Washington, D.C., hosted by president and at that point in time, still beleaguered Democratic candidate Joe Biden, where Biden underscored NATO unity. And during the summit, it was widely reported that the allies were working to “Trump proof” the Alliance as polls showed that Biden was slipping in the presidential race.
Trump, of course, is remembered as deriding the Alliance, threatening to pull out entirely during his presidency. And at the same time, he is also somewhat credited with pushing member states to up their defense spending. With Biden out, of course, the calculus has perhaps changed a little bit.
Vice President and now candidate Kamala Harris represents some measure of continuity with the Biden administration, though we know that her foreign policy experience is not necessarily as deep as Biden's. But a Harris presidency would be more compatible theoretically with the tradition of America as a stable leader in the transatlantic relationship.
And obviously a strong NATO is critical to the security of the Baltic States. So, I wonder how you perceive the candidate stances on NATO and how they align with Baltic interests.
AK: All right, briefly, Trump would be a disaster and Harris, indeed, would represent continuity with, with Biden. It goes back to the nature of the candidates, right, that Trump is a purely transactional individual, and doesn't seem to understand how NATO works.
He's always said that the NATO countries owe the Americans money. It's not an organization where you pay a membership fee, so he simply doesn't get it. It is sort of partly true that European members who weren't doing enough spending on their own defense budgets, have been frightened into contributing more.
Trump has something to do with it, but it has more to do with Russian aggression, in the region. So starting already in 2014 when Russia seized Crimea, European countries started increasing their spending. With the Harris presidency, it would be sort of more of the same, which is better than Trump, but it's certainly not as good as America could do, because Joe Biden has been failing Ukraine recently and placing these unreasonable restrictions on Ukraine's right to strike at Russian targets to defend itself.
And hopefully Harris wouldn't continue that weak kneed policy.
DA: I agree with what Andres has said, but I think it's quite interesting to look at the perspective also of Baltic Americans who after all will be voting in the election, unlike, I presume, the three of us—Margarita, Andres and I—who, as not being American citizens won't have a vote in the elections.
And traditionally, there's been quite a lot of support for the Republican Party amongst the Baltic diasporas, because during the Cold War, the Republicans were seen as having the strongest backbone in defending Baltic interests. And much of this support actually carried over into the Trump era with a significant portion of Baltic Americans, especially from the older generation, still holding out support for Trump.
And what I thought was interesting was that after Trump announced J.D. Vance as his vice-presidential candidate, the attitudes of many Baltic Americans actually changed because a lot of the affection for Trump is deeply personal, connected to his charismatic personality, the way he speaks, the way he does business, the way he calls back, sort of an ancient era of essentially a white America, from the 1950s.
J.D. Vance doesn't have this affection. And when J.D. Vance was announced as the vice-presidential candidate, people were bringing out his notorious op-ed in the New York Times on April 12th, which was very defeatist in its nature, calling out various quotes that he had of not really caring who won in the war between Ukraine and Russia.
And this was the moment that a number of Baltic Americans turned away from the Republicans and turned towards the Democrats. So, I would perhaps highlight the role of J.D. Vance in furthering support for the Democrats at least amongst the Baltic community in the United States.
MS: I totally agree to what has been said already, but then I'd like to look from a more systemic perspective, and just to add to what has been said: We live in a very volatile security situation at the moment and this dynamism, security-wise, will not be changing pretty soon because there are some changes in the balance of power the rivalry between autocracies and democracies.
So where do we stand as Baltic countries? We are small countries, and we have a major war in our region. And therefore, for us, it is essentially important to have our allies strong and to have our allies helping us. The United States is our main ally when it comes to security. Yes, we are members of NATO, but in terms of deterring Putin, one has to think about deterrence as a psychological concept.
Putin is less afraid of NATO as overall organization than he is afraid of the United States of America. So having this in mind, the one who sits in Washington D.C. in the presidential position for us is essential as well. In Athena, we had already two elections this year, presidential and European Parliament elections, and the parliamentary elections are coming in October.
But we're joking that the elections in the United States are more important than the elections in Lithuania and the change would be felt stronger of who comes to power in the United States.
Interestingly enough, one of our media outlets just recently published a survey asking Lithuanians: Who would be a better president for Lithuania in the United States, Trump or, Harris? The majority of Lithuanians, 66 percent, said Harris and only 12 indicated that that could be Trump. So, for us, it's very important. It matters. We follow this election very, very closely.
And I would say there are two points which are particularly important for Lithuania. Yes, NATO and US presence in the region. And we don't know what position Harris will take or if she will be more involved in the Pacific. But it's about stability. That's important.
And another very important question, and it's very intertwined, is the war in Ukraine. And we already heard what Trump was saying about Ukraine, that when he becomes the president, he will seek for a certain deal. And for us Baltics, it's clear that no deal with Putin can be achieved at the moment, and it would be dangerous, and it would endanger our situation. So it's not acceptable.
IE: You're actually running into kind of my next question here, which is exactly about Russia and Ukraine. And as we know, the Baltic states have been among the most ardent supporters of Ukraine following the full-scale invasion in 2022. Also, we know that the Baltic leadership has been quite hawkish warning about Russia for some time.
And as you just mentioned, Donald Trump has refused to say that he wants Ukraine to end the war. He often talks about his rapport with Russian President Vladimir Putin. Harris, on the other hand, has called Putin a dictator who would, “eat Trump for lunch.” She has condemned the Russia's actions in Ukraine as crimes against humanity and underscored the US commitment.
But as you also mentioned, there has been a slow roll of US advanced weaponry and providing the ability for Ukraine to hit targets deeper into Russia, something that is actually being talked about right now at the UN General Assembly.
Could you say a little bit more on the candidates’ stances on Ukraine and Russia and in the war more broadly, what that means for Baltic leaderships and Baltic publics?
DA: I think that the presidential debate, which I think looks like being the only debate between the two candidates, pretty accurately sketched in the difference, between the candidates. President Trump very much was hooked into the Kremlin narrative.
He said that he was for peace, which we understand here in Europe as meaning you are for Russia because you bought into the narrative. He even mentioned that the United States holds some responsibility for the war as opposed for it to be a decision made by Russia to invade a sovereign country.
I think we quite clearly saw that one of the candidates is, despite the macho image, quite soft on Russia. And the other one is fixing more clearly with the governing elites in the Baltic States perspective on, the war on Ukraine. One thing we should mention, however, there is an undercurrent of support for Trump in the Baltic States.
In, Latvia, there is a political party named Latvia First—where did they get that name from—which sits in the parliament in opposition and is clearly Trumpian. They managed to have one MEP (Member of European Parliament) elected to the European Parliament. And in one of the debates, he was asked a very technical question about how he would vote on a trade deal with certain countries.
He said, “well, I would do whatever Trump does. If it's good enough for Trump, it's good enough for me.” And he pretty much attached this to any other form of foreign policy. Now, this is a minority party, but we should recognize that there is some support for the Trumpian position albeit not in a governing position in the Baltic states. I'll hand over to Andres now.
AK: Well, the same applies for Estonia, where the major opposition party EKRE (Conservative People’s Party) on the far right is very clearly Trumpian. There's also, more alarming in this case, a lot of the mainstream media, like Postimees and the foreign news desk of the national broadcaster seem to normalize Trump.
They don't point out his really deviant and demented behavior but treat him like a normal candidate. So, I also feel that there are plenty of people in Estonia who think that Trump has some good ideas, or at least they're so angry at the woke folks, that they're willing to entertain Trump, not recognizing the great damage that Trump would do to the Transatlantic Alliance and how he would put NATO deterrence, its credibility, in question.
And I think that's what Margarita was saying earlier, right? Deterrence is psychological. It's not only what we do, it's what Putin believes, right? If Putin believes that the United States is ready to defend us, then he will be deterred. And that's, that's the bottom line.
And with Trump, that's the one thing that's been consistent. I mean, he flip-flops on everything, criticizes everything, but the one thing he's been consistent on, he's never said a bad word about Putin, which really is not just odd, but quite alarming.
MS: Well, I just want to add on what has been said in terms of the differences between the Harris and Trump. We don't know exactly what the policies of Harris will be because we don't know her so well, but for us, the most important thing is the stability, because if Trump becomes US president, it's not only what he does, but what kind of messages he sends.
Andrus was already mentioning the messages for Putin, what's happening in Putin's head, understanding what Trump’s messaging is. But also for the world, we are more secure and stronger together in European Union, in NATO, as transatlantic family and community.
If Trump comes to power, the world will become a more dangerous place, because there will be more rifts and disagreements between allies, and we will be seen as weaker as a transatlantic community, not only by Russia, but by China, by Iran, by North Korea. So, it is a very dangerous scenario for us small states, because we cannot change the system. The system affects us.
DA: And in the event of a Trump victory, I think there would be a much greater focus from policymakers in the Baltic states on the diaspora community in the United States. The diaspora community played a very important role in the Baltic accession to NATO in the late 1990s, early 2000s. And clearly one thing that Trump does listen to is voters, supporters, and interest groups in Washington. And I think the role of JBANC (Joint Baltic American National Committee) and also the three national lobby groups of American Latvians, American Lithuanian, and Estonian Americans will simply grow in importance, hugely. We can expect them to have quite a lot of communication and cooperation with our foreign ministries and with our embassies, even more so than at the moment.
IE: Yeah, that's a really fascinating point too, that the impact of the diaspora lobbying groups in the United States. You all are touching on something that I also wanted to get at, which is the impact of the US elections on European solidarity. You mentioned how Trump's America first agenda has also emboldened right wing politicians in Europe and the Baltics.
He has a close relationship with Viktor Orban, the prime minister of Hungary. Who has also even spoken at CPAC, the Conservative Political Action Conference in the United States, but has been in some ways a thorn in the side of the European Union particularly around Russia.
During his presidency, Donald Trump also often tried to bypass European institutions, kind of favoring a bilateral approach and personal appeals to national leaders. Harris presidency represents more of a stable transatlantic relationship, but there's also the concern that, as Margarita mentioned, that there's going to be a shift in attention to the Indo-Pacific. The People's Republic of China is seen kind of as this coming-up threat.
So, some questions here. What is the situation of the European Union? How united or divided might the block be with either candidate? How is Europe thinking about retaining the focus of the United States as opposed to a shift to other global regions?
Where do the Baltic states fit into that? Maybe we start from the Lithuanian perspective this time.
MS: It's a very tough question. I think that when the war in Ukraine started, the European Union has surprised itself by its unity. And over the last three years, I think that this unity pertained, and we continue to be united.
We sometimes disagree on how fast Europe has to be in providing certain aid for Ukraine. We sometimes disagree on how strict we have to be on punishing Putin in terms of sanctions, et cetera, et cetera. But in general, there is a consensus that we're sitting in the same boat, and this is a European war andI think that this is very important.
Therefore, there is an appetite to continue supporting Ukraine until the end of the war, until the victory. But the problem is that there is this unity, which is very strong on the decision takers, decision-makers’ level. But if you scratch the surface, you see that there are many different opinions.
Businesses, communities, general society, different players do not share the general decision-makers’ opinion, not in every country. States of the European Union are facing their own economic, political, and identity problems. And what makes me anxious is the tide of radical populism in certain European countries, and in particular in the biggest countries who matter a lot in the decision-making of the European Union.
And maybe in the next two or three years, we won't be seeing those radicals overtaking the government. Well, let's hope fingers crossed that in Germany, the elections will not bring AfD (Alternative for Germany) to power. However, it reduces certain policies, international policies, foreign policies, to a minimal level rather than emboldening them.
So there could be some steps back, which might be quite dangerous in these final stages of the war, or what we are seeing now, when at least Ukrainian side is trying to search for certain agreements. So, yes, there is a unity that also benefits the Baltic countries.
European countries are listening to what we said more and Ursula von der Leyen, the President of the European Commission, in her State of the Union speech, said we should have listened more to the Baltic countries. But I guess the appetite to listen to Baltic countries is shrinking a bit for the time and also when we propose certain solutions, they still seem very provocative and more provocative than some of the EU countries would like to take.
AK: Let me just add that in American debate, when they talk about Europe, they talk about Europe as kind of lagging behind and being a slacker in support for Ukraine, which is absolutely false, right? The United States is obviously spending more in absolute terms than any other country in terms of military. But as a whole Europe is providing more altogether.
And of course, we should really be looking at the contribution in terms of the percentages. And here, the three Baltic states, from the beginning, have been the leaders, along with some other countries like, like Denmark and Sweden, who have given a percentage of their defense budget to Ukraine, which is much greater than the percentage that the Americans are giving.
Americans are actually being quite miserly, even though the sums sound huge. And of course, in the American case, the money, which in the US political debate seems that it's just being handed over to Ukraine, is actually going to American manufacturers. And a lot of the money is actually just nominal sums, which are old American armament, equipment, and ammunitions, which were destined to be written off. In any case they're given some monetary value.
So, this is something that's really caught on in the narrative in the US: The Americans are paying so much, and the Europeans are doing so little, which is certainly not the case. When you look at the three Baltic states, which have been, continue to be in the lead, and that leads to what Margarita was highlighting.
Our establishments, our political leadership in the Baltic States are very firm on Russia, but as a society, there's a cost to that. If we've all raised our defense spending, that means cuts in societal programs, and that leads to dissatisfaction and unrest.
So, that's difficult for the governments to keep a check on.
DA: Europe is changing. We see this in the European Parliament elections in 2024, that you have this growing support for political parties on the fringes, which we sometimes call as populists, and the support for the centrist mainstream parties, which we typically understand as the liberals, the center right, the Christian Democrats, or the European People's Party and the centrist socialists are declining.
Now, they still make up a majority, and we see this in the European Commission as well. The European Commission, which is likely to be approved over the next couple of weeks under Ursula von der Leyen, is still a centrist European Commission, but Europe is changing. And I think it's quite interesting if we look at the Baltic States here.
30 years ago, as the Baltic States were just beginning to build democracies and capitalistic systems after 50 years of Soviet occupation, they were quite crackpot, right? I was reading some newspaper articles from the early 1990s, and the one that stayed with me—it's a casual throwaway article written sometime in late 1992 about, oh by the way, 62 prisoners escaped to prison yesterday, and they haven't been caught yet.
And the next day, it's not even on the front page of a newspaper, because there's some kind of mafia killing that's being reported on. And that's how things were 30 years ago. Today, the Baltic states are a sea of tranquility. We see that our political systems are actually far more stable, if you look at recent indicators, than the Nordic states.
You look at the profile of our governments, the female prime ministers that we had in office in the summer, Europe's first, openly gay president. We have very progressive political systems, and it's Western Europe where democracy is declining in quality, where crackpot political parties are appearing, where you have extremely dodgy political leaders being elected to lead governments and extremely odd parties coming into governments or propping up minority governments.
Europe is changing quite a lot, which is unfortunate for the Baltic States in a sense, because just as we have achieved a level of normality. Lithuania is achieving huge economic success as being the fastest growing economy in Europe in the 21st century, the rest of Europe is fraying.
Fortunately, there's still a majority, let's say a mainstream majority, which favors support for Ukraine and whose policies broadly align with the very centrist and mainstream policies that all three Baltic governments have long been adopting. But things are changing and there is a risk that the longer the war possibly drags on in Ukraine, the more—I'm sure that opinion in the Baltic states won't change because this is such an existential issue for us—but elsewhere in Western Europe, we might see these radical populist forces rise even further and perhaps begin to fray away at the coalition, which is still broadly supportive of Ukraine. But it is being chipped away at almost monthly, I would say.
IE: I want to put a pin in some of the things that you just touched on around the state of democracy, maybe we can turn back to that in a moment.
Perhaps we can briefly turn to the impacts of either candidate on US trade policy and energy.
MS: It’s a global issue. And globally, it is important when it comes to the general situation in transatlantic community, the feeling of trust. But when it comes to Baltics, I don't that it has this direct link to what is important for us. I believe that neither decision-makers nor society are looking in particular what Trump or Harris are saying in terms of energy policy and trade.
Okay, he [Trump] can increase tariffs for Latin products, but there are now so many going to the United States.
DA: For the Baltic States, our biggest trading partners are our Western neighbors. In the case of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, are one and two. Then the Nordic countries, Poland, Germany, and so on.
I took a look at the data for 2022, and the United States was Latvia's 11th biggest trading partner: small, single digits. Latvia for the United States was the 117th biggest trading partner. So, when it comes to economic relations, including also energy, it's not a critical relationship.
Politically, the relationship is very, very important. But economically, when it comes to trade, it's marginal.
AK: Well, let me just add that for the bilateral relationship, it's not important, but the tone that the US administration sets is not a good direction for the Baltic states. Trump initiated this protectionism, and Biden unfortunately has continued in that same vein.
And we don't really know how Harris will continue Biden's legacy on that front. But in any case, the world has become more protectionist. And the three Baltic states have been amongst the biggest champions and beneficiaries of free trade, right? And for an open, globalized economy. This wave of protectionism, which Trump initiated, and Biden has continued in a general picture, is bad for the world and bad for the Baltic states.
DA: There is an alternative view to that, Andres, which is that, because of the policies, the global value chains are becoming more compact, they're becoming more localized. And as the global value chains are, let's say, semi-returned to Europe, away from Asia, then the Baltic States together with Poland and other countries are expected to be the big beneficiaries of, say, manufacturing returning to Europe.
I don't think it's such a black and white picture, but a collapsing global trade is necessarily bad for the Baltic States. It depends on the domestic policies which are adopted that can seize the opportunity in a sense.
MS: And when it comes to energy, if the United States chooses to become the major player in the world in terms of energy supply, it could change and change in general, the picture of the world that we have.
But that is a big question: the tracking issue, getting further away from the green plan or implementing this plan. There are advantages and disadvantages of either path.
In order to stop climate change, I think fracking would be quite a bad decision because it's increasing dependency on this fuel. But when it comes to changing the power balance, that could be the way to end the war in Ukraine, pushing Russia to the corner, because the bulk of its budget comes from natural resources.
This would add more competition: increasing the supply of energy resources in the world's market.
IE: For a non-question, that actually was a quite interesting response.
But to come back to the idea—Donna you were talking about people's feelings of democracy and the shift in the way that the Baltic states perhaps are perceiving or showing off their strength, in democracy—you all sort of mentioned attitudes on the ground.
I'd like to explore that a little bit more. I mean, Margarita noted that people think of the American elections as potentially more consequential than the upcoming elections in Lithuania. Do you feel that on a day-to-day basis? Is it just in surveys or are people paying attention? Do they care?
And how do they view the state of democracy in the United States, which I think is a big question on this side of the Atlantic.
DA: Well, I think we clearly see that the media in Latvia, at least, are following this election much more closely than previous elections. Certainly, that's because of the nature of the election taking place at a time of war, not so far away from us.
But it's also because of the candidates and especially Trump. I mean, Trump is news. He's magnetic. And there is a feeling about, “Wow, look at this guy.” Some people look at him in awe. I would say a majority look at him in confusion as to, as to why is it that he's so attractive to American voters.
But certainly, the nature of the candidates, as well as the context of the election, is something which draws public attention. And we see a lot of newscasts, a lot of discussion shows, both on television and online portals, dedicated to the American elections more so than in previous years.
AK: In fact, as soon as we finish recording this, I will have to go to an Estonian webcast to discuss the US election. So, indeed, there's plenty of interest and a realization that this matters to us in the Baltic states quite a bit, but that's been the case for previous US elections as well.
Trump just adds this more of a circus atmosphere to it that was perhaps not present and a sort of polarizing view. But when you talked earlier about the impact of Trump on Europe, I can remember back to when Obama was elected, right?
And the response in Europe was: Western Europeans loved him. Eastern Europeans were a little bit more skeptical, but even the Western Europeans who loved Obama were very disappointed by the man because he was focused on a pivot to Asia. And he didn't give the Europeans the deference and the time of day that his predecessors had.
So that's already a shift that's been going on for quite some time and Biden has been the throwback to the way things were, but I think we can expect that Biden will be sort of the last real trans-Atlanticist American president.
MS: Yeah, I just want to pick what Andras was mentioning in terms of the policies of the potential US leader, President Harris or President Trump, and the consequences for the Baltic countries. I think that this pivot to Asia is very consequential, and the consequences are increasing with time.
And first of all, it was more economic and political, but now it's also related to defense. We've seen, one of the former advisors of Trump, Elbridge Colby, say that Taiwan and the security of Taiwan, would be a more important issue than the security of Europe or Eastern Europe and that he would advise Baltic countries to not stop at 3 percent spending from GDP, but continue spending more for defense and reaching perhaps 10 percent, which is a lot of money.
And I don't think it's attainable in the near future. However, the US Pivot to Asia had an effect on Lithuanian policies. If your major ally pivots to Asia, you have to pivot there as well. I think that there is more Asia in Lithuania and there is more Lithuania in Asia in the Indo-Pacific at the moment.
First of all, it started with the hosting of Taiwanese representation in Vilnius under the name of Taiwan, which became a major issue for China. A major argument with China ensued on economic, secondary sanctions that China was threatening with political ranting and a lot of other things.
But then due to this disagreement, we discovered a lot of potential for cooperation in this area. At the moment, the economic relationships with Indo-Pacific countries are increasing quite speedily. And there are more of those countries, like South Korea and Japan, in Lithuania, both politically, but also economically.
And we are also discussing our security corporation, particularly in the era of cyber security. I think that this is an important turn for Lithuania, probably for other Baltic countries to a less extent, but still, and this is also a certain security net for us. If there will be some more speedy pivot to Asia under the Trump presidency, we might also try to ask our friends in Taiwan to say some good words about Lithuania and our security to the ear of Trump, because Trump most likely will listen what Taiwanese are saying.
IE: Well, you've kind of tackled the last question head on, which is what are the Baltic States doing to ensure their own futures? Regardless of who ends up in the White House in November. I want to open it up for any last words or thoughts on the subject.
Any final conclusions that you'd like to share?
DA: Well, I think a big development, possibly a positive outcome from the events in Ukraine, is the additional impetus for Baltic cooperation. Because Baltic cooperation really has lagged for the last 30 years. If we compare the way in which the Baltic states work with each other to our closest neighbors, the Nordics, we don't really cooperate. We've imitated some of the institutions of the North, but we haven't really enacted them. We haven't sort of like full-bloodedly, adopted them. But we can see that when it comes to defense, there are some very serious initiatives, which have moved ahead recently.
I think procurement is one of the big areas where we see Latvia cooperating with Estonia, for example, in air defense systems, in buying training grenades. We also have a cooperation between Latvia and Lithuania on respirators. We have the Baltic defense line—although that seems to be being executed individually by each state—but it was still a common announcement with a common aim, and so on. It would be great if this was an impetus for even further Baltic cooperation, because there are many areas where we would benefit from cooperating with each other in a sort of Nordic style politically, economically, culturally, and so on.
Because we are an extremely dynamic region of Europe, especially if we look at the Lithuanian economy, which is to an outsider, an amazing story. What's happened there over the last 20 years is a story to tell, and there is a common identity and common political structures which can be built upon, beginning with this enhanced military cooperation, but taking that to various political and economic levels as well.
So that’s one thing that I would end on attempting to be more positive.
AK: I would just add and expand on Daunis, for the regional cooperation, of course, is much wider. It's a Nordic Baltic cooperation, which is the most intense and active at the moment. And the one good outcome of Putin's invasion of Ukraine has been Finland and Sweden joining NATO, which has given a real impetus to Nordic Baltic cooperation, which was already strong in all other fields.
But now with defense cooperation also, we're all much closer together in the region and it's one of the most dynamic regions in the European Union.
MS: I guess I'm obliged to step even further on the European level. I don't know how strong this political will and commitment in the European institutions and in some European countries will continue to be. I guess it will depend at the end of the day on the level of a threat—but we will not be living in a less threatening environment in the future—and the appetite to build strong defense industry and defense in Europe.
That's a very, very important step forward. And if one thing is to come from the Ukrainian War, I would say that this would be a very, very important thing for the future of the European Union as the player in international politics.
IE: Well, Professors Kasekamp, Šešelgytė, Auers. Thank you so much for your time for your commentary and we really appreciate you taking the time to speak on this subject. Thank you very much.
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