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Introduction: Disinfolklore, AI, and the MAGA Cult
People who are still part of the MAGA cult may find the exemplar of Don — Druidy Don, disinfolklore — a bit unappealing as one of the main examples I use to illustrate this. It occurred to me that maybe I could quickly talk about how the Code of Positive Trolls will work with AI algorithms, and help people manage this transition many of us are going through at the moment, where we’re dealing with chatbots and different AI algorithms to help us in our work.
Mockers and Will: A Morality Tale in Infolklore
First, I wanted to talk about something. Mockers and Will had this great exchange on Volya for Ukraine Radio Space on X last Saturday, relating to the russian military intelligence — the GRU general who was born in Ukraine, who was almost assassinated in an elevator in Moscow.
It occurred to me that that exchange, which I mean to record — I haven’t done it quite yet, but I’ll go back to the Volya Spotify channel and record it, and then perhaps try and speak to Mockers about it, if she was willing to one day on Volya Radio — just because it is an example of what I call archetypal infolklore.
What Mockers was doing in her mocking tone, which her moniker “Mockers” clearly is well earned, was basically turning this assassination attempt of this treacherous Ukrainian — responsible, as we’re now told, for much of the organisation of the so-called Wagner military arm of the russian military and their activities until they were destroyed by Ukraine in Bakhmut — their activities in Africa. She turned it into a morality tale, all relating to the allegation that he was visiting somebody who was not his wife at the time that he was shot several times.
That struck me as being archetypal infolklore, in the sense of folklore — the folklore we encountered as children — which often had a message in it, a moral message and an identity and action point: don’t go into the forest, don’t go to the seashore, don’t fall into the swimming pool, all of these things.
Infolklore and Disinfolklore: The Divine Twins
What Mockers was illuminating there was a perfect example of infolklore. When I first coined the term disinfolklore, I didn’t really think of the term infolklore. In fact, I’ve really only been developing it since these radio shows — this is our 37th by my count.
Basically, infolklore spoke for itself until around 2014–2015. What I now call infolklore and disinfolklore — immanences in the news, immanences in our general culture, in the kinds of stories which we exchanged to manifest our interest in our community — news, whether local or national — they were balanced.
I won’t go quite as far as an Adam Smith situation where I talk about the unseen hand of God balancing out infolklore and disinfolklore. However, there was a relative balance between them.
The Internet Research Agency and the Disruption of Balance
Then what happened in 2014–2015, not least because of the Internet Research Agency, which Putin’s — the person, the character, the disinfolklore character I call the Chef Saucerer (as in sauce, as distinct from the Chief Sorcerer, as in magician or magus) — meant somewhat ironically for Duncy Putin, who never seems to learn from his mistakes.
The Chef Saucerer’s financing of the Internet Research Agency and their interference in the 2016 presidential election and in the Brexit referendum through Cambridge Analytica and all of that malarkey — that upset this balance.
I wouldn’t have needed to invent the word disinfolklore if I hadn’t seen its power to change the identities of people inside russia’s occupation of Ukraine, to turn Ukrainians into thinking they were russians, to turn your favourite aunt into someone who may now be supporting somebody who engaged in the most horrendous crimes against Mexican children trafficked over the border to Epstein’s estate in New Mexico — where, according to an allegation by a local police officer, an incinerator may have been capable of incinerating the bodies of some of these trafficked children.
This kind of disinfolklore which Donald has introduced into all of our lives, along with the help of the russians and Prigozhin and the Chef Saucerer — we do need an antidote. That’s the whole point of disinfolklore as an analytical method: to come up with the tools to see what they are doing, how they are hacking our minds, and to counteract it.
Because of that, it was necessary to invent the term infolklore, which is a particular form of folklore which contains in it information. When I tell that tale about the New Mexico estate, you may or may not be aware of this news which is emerging from some of the documents — most of which we still haven’t seen — about 3 million records, which could be about 50 million documents. What we do know is Donald’s name appears one million times in the whole dataset. Of the released documents, his name appears 38,000 times.
It’s very unfortunate that we need to understand this infolklore. It’s very unfortunate that russia invaded Ukraine and did all of this in Luhansk. Infolklore, and the kind of infolklore which Mockers and Will exchanged — their little morality tale about not cheating on your wife might save you from getting shot in a lift.
I wa…
Ukraine as a Character
Why is disinfolklore an appropriate moniker? In disinfolklore, we look at characters in the stories we’re served up. Ukraine is a damsel in distress who must be rescued by Donald—this is how he’s trying to archetype Ukraine. We know it’s obviously false. Ukraine is a damsel in distress who must be rescued by russia because of the coup and all of these trolls. Or Ukraine is a damsel in distress who must submit.
We go back to coercive control. We go back to the people many of us might have met in our lives who come from the perspective of realpolitik. They say, oh yes, isn’t it awful what russia is doing? But honestly, it’s time to just—you know, Ukraine just needs to give up Donbas and everything will be fine, and we’ll be able to get back to our cappuccinos and whatever.
I’m going through a thorough reorganisation of my work and approach to teaching. Watch this space. Here’s a sneak preview of part of my new homepage, and of what is coming:
What’s going on there is Ukraine is being archetyped as a character. Ukraine is a country of 42 million people, a very complex concept. It’s a geographical space. It’s a historical context. If we take the disinfolklore lens, then it’s quite natural for us to see anything in a meme as a character.
Abstract Concepts as Characters
Obviously when we’re looking at Netflix or a story in the news or any art or play, we have characters manifesting as individual humans. What the disinfolklore analytical method allows us to do is perceive how abstract concepts take on the characteristics of characters, of personalities.
This is one of the main means by which russia’s disinfolklore manipulates us—because we don’t notice it. We’re not looking for it. We’re not looking for the energy of character in an abstract concept like Ukraine. Putler then can talk about Ukraine as a corpse, as a dead corpse, as a dead woman who is worthy of becoming a victim, as in that song by Red Mould which I’ve talked about before—*Sleeping Beauty in the Coffin*. International lawyers use it as evidence of Putler’s intention to genocide Ukraine, because he quoted this disgusting lyric which I’m not going to repeat here—*Sleeping Beauty in a Coffin, I Walked Up and XXXX her…*
This archetyping through characters is a phenomenon that very few other so-called disinformation researchers, or people watching propaganda, or people interpreting data have noticed. I’ve not only noticed it—I’ve tried to think about it, work it out, and articulate what is going on.
It’s quite natural, if you look at disinfolklore as a narrative form, to see how Ukraine is being archetyped as a particular character with characteristics.
Don’t Poke the Bear
russia does it when it calls itself a bear and promotes this troll. I first came across this with an American senior officer, a colonel, who once in eastern Ukraine just mentioned to me about the bear—“don’t poke the bear.” That was the first time I came across this meme.
What this actually is, is archetyping russia as the strong bear, which you can’t do anything about when it pokes you—you can’t poke it back. If it pokes you, then it’s your fault for poking it. It’s a really complicated, psychologically manipulative set of mental routines it sets off in our minds. That is concealed by the use of a bear, which we think of—well, those of us who didn’t grow up in Central and Eastern Europe with bears running around, or in Pennsylvania where bears are actually running around. Those who grew up in bourgeois Western Europe haven’t come across bears except in fairy tales and folk tales.
That for me was a clue of how russia uses character in stories. Donald uses the same trick, and many propagandists use the same trick. It’s also a means of critiquing what they do. russia is the implacable bear—better get over it, Ukraine.
Stereotypes versus Archetypes
Stereotypes are delivered through the storytelling and newsy memes every time Druidy Don, Donald, Duncy Putin, or their henchmen and women speak in disinfolklore.
When I speak of archetypes, it’s much deeper than mere stereotypes. I’m not just saying we’re reifying reality, aggregating components into a trope. Archetypes connect deep Indo-European cognitive structures with particular aggregated ideas—like the data-resistant archetype of a Potemkin state.
Data-Resistant Archetypes
I was reminded this week, reading a politician’s speech from a formerly occupied part of the former Soviet Union, where they were talking about NATO as if the past three years hadn’t happened, or as if America’s threats to invade NATO hadn’t happened. They were talking about how the Collective Security Treaty Organisation, which is russia’s fake NATO, has russia as a necessary component in it. Have you not seen anything in the past three years? Have you not picked up the data? Have you not updated your archetype of the CSTO, of russia, of NATO, of the past few years?
These characters have changed. They’ve been transformed. You’re talking about NATO and russia from Act One of the play. Those of us who have been watching avidly for the past four years, day by day—these characters evolve and develop. We are now in Act Six, and the character of NATO is not what it used to be.
Some of us will have seen reference today to how a drone, suspected to be a russian drone, penetrated Polish airspace and crashed quite far into Poland, right near—or maybe it didn’t even crash, maybe ran out of juice—near a Polish base which is rumoured to be one of its main electronic warfare facilities. Nobody there knew how to shoot it down. They couldn’t shoot it down.
This idea of NATO as a bear has to develop, just as the idea of russia as the bear has to develop. When I talk about data-resistant archetypes of a Potemkin state, I’m using literary references with the idea of a character to articulate how these signifiers like russia or NATO—their actual contents can transform.
Too Much, Never Enough
When I speak of disinfolklore’s archetyping, I’m talking about a process that takes many different words and meanings, imbues them with dynamic characteristics, then does it again and again and again—too much and never enough. That phrase is basically the title of the biography of Donald by his niece, but it’s also what characterises hyper-modernity as distinct from post-modernity, modernity, or the classical period. Too much, never enough—acceleration and insufficiency.
Before we know it, we’re inside a MAGA universe wrought by disinfolklore. It’s the system effects of all of these aggregating characters in the stories that we are embedded in, which are broadcast through the news, repeated by Donald and by many others all the time—including ourselves. The aggregating effect is that we’re put inside this MAGA universe.
Inside the Usurpers’ Universe
I’m using a metaphor here—the idea of being put inside a universe, a MAGA universe, but also inside a russian universe. This goes back to what I talked about at the beginning and what James was talking about at the beginning. The whole point of the Kennedy Center is just one of tens of thousands of vectors for each of us which could have the impact of transforming our identities and our surroundings and turning the usurper’s reality into an irreversible reality.
As it goes, I think the disgustingness of what we’re gradually learning about the whole Epstein stuff—the enormity of it, Donald’s complicity in it, Putler’s complicity—it would be somewhat ironic if Epstein brings them down. Out of all Putler’s crimes, this is the one that ends him.
International Relations as Storytelling
The stock in trade of international relations professionals is storytelling, as if the phenomena they speak of are more real than characters in a folktale. The West, NATO, russia, strongmen, spheres of influence. As many of us see and understand now—this great German word for Putin understanders—they impute intention to this character called Putler who doesn’t correlate in any way with the biological human called Putler. It’…
This is episode six of going through the battling archetypes and essential tools in the Disinfolklore analytical method. Some of you may remember last week I talked about Donald archetyping himself as mad, and my archetyping of my experience on the bridge at Stanytsia Luhanska as something folkloric, and that leading to an accidental insight which in turn led to my discovery of Disinfolklore.
Today I wanted to keep going. Inside russia-occupied Ukraine, in occupied Luhansk, where I crossed into every day from government-controlled Ukraine, on a journey I would take from now-occupied Sievierodonetsk — about 150 kilometres on terrible roads, but really beautiful landscape all the way — from my hotel, the Hotel Mir, “Peace,” which had been bombed in 2014 in Sievierodonetsk. Last time I saw photographs of it, like many places I stayed in Ukraine, it’s now in ruins.
I lived in the Mir Hotel for a year, and then I moved into a beautiful house with a swimming pool and underfloor heating in Sievierodonetsk. Now that house itself — it’s not quite a ruin, but it has been looted. The family I lived with sent me photographs of the house recently, and I can now determine when places have been looted repeatedly. Walls are missing.
At the time, Sievierodonetsk was a bit of a haven. Gradually, as I was there from February 2015 onwards, as I got my eye into what for me was the first former Soviet city — it was a real Soviet city, the largest producer of ammonium in the former Soviet Union, that was its speciality, and it looked very like Soviet cities — but gradually it became more colourful. People became richer. Avocados appeared in the supermarket, as did hummus. Now those supermarkets are in ruins.
Sievierodonetsk’s best days — depending on one’s viewpoint — may have been in the Soviet era, or I would claim that its best days were during the years I was there, up until 2022, as it experienced being the de facto capital of Luhansk.
Each day, going to Stanytsia Luhanska was like passing into another world through this long journey along very rough roads, which we got to know extremely well because I did it five days a week for three years. Crossing into that bridge was like crossing into a matrix. Inside russia-occupied Ukraine was a matrix — and here I’m using the matrix from the movie as a metaphor rather than an actual place.
russia’s archetyping system inside russia-occupied Ukraine consisted of hundreds of media outlets intermeshed with coercive force, coercive control, and so-called institutions which did not actually mediate reality. All of these means — the media outlets, the coercive force, the coercive control, and these fake institutions which only existed on paper in the media outlets — I mentioned this last week, how for the first few months I was reading stories about how the russian occupiers were establishing a central bank and courts and a parliament and all these normal foundational institutions. But they were fake. They only existed on paper. Took me a few months to realise that.
None of these means really mediated reality. They forged reality. I use the word “forged” there as a double entendre — in the sense that they forged it like you might forge a horseshoe in a forge, hammering it away, putting it in the fire, taking it out, hammering it away. And forged in the sense of forgeries, art forgeries, fake reality — which is the essence of the Disinfolklore metaphor, the Disinfolklore insight that I had.
I didn’t then understand what the russians were doing. I didn’t understand their objective. At the time, March 2015, the Council of the European Union — the supreme governments’ part of the European Union, as distinct from the European Commission’s civil servants and the European Parliament’s directly elected parliamentarians — the Council of the European Union at the end of March mentioned disinformation for the first time. So at the time, there wasn’t really a vibe of disinformation. Of course, I had the memory of russian propaganda from my school textbooks and a bit at university. But I didn’t realise that what I was being embedded in was something completely new, which required new language and new terms to describe, and which had — and this is key to the battling archetypes aspect of Disinfolklore — system-wide effects.
We’re not just looking at individual memes or stories or tweets. We’re looking at the system-wide effects of thousands or millions of those. I got that insight from seeing how this matrix-like enmeshing of the humans living inside russia-occupied Ukraine worked — and here I’m not using matrix in the sense of the film, but in the geometric sense — this enmeshing of different media outlets.
Those of us who listen to Chuck Pfarrer and Alan regularly — they have a good new show this week I listened to a couple of days ago — one of Chuck Pfarrer’s many aphorisms is “one is none,” which I’ve taken quite to heart. In the past, I would try to only have one item, one charger for instance, that could do everything. Now I’m going for redundancy — having loads of different chargers. It’s quite liberating actually.
This “one is none” principle is practised by the russians. They have constant redundancy, whether it’s in their operations overseas — they’ll flicker between using church groups, diplomats, propaganda outlets. There’s this enmeshing. This principle of enmeshing, a matrix in the geometric sense, is something we may not notice when we’re looking at particular memes.
What I’m trying to articulate with the battling archetypes aspect of the Disinfolklore analytical method is the system-wide effect. Donald saying certain things — it’s not just about Venezuela or Greenland or Ukraine or the Epstein files. It’s a whole system, and it has persistent effects on us.
At the time, in 2015, I didn’t see that this was what they were doing in russia-occupied Ukraine. But I was gathering data points, which I then spent years parsing for patterns. They were weaving reality in there. I didn’t know why they were doing it. They were changing the identities of the consumers of Disinfolklore. This is what MAGA does, what Donald does, and what the russians are still doing.
Coming up to the anniversary — I think Volya is doing a 24-hour thing for the anniversary, which is great. Hopefully I’ll be able to participate in that. One of the things I’ve been reflecting on is how the war has changed me. I started out with a set of beliefs — that the West would intervene, that NATO was useful. Those external perceptions have then moved right into the depths of my mind. Things have changed in my own mind. My identity in many senses has been changed, and perhaps many of our identities have been changed, where our identities are a function of what we think and do day after day.
I was interested to read recently on X about the algorithm, because I noticed this. Up until the 27th of February 2022, I never tweeted about Ukraine because I was still working there and didn’t want to be talking about what I was working in. But I was very engaged in trying to raise awareness about COVID. My timeline was full of doctors and medics. Then that changed really quickly — I was put into the Ukraine category. I was interested to read recently that my lived experience backs up that your categorisation by the Twitter algorithm can change quite quickly according to what you like and what you post.
In some ways, that’s a metaphor or example of how our online identity can change quite quickly. We’re not stuck in boxes. Now, after he who shall not be named bought Twitter, there was a thing about how, when the algorithm was released, people in the pro-Ukraine group were being discriminated against. So maybe when you got into the pro-Ukraine group, it became more of a fixed identity.
Again, how quickly our externally perceived identities can be seen to change. I saw the same thing happen — and many of us have — with MAGA people, and in russia-occupied Ukraine through the means of this enmeshing matrix…
The Soviet Union was so mysterious for many of us, as was eastern and central Europe. I was 17 when the Berlin Wall fell. Many people I’ve met since — I went as soon as I could. I spent time hitchhiking to Czechoslovakia and Poland and Hungary, went around those places several times, because I was fascinated by what it was like, how they lived.
I always imagined it would be really interesting working in the former Soviet Union, because it was such an interesting and alien place. In Ireland at the time, we did learn a lot about russian politics. I think we learned more truth about russia and the five-year plans and Stalin than they learned about us when it comes down to it. So it was planted as a seed of interest. But I never thought I’d end up going around villages and being able to just talk to people. The joy in that never left me, no matter how hard some experiences were — when it was minus 20 and having to be out on the bridge for seven hours, or fiddling around with camera systems and thermal-shutdown computers.
Having said that, Wendy, it was one of many ambitions I had, many of which I’ve achieved. It wasn’t like I was obsessed by it because I’d never looked for it. It just landed on my lap through accident — like a Grail tale or Don Quixote. My life in that sense has been more picaresque than a tightly planned novel. I didn’t decide when I was eight that I was going to work in Ukraine and get there in the end. That isn’t what happened. But when it did happen, I was aware that this was one of the many things I really wanted to do.
This is episode five of going over the basics of battling archetypes and the Disinfolklore analytical method. We were on the bridge and went through the luxury sausage troll saga. Last week we went through some of the folkloric resonances of my experience as a diplomat on that bridge in Stanytsia Luhanska — the passage to the other world.
I wanted to move onwards with archetyping. I had an interesting discussion with someone today about whether or not Donald is compos mentis. Some of us may be aware there’s been a bit of a divorce between Michael Cohen and the liberal media this week. I don’t quite fully understand it, but I think it’s something to do with one of the documents released in the 1% of documents released in the Epstein files. That document attests, apparently, to Michael Cohen’s lawyers offering the New York DA and/or AG during his case — I think this was during the case in 2018 when he ended up in Otisville, in prison for campaign finance violations. Unindicted co-conspirator number one is Donald.
Michael Cohen has been, in his podcast for the last couple of years, promoting the troll that he knows for certain that Donald — first, that he knew nothing about Epstein, because as is true, Epstein and Donald had divorced before Michael Cohen came on the scene — but also Michael Cohen was very strongly attesting to his very strong belief, as the person he believes knows Donald best of practically anyone in the world, that Donald was not involved in really bad stuff in the Epstein files.
There’s been this divorce. I’ve had to reassess almost everything I learned about Donald from Michael Cohen and try to think about whether he was lying about that or not, whether he was trolling us. There were a few things I was pretty clear he was just banging on about. But it doesn’t mean everything he ever said about Donald is incorrect.
One of the things he’s been very clear about is that Donald is acting. He does not have dementia — he is acting this role of someone who’s completely nuts. In the background of my mind, I’m recomputing all the data I collected over listening to Michael Cohen’s podcast every now and again over the past couple of years. There’s this data point as well.
I had this discussion earlier today. Certainly what Donald is doing — he is archetyping as the archetypal madman. Anyone who studied, or had the misfortune even though I did have a good teacher, to study game theory at college will know the archetypal example of the madman is Khrushchev at the United Nations in 1961, banging his shoe during the Cuban Missile Crisis — which seems like a very tame crisis at this point.
The people who established game theory as a science in political science — I think Harvard is basically the beginning of all of that — established this idea that you could play the madman. Donald is certainly a very convincing actor in that role. Whether or not he has dementia or is at death’s door, I just don’t know. I’m not convinced he is. Obviously we all wish he would just retire peacefully somewhere, preferably somewhere else.
I was pretty sure after January 6th that we wouldn’t have to deal with him again because he seemed so unhealthy. If you set out in your political career to try and gain immunity from whatever is in the Epstein files — and I do think his experience with Epstein and his knowledge that the stuff would come out is possibly the main motivating factor in his entire political career. Again, Michael Cohen is a source for: Donald did not intend to win the presidency in 2016. He was doing it to build his brand and it got out of hand and he won it.
But if, in the course of running for the 2016 elections, the Epstein case — certainly in 2018, I think that’s when it really broke, early 2018, but obviously people in the know knew about it — and he appointed as his Secretary of Labor, Acosta, who as I understand it arranged the plea deal with Epstein in Florida. Epstein and all that stuff was very much on his mind. If Donald is willing to threaten to invade Greenland over whatever is in those files and sacrifice the whole of Ukraine, then it might be pretty horrific. If he knows this is there, then that could well have motivated his political career.
The other thing is Ukraine has been central to Donald and to Republicanism and to American democracy since 2015, and certainly since 2016, when it’s always been my belief that russia bet everything on Crimea. Then it doubled down on Luhansk and Donetsk. Then it doubled again on Syria. Then it ten-tupled its bets on the full-scale invasion.
Everything russia does and has done over the past decade has been motivated by its animal and completely irrational drive to subjugate and kill and destroy Ukraine — which of course is the kind of vulnerability which President Zelenskyy and General Budanov and everyone, the leadership in Ukraine, have been using, trolling, knowing this vulnerability, trolling russia to its doom.
All of this is a way of introducing one of the central ideas in Disinfolklore and the battling archetypes: the idea of archetyping. I’ve spoken before about how Donald used Alphonse Capone — he would always say “Alphonse Capone” as part of his campaign speeches — and how Melania’s meme-chic costume at his inauguration earlier this year, feels like an eternity away, were deliberate acts of archetyping. As was all that stuff with Batman and Robin — Musk and him, daddy in the White House earlier this year.
If Donald is archetyping himself as the archetypal madman from game theory, then yes, he’s very convincing at it. He may well be suffering dementia. But when I reflected on it, I’m not sure I’d even heard of narcissism until maybe 2016 or 2017 as a psychiatric disorder. Everything I know about narcissism is from him. When I reflect on it, he could just be playing that role. I just don’t know.
All of this is introducing the idea of archetyping. If Donald is archetyping himself as the dementia-ridden, Alphonse Capone-admiring, crazy guy, and now he just has to keep on doubling down and tripling down — again, parallels with russia — then my idea, the element in archetyping which applies to memes and overall strategies, I think is central to understanding what is going on. It’s even central to having a conversation about it.
My jury is still out. I swing both ways. Yesterday I was arguing with this particular person that Donald was strategically illiterate, because there is this …
Last week I was right back at the bridge at Stanytsia Luhanska and I went through the luxury sausage troll saga and the complicity between the activities which the russians, and indeed the Ukrainians, create on the ground, but then the complicity between these actual activities and how the russian Disinfolklore apparatus, the propaganda apparatus, then spins these actual events.
What I wanted to talk about today was the folkloric dimension of the bridge, because that’s obviously quite fundamental to Disinfolklore. I’m aware that most of us haven’t thought too much about folklore since we were children. I wanted to bring us through how I had this intuition — unwrapping that intuition that there was something folkloric about that situation — into what has now become the Disinfolklore analytical method.
The saga of me and my russian colleague featured in a whole array of Disinfolklore stories spun by the russians. But there’s another aspect of the bridge and that situation I was in that struck me almost the first moment I was there.
One thing I’ve noticed, by listening to Chuck Pfarrer since the Maria days, and Alan as well — I’ve actually learned quite a lot of how he thinks, how a Navy SEAL thinks and computes data. Every now and again, someone in my real life who doesn’t pay that much attention to Ukraine but is interested in what’s going on, I find myself speaking about what’s going on — like, for instance, about Pokrovsk in November — being able to channel what I was learning from Chuck Pfarrer and how he was looking at the battlefield. He didn’t think it would fall that easily. I realised I’ve actually learned quite a lot. A certain part of my mental architecture, the way I compute data, especially battlefield stuff, has really developed and evolved a great deal as a result of listening for three or four years to Chuck Pfarrer.
By analogy, that’s what I’m trying to do with the Disinfolklore analytical method. I’m grateful for these opportunities, these shows, which is just to give an idea of how I think about this kind of data and how I control it going into my mind.
But I didn’t start out that way. I forged the word Disinfolklore out of disinformation and folklore in February 2023. I established a folder on my computer in February 2020 called “Folklore.” That folder is where I was putting all these texts that I was reading to try and understand what trolls and trolling was about. Out of that initial attempt to look at how those terms were being used in the media, tracing them back — that led me on this massive journey, which I’m still on, into the origins of Indo-European languages, but also particularly through this data set I got from Factiva of tens of thousands of references to trolls and trolling.
I had that folder on my computer called Folklore, and then disinformation, obviously, was one of the words. It could be misinformation or disinformation. In February 2023, I was trying to think of a way of how I can archetype everything I have learned since being on the bridge. That was February 2023, a year into the war as well, where I realised — because of my experience on this bridge from February 2015 onwards, seeing and looking at patterns and data — that I had a particular way of perceiving the daily diet of information we were receiving through X and through Telegram. At the time I was on Telegram and looking at it for the full-scale invasion.
I spent the first month of the full-scale invasion collecting information for the OSCE’s Moscow Mechanism mission, which then in April 2022 produced the first report. It was charged by 44 countries, nation states, to inquire into russia’s conduct of the war in Ukraine for the first month. That report was then cited in the definitive, historic, comprehensive 600-page judgment delivered by the European Court of Human Rights about three months ago on russia’s violations of the European Convention on Human Rights.
I was collecting this data initially to help these four jurists who were producing this report. But I found that I had a particular perspective on it that was worth sharing. I was looking for a means of naming it, naming what I was doing. I consciously sat down one day and wrote down “disinformation” and then “folklore.” Disinfolklore was then pretty obvious because of the F in disinformation overlapping with folklore. That’s where the moniker, the branding, was born.
Instead of including the word folklore, I could have chosen song, or folk song, propaganda, stories, narratives, or a heap of other words to describe the new phenomenon I’ve identified. Folklore, however, captures best the way of seeing — in the sense of that brilliant book by Berger, Ways of Seeing, ways of looking at art. I think it’s from the early 70s. That title, that idea from Nietzsche as well — all knowledge is perspective. This idea of ways of seeing is as valid today, to see what I describe as Disinfolklore, as folklore was in Jacob Grimm or Herder’s times.
I mentioned Herder’s call last week, in 1777, where he said: we’re under occupation by the French and we need to unite the 10 Germanic tribes. In order to do this, we need our Shakespeare. Where is our Shakespeare? We have no Shakespeare. He launched the folklore collection movement in Germany, which recruited the Grimm brothers later and Goethe.
It’s quite amusing in a very nerdy way that one of the origin stories of the folklore movement is in Macpherson’s Ossian tales, which turned out to be faked. From the 18th century, they brought into the consciousness of all of Europe — Europe was basically convulsed by these stories of peasant wisdom and the found document, which is a trope across Indo-European culture, including in Tibetan Buddhism, of these documents which are suddenly found somewhere under a rock.
Macpherson is the archetypal Disinfolklorist because he did communicate something very authentic — they’re mainly based on Irish folklore — but he did it in a deceptive manner. But who can blame him, because it was that work which then inspired Herder to realise: we can create a sense of national self-identity by collecting stories and finding the archetypal stories of the German people.
For three years I had been researching Indo-European mythology and folklore — the three years before 2023, a year into the full-scale invasion. For three years I had been researching Indo-European mythology and folklore as a means of seeing how russia and MAGA were using stories to create community. I was looking for that moniker, and then Disinfolklore just suddenly came to me — a bit like all those famous Eureka moments.
When I arrived, the reason I had this folder called Folklore on my computer was, yes, I was trying to look at trolling and trolls. But from almost the very first moment I arrived at the bridge in Stanytsia Luhanska — which is on the Donets River, in a biosphere reserve area, beautiful forestry either side of the river, weeping willows whose leaves are falling into the river and whose boughs are bowed towards the river, and a bridge across it — on either side of the bridge were the russian occupiers on one side and the Ukrainian defenders on the other, separated by a kilometre and a half. There were all these old houses, beautiful old wooden houses. Typically the architecture around that part of Ukraine is brick-built first storey, and then they have wooden tops.
This didn’t fit my archetype of russia or the Soviet Union, where I thought everyone lived in these horrible apartment blocks. That’s from the perspective of a bourgeois Westerner, where these apartment blocks generally seem like the equivalent that Americans see as projects. But now, having travelled a lot around central and eastern Europe, I realise that that archetypal meaning of these places is not consistent with the data — you have lovely, well-looked-after apartment blocks. To the untrained eye, they just look like a council estate in South London or something. But when you get close to them, you see a whole …
What I look at in Disinfolklore is particularly the system effects of specific memes. I’m also interested in the moment — how they affect us, how they affect our motivations, our intentions, our attitudes. But the whole thing, what’s special about the Disinfolklore universe, is that when I set this out in February last year in Munich, just as Vance was making his speech, I said that what I feared would happen is this.
For those of us who know people who have gone MAGA, I suppose it’s a bit like our Ukraine war universe by comparison to people we know who live a normal civilian life, who think about Ukraine maybe once a week, if that. It’s an all-encompassing system where you wake up in the morning — a bit like being in love or something — and it’s all you think about. Or being in grief.
But the Disinfolklore universe that Donald wields, that he was trying to wrap the world up in, which I witnessed in eastern Ukraine where the russians wrap everyone up in it — that’s what’s unusual or unique or not that common in how I look at the system effects of particular memes: the aggregation of particular memes in a certain way, so that before you know it, you’re in the cult. Or you begin to think that Greenland belongs to America, or that Venezuela belongs to America, or that Ukraine belongs to russia. That would be the result of an aggregation of thousands, millions of memes that transform your mind.
In a minute, I’m going to go back to the bridge at Stanytsia Luhanska, which I talked about in the last show on Christmas Eve. Amazing — we did a show on Christmas Eve. I think this is our 32nd show, by my count. We’ll go back to that bridge in a minute.
What I’ve noticed is this idea I’ve been working on, what I call paradoxical brainwashing. “I’m a Ukraine supporter, but Ukraine will lose.” We had this caller on the show — I’m glad I wasn’t the only one who noticed them — who joined the show about a week ago. Will and I think James, you heard them as well. They were a total downer about any argument which was given as to why — actually, it was Alan Brewer and Will who were dealing with this person. They were speaking the whole time about how Ukraine was going to lose. Any argument from the reservoir of many good arguments, factually based, that Will or Alan Brewer offered, this person was like, “Yeah, but...” They were just going on and on with the negative vibe.
The paradox is: I’m a Ukraine supporter, but Ukraine will lose. That structure, that energy, was in everything they were talking about. Some of us sometimes need to be reminded — we get in a rut, a mental rut, a mental routine — and we need to be reminded: “Yes, but this. Yes, but that.” That’s the value of Volya Radio. It’s the value of Mokrushyna’s show, and hopefully the value of this show as well for people — that when we’re in these mental ruts, as perhaps some of us have been about Venezuela or about Greenland or about other aspects of this, or something going on in Ukraine at the moment, by having different people talking to us, we get out of the rut.
Because we’re genuinely Ukraine supporters, we’re not trying to fool or trick people. We’re not concern trolling to get into someone’s mind, to bring them down and demotivate them and fill them with dismay. Because we’re like that, we’re relatively easily able to move out of a particular mood, out of a particular attitude or state of motivation. But this person who was on the show couldn’t be moved. I found it a really interesting case study.
Another paradox recently was “Putler wants Ukraine to succeed.” This is something I’ve begun to notice everywhere. It’s an aspect of cult formation — these apparent contradictions which people say. For instance, when Donald was talking about Putin wanting Ukraine to succeed, he also said, “Oh, and Russia, Russia, Russia.” Then in almost the same breath, he goes on to talk about how Putin wants Ukraine to succeed.
He introduces this formula, this mantra, which is supposed to mean to his supporters that there is this big conspiracy against him about Putin — even though, as previously discussed, the Mueller report found six or seven different ways in which his campaign was purposefully adulterated and influenced by the russians. And then we have all of these other bits of evidence. But he uses this mantra to diffuse and as a shorthand to dismiss anyone who references that. Then the paradox is: in the very same breath, he says Putin wants Ukraine to succeed, even though that very day he’s trying to bomb Ukraine. Paradox rolled over, folded into another paradox.
Now that I draw your attention to these apparent contradictions in speech — from Putler as well: “I love you, so I’m going to hit you” — those kinds of apparent contradictions which people speak, I see as characteristic not just of particular instances of Disinfolklore, but of particularly powerful instances of Disinfolklore that have the potential to have system effects. They’re part of a brainwashing. It’s not the one story which brainwashes you. It’s hundreds, it’s thousands, it’s day after day after day which does it.
Once you begin to see these paradoxes, I think they’re more than a rhetorical tick — they’re actually a powerful weapon. It sounds a little strange, but again, an apparent contradiction: you’re disarmed, you go in. That was from Donald. Before he says “Putin wants Ukraine to succeed,” he says, “It sounds a little strange, but...” — another paradox. And yes, it’s totally strange that Putin wants Ukraine to succeed. This hesitancy on Donald’s part is the indication that even he understands this is a paradox that will be too much for many, but the most willingly gullible in that moment, to swallow.
In certain moments, all of us are vulnerable to Disinfolklore and to paradoxes. Imagine how susceptible someone exhausted from two years of nights in a bomb shelter in Ukraine would be: “Oh, if Ukraine just surrenders all of Donetsk, peace will follow.” Again, another paradox. If you surrender, peace will come, even though you’re surrendering to the big bad wolf.
Donald said, “I was explaining to President Zelensky here — President Putin was very generous in his feeling towards Ukraine.” We all saw President Zelenskyy’s endearing response where he goes into character — his actor character — and draws the whole of Ukraine and all of us into his mind, looking at Donald, and manages to pull it off without annoying Donald. The generosity that Donald was talking about there is the generosity of a wife-beater and of Epstein’s greatest friend — of Donald himself towards his own sexual assault victims. We know there have been many.
The main point here is the use of apparent contradiction, of paradox, to brainwash, to assuage, to soothe. Over the short term, we may not fall for this troll. However, over the long durée, we become habituated to such contradictions and apparent contradictions, to such paradoxes. When the same trolls are repeated, amplified ad nauseam, they take on a truth of themselves. “Ukraine made Russia invade.” “Ukraine was wearing a short skirt.”
This guy called Andrey, a long-term KGB agent and author of numerous intelligence-related publications, argues that russian cultural heritage, linguistic structure, perception of paradox, and abstract thinking provide russia with a competitive advantage to successfully use socio-humanistic technologies, which he sees as the main weapon to control people in the digital age.
This charge of hypocrisy, which I characterise as part of these paradoxes — I’ve spoken about before how I’ve noticed that the charge of hypocrisy is very often immanent in Telegram posts that Mokrushyna reads out on Twitter, on the Volya shows, or from Simonyan and the other russian propagandists. So much so that I began to notice a pattern and began to wonder: what are they doing? What are they trying to do with this?
There are a number of objectives, but really what they’re trying to do is get people used to paradoxes and inconsistenci…
This is episode three, where I’m keeping a grip on where we are. This is episode three of a series I started four weeks ago. As some of us might remember, there were technical issues in the second week. I’m going through the piece which I delivered, the paper I delivered at the Pirate Party Security Conference at the time of the Munich conference in Munich last February. And the words from the United States Vice President at that conference are continuing to resonate with new policies being released all the time. Most recently, the attempt to sanction several senior European Union officials for so-called free speech crimes. So this is the Disinfolklore universe that I had an intimation we were moving towards, and it’s provoked into being by such actions as we have seen today.
I’m also aware of my promise to Ioana about six weeks ago that we would deal with truth, and I’m moving towards that as well. It’ll be a few more episodes where I move towards that point.
But last week we saw the continued reference to the territorial integrity of Ukraine. Some of us might remember in the prehistoric past — which when I looked back on my writing over the past few months was actually only a month ago, believe it or not — five weeks ago, I got the first intimation that this new round of so-called capitulation or peace talks was beginning and the pressure was on. My first intimation of it, some of us will remember picking this data point up on our timelines, was when the United States had attempted to take the term “territorial integrity” out of the annual United Nations resolution in support of Ukraine’s war of independence and against russia’s aggression.
At the time, that stood out to me like a sore thumb. The reference to sovereignty without the reference to territorial integrity. And the sound RT, RIT, is in both those terms — territorial and integrity. It’s also in sovereignty, but it’s disguised as the REIGN element — reign, reine in French — originating from this idea of straight, straightness, truth, and the rod which, for instance, President Zelenskyy held in his right hand when he was inaugurated as president in the Verkhovna Rada. And the current English king who is sovereign — there’s only one sovereign on the island of Britain, and that is the king — he also holds a rod, a straight rod in his right hand when he was inaugurated as monarch.
These are very old Indo-European rites and they are integrated into our language and the way we as Indo-European communities govern ourselves, going right back to Mykhailivka village on the Dnipro in Kherson Oblast, where the Yamna community — who spread Indo-European languages, religions, and forms of governance into the area between Ireland and India — lived between 4100 BCE and 3500 BCE.
So when I see today the President of the European Commission, the President of France, and Indo-European civilisation’s greatest leaders, particularly in Europe, referencing in almost identical terms the term sovereignty and digital sovereignty, it pleases me enormously. We’re moving forward towards the relationship between these concepts and trying to define what is rightful and what is truthful, which is what we try to do every day in real time on our timelines.
I am a great admirer of postmodern philosophy. I studied as a postgraduate at Georgetown. But I am also a little old-fashioned insofar as I do believe there is truth, and truth is not merely a mobile army of metaphors. It can be, but it’s not merely that. There is truth — when we sit on a chair, we’re sitting on the chair.
As we previously discussed about emptiness with Wendy — the idea of emptiness, that ultimately nothing does matter. However, in conventional reality, we have elaborated and established certain rules, certain regulations, and certain rights. And in that conventional reality that we’re living in, for me the preeminent rights are those established after World War II: the legal order, the international legal order for which 8 million Ukrainians died, including 1 million Ukrainian Jews. 8 million European Jews died, and however many tens of millions of others died. We established this set of rules and regulations after World War II, and for me that is the truth — the standard against which we measure any speech trying to incite hatred or division.
Sadly, we see the lack of respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, which China for instance practised when it invaded and occupied Tibet, and which russia has denigrated a billion times. And which, sadly, we are seeing now with the serious threats against Greenland — military threats against Greenland, part of the Kingdom of Denmark — and also against the European Union’s digital sovereignty. These concepts and ideas are more important than ever.
How I see all of this is part of the Disinfolklore universe, which the MAGA administration, as well as russia, as well as the CCP, the Communist Party in China, are attempting to wrap us up inside. And thankfully, for the time being — and I see no clouds on the horizon on this front — the European Union is holding up what’s right, as indeed is Australia and Japan.
One of the main means we can use to determine who is upholding right — meaning the post-World War II legal and social order in today’s world — is how they are supporting Ukraine. Some of us might well have friends who don’t necessarily support Ukraine, or who have had their minds contaminated by russian Disinfolklore so that they think they can challenge for the sake of debate or argument and argue russian information warfare tropes, either knowingly or unknowingly — just to épater la bourgeoisie, to cause a bit of problems, to have an intellectual debate about it. That’s where it begins.
And then on the other end of the scale, it’s what the Trump administration is doing — withholding aid or not doing what it should be doing to defend Ukraine’s territorial integrity. It’s not enough to defend its sovereignty, because the three archetypes which are central to Indo-European communities since the time in Mykhailivka, Kherson Oblast, between 4100 BCE and 3500 BCE, when the Yamna lived in one community before they spread out and established all the different Indo-European cultures — Celtic, Germanic, Indic including Iranian and Hindu, Slavic, and all the rest — they had these three archetypes in their community: sovereignty, security, and prosperity/fertility.
These three elements are represented today, for instance, in our memory of the Indian, the Hindi caste system, where you have priests, soldiers, and farmers. The priests are one aspect of sovereignty, the soldiers are an aspect of security, and the farmers are an aspect of prosperity or economy or fertility.
And again, the RIT sound is in those — security, fertility as prosperity, and sovereignty as well. So we have these archetypes very deeply embedded into our language, into the way we think, into how we govern and organise ourselves.
It really tickles me to have come across this whole literature, which is from this amazing French philosopher Georges Dumézil, who discovered these three archetypes — sovereignty, security, fertility/prosperity — immanent in all the Indo-European traditions in the 1930s. We’re going to move towards that point.
It really excites me to see how present and important, how primary and fundamental, these concepts are even today in these statements of resistance to this attempt to infringe on other countries’ sovereign rights to determine what is and what is not hate speech. Germany’s lead in all of these matters — I recognise it and I celebrate it, because obviously, because of their history, they are. And Merz is very much, as a self-declared rightist, very much part of the post-World War II generation which believes in never again.
I did this piece, some of you might remember, about six months ago, where I spoke about rescuing the right. I never myself identified on the political right. But when I look at how Meloni and Merz and Presid…
Two weeks ago, I ended at the point where I was talking about how what I was most concerned with in my Munich speech in February 2025 was that we would be wrapped up inside what I call a Disinfolklore universe, made up of different discrete galaxies all coalescing. Sadly, the attempt to re-engineer humanity through this is ongoing. We see it every day throughout this so-called peace process.
How it manifests in our minds and in our timelines is exactly what we’re experiencing at the moment: a constant battering of our senses and emotions — our emotions most importantly — with hope and with feelings that maybe, for instance, in the case of one of the main characters at the moment, the war in Ukraine, many people are commenting on it as if peace is going to arrive in a month or two, or is imminent.
I’m not going to go through why I don’t think this is true. I could go through each of the peace agreement’s elements and demonstrate it’s not true. But I probably will get to that later, in a few weeks, when I get to the point about my experience in eastern Ukraine.
US presidents could always archetype at scale. By archetyping, I mean something bigger than branding. It’s not a mere imprinting of ideas in our consciousness. It’s something akin to attaching something in the quotidian, in our timelines, to very deep structures within our cognitive frameworks — on an individual, but also on a micro and macro level.
When President Trump was talking about immigrants eating our dogs, that can be understood on a literal level: immigrants are eating our dogs. Many of us would have spent time fact-checking this. Lo and behold, we discover immigrants aren’t eating our dogs.
But when I heard that, it reminded me of one of my great supervisors, Anna Lo, who was a member of the Northern Ireland Assembly. Sadly she died about a year ago. She was the first ethnic Chinese member of a legislature in Europe. I worked for her in Northern Ireland when I was General Secretary of the Alliance Party of Northern Ireland, an anti-sectarian political party.
There is a tradition among those supposedly loyal to the British crown of lighting bonfires in July. Some of us might remember seeing lots of bonfires. And I remember seeing “Anna Lo ate my dog” on a sign on one of these bonfires, and wondering what they were talking about.
I thought of that immediately when Donald was talking about migrants eating our dogs. There is this element of an archetypal relationship between dogs and migrants — being eaten, eating our pets — somehow othering. That’s quite conventional in far-right circles. I happened to come across it once by accident in Northern Ireland, and then it popped up in Donald Trump’s speech, and suddenly everyone is going.
That’s also an archetypal structure. But it also sounds so bizarre to us as normal human beings who support Ukraine — it’s like a hidden code, an unhidden code. Somehow it connects with deep psychological fears of people in their inner minds and motivates them to hate migrants. Enough of a set of people that it was worth Donald airing this in his campaign. It was worth these so-called loyalists attaching a poster of Anna Lo to their bonfire and then burning it — the effigy and the sign: “Anna Lo ate my dogs.”
This is the kind of thing I’m talking about with archetypal Disinfolklore literacy. We don’t have to learn all of these tropes, because honestly I think we could end up being brainwashed.
But when we see the Wagner — the Wagner propagandist who was killed by one of the first HIMARS strikes in Popasna in July 2022 — some of us will remember that incident where he was visiting the front line as a tourist. It was in Popasna, a city I know well from when I lived in eastern Ukraine. He was photographed on arrival, it was put up online, there was a label on the building behind him, and HIMARS came to visit, and he was killed.
The person who took over the Grey Zone Telegram channel wrote: “So-and-so has gone to Odin.” This is a very deep archetype in Indo-European history. In ancient Germanic thought, surfaced by Tacitus, recorded first in the first century of the Common Era, and then used by Wagner the composer as part of this project to create a German national consciousness movement — a response to the call by Herder in 1777 to unify the ten German tribes that Tacitus had recorded existed.
Odin became part of that. Wagner the composer played his role, as did Goethe and many other great artists and writers, in forming this culture — which is akin to what MAGA and russia are trying to do using all these different means.
When they use archetypes, like in this case Odin — “he’s gone to Odin” — these are very deep structures. They attach not just into our culture but into, for instance, “Wednesday.” Every time you say Wednesday, you’re unknowingly perhaps making a dedication to Odin. Wōdanaz is the Germanic way of calling Woden the god, but Odin is another name for it. The Wagner military guys — it was part of their lore, their inner lore, and it is still part of their lore.
When you pick these up, they’re not mere tropes. They’re not accidental. There’s something more about them. That’s what I mean about archetypes. It’s bigger than branding. It’s more than representation. It’s something much deeper. And that’s what I’m most concerned about.
This week we saw — well, two weeks ago, and we talked about it last week — the new national security strategy. What I noticed from my previous work, which I’ve talked about before, is how Putler archetypes Ukraine as a woman — a woman from the perspective of the masculinist. From the perspective of Hegseth, who also — or the head of the FBI, who incidentally when he talks about Valhalla, that’s tapping into those white supremacist Germanic lore archetypes. So it’s not just the Wagner military.
What I noticed they’re also trying to do in the national security strategy is archetype Europe in the same way they’re archetyping Ukraine — turning the concept of Europe away from its power, its economic power, and into a character in Disinfolklore with the characteristics of a weak woman. A weak woman is an archetype from the perspective of masculinists like Putler, like Hegseth, like Donald, like all of these palaeo-male, palaeo-conservatives. They’re trying to create a sense of disgust about it.
One friend of mine wrote to me from the United States: “How is Europe these days? It sounds very sick to me, everything going on there. You’re just ailing.” This is the mood which has been spread.
I talk about how Disinfolklore works on our mana, our energy, from which all our motivations come, our attitudes, our moods emanate. This is the secret sauce. We’re looking at the meme, the peace talks, the so-called peace talks, and our mood is being affected. Mood is a much longer-term mechanism to brainwash us and demotivate us. “What’s the point in voting? They’re all the same.” That’s the way they use memes, and that can be effected by…
It’s exactly a year since I detected the system-wide effects of the aggregation of MAGA and russian Disinfolklore artifacts invading our minds, information space and reality. In February in Munich at the Pirate Party security conference I declared what by then I had archætyped as a “Disinfolklore Universe” to be operating inside all of our minds and cultures.
Today I want to begin a series of several parts of the “Battling Archetypes” paper I conceived for the first time exactly a year ago and which I spoke about in embryonic form at the Munich meeting in February.
I wanted to go through the four — or five parts rather — over the next week or two, to remind us of the system so that we can apply it to this idea of a peace process of which Ukraine isn’t a voluntary part. It’s obviously sticking in there as long as it can to maintain intelligence support.
As I understand it, Ukraine last year spent 5 billion euros on drones, and 70 or 80 percent of russian casualties were caused by those drones. So the amounts of money and the technical needs of Ukraine — they have everything they need, basically, at a minimum. It would be very nice if they can maintain intelligence support and other particular munitions. But even the Patriots — we see these things, the SAMP/T, the anti-aircraft system that the Italians make, I think with the French — seem to be doing very well. The United States is no longer the indispensable ally.
I totally admire the patience of the Ukrainian side. They want to keep America on board, mainly because the deep state, if there is one, and the people who will succeed Donald — God willing — will expect Ukraine to maintain its politeness. It’s an investment in Ukraine’s future, but I don’t see it as an existential need for them.
So what are the Americans and the russians doing? They are altering our culture, changing our approach to international law, trying to return us to the social conditions of the 1930s. This has always been the plan of the people behind MAGA and Donald: that municipal law should trump international law.
If you were to say to me, “What is Russia’s game? What is the project by invading and occupying Crimea?” — that’s what I would say. It’s to replace the international law which constrains individual sovereigns from certain activities. It proscribes a certain set of activities: contravening human rights, contravening various laws — laws of the sea, laws of armed conflict, the Genocide Convention. These are all constraints on the sovereign. Both MAGA and russia and many oligarchs around the world don’t want any constraint on sovereigns.
When we hear them trying to talk about recognising Crimea, recognising the taking of a territory — on the one hand, it will be America doing what russia did when it brought Zaporizhzhia into its constitution. It just ruins the entire constitution of America, as it would with russia. It will have no effect on other countries like the European Union, or powerful countries like Japan, in terms of recognition. They’re not going to suddenly recognise it. But Taiwan and everyone will accelerate their nuclear weapons programmes, and it will have real-world effects.
Apart from all of that, what I see happening, almost imperceptibly, is it changes our realities and normalises what was previously impossible. This is what I talk about as the Disinfolklore universe. This is why, Wendy, when I see articles particularly like this one about recognising Crimea, it just jumps out: they are going to do this, and these are the implications. In my own small way, I try to lay those out. But I hope people who have power are trying to lay this out too. And I hope there’s a plan. Maybe the plan involves leaks. Maybe that’s why Witkoff looked so terrible in Miami — because he was spending nights going through all his conversations for the last six months, which someone perhaps has, and they’re all going to leak.
I declared our Disinfolklore universe in February in Munich. I thought it was appropriate to be talking about that at a Pirate Party security conference event, because those who founded the Pirate Party get what I’m about to speak to you about. There’s a flow between, on the one hand, culture, art, films, literature about pirates, and geopolitical security. This is especially apt as we see these attacks on russia-connected cargo vessels.
Those whom we entrust with securing our conditions of civilised life don’t seem to understand this flow between culture, art, films and literature, and geopolitical security. Donald, of course, does — because he talked incessantly about Al Capone, about Hannibal Lecter. He brought in these archetypal characters from art. He archetypes himself as the Joker, or as a Magus or seer. He gets it. But many of our leaders don’t. President Zelenskyy certainly gets it, and that’s part of my argument.
This is partly why they’re such easy marks for russian and MAGA Disinfolklore. I’m talking about the straight-laced geopolitical actors and commentators who don’t really get this flow between art, culture, films and security. For them, they can’t really understand Donald as an artist, as an archetyper, someone who archetypes at scale. Same obviously with Duncy Putler. They get wrapped up so easily in russian or MAGA trolls, like flies in a spider’s web. It’s very hard for them even to understand that they’re trapped inside old thinking.
I’m not saying I don’t get trapped. I get wrapped up in these trolls all the time. I’m just trying to develop tools that help me escape the spider’s web. When I find myself in a state of confusion — for instance, when I saw last Friday night about America recognising Crimea — I don’t go into despair or put out tweets going, “This is terrible.” I just try to think it through: what will happen if this happens? What are they up to? Is it likely to happen?
Today I’m going to offer a perspective on what I call our Disinfolklore universe. I’m also going to offer a means to escape the trolls, the memes that wrap us up inside when we fall for MAGA or russian Disinfolklore.
None of this is easy. I don’t have all the answers. Whenever you hear anyone talk about disinformation or Disinfolklore as if it happens to other people, as if only stupid people fall for trolls — whenever you hear chatter like that, be certain these people are easy marks for trolls, for MAGA and russian Disinfolklore. You’ll have heard me say this a lot, most recently with President Biden and his “we’re not going to go for World War III over Ukraine.” We talked about that three weeks ago.
Today we live in a true Disinfolklore universe. The fabric of every dimension of our lives — our work, personal relationships, life choices, fates — are fused with aspects of Druidy Don and Duncy Putler’s memetic onslaught. That is as true today as it was in February when I first spoke about this in Munich.
You’ll all remember the White House visit happened a few days after my Munich speech. It affects all our moods, motivations, intentions and attitudes. Increasingly I’m focusing on moods, because it’s the moods which are affected by this news about peace plans, about Ukraine being forced into capitulation. “Can they do that? Is it going to be?” And we’re just depressed by it. The aggregate of us all being depressed is: “Ukraine can’t win.” This is really what they’re attacking on a civilisational scale, on a country scale — this fear, this malaise they’re trying to create.
These moods are being formed by what I call Disinfolklore — directly through the media memes we consume, or indirectly through our own minds working through these memes and those of others influencing us, from archetypes created and evolving from Disinfolklore.
We had all of the archetyping of Elmo and Druidy Don in the White House those days in January. The totality of our information space was occupied by memes like the Department of Government Efficiency — named after a meme coin, but also after the class of oligarchs who ran, I think, Venice into …
Disinfolklore is russia using First Person View Drones on human prey to train its drone pilots.
Then the russian state publishes the footage of these murders, from the perspective of the First Person view drone pilots as they close in on their human prey.
This is archetypal Disinfolklore: create the event (in this case murder), then publicise it using different memes and means of storytelling. russia’s only in Ukraine to create social media content, which it uses to troll its own population and America’s leaders into perpetuating Ukraine’s annihilation. Disinfolklore always has a purpose. Infolklore (such as this podcast), by contrast, has an opposite purpose.
After detailed investigations into 200 of the 2,800 murders of civilians by russia using First Person View drones in Kherson, the UN Commission of Inquiry has determined these are Crimes Against Humanity.
The UN Commission of Inquiry based in Vienna has issued a report on the human safaris in Kherson that all of us are aware of, which have been going on since July 2024. It has established that these are crimes against humanity.
Part of the indictment of russia and those participating in the prosecution of these crimes against humanity — interesting to use the word “prosecution” there — is that russia, the russian state, is sharing these videos of their human safaris, of the 140 people they’ve murdered using first-person-view drones. The Commission of Inquiry determines that because they are first-person-view drones, the operators are hunting individuals, chasing them, watching as they murder them, and then sharing these on what I call the Disinfolklore apparatus: Telegram, X, Facebook, Instagram, and now sadly the White House press room.
These videos themselves are a perfect example of Disinfolklore. They breach all ethical guidelines — which is the second of the six criteria I use to determine whether a story constitutes Disinfolklore. The second criterion is “right” or ethical discipline. Obviously it’s morally wrong to engage in human safaris. There’s no law anywhere, moral or otherwise, which allows this.
Now we have a determination by a UN commission specifically established by 184 UN member states to inquire into russia’s war crimes in Ukraine. It determines that these are crimes against humanity — there is no greater crime in the human family. Therefore, the breach of the second element in the Code of Positive Trolls, which I use to distinguish between a unit of Disinfolklore and a unit of folklore or any other kind of story or narrative form — now we have this determination. That’s a perfect example of Disinfolklore.
Much of what is on Telegram — and of course Telegram features in russian combat propaganda, in russian military strategy, where you have this concept of “information confrontation” in which informational units and the environment are engaged in a confrontation — here we have Telegram, specifically leveraged by the russian state, to communicate Disinfolklore into the inner minds of humanity. Very successfully. It is acting in concert with the military apparatus in Kherson.
It’s not just killing these people. It is spreading the stories, spreading the images of these people being murdered, as part of its plan to dominate the inner minds of humanity and create terror — not just in the minds of the people of Kherson (and this is not me, this is the inquiry), but inside the minds of humanity as people gradually become aware of what’s going on.
That’s a good example of what Disinfolklore is in practice.
What helped me see this pattern — this is what I really do, I hunt for patterns in data. I assimilate, as many of us do who participate in X, because X, as we now know from the third report on Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference by the European Union, released a couple of weeks ago — I highly recommend reading it along with the first two reports — X is where, on a dataset of I think over 40,000 FIMI instances collected by the European Union, X was involved in 86% of them.
This is where we all are. I know many of us have ethical dilemmas about whether we should be here. Most of us are also on Bluesky and other places. But the fight is here. The examples are here.
I saw Margarita Simonyan tweeting again in her folksy Disinfolklore way — she does this a lot, telling these stories, as indeed does Donald. They tell stories of frankly horrifying things. This goes to your question, James.
For instance, the way Donald communicated — I think it was March 2024 — that if the head of a major NATO country said to him, “We can’t pay for our NATO membership, would you protect us?” he said, “I’d say, you know, do whatever the hell they want with you.” This unit of information was then reported by CNN as a fact — that Donald had told this head of state that America wouldn’t protect him. But we’re not clear whether this ever happened. It was reported as a fact by CNN. And so you see these folksy stories get taken up.
Simonyan tonight — she’s talking about how “people in the offices in Moscow” are saying that if Germany gives weapons to Ukraine, Ukraine won’t be able to do anything with them without Germany’s help, therefore Germany is complicit, and so they’ll have to strike Berlin. This is a classic piece of Disinfolklore.
There’s a distancing device in the narrative form. It’s presented as a folksy story: “people in the offices of Moscow” — as if she’s just heard this gossip. She’s said this before, when she spoke at the St Petersburg International Economic Forum in June 2022. Many of us will remember this. She said: “People in Moscow are saying that all our hope is in the famine.” And then she interprets what these folksy people are supposedly saying.
She’s sitting beside the head of state. She’s sitting beside Putin himself on the dais at the St Petersburg Economic Forum, dressed in green — which is why I call her Maid Marian Simonyan, like a reverse Robin Hood. This is an aspect of the Disinfolklore analytical method: we can use these folklore archetypes to interpret those who are themselves using folksy archetypes, and to combat them.
She said: “All our hope — the people in Moscow are saying — all our hope is in the famine. And what they mean by that is” — this is her interpreting what the ordinary folk in Moscow are supposedly saying — “there will be famine in Africa and the migrants will come to Europe, and then the European Union will release the sanctions because it’s impossible for us not to be friends.”
This is the folksy banter of the schoolyard. This is your seven-year-old child speaking to their best friend after an argument: “It’s impossible not to be friends.” But this isn’t a micro chat in a schoolyard. It’s a conversation sitting beside the head of state of a country at war, which is planning to starve millions of people in Africa in a madcap attempt that you’d only see in literature — in Don Quixote or in some folktale.
The madcap plan to win in Ukraine is to starve millions of Africans. That will provoke the Europeans into lifting the sanctions. Then russia will become friends with Europe and Ukraine will be abandoned. The way she tells the story, it’s solid russian strategy, but told in a folksy way. It’s absolutely horrifying when you analyse what it’s saying. But it passes most people by. It enters their inner minds.
As indeed does this stuff archetyping the former president of russia as drunk. Many sensible people were tweeting today the content of Medvedev’s tweet, once again threatening World War III if something happens — I think related to the Germans. These are folktale archetypes, folksy stories which communicate really horrifying things when you parse the data. It’s a pattern they use. And it’s really effective, because people like us share these because they provoke something in our emotions. Even if we think we’re harming the former president by archetyping him as drunk, we’re still repeating the meme. The horrifyingness is slyly communicated, the energy continues, a…
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