This page gives a brief overview of the NIH's framework for guiding funding decisions on potentially risky research involving enhanced potential pandemic pathogens (ePPPs). Following the release of a report, 'Proposed Biosecurity Oversight Framework For The Future of Science' in early 2023, the US Government is reviewing the process for the oversight of ePPP research. This report and a response to it can be found in the optional resources section.

Original text:
https://www.nih.gov/news-events/research-involving-potential-pandemic-pathogens

Author(s):
National Institutes of Health

The document highlights the need for national-level norms for biosafety, given that a laboratory accident with contagious pathogens could have global implications. Despite guidance for local and institutional biosafety practices, there are few international guidelines that standardise biosafety activities and oversight mechanisms from one research-producing nation to another.

Original text:
 https://www.cell.com/trends/microbiology/fulltext/S0966-842X(15)00228-0

Author(s):
 Gigi Kwik Gronvall and Michelle Rozo

This article proposes four key actions that can be taken to prevent outbreaks from zoonotic spillover: protecting tropical forests, regulating or banning live wildlife markets, improving biosecurity for farmed animals, and improving health and economic security, particularly in hotspots for disease emergence. For those digging deeper into zoonotic spillover for this week's exercise, you will find the original paper in the optional resources section.

Original text:
 https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-022-01312-y#:~:text=faces%20another%20pandemic.-,Four%20actions,-The%20risk%20of

Author(s): 
Neil M. Vora, Lee Hannah and Susan Lieberman et al.

As synthetic biology techniques develop and the barriers to entry become lower, we are increasingly seeing the development of privately-operated biological labs. These often enforce less stringent safety standards than those in academia, and can fall through the cracks of regulatory oversight. This article focuses on a recent example in California, emphasising the need for a unified regulatory system and increased federal oversight for these labs, especially those working with dangerous pathogens.

Original text:
https://time.com/6309643/invisible-biolabs/

Author(s):
Dan Greene and Jassi Pannu and Allison Berke

This article introduces a range of strategies to reduce pandemic risk whilst drawing parallels to fire-fighting interventions. It argues that pandemic prevention, like fire-fighting, needs a comprehensive approach that includes prevention, early detection, and both passive and active protection. It underscores that proactive pandemic preparedness measures are significantly less costly, both in financial terms and lives lost, compared to reactive responses. It's worth highlighting the need for global cooperation to implement suggested interventions, given the rapid and borderless nature of pandemics.

Original text:
https://worksinprogress.co/issue/pandemic-prevention-as-fire-fighting

Author(s):
Richard Williamson

There is a tension in the life sciences between scientific transparency and the need for secrecy to protect national or global security. This report introduces the term 'dual-use research of concern (DURC)' and covers debates from the last two decades over what information should be published.

Original text:
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK458495/

Author(s): 
US National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine

Historically, the complexity and unpredictability of biology has meant most scientific progress in this field has come from slow and expensive trial-and-error experiments. This post explores three areas that are turning biology from trial-and-error into a precise engineering discipline and unlocking dramatic progress; deep learning on biological data, laboratory automation, and precision DNA editing.

Original text: https://www.noahpinion.blog/p/were-entering-a-golden-age-of-engineering

Author(s): Joshua March and Kasia Gora

This paper proposes two categories of AI models that could have impacts on biosecurity in different ways: large language models (LLMs) and biological design tools (BDTs). Overall, the author suggests that LLMs could lower barriers to biological misuse, while BDTs could expand the capabilities of sophisticated actors to create pandemic pathogens worse than anything seen to date. The paper also provides suggestions for mitigating these risks.

Original text:
https://arxiv.org/abs/2306.13952

Author(s):
Jonas B. Sandbrink

This report breaks down the categorisation of LLMs and BDTs into more specific subcategories of AI-enabled biological tools at each stage of the risk chain, from ideation to production of biological weapons. By being more specific about the existing and potential tools at each stage, we can have more precise discussions about the risks.

Original text:
https://www.longtermresilience.org/post/report-launch-examining-risks-at-the-intersection-of-ai-and-bio

Author(s): 
Cassidy Nelson and Sophie Rose

This document introduces the concept of information hazards (often called 'info hazards') and reasoning for why we should be cautious around them. It also provides a list of concrete examples that seem safe to discuss, stressing the importance of maintaining a balance between openness and conscientiousness. It's worth noting that reasonable people disagree about the degree of caution with which to approach info hazards.

Original text:
 https://docs.google.com/document/d/1d8269g3b-_GeNAPwxGZ8vqWuCzw7F1a5dwHdrxXH4xw/edit?usp=sharing

Author(s):
 Chris Bakerlee and Tessa Alexanian